Chapter II: Part 2

From amongst these numerous shelters, two have been preserved: the first at the South of the Bridge-rail of Dixmude, is situated in the centre of the bend formed by the Yser in front of the town. The second was used as a fighting post for the commander of the company entrusted to defend the portion of the embankment, situated in front of the Handzaeme Canal. That particular point was specially momentous and to be watched, because it meant there to forbid the inroad in our lines of the Germans troops, which, under the cover of the Handzaeme canal banks, could, mounted on little boats berthed at Dixmude, try a landing on the West bank of the river Yser.

15.—The Flour-Mill of Dixmude.

How can one recall the battle of Dixmude without having before one’s eyes the vision of the flour-mill rising far above the ruins of the little Flemish town? One saw it in spite of oneself; in fact nearly always one felt its presence. During the four years of trench warfare it was the vigilant eye watch of the enemy. An eye with a look of fire and iron. An eye which had the command over powerful artillery, over numerous minenwerfers, and even over simple snipers who coldly struck down the imprudent and foolhardy ones who ventured to brave it, very often without being aware of it.

At the beginning of the war, a legend ran that the massif construction of the corn-mill was built by the Germans. The authorised opinion of E. Hosten in his book entitled _the Agony of Dixmude_ gives the lie to this assertion in the following terms: “It is quite evident at the present day that the platform of the huge cube of cement which formed the corn-mill of Dixmude was not erected on the shore of the Yser, solely to receive heavy German artillery which from that matchless observatory could have overlooked and swept-away all the surroundings”.

During the tragic days of the battle of the Yser (from the 17^{th} to the 31^{st} of October 1914) the bridge-head, created round Dixmude was preserved in spite of the many furious assaults of the enemy. It was the witness each day, each hour even, of incredible and superhuman tenacity and endurance on the part of the Belgian and French troops. Those brave soldiers were commanded by energetic, resolute and iron willed chiefs, whose fame has long classed them among the most accomplished men of the war. Let us suffice to mention the celebrated and famous names of Ronarch, Meiser and Jacques.

DIXMUDE.—The flour-mill (La minoterie) in 1916.
]

DIXMUDE. The flour-mill (La minoterie) in 1917.
]

The corn-mill, in this position acted the double part of observatory and shelter for the defensive reserves. An observer connected with Colonel De Vleeschouwer, who was in command of the Belgian artillery in front of Dixmude, could, while placed on the platform of the building, direct the firing on all telling points, such as batteries of the enemy in action, troops on the march, preparations for attacks, etc....

The enemy did not allow our artillery such an advantage for long; the corn-mill was partly taken by the German batteries, which took great pleasure in directing blazing fires on that colossal building. The observer was forced to abandon his post, but nevertheless not without the satisfaction of having registered to the best advantage and conditions the first fires of our artillery.

The corn-mill, from that time, was simply utilized as the nest for the reserves of the bridge-head. A company, to which a platoon was sometimes added, composed its garrison.

⁂

The night of the 25^{th} to the 26^{th} of October 1914 was marked, in the resistance of Dixmude, by a unique and singular incident.

In the evening of the 25^{th}, groups of Germans had managed to creep into the intervening spaces of the trenches, situated between the railway line of Zarren and the road leading to Eessen, trenches which were guarded by troops physically exhausted, whose lines were considerably weakened by ten days of cruel and outrageous fighting. These groups of enemies formed themselves up again inside our lines. The night was as black as ink, and unfortunately the guns on the road of Eessen were jammed.

As soon as Lieutenant Simon of the 12^{th} line was informed of the incident by one of his men, he immediately directed an intensive fire on the Germans, putting a great number out of the field. The others reformed on the road. They were about three hundred. Headed by the Major and accompanied by an enervating music of fifes, they penetrated in the town, firing on all lited points, such as fighting posts, shelters for troops, relief posts, killing and capturing on their passage all small and isolated groups of French and Belgian soldiers who were taken prisoners and forced to march in front to serve as shields.

Thanks to this infamous trick the German column arrived without incident as far as the bridge road. The latter was crossed by the allied soldiers followed up by the Germans, the Major included. The machine-gunners of the bridge only perceived their mistake when a hundred pick helmets had already passed over. They then opened a muzzle to muzzle fire on the rest of the column which went whirling over and was scattered in the town, leaving numerous dead and wounded on the pavement.

In the meanwhile the troops of the bridge-head were living the most thrilling moments of the battle. Nevertheless though much unnerved, they were maintained at their post, thanks to the marvelous calm and heroical energy of the officers who examined and rectified the occupation of the trenches.

And then, what an unutterable relief to the troops and their chiefs when they heard the guns firing on the bridge road proclaiming loudly that the line of the Yser still held good and that it had not been taken unawares!

Till dawn, the front of the bridge-head had to face at the same time, the positions of the enemy, and the town. It was not necessary. The Germans who had crossed the bridge, marched on at random. At a little distance at the East of the halt at Caeskerke, they soon ran up against a company of the 12^{th} of the line in reserve. (The C. P. of the admiral was composed of a group of cyclist carabiniers re-enforced by their runners). Without fighting the enemy detachment turned South across the fields, and fell, without knowing, on our batteries and would have surprised them without help when fortunately the detachment was taken between the fires of several groups of French and Belgian soldiers and was encircled without difficulty. Not quick enough though, to prevent the said detachment of committing the most abominable crime: the massacre without mercy and without distinction of their prisoners.

Taken prisoners in their turn, the Germans could have been judged according to the regulations and an avalanche of shot would have sufficed to have stretched them out. But we were struggling for the Right; brought before Admiral Ronarch, he decided to have executed militarily the Germans who had shown themselves the most cruel in the massacre; three amongst these, recognized by the Belgian doctor Van der Ghinst, who had been taken prisoner during the night, and had escaped by miracle, were shot on the spot, the others were sent to the back.

As for the part of the German column which had not been able to cross the bridge, this was taken under the fires of the guns, and was, as we have already said, dispersed in all directions, endeavouring to seek refuge in the houses at Dixmude. The reserve garrisoned in the flour mill, awaken by the noise of the fighting and being at once acquainted with the situation, remained in place, ready to intervene.

The Germans, who tempted to take refuge in the corn-mill were shot down without ceremony, and at daylight patrols were sent in the town to search the houses, and arrest all those who were hidden there. The nightmare was ended, and confidence revived more than ever.

This trick of the Germans, which might have figured in their war annals, as a glorious page, simply lengthened the list of their crimes. On the other hand, it set of more than ever the admirable qualities of the French and Belgian armies: the confidence of the troops in their chiefs, their character and above all their generosity perhaps somewhat exaggerated when addressed to individuals deformed by a barbarous “Kultur”.

The action of the bridge-head ended with the battle of the Yser, the 1^{st} of November 1914; anyhow for reasons purely moral, it was still kept there. The occupying troops were reduced.

The defensive artillery was also reduced in too large proportions owing to the reason that a great quantity of pieces had been disabled, moreover the munitions were deficient. Many empty ammunition limbers could not be replenished, already for several days the wants surpassed the means of supply.

The days of the 9^{th} and 10^{th} of November 1914 marked out the agony of Dixmude which began by a general bombardment of great violence, to which our twenty guns of 7c5, with only the aid of a few heavy french guns, could but attempt a retaliation.

The 3^d battalion of the 1^{st} line regiment and two battalions of Singalese kept the bridge-head.

The 10^{th}, about 7 o’clock, a first German assault failed before our lines, to the great astonishment of the enemy who was convinced that he had annihilated all our defences.

His plan of attack had to be completely altered. The XXII^{th} army corps of reserve was charged with this mission. Three convergent columns took the South and East sectors as though in pincers. The artillery carried on an infernal fire, casting and sowing death in the trenches, in the town and on all accessible roads to our reserves.

The South sector resisted, the East one also, but unfortunately a portion of the trench, situated between the railway line and the road, and only guarded by the dead and wounded could no longer keep back the enemy who rushed the position and took it back handed. Then began a most terrific fight, the memory of which makes the ancients shudder. It was a serie of hand to hand fights, individual fights with the bayonet in the streets, in the houses, in the trenches, leaving on the ground at every step, the blood of the vanquisher as well as the vanquished.

Unfortunately the admiral disposes of no reserves at hand. He cannot untrim the bank of the Yser which will have to face the attack if continued, and endeavour to bar the crossing of the river.

And that is why under the pressure of numbers and after several hours of bloody struggle, the defenders of the bridge-head were forced to concentrate themselves in the corn-mill and in the trench preceding it. During several hours it is a resistance, where the resolute and determined courage of a few men, held the head to a numerous enemy which was struck down in heaps.

In the meantime, the bridging company had placed a foot bridge across the Yser at the western side of the corn-mill thus permitting the last defenders of Dixmude to cross the river, sheltered from the front fires of the infantry.

All our men re-entered the corn-mill. The order for the general retreat arrived. It was four o’clock p. m.

With heavy hearts, those brave troops who had fought like lions and who were determined to the last sacrifice leave their fortress of one day cast a last look on the smoking ruins of the town, on the corn-mill, which in its turn begins to burn (the fire was set during the defence by a french soldier), send a last and pious thought to all the gallant heroes who have just bravely fallen for their country, and the river is crossed.

Twenty-two officers and a large number of soldiers were missing at the roll call on the left bank.

The German attack attempts again the passage of the Yser, but it is annihilated. The artillery thunders, all the time, but the infantry holds, and will hold till the end.

Thus were the last spasms of the battle of the Yser, and the trench warfare begins.

⁂

The Germans occupied Dixmude and the corn-mill. Our first line was staked out on the West of the Yser. From one end to the other, positions were organized, fortified and armed according to the constant progress of the science of the new war, which transformed the sectors into real fortresses, whose smallest corners hid instruments of death.

The corn-mill did not escape German organization. Strong, it was already, but it was rendered undestroyable. The walls were used as lock ups for tons of concrete in the midst of which were disposed a series of shelters and posts of observation, which had nothing to fear even from the most enormous projectiles.

The corn-mill was a source of great suffering to our troops, not only by the watchmen, but by the minenwerfers that it sheltered. Our artillery made many desperate attempts to attack it. It only managed to round its cubic forms and to pulverize certain points of its bulk, but that was all.

⁂

During the Franco-British offensive from August to October 1917, our staff thought, at a certain moment to be able to extend on our front the progression of the Allies. It was at the time of the long artillery preparations. Our batteries, re-enforced by numerous guns of heavy calibre of the allied armies, executed a systematic hammering on the enemy’s front, which after a few days enabled us to believe that the works of the enemy had been absolutely and thoroughly annihilated.

It was decided to ascertain and see the state of the upheaval. Consequently raids were undertaken on all the beaten front. They were a great success, except at the flour-mill.

On the nights of the 28^{th} to 29^{th} of October, on the 3^d and 4^{th} of November 1917, detachments of the 5^{th} and 6^{th} of the line regiment crossed the Yser with magnificent spirit. The South and North trenches of the flour-mill were cleaned out without great difficulty, but when the detailed group attacked the flour-mill, there was a reaction, and a painful one which cost the life to many a brave man, a reaction which proved once more, the power of inactive and inert substance against which courage is nothing. Through their invisible loop holes and under the thick armour of their shelters immersed in concrete, the few occupants of the flour-mill soon overpowered the will and determination of our troops, who were forced to retreat taking away with them their dead and wounded.

The Franco-British offensive could not be continued for several reasons, and our army resumed the life of the trenches which still lasted another year.

At last there was the liberating offensive.

The rapid progress of our troops forced the enemy to abandon Dixmude. Our soldiers entered there the 29^{th} of September 1918 and settled there till the 15^{th} of October, date of the second rush forward.

The town was nothing but a heap of ruins and the flour-mill a grey shapeless mass, which will perpetuate the remembrance of this long war and the numerous heroes fallen there under its blows.

17.—Albert and Elisabeth Redoubts.

18.—The Joconde’s dwelling.

19.—Battalion commander’s Headquarters (all between kilom. 19 and 20 of
Yser river, left bank).

The fighting posts and shelters established after the battle of the Yser, in the ruins of the small buildings along the embankment, saw little by little their walls relined with a strong interior casing of concrete, and their lost roofs, replaced by thick concrete layers also. The house of the Joconde (so called, because of the good old proprietress, Mieke Bœuf, who during long weeks of trench warfare still occupied it and who became quite legendary with our soldiers), served as a lodging to the Commander of the company at the bridge-head, till a better appropriated shelter was built. It was occupied after, by the men of the Royal engineers, who were charged to keep in good order, the foot bridges giving access to the bridge-head.

The next house to the one of the Joconde’s served as C. P. to the major on guard.

After the organization of the bridge-head (see notice n^o 20), an allround plan fortifying the sector was elaborated. They foresaw the construction of little forts or redoubts with a distance of 600 meters between each and utilizing the embankment as a parapet and the Yser as obstacle.

It was with the redoubts Albert and Elisabeth that they began. They were finished in December 1915. The reason of their existence, was to protect the bridge-head against enfilading fire; but that was not the only part they played. These two redoubts completed and formed with the part of the embankment which bound them together a kind of curtain which had to hold good, whatever happened.

The system and assemblage of fires which shot out from the numerous loop holes and “embrasures” of their shelters for machine-guns and rifles gave them an enormous capacity of resistance.

The redoubts Albert and Elisabeth were the work of the engineers of 2^d army division.

20.—The Bridge-Head at kilometer 19.500 (Right Bank).

When the Belgian front was stabilized (November 1914), it was in part covered by floods, before which our posts soon became powerful main-guards.

Two well distinctive floods had been spread; the first during the battle of the Yser, was extended between the river and the railway line Nieuport-Dixmude having the paved road Oostkerke kilometer 16 of the Yser as Southern limit; the second, subsequent to the fall of Dixmude was created at the request of the French troops from the 14^{th} of November 1914. All the land situated at the East of the Yser, between the Houtensluisvaart and the road embankment of Knocke to Drie Grachten was flooded (this was realised, thanks to the great difference of water level of the two river-banks. The one on the right bank being inferior to the one on the left).

Between the kilometer 16 of the Yser and Houtensluisvaart the obstacle of water did not exist. The enemy, at Dixmude occupied the right bank of the Yser, which alone separated the adversary lines. At the South of the railway line of Dixmude to Zarren, the German positions followed a course almost parallel to the road of Woumen, comprising the strongly organized points such as the cemetery of Dixmude, the Castle of kilometer 19 and several farms. Our troops continued to follow the left bank of the river.

After the victory of the Yser, the constant idea of our staff was to reconquer the most ground possible. The Belgian army built on all practicable spots; posts of various degrees of importance, and this principle was applied to the sector of Nieucappelle on a very large scale.

It was decided to establish on the right bank of the Yser, at the South of Dixmude, towards kilometer 19, to the close contact of the enemy a bridge-head which would be afterwards widened, in order to create a starting position to permit our army to take and offensive. It was Major Panhuys who was charged with this perilous operation, with a group composed of his own battalion (the 1^{st} battalion of the 2^d foot jagers), re-enforced with a company of machine-gunners and a company of cyclists. It was important to take the enemy unawares. All was put in action to that end, each one having his definite mission to accomplish. During the night of the 21^{st} to the 22^d of December 1914, a night cold and dark, the group crossed the river in two places and managed to instal itself on a position uniting the little wood of the peninsula of kilometer 19.500 with a bend to the North, facing the cemetery of Dixmude. The enemy being taken by surprise, could not till dawn offer an efficient resistance: but already our troops had organized the ground and maintained their positions in spite of firing, counter-attacks and severe bombardments.

Bridge-head of kilometer 19.500 of the river Yser in June 1915.
]

The heroïc group, who had performed the operation with such valour and spirit, was mentioned in despatches by decision of the H. M. the King.

It was of the utmost importance to strengthen the occupation, but there could be no question of working by day, the enemy holding the watch and sway over the land, and especially over the knoll of Woumen (castle of kilometer 19). So our troops were kept to the task without respite.

Afterwards the extension of the bridge-head to the South, for months saw added to the companies on guard, picket companies and detachments of pioneers, nightly erecting parapets and communication trenches, building shelters, casting footbridges over muddy ground, covering the positions with wire netting work, regulating the current of the waters at Sparken and Waalevaardeken by locks and dams, multiplying and rebuilding the footbridges on the river etc., in a word executing the thousand and one labours required by an advanced position to render it strong and powerful, durable if not comfortable and give to the troops of the principal resisting position real and positive security.

Then, arose the question of progressing towards the East and towards the North. The works of extension were commenced, but it was soon realised what a great effort and incessant sacrifice such an enterprise would demand, that about Mai 1915 the bridge-head was brought back to its former line. During the course of the war, the evolution of fighting methods altered and likewise the mission of the advanced positions and the effective forces of the garrisons which held them. For this reason, when the bridge-head of kilometer 19.500 was created, and which had to resist to the utmost, it required more than one battalion to guard it; and in 1918, a few posts of section or squad sufficed, the mission of the advanced ones having simply become at this place, for watching purposes in case of a defensive, or kick off in the case of an offensive.

To give one an exact idea of the enormous effort that the bridge-head of the kilometer 19 cost, one needed to see the development and extension it had taken in May 1915 and be equally penetrated with the idea, that all the work had been done at the price of heavy losses, although it had been done by night, under the bullets and shrapnells, in bad weather and often with reduced means. This bridge-head contributed greatly to maintain an offensive spirit in the minds of the infantrymen, it served also as a base to many patrols towards the enemy’s organizations and notably to a famous raid on the castle of kilometer 19 on the night of the 28^{th} to the 29^{th} of October 1917, which was a brilliant success, led by Captain Dendal, who brought back materials and prisoners.

Several times the Germans tried to rush the bridge-head of kilometer 19, but without any result whatever.

And then during the offensive of September 1918, it served as a starting trench to the troops of the Belgian 4^{th} division, for the victorious assault which ended by the liberation of Dixmude.

21.—Observation-post near the Church of Clercken.

Clercken Ridge was very precious to the enemy to whom it gave the opportunity to establish a lot of natural observation-posts which had not the vulnerability of the confined kite balloons and which assured more stability to the observation. Many of these posts were destroyed during the war, especially by the destructive fires which preceded the great offensive in Flanders on the 28^{th} of September 1918. Others, such as the mill of Clercken, are already rebuilt, so offer no longer any historical interest.

German observation-post near the church of Clercken.

Sketch showing the directions of the villages seen from this
observation-post.
]

However the one which is situated near the church of Clercken, and still exists in the same state as when abandoned by the Germans (see sketch), shows how easily the enemy could see into our lines, in spite of all the efforts made by the Belgian Army to counteract their observations, such as: diverse dissimulations, plantations of all kinds, artificial masks in linen, sandbags, reeds and straw, etc....

22.—“Grand-Père” concrete dug-out.

23.—“Castel Britannia”.

24.—Hoekske.

The southern part of the Belgian front may be classed as one of the most agitated sectors of the Western front. The short communications of the press which announced in their brief laconic style: “Bombing actions at het Sas and at Steenstraat; duel of artillery in the region of Noordschote”, said nothing of the horror of certain days of guard where the blood marked the ground of trenches, a hundred times turned over and as many times reestablished and always defended by our heroical troops. Drie Grachten, le Passeur, Steenstraat, Merckem, all these names resound, like as many bugle calls proclaiming the heroism of our soldiers and the glory of our arms.

It was in July-October 1917 that the Franco-British offensive gave us back, in that region, a corner of Belgian land. A few Belgian units participated on the 27^{th} of October to the last assault which drove the enemy back beyond Luyghem, Kippe, Aschoop and reached, on the right, the outskirts of Houthulst forest. The effort had to be followed up, our troops had to extend to the North of Dixmude, the progression of the Allies; our artillery preparation was ended, the Belgian army only waited for the signal!

But a run of unfavourable circumstances: the russian defection, the Caporetto incidents and the continual rain obliged the allies’ chief staff to suspend the offensive. One had to be resigned and wait, but it was a great deception to the Belgian soldier.

The 11^{th} of November 1917, the 4^{th} army division relieved a French division at Merckem. The state of the field after the battle, is depicted in the following extract from the order of the division commander dated the 14^{th} of November. “In order to avoid, during the relieves, the sinking of the men in the excavations which are hollowed out all over the track, it is advised to gather the men in groups of five, holding one to one another with a rope and thus lending each other mutual help.”

Nineteen hundred and seventeen was, in fact, the year of offensives with long artillery preparations, which transformed the battle fields into masterpieces of devastation. The soil ploughed up by thousands of projectiles formed a vast field of hollows, filled with water by the autumn rains. Nothing else was seen in this desolate landscape but a few cut down trunks of trees and the monstrous concretes of the Germans, which were sometimes demolished and overturned.

However, it was absolutely necessary to remain on the chaotic ground. The positions had to be established strong enough to repulse the counter-attacks. At first it was only a system of shell holes surrounded by blocks of concrete which had been deserted by the enemy. It was a dreadful hard winter for the 4^{th} army division. When the engineers and infantrymen at the price of terrible labour, had repaired and rebuilt the roads and tracks which facilitated and rendered possible the relieves, the rational and defensive organization of the sector was undertaken. Successive lines showed themselves, and were bound between by intermediate lines and a well organized plan of defence was able to be applied.

The “Grand-Père” (Grand-father) concrete dug-out, the remains of which have been preserved, was one of the posts best known among of the advanced positions of Merckem. It formed a rather prominent salient which was always a temptation to the enemy and provoked him to many sudden attacks, generally preceded by violent artillery fires demolishing all the surroundings.

The 4^{th} army division managed to repulse two attempts and that at two days’ interval: one on the night 26–27 and the other 28–29 of November 1917. They were more like trials on the part of the enemy to stake out our advanced positions.

During the occupation of the sector by the 3^d army division, the raids became real attacks to reconquer the “Grand-father”. The 15^{th} of February 1918, the enemy was thrown back in his own lines; but on the 7^{th} of March, he managed to take a footing and bring machine-guns in the concrete shelter, from where our counter-attacks drove him out on the evening of the 8^{th}.

It was decided then, to rectify the advanced line by suppressing the salient of the grand-father, and also the one, constituted by three little posts of Aschoop, which also was subjected to the enemy’s fires.

The last german raid on the “Grand-father” was on the 27^{th} of March 1918, which hastened the decision, taken on the 29^{th} of the same month, to abandon after destruction the salients of the Grand-father and Aschoop.

The “Grand-father” was again occupied by our troops the 9^{th} of September 1918 after the taking of the german position of Kwaebeek brook. A centre of resistance was established there and was occupied till the offensive of the 28^{th} of September 1918.

The name of _Castel Britannia_ was given to the place occupied by the enemy’s batteries which oppressed up till 1917 our positions of the sector of Steenstraat. Thick concrete masses protected them. They served under the Belgian occupation as observation-posts and battle posts.

The cross road of _Hoekske_ is situated at the crossing of Steenstraat to Dixmude road with the road of Merckem. It marks nearly the centre of the subsector which bears its name, and is celebrated by the numerous bombardments it has been subjected to. Heavy pieces of german artillery have been sunk in its vicinity.

These three sites are destined to perpetuate the remembrance of the defence of Merckem sector, organized by the 4^{th} army division at the price of the greatest difficulties during the winter of 1917, and brilliantly defended by the 3^d army division in April 1918, and the gallant fields of action of the 1^{st} army division at the time preceding the offensive of the 28^{th} of September. These sites will remain it that region, the witnesses of the _battle of Merckem_, which was fought the 17^{th} of April 1918 in the neighbourhood of Kippe near Langemark, and where the 3^d army division, under general Jacques, and the 4^{th} army division, under general Michel, were covered with glory.

The Germans, who were in immediate contact with the 3^d army division at Kippe, made a sudden and abrupt irruption in the lines of this division and advanced up to the front of the Merckem and Hoekske trenches, where they were stopped.

Brilliant and heroical counter-attacks cleverly upheld by the artillery, drove them back disabled in their positions.

On the side of the 4^{th} army division, the enemy, who, before approaching the front had to descend the slope at the North-East-bank of the Broenbeek and although vigorously welcomed by infantry and artillery fires, managed to push through a corner between the main-guards of Champaubert and Montmirail, whose wings were turned over to form a hook. Held in that way, the efforts of the Germans to open the breach further were vain. Crushed by violent musketry fires and the precise firing of the artillery, the enemy could not hold the positions reached and had to retire.

The battle of Merckem which had not procured to the Germans one atom of land, nor advantage, cost them many dead and wounded, eight hundred prisoners and the loss of numerous material, which was left in the hands of the 3^d army division. The order of Leopold was granted to the 9^{th} regiment of the line and to the 1^{st} jagers.

The inscription of “Merckem” on the regimental Colours of the 3^d army division, and on those of the 13^{th} and 19^{th} of the line (4^{th} army division) and also on the shields of the guns, rewarded the bravery of the troops who won the battle.

As regards the moral point of view, the victory of the 17^{th} of April in which our regiments had overthrown whole divisions of enemies, revealed to the General Staff, the offensive worth and power of our army and gave to it the full due, of its conscientiousness and strength and the ardent desire to go forward.

From the 17^{th} of April, our soldiers at Merckem felt themselves masters of the sector. Patrols and audacious raids were undertaken, sometimes on Kloostermolen, sometimes on the trenches of the Kwaebeek position or on the Little-son and on Italy, Portugal and Epernon farms.

The numerous prisoners brought back from these expeditions supplied our Staff with informations, which were the more interesting because, at that time, the allied armies had begun to drive back the enemy from the French front.

At last, on the 9^{th} of September, at dawn, a brilliant attack was executed without great loss by the 3^d line regiment. The position of Kwaebeek, entirely taken, was organized, and, when a few days later, the enemy who had recovered, attempted with the aid of great reinforcement to drive back our troops in their former lines, the success was of short duration, for the enemy had to let go.

It was from the position of Kwaebeek, that the 1st Infantry division, started the 28^{th} of September 1918 to the signal for the great liberating offensive.

25.—The big german gun of Leugenboom at Couckelaere near Moere.

Not having succeeded, in spite of their brutal effort and the use of asphyxiating gas, which till then had never been made use of, to pierce the front at Steenstraat, in April 1915, the Germans who had foreseen every thing, began to bombard Dunkirk, this permitted to their press to hide the check, to cry out loudly “Victory, our artillery is bombarding Dunkirk”.

A marine gun of 380 mm. installed in a public house called “In het Predikboom” (kilometer 12^{th}, road Dixmude-Poelcappelle) had just started, to execute its first shot. That was on the 26^{th} of April 1915.

A powerful counter-battery action was soon organized and proved a success. Twice the gun was disabled, the first time for a period of forty two days and the second time for forty eight. The 9^{th} of August 1915 registered its last shot.

Nevertheless the counter-battery maintained its firing in order to prevent the Germans rebuilding the place and arming it.

In October 1916, an extraordinary activity was shown at the former emplacement of Predikboom. Numerous and deliberate firings were executed by the counter-batteries; and one might well ask if this German activity was not a new dodge. Another place, in fact was being built at Leugenboom (3200 meters to the North of Couckelaere).

The emplacement of Leugenboom was noted for the first time the 7^{th} of May 1917 by Captain Jaumotte while making one of his aerial reconnoitrings. He took a photograph of it, which clearly showed the advanced state of the works, the switch line, grafted on a point to a normal gauge, thus forming the junction at Eerneghem, to the state railway line Ostend-Thourout.

Without a doubt the firing on Dunkirk was going to begin again.

The Belgian artillery staff, started at once a plan of action against that urgent threat. The said staff obtained of the 36^{th} French army corps, which was operating on the Belgian front the aid of two guns of A. L. V. F. (artillerie lourde sur voie ferrée, i. e. Heavy railway battery) two magnificent naval guns of 305 (12 inch.).

These two pieces will be the soul of the counter-battery, they will be upheld in their action by a special group of numerous heavy batteries which will make opposition on all german batteries opening fire on the two heavy guns.

The plan was prepared, but to realise it, important and preliminary works had to be executed, which took five days after Captain Jaumotte’s reconnoitring.

These works consisted thus: first of all, the building of firing emplacements for the heavy artillery; establishing many telephone connections, needed since the creation of the special group, connections which had to perform not only the centralisation of the command, but also a perfect understanding between the director of the firing, the batteries and the observation-posts and the cross registering section, as well as the creation of antennas to receive the messages of aerial observations.

The railway battalion, pushed on after three days of splendid and extraordinary efforts, the works sufficiently far to render the point of Eggewaertscappelle capable of bearing the firing of the heavy guns. The group of telegraphists and telephonists accomplished at the same time, grand and important works of liaison, which altogether constituted the tool of the firing director.

A firing program was elaborated, a program which led the action on Leugenboom and on the Tirpitz battery (see site n^o 4) at the same time. The firing on the Tirpitz was assured by two heavy guns of 305 in position on the point of Coxyde-Bains.

The 13^{th} of May, the two heavy guns of 305 were brought to the place of firing which had been chosen—the switch-point of Eggewaertscappelle—and a nice clear day was waited to open action. That beautiful day was longed for right up to the 20^{th} of May 1917.

The execution of the genuine program was preceded by an independant firing directed on the German observation-post installed in the belfry of Eessen, with a 240 (10 inch.) gun in position at the East of Burg Molen, upheld by the special group. The tower was partially demolished.

About 11 o’clock, the heavy guns of 305 of Eggewaertscappelle fired their first shot on Leugenboom, while the gun of Burg Molen continued its demolishing and blinding work on the enemy’s observation-post. A little while after the guns of Coxyde-Bains entered in action in their turn against Tirpitz battery. The observation of these firings were both terrestrial and aerial.

The firing program was continued the following days when the weather was favourable for observation.

On the 25^{th} of May, an aerial photograph of Leugenboom position was taken. It did not disclose the least damage to the concrete block, but its clearness sufficiently noted the gun carriage not yet armed, in the centre of the honeycomb which formed the platform.

In order to parry, as might be the case, to a more accurate enemy counter-battery, the railway battalion built or layed out sucessively several sites for heavy artillery firing. It is so, that two sites on the switch point of Eggewaertscappelle, a third at the station of Moerhoek and a fourth on the point of Isenberghe, served as reserve, and were occupied in turns.

The Leugenboom heavy gun entered in action the 27^{th} of June 1917. Between 5 and 10 o’clock, it bombarded Malo-on-sea and Dunkirk. This first action made numerous victims. The shells were of 380 mm.

One shell, amongst others, the first, it is thought, fell on the Casino of Malo, where the general staff of the XV^{th} British army corps was established: it made twenty four victims, eleven dead and thirteen wounded.

In July 1917, there were several bombardments to be noted on different objectives: Furnes, Dunkirk, Coxyde, Forthem and Alveringhem.

The bombardments of Dunkirk, threatening to become very frequent, alarmed the authorities, and it was decided from the 19^{th} of July 1917 to create two direct telephone lines at different courses which would join Dunkirk to the Pervyse railway station observation-post, which was particularly well situated.

The starting shots of Leugenboom, heard at the railway station at Pervyse, were in that way instantly communicated to Dunkirk, where the reception posts gave the alert to the town by powerful horns and other alarm engines, thus permitting the population to take refuge in the concrete shelters specially built for that purpose.

In spite of the well studied counter-battery, the Leugenboom gun still continued firing. The lulls, which lasted often long time, gave the hope that a positive result had been obtained. Then after a lapse of one and sometimes two months, the rage of the Germans revived and Dunkirk was again subjected to further attacks.

In 1918, bombardments were very frequent. At certain times, they became even daily, but Dunkirk was not always the objective. In May and notably in June, the firing of Leugenboom was directed on Klein-Leysele and the 27^{th} of September 1918 on Bergues.

The offensive of Flanders, at last lights up. But the enraged Germans will hold on till the last minute.

It is only on the 16^{th} of October at 20 minutes to three that the heavy cannon of Leugenboom is for ever silenced. In its last spasms of agony it dealt terrible blows to the localities situated behind the front of attack.

At last on the 17^{th} of October the monster of Leugenboom belongs to us. Our troops neared it, and, passing by it, threw a slightly haughtly look, but certainly encouraged by their grand trophy. Pressed by our soldiers, the Germans had hastily attempted to put their cannon out of action. It was loaded and levelled horizontally, and so it remains to the present day. In that position they hoped that the projectile would touch the concrete mass before being entirely shot out of the tube, and that its bursting would blow up the flight. But their anticipations were not realised; the projectile, instead of being stopped by the mass of concrete, passed through it, making a breach and burst about 800 meters further.

It was a Krupp marine gun of 380 mm. (15 inch), type 1914, n^o 154, of a total length of 17 m. 13 placed on a gun carriage, formed by two formidable tanks, tap rooted in the centre of a concrete pit. This pit has a special shape because, of the conditions the constructors imposed themselves to give it a field of fire of 157°, the axis of which passes by Dunkirk.

The total weight of the piece is 77630 kilos.

The breech has an outer diameter of one meter, the manœuvre is electrical but there exists handles for hand manœuvring. The artillery men were entirely protected by a cabin joined to the gun carriage, built in strong sheet of iron of a thickness of about 50 mm.

The cannon fired a projectile of 750 kilogrammes.

The two heavy guns of Predikboom and Leugenboom subjected Dunkirk to thirty two bombardments, the four hundred and eleven 15 inches shells of which killed one hundred and fourteen persons and wounded one hundred and eighty five.

COUCKELAERE.—Heavy 15 inch gun at Leugenboom.
]

CAESKERKE.—Arched communication trench and light railway line (1916).
]

LIST OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SKETCHES

Pages.

H. M. THE KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM 3

CAESKERKE: Arched communication Trench and light railway line
(1916) 71

CLERCKEN: Sketch of the German Observation-post 59

COUCKELAERE: Heavy 15 inch German gun at Leugenboom 70

DIXMUDE: Their Majesties the King and Queen in the “Death
Trench” (June 1^{st} 1917) 32

DIXMUDE: Their Majesties the King and Queen at the “Rider’s
work” (June 1^{st} 1917) 32

DIXMUDE: The flour-mill. La minoterie (1916) 45

„ The flour-mill. La minoterie (1917) 46

„ Aerial photo (May 26^{th} 1917) 31

„ Sketch of the “Death Trench” and of the “Rider’s work” 35

DIXMUDE: Sketch of the Bridge-head at kil. 19.500 of Yser river 56

KNOCKE ON SEA: German battery Wilhelm II 17

NIEUPORT: Aerial photo of the Main Redan (August 10^{th} 1918) 18

OUD-STUYVEKENSKERKE: The Tower (November 1914) 28

„ The Tower (February 1917) 28

PERVYSE: The inundation facing the railway station (September
1916) 27

ZEEBRUGGE: Sketch showing the blocking of the harbour 13

IMPRIMERIE DU MINISTÈRE
DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE
BRUXELLES
B 10,002.—3000 ex.

CHAMP DE BATAILLE DE L’YSER—SLAGVELD AAN DEN IJZER—BATTLEFIELD OF THE
YSER.
]

------------------------------------------------------------------------

PUBLICATIONS

=issued by the=

BELGIAN WAR SITES DEPARTMENT

(English translation of the French text, written by the Army General
Staff).

Booklet N^r 1: General View on the operations of the Belgian Army,
1914–1918, including one map and 14 illustrations.

=PRICE: 1 fr. 75 (net).=

Booklet N^r 2: Notices on the outlasting war sites, including one map,
four sketches and 13 illustrations.

=PRICE: 1 fr. 75 (net).=

These publications have appeared in French, Flemish and English.

N^r 3: Ordnance Survey map of the Yser sector scale 1/200.000.

=PRICE: 1 fr. 25 (net).=

For orders, application to be made to the

“_Directeur des Sites de Guerre
Hôtel de Ville_

_Knocke-sur-Mer._”

These publications are also sold at the _Touring Club de Belgique_, 44,
rue de la Loi, Brussels.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

Page Changed from Changed to

12 propeller got entangled in the propeller got entangled in the
nests of the defences, rendering nets of the defences, rendering

12a It was while these manœuvres It was while these manœuvres
were one, that Lieutenant were on, that Lieutenant

22 fight last the whole night long fight lasted the whole night
and after the most bloody long and after the most bloody

23 English battery composed of two English battery composed of two
9 inches 2, guns. That 9.2 inches, guns. That

26 war guarded by two main guards was guarded by two main guards
i. e. Rijkenhoek and i. e. Rijkenhoek and

30 rendered waterproof by means of rendered waterproof by means of
tared board, while a tarred board, while a

39 But the month of may with its But the month of may with its
had and bloody days the men had hard and bloody days the men had
to content to contend

43 banks, could, mounted on little banks, could, mounted on little
boats birthed at Dixmude boats berthed at Dixmude

60 at Steenstraat; duel of at Steenstraat; duel of
artillery in the region of artillery in the region of
Noordschote Noordschote

69 to give it a field of tire of to give it a field of fire of
157°, the axis of which 157°, the axis of which

● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained. ● Used numbers for footnotes. ● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. ● Enclosed bold font in =equals=. ● The caret (^) serves as a superscript indicator, applicable to individual characters (like 2^d) and even entire phrases (like 1^{st}).