Ocean Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post

Chapter XXI: Section I: ) (1)

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_Collins Line, 3 steamers, 9,727 tons._

Adriatic, 4,144-74/95 tons: Atlantic, 2,849-66/99 tons: Baltic, 2,733-1/95 tons.

_Havre Line, 2 steamers, 4,548 tons._

Arago, 2,240 tons: Fulton, 2,308 tons.

_Vanderbilt Bremen Line, 3 steamers, 6,523 tons._

North Star, 1,867-60/95 tons: Ariel, 1,295-28/95 tons: Vanderbilt[H], 3,360-54/95 tons.

[H] Independent, running between New-York, Southampton, and Havre, in connection with the Bremen steamers.

_United States Mail Steamship Company, 6 steamers, 8,544 tons._

Illinois, 2,123-65/95 tons: Empire City, 1,751-21/95 tons: Philadelphia, 1,238-1/95 tons: Granada, 1,058-90/95 tons: Moses Taylor, 1,200 tons: Star of the West, chartered, 1,172-1/95, (contracting for a new ship.)

_Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 13 steamers, 16,421 tons._

Golden Gate, 2,067-35/95 tons: Golden Age, 2,280 tons: J. L. Stephens, 2,189 tons: Sonora, 1,616 tons: St. Louis, 1,621 tons: Panama, 1,087-31/95 tons: California, 1,085-64/95 tons: Oregon, 1,099-9/95 tons: Columbia, 777-34/95 tons: Republic, 850 tons: Northerner, 1,010 tons: Fremont, 576 tons: Tobago, 189 tons.

_Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana, 1 steamer_, the Isabel, 1,115 tons.

_New-Orleans and Mexico, 1 steamer_, the Tennessee, 1,149-1/2 tons.

The Coasting Service has 8 lines, and 23 steamers, of 24,071 tons registered tonnage.

_New-York, Havana, and New-Orleans_, 2. The Black Warrior, 1,556-1/95 tons: Cahawba, 1,643-1/95 tons = 3,199 tons.

_New-York, Havana, and Mobile_, 1. The Quaker City, 1,428-3/95 tons.

_New-York and Savannah_, 4. Alabama, 1,261-13/95 tons; Florida, 1,261-13/95 tons: Augusta, 1,310-61/95 tons; Star of the South, (propeller,) 960-1/95 tons = 4,793 tons.

_New-York and Charleston_, 4. Columbia, 1,347 tons: Nashville, 1,220 tons: James Adger, 1,151 tons; Marion, 962 tons = 4,680 tons.

_New-York and Virginia_, 2. Roanoke, 1,071 tons: Jamestown, 1,300 tons = 2,371 tons.

_Philadelphia and Savannah_, 2. Key Stone State and State of Georgia, each about 1,300 tons = 2,600 tons.

_Boston and Baltimore_, 2. Joseph Whitney, 800 tons: Unknown, 800 tons = 1,600 tons.

_New-Orleans and Texas._ The Charles Morgan, Texas, Mexico, and Atlantic, averaging 600 tons each=2,400 tons.

_New-Orleans and Key West._ The General Rusk, 600 tons, and the Calhoun, 400 tons = 1,000 tons.

There are also several propellers running: between New-York and Charleston, New-York and Portland, and between Philadelphia and the South. They are all, however, small, and irregular in their trade. The Calhoun is not a regular steamship.

Steamers lying up, 18. Registered tonnage, 24,845 tons.

Queen of the Pacific, 2,801-92/95 tons.
Washington, 1,640-71/91 tons.
Prometheus, 1,207-61/95 tons.
St. Louis, 1,621-14/45 tons.
Brother Jonathan, 1,359-52/95 tons.
Oregon, 1,004-89/95 tons.
Southerner, 900 tons.
Herman, 1,734-45/95 tons.
Northern Light, 1,747-91/95 tons.
Uncle Sam, 1,433-44/95 tons.
California, 1,058 tons.
Northerner, 1,012 tons.
Ericsson, 1,902-1/95 tons.
Star of the West, 1,172-33/95 tons.
Daniel Webster, 1,035 tons.
Orizaba, 1,450-62/95 tons.
Panama, 1,087 tons.
Fremont, 576 tons.

The registered tonnage of these vessels was furnished me by Mr. S. P. Ingraham, of the New-York Custom-House.

PAPER B.

The following paper, prepared by Mr. Pliny Miles from the reports to which we have alluded, presents the British steam mail service in full detail.

"The following tabular statement gives the particulars of the
ocean mail service of Great Britain, now carried on almost
exclusively by steamships. The numbers in the margin, running from
1 to 15, will point out the different lines in the recapitulation
at the close.

The following are the names of the steamers in service in each
line, with the amount of tonnage, the horse power of each, the
draught of water, the number of the officers and crew attached to
each one, and, when it could be obtained, the date that each
vessel was surveyed and approved for the service. Where the date
of survey of a vessel is unknown, it is placed as near as possible
with others surveyed at the same time, the vessels in each line
being arranged in chronological order:

1. LIVERPOOL AND ISLE OF MAN.

Draft of
Horse Water. Date of
Name, Class, etc. Power. Tonnage. F. I. Crew. Survey
----------------------+------+--------+--------+-----+------------
King Orry, 190 429 0 0 22 Dec., 1845
Tynwald, iron, 260 657 8 9 29 Oct., 1846
Benmy Chree, 130 295 6 6 18 June, 1847
Mona's Queen, iron, 220 508 8 6 22 M'ch, 1853
====== ======== =====
Total, 4 vessels, 790 2,089 91

2. ENGLAND AND IRELAND.

Prince Arthur, iron, 220 418 8 8 26 July, 1852
Llewellyn, iron, 342 654 9 6 29 Oct., 1852
Eblana, iron, 372 685 8 11 31 Jan., 1853
St. Columba, iron, 350 650 8 10 29 Sept., 1853
====== ======== =====
Total, 4 vessels, 1,284 2,407 115

3. SCOTLAND AND SHETLAND.

Fairy, 120 350 -- 18 --
Duke of Richmond, 180 500 -- 24 --
====== ======== =====
Total, 2 vessels, 300 850 42

4. ENGLAND, SPAIN, AND GIBRALTAR.

Sultan, iron, 420 1,001 14 0 67 Jan., 1853
Madrid, iron, 133 448 10 2 40 Feb., 1853
Tagus, 280 691 14 8 41 Jan., 1854
Alhambra, 140 642 13 7 52 July, 1855
====== ======== =====
Total, 4 vessels, 973 2,782 200

5. MEDITERRANEAN, INDIA, AND CHINA.

Lady Mary Wood, 270 619 0 0 40 Feb., 1842
Precursor, 520 1,783 18 0 121 July, 1844
Pekin, iron, 415 1,003 14 0 78 Jan., 1847
Oriental, 420 1,427 13 0 78 M'ch, 1848
Achilles, 430 823 16 0 59 June, 1849
Malta, iron, 460 1,222 0 0 82 Sept., 1848
Hindostan, 500 1,595 16 10 53 July, 1849
Singapore, iron, 465 1,189 12 6 96 M'ch, 1851
Ganges, iron, 465 1,189 14 7 69 June, 1851
Pottinger, iron, 450 1,275 17 6 82 April, 1852
Formosa, screw, iron, 177 658 13 6 60 Aug., 1852
Chusan, screw, iron, 100 765 11 3 45 Aug., 1852
Haddington, iron, 450 1,303 17 7 105 Nov., 1852
Vectis, 400 900 0 0 51 --
Shanghae, screw, iron, 90 825 0 0 60 --
Manila, 60 646 0 0 60 --
Bentinck, 520 1,973 19 3 83 Nov., 1852
Euxine, iron, 430 1,071 15 6 72 Jan., 1853
Bengal, screw, 465 2,185 17 6 115 Feb., 1853
Valetta, 400 984 12 2 51 July, 1853
Norna, screw, 230 1,040 0 0 80 Nov., 1853
Colombo, screw, 450 1,808 0 0 118 Dec., 1853
Ripon, iron, 445 1,400 14 9 94 Dec., 1853
Douro, screw, 230 903 13 3 63 Dec., 1853
Bombay, 280 1,240 0 0 84 --
Madras, 288 1,217 0 0 82 --
Indus, iron, 450 1,302 17 9 88 Jan., 1854
Candia, screw, iron, 450 2,212 18 9 115 June, 1854
Nubia, 450 2,095 21 0 122 -- 1855
Pera, screw, iron, 450 2,013 19 0 129 Jan., 1856
Ava, screw, iron, 320 1,372 17 0 94 Feb., 1856
Alma, screw, iron, 450 2,164 20 0 124 M'ch, 1856
Aden, screw, iron, 210 507 18 9 40 Aug., 1856
Delta, screw, 210 985 0 0 64 -- 1856
Delhi, screw, 450 2,400 0 0 125 -- 1856
Unknown, 4 vessels.
====== ======== =====
Total, 39 vessels, 12,850 46,053 2,877

6. ENGLAND AND UNITED STATES.

Europa, 650 1,777 15 6 88 July, 1848
Canada, 680 1,774 19 6 88 Nov., 1848
Niagara, 630 1,774 19 6 88 Dec., 1849
America, 630 1,729 15 3 88 Jan., 1850
Asia, 800 2,073 19 0 105 May, 1850
Africa, 800 2,050 0 0 105 Oct., 1850
Arabia, 870 2,328 16 7 105 Dec., 1852
Persia, 858 3,587 21 0 165 Feb., 1856
====== ======== =====
Total, 8 vessels, 5,918 17,092 922

7. NORTH AMERICA, (Colonial.)

Merlin, 120 451 0 0 26 May, 1850
Delta, screw, iron, 180 700 12 10 34 June, 1852
====== ======== =====
Total, 2 vessels, 300 1,151 60

8. WEST-INDIES, MEXICO, AND SOUTH-AMERICA.

Dee, 410 1,269 18 0 87 May, 1846
Trent, 450 1,293 17 7 87 April, 1848
Eagle, 263 496 11 10 57 July, 1849
Derwent, 280 708 15 0 66 July, 1850
Magdalena, 760 2,250 19 0 108 May, 1852
Medway, 420 1,305 17 6 72 May, 1852
La Plata, 939 2,404 21 10 114 Aug., 1852
Conway, 270 827 12 10 55 Sept., 1852
Orinoco, 800 2,245 20 11 108 Oct., 1852
Avon, 450 2,069 17 0 94 M'ch, 1853
Teviot, 450 1,258 18 1 97 April, 1853
Parana, 800 2,222 21 2 120 May, 1853
Clyde, 430 1,335 19 1 87 June, 1853
Thames, 413 1,285 18 3 72 Aug., 1853
Solent, 420 1,805 14 11 88 Oct., 1853
Camilia, iron, 213 640 9 0 34 Oct., 1853
Wye, screw, iron, 180 818 14 0 45 Feb., 1854
Atrato, iron, 758 2,906 20 6 127 M'ch, 1854
Tamar, 400 1,873 18 7 93 June, 1854
Prince, 200 446 8 8 35 July, 1854
====== ======== =====
Total, 20 vessels, 9,306 29,454 1,667

9. ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM.

Alliance, 120 300 7 3 16 --
Vivid, 120 300 7 0 16 --
Violet, 120 300 7 0 16 --
Empress, 100 308 6 6 16 --
Queen, 100 307 6 6 16 --
Ondine, 80 250 6 0 16 --
====== ======== =====
Total, 6 vessels, 640 1,765 96

10. CHANNEL ISLANDS.

Atalanta, 120 240 8 4 21 Oct., 1846
Wonder, iron, 150 449 0 0 22 Feb., 1853
Courier, iron, 184 440 7 0 18 April, 1853
Dispatch, iron, 183 443 7 6 22 Aug., 1853
Express, iron, 160 380 7 4 24 Nov., 1853
====== ======== =====
Total, 5 vessels, 797 1,852 107

11. WEST COAST OR SOUTH-AMERICA.

New-Granada, iron, 210 600 13 0 41 Nov., 1846
Bolivia, iron, 252 705 0 0 41 Oct., 1849
Inca, iron, 370 549 13 0 55 Aug., 1851
Lima, iron, 370 1,122 10 8 55 Nov., 1851
Bogota, iron, 394 1,122 13 6 61 April, 1852
Valdivia, screw, iron, 480 782 13 2 41 Nov., 1853
Valparaiso, iron, 320 839 13 6 84 --
====== ======== =====
Total, 7 vessels, 2,396 5,719 377

12. SCOTLAND AND ORKNEY.

(Unknown,) 60 250 6 0 16 --

13. WEST COAST OF AFRICA.

Hope, iron, 120 833 15 0 46 --
Charity, iron, 120 1,007 15 6 52 --
Ethiope, 120 674 0 0 42 --
Candace, 120 900 0 0 46 --
Retriever, 120 900 0 0 46 --
Niger, 120 900 0 0 46 --
Gambia, 130 637 14 0 42 --
====== ======== =====
Total, 7 vessels 850 5,951 320

14. SOUTH-AMERICA, MAURITIUS, AND CALCUTTA.

Five screw steamers,
Total, 5 vessels, 2,000 8,000 -- 570 --

15. ENGLAND AND AUSTRALIA.

Oneida, 400 1,600 15 6 84 --
Simla, 630 2,510 17 2 88 --
European, 530 2,200 18 9 115 --
Columbian, 530 2,300 17 6 120 --
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 --
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 --
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 --
====== ======== =====
Total, 7 vessels, 3,290 13,410 671

RECAPITULATION.

KEY:
A: Lines.
B: Number of steamers.
C: Horse Power.
D: Tonnage.
E: Number of men.
F: Service commenced.
G: How often.
H: Annual Compensation.

------+----+--------+--------+-------+------+-----------+-------------
A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H
------+----+--------+--------+-------+------+-----------+-------------
1 | 4 | 790 | 2,089 | 91 | 1833 | 2 a week | $4,250
2 | 4 | 1,284 | 2,408 | 115 | 1850 | 2 a day | 125,000
3 | 2 | 300 | 850 | 42 | 1840 | 1 a week | 6,000
4 | 4 | 973 | 2,782 | 200 | 1852 | 3 a month | 102,500
5 | 35 | 12,850 | 46,053 | 2,877 | 1853 | 2 a month | 1,121,500
6 | 9 | 6,418 | 18,406 | 922 | 1850 | 1 a week | 866,700
7 | 2 | 300 | 1,151 | 60 | 1854 | 1 a month | 73,500
8 | 20 | 9,308 | 29,454 | 1,667 | 1851 | 3 a month | 1,350,000
9 | 6 | 640 | 1,765 | 96 | 1854 | 1 a day | 77,500
10 | 5 | 797 | 1,852 | 107 | 1848 | 3 a week | 20,000
11 | 7 | 2,396 | 5,719 | 378 | 1852 | 2 a month | 125,000
12 | 1 | 60 | 250 | 16 | 1856 | 1 a day | 6,500
13 | 7 | 850 | 5,951 | 320 | 1852 | 1 a month | 106,250
14 | 5 | 2,000 | 8,000 | 575 | 1856 | 1 a month | 205,000
15 | 7 | 3,290 | 13,410 | 671 | 1857 | 1 a month | 925,000
|====|========|========|=======| | |=============
Total, 121 | 42,254 |140,139 | 8,137 | | |$5,114,700[I]
-----------+--------+--------+-------+------+-----------+-------------

[I] There are some lines not here noticed, which swell the sum to
$5,333,985.--T. R.

PAPER C.

PROJET OF FRANCO-AMERICAN NAVIGATION.

Mr. Wm. Iselin, of Havre, kindly furnished me the following:

"The French Government has offered the following contracts:

"Havre to New-York, 26 voyages a year, fr.3,100,000, or $620,000.

"Bordeaux to Rio Janeiro, touching at Lisbon, Goree, Bahia, or
Pernambuco, and a branch line from Rio Janeiro to Montevideo and
Buenos Ayres, 24 voyages a year, fr.4,700,000, or $940,000. The
Government now requires 13 departures from Bordeaux and 13 from
Marseilles at the same price.

"Nantes to St. Thomas, thence to Guadalupe, and thence to
Martinique, with the following branch lines:

"No. 1. St. Thomas to St. Martha or Carthagena, and thence to
Aspinwall.

"No. 2. St. Thomas to Porto Rico, thence to Havana, Vera Cruz, and
Tampico.

"No. 3. From Martinique to Cayenne.

"The subvention offered is fr.6,200,000, or $1,400,000.

"The total amount of subvention offered for the 3 lines is
therefore 14 millions of francs per annum, or $2,800,000.

"The Messageries Imperiales have given a tender for the Brazil
lines.

"William Iselin of Havre, in connection with Mr. Calley St. Paul,
for the Havre and New-York line; the necessary capital of
$3,200,000 is subscribed; their intention is to have a weekly
departure from Havre to New-York, by making the fortnightly
departures of the French boats alternate with American Havre and
Bremen boats.

"For the line from Nantes to the West-Indies the Company Gautier
is said to have given a tender; but it is doubtful if they can
make up their capital."

The _Messageries Imperiales_ is one of the largest and strongest companies in all Europe. They have the following different lines: the Italian, the Constantinople direct, the Levant, the Egyptian, the Syrian, that of the Archipelago, the Anatolia, the Thessalian, the Danubian, the Trebizond, the Algiers, the Oran, and the Tunis lines, and forty-seven sea-steamers. They have already obtained the Brazilian service.

Mr. Iselin and others have proposed for the United States line, and will doubtless get it.

The Company Gautier may not get the West-India service, it is said. They had the line from Havre to New-York, with the steamers Alma, Cadis, Barcelona, Franc-Contois, Vigo, and the Lyonnaise, and without subvention. They found it impossible to run it without subsidy, and hence, sought a new home for their steamers. They attempted to run from Havre to New-Orleans; but this again failed, after four voyages. They had also the 1,800 ton ether ships, "Francois Arago," and "Jacquart," which broke down. These ether engines were built on the principle of De Tremblay; but the Company are now substituting steam for the ether engines. Thus, the experience of this Company proves two important positions which I have taken; that ocean mail steamers can not run on their receipts, and that many of the gazetted improvements on steam propulsion and the ordinary methods are valueless.

The _Compagnie Gautier_ have a contract with Spain, for semi-monthly voyages between Cadiz and Havana, and receive $25,000 per round voyage for each steamer. They are all English built, iron vessels, of about 1,800 tons each. Lyons is the home of the Company.

PAPER D.

STEAM LINES BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA.

COLLINS, steamers Adriatic, Atlantic, and Baltic; (running:)

HAVRE, steamers Arago, and Fulton; "

BREMEN, steamers North Star, and Ariel; "

HAVRE, _in connection with the Bremen_. Steamer Vanderbilt; (laid up:)

CUNARD, steamers Persia, Arabia, Asia, Africa, Canada, America, Niagara, and Europa; (running:)

CUNARD, screw-steamers Etna, Jura, Emue, Lebanon, and Cambria, (side-wheel; all running:)

GLASGOW, screw-steamers Glasgow, Edinburgh, and New-York; (running:)

BREMEN, steamer Ericsson; run temporarily by Mr. Sands; (laid up:)

LIVERPOOL AND PORTLAND, screw-steamers Khersonese and Circassian, General Williams and Antelope; the two latter about 1,500 each, running _via_ St. John's, N. F., the two former chartered for the East-Indies:

LONDON AND MONTREAL, screw-steamers; (names not known:)

LIVERPOOL AND QUEBEC, screw-steamers; " " "

LIVERPOOL AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers City of Manchester, City of Baltimore, City of Washington, and Kangaroo, (running;) (line ran to Philadelphia and was withdrawn:)

HAMBURG AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Borussia and Hammonia; building two more steamers, each 2,000 tons, in the Clyde, for same line; (running:)

ANTWERP AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Belgique, Constitution, Leopold I., Duc de Brabant, and Congress. _Taken off and chartered to British Government for transporting troops. Names altered:_

LONDON, CORK AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Minna and Brenda; (laid up:)

HAVRE AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Barcelona, Jacquart, Alma, and Francois Arago, _withdrawn, and running from Spain to Cuba_. (_See Paper C._)

BREMEN AND NEW-YORK. The North Dutch Lloyds are building four screw-steamers in the Clyde, of near 3,000 each, to run between Bremen and New-York:

THE CONTINENT, SOUTHAMPTON AND NEW-YORK. Croskey's lino consists of the following screws, of about 2,300 tons each: the Argo, Calcutta, Queen of the South, Lady Jocelyn, Hydaspes, Indiana, Jason, and Golden Fleece. (_Most of these steamers have been withdrawn from the route, and five of them are chartered for troops for India._)

PAPER E.

The following numerous extracts from the Senate Reports of 1850 and 1852, and also from the letter of Judge Collamer, then Post Master General, as well as from a letter by the Hon. Edwin Croswell, will present in detail a strong corroboration of the views which I have taken in the preceding Sections. I copy first from the Report of 1852. The Committee was composed of Hon. Thomas J. Rusk, Chairman, and Messrs. Soule, Hamlin, Upham, and Morton. The Report says:

"Your Committee desire to have it understood at the outset, that,
regarding the ocean mail service as the offspring of the wants of
all of the producing classes of the country, they have not felt at
liberty to consider the propositions which have been presented to
them, in any other point of view than as connected with and
subservient to the general policy of the government, which
embraces alike every section of the country, and can not know nor
recognize any personal or local influence.

"The system of ocean steam navigation was adopted by the
Government for the joint purpose of extending and advancing the
commercial and other great interests of the country, and, at the
same time, providing a marine force which might be easily made
available for the protection of American rights, in the event of a
collision with foreign powers. The attainment of this double
object was the motive which, in the opinion of Congress, justified
the advance of public funds in aid of private enterprise,
inasmuch as it was calculated to insure to the country the
acquisition of a powerful means of maritime defense, with little
or no expense, eventually, as the money so advanced was to be
reimbursed in money or in mail service at the option of the
parties concerned, while commerce and the arts would be promoted
during the time of peace.

"At the time when this system was commenced, the ocean mails along
our whole Southern coast were in the hands of foreign carriers,
sustained and encouraged by the British Government, under the
forms of contracts to carry the British mails; while the Cunard
line between Liverpool and Boston, _via_ Halifax, constituted the
only medium of regular steam mail communication between the United
States and Europe. In this way the commercial interests of the
United States were, on the one hand, entirely at the mercy of
British steamers which plied along our Southern coast, entering
our ports at pleasure, and thereby acquiring an intimate knowledge
of the soundings and other peculiarities of our harbors--a
knowledge which might prove infinitely injurious to us in the
event of a war with Great Britain; and on the other, of a foreign
line of ocean mail steamers, which, under the liberal patronage of
the British Government, monopolized the steam mail postage and
freights between the two countries. Under such a state of things,
it became necessary to choose whether American commerce should
continue to be thus tributary to British maritime supremacy, or an
American medium of communication should be established through the
intervention of the Federal Government, in the form of advances of
pecuniary means in aid of individual enterprise. It had been found
to be impossible for our merchants to contend successfully, single
handed, against the joint efforts of the British Government and
British commercial influence. Our noble lines of packet ships
which had far outstripped the sailing vessels of all other
nations, in point of beauty and swiftness, had been superseded by
the introduction of steamers, the power and capacity of which
recommended them, as the best means of inter-communication by
mail, and of transportation for lighter and more profitable
freights, and American interests were becoming every day more and
more tributary to British ascendency on the ocean.

"Under the circumstances above stated, it was impossible for
Congress to hesitate for a moment which course to pursue, and it
was determined to adopt a policy which, while it would be in
strict accordance with the spirit of our free institutions, should
place the country in its proper attitude, and render its commerce
and postal arrangements independent of all foreign or rival
agencies.

"Of the correctness of this determination, experience has
furnished the most ample evidences in the results which thus far
have attended the prosecution of the system. The line between
New-York and Chagres _via_ New-Orleans and its auxiliaries, have,
by their superiority in point of swiftness and accommodation,
already superseded the British steamers which had previously plied
along our Southern maritime frontier, and the United States mails
for Mexico, South-America, and our possessions on the Pacific are
no longer in the hands of foreign carriers, but are transported in
American steamers of the first class, convertible, at a very small
expense, into war steamers, should occasion require, which have
commanded the admiration of the world by their fleetness and the
elegance of their accommodations for the travelling public. Our
Southern ports are, consequently, no longer frequented by British
steamers, commanded by officers of the British crown, whose
legitimate business it is to collect intelligence respecting the
approaches to and defenses of the harbors which they visit, to be
made available for their own purposes, in the event of the
existence of hostile relations.

"A similar result has, to a certain extent, attended the
establishment of the American, or Collins line, between New-York
and Liverpool. Previously to the commencement of this line, the
transportation of the United States mail matter, as well as the
finer and more destructible descriptions of merchandise, requiring
rapidity of transmission to and from Europe, had been monopolized
by the British Cunard line; and the British Government had, within
the short space of six years, from the postage on this route
alone, derived a _clear income_ of no less than five million two
hundred and eighty thousand eight hundred dollars, after deducting
the amount paid to the concern under the contract to carry the
mails.

"Since the establishment of the Collins line, notwithstanding the
combined efforts of the British Government and commercial
interests to confine their freights and postages to the Cunard
line, the revenue to the Post Office Department of the United
States has amounted to several hundreds of thousands of dollars
per annum, whilst a large proportion of the money for freights has
been received by American citizens. The effects of this measure
have, it is true, thus far been but partial, because the trips of
this line have been but twice a month, while those of its rival
have, for a considerable portion of the time been weekly. During
the intervals between the trips of the American line, the postages
and freights must, of necessity, enure to the advantage of the
British, and, consequently, the evil referred to has been but
partially remedied."

Speaking of the large steamers built, the Report says:

"It is not to be supposed that engines of such vast dimensions
could have been constructed in a country where there were, as yet,
no workshops adapted to the purpose and where labor is very high,
as cheaply as in a country where every appliance of the kind
already existed and where the prices of labor are proverbially
low. Nor can it be reasonably imagined that vessels of this
description could have been navigated on as good terms, by men
taken from this country, where there was little or no competition
in this peculiar branch of maritime service, as by those who were
easily to be found in a country in which the density of population
and consequent competition for employment, caused the wages to be
small.

"An attempt seems to have been made, in certain quarters, to
create an impression that the aid heretofore extended by the
Government to the individuals engaged under contracts to carry the
ocean mail, has been induced by feelings of personal friendship,
on the part of members of Congress. Such is not the case. The
friends of the system of ocean mail steam navigation, have, so far
as your Committee are advised, considered this important subject
as a matter of great national concern and independently of the
very secondary motive of individual interest. The question
presented to their minds has not been whether A, B, or C should
have a privilege extended to him, but whether the commerce,
manufactures, and agriculture of the country would be benefited by
the performance of a public service through the instrumentality of
individual enterprise, under proper conditions and restrictions.
As matters stood at the period when the system was adopted, Great
Britain was exerting herself, successfully, to make the United
States, in common with the rest of the world, tributary to her
maritime supremacy. She possessed the monopoly of steam connection
between the United States and Europe, the West-Indies and
South-America. There was not a letter sent by ocean steam
conveyance, in these quarters, which did not pay its tribute to
the British crown, and not a passenger nor parcel of merchandise
transported, by the agency of steam, upon the ocean, which did not
furnish profit to the British capitalist. Great Britain asserted
her right to be the 'queen of the ocean,' and, as such, she levied
her imposts upon the industry and intelligence of all of the
nations that frequented that highway of the world.

"In this condition of affairs, the law instituting the system of
American ocean mail steam transportation in its present form was
enacted, as the best, if not the only means of correcting a great
evil, and, at the same time, building up a naval force which
should be available for national defense in the event of a war.
The system so instituted was deemed to be not only calculated to
draw forth and reward the enterprise of American citizens, but it
avoided the difficulty of keeping upon hand, in time of peace, a
large and, for the moment at least, useless military marine, which
could only be preserved in a condition for effective service by a
vast annual outlay of the public money.

"_It was right and proper, then, in the opinion of your
Committee, that these ocean steam facilities should exist, through
the intervention of the Government, more especially as they were,
in all probability, beyond the reach of private means._

"The transportation of the ocean mails, with the greatest possible
advantage to the important interests of the country at large, is
an object of paramount importance; but which, however desirable,
can only be effected at great expense. It is a matter of
comparatively small moment at what precise time this expense is to
be paid, provided that the end in view can be attained with
certainty. The temporary loan of a part of the means required,
under proper securities for reimbursement, appears to be the
readiest mode by which the purpose can be effected. How is this
security to be acquired? Simply, by taking due care that the funds
advanced shall be faithfully and honestly applied to the object
for which they are intended, and then holding a lien upon the
ships, for the construction of which they are appropriated, in
such a manner as to insure the reimbursement of the sums advanced
in the form of mail service or money; or, should circumstances
require, of ships suitable for national purposes, as war steamers.
This has been done. In all cases the contractors for the
transportation of the ocean mails, have been required to cause
their ships to be built and equipped under the immediate
superintendence of experienced naval officers and under the
direction of naval constructors, appointed by the Government, in
such manner as to be convertible, at the smallest possible
expense, into war steamers of the first class.

"Nor has experience caused any regret, on the part of the friends
of the system, further than that in some cases, owing to the
increase in the tonnage and power of the ships and other
circumstances, the expenses incurred by the contractors have
outrun the receipts, and they have incurred heavy losses, which
might even prove ruinous, if they were forced to sell the property
acquired in this form. It should always be borne in mind, however,
that in these cases, the increase of expenditure thus incurred has
been caused by a laudable ambition on the part of the proprietors
of these lines to do even more than they were required to do under
their contracts, with a view to secure the confidence of the
Government and the public. It should also be remembered that in
thus increasing the cost and consequent value of their ships,
these companies have enlarged the security of the Government for
the money loaned, and promoted the safety and comfort of
passengers. It has, in no instance, been charged that the
companies referred to have, in any way, misapplied the aid
extended to them, or given to it an improper direction. The
products of their expenditures, even admitting them to have been
greater than they might have been, show for themselves, in placing
the American steam mail service, as far as it has gone, at the
head of all others, in point of accommodation, elegance, strength,
and swiftness. Nor is this all. The establishment of these lines
is not to be regarded merely with reference to the immediate
profits arising from the system, in connection with the
transportation of the mails. Millions of money have been saved to
American citizens, which, in the absence of these ocean steam
lines, would have gone to fill foreign coffers. The Committee will
refer to one fact in illustration of the truth of this
proposition. Before the Collins line was established, the Cunard
line was receiving L7 10_s_ sterling per ton for freights; at
present (1852) the rate is about L4 sterling. By whom were these
L7 10_s_ sterling paid? By the _American consumer_, in most
instances, upon articles of _British manufacture brought to this
country by a British line_. At present the American consumer pays
but L4 sterling per ton; and, presuming that the American merchant
makes his importations in the American line, this freight is paid
to our own people and goes to swell the sum of our national
wealth. Thus, it will be seen that, formerly, the American
consumer paid _very nearly twice as much for the service_, and
enriched the British capitalist; whereas, at present, he not only
saves _one half of the former cost of freight to himself_ but, in
paying the remaining half, benefits his fellow citizen, who in
return aids in consuming perhaps the very merchandise which he has
imported.

"Under these circumstances, can any reasonable man doubt the
propriety, even in a pecuniary point of view, of sustaining the
present system, which, at its very commencement, has given such
ample proofs of its usefulness? Your Committee think not, and do
not hesitate to give it as their opinion that, _merely as a matter
of dollars and cents_, the service in question should be liberally
sustained by Congress, and will in the end make ample returns.

"But your Committee regard this proposition as one, the mere money
feature of which is of minor consequence, when brought into
comparison with other more important considerations. The question
is no longer whether certain individuals shall be saved from loss
or enabled to make fortunes, but whether the _American_ shall
succumb to the British lines, and Great Britain be again permitted
to monopolize ocean mail steam transportation, not only between
Europe and America, but throughout the world. We are aspiring to
the first place among the nations of the earth, in a commercial
point of view--a place which belongs to us as a matter of
right--and are we to suffer ourselves to be overcome by British
commercial capitalists under the auspices of the British crown?
Shall it be said that, at the very moment when our steamships are
admitted to excel those of any other people on the face of the
globe, our enterprising citizens have been forced to relinquish
the proud position they have attained, for the want of a few
thousands of dollars, when the national treasury is full to
overflowing? Let this end be attained and our great commercial
rival will have postages and freights all her own way, while we
shall be compelled to contribute, as heretofore, to her undisputed
supremacy.

"With a view to a full and fair understanding of this important
subject, your Committee have communicated, through their Chairman,
with the Executive Departments of the Government and the
presidents of the various companies engaged in carrying the ocean
mail by steam, and will now proceed to lay before the Senate the
results of their careful inquiries. It may not be improper here
again to note, by way of illustration, the benefits to be derived
from ocean steam mail transportation, when in successful
operation, as manifested in the case of the British Cunard line,
under the auspices of the British Government. During the first six
years of its existence, the line above named received from the
Government no less than $2,550,000, while the Government received
from the Company, in the form of postages, the enormous sum of
$7,836,800, or $5,826,800 net revenue.

"The Government has paid to the line, (the Collins,) for mail
service, in the two years, $770,000, and has received from the
line $513,546.80. If the receipts be deducted from the outlay, the
balance against the Government is $256,453.20 for the whole time,
or $128,226.60 per annum.

"Thus it appears, that from a fair statement of the account
current between the line and the Government, the latter is out of
pocket, at the end of the two first years of the undertaking and
under circumstances the most disadvantageous to the line,
$256,453.20, or in other words, has paid $128,226.60 per annum,
for carrying the ocean mail by steam over about six thousand miles
of the greatest commercial thoroughfare in the world, for which,
as yet, it has received nothing in return. But your Committee
would ask, what has _the country_ received in return for this
$256,453.20? They will furnish the answer. The country has
received through the proprietors of this line, in the form of
freights and passage money, a no less amount than $1,979,760.85,
in cash; and, if the reduction in the prices of freight formerly
paid to the British line be taken into account, nearly as much
more, by saving the difference in freights and passage money, to
say nothing of the general advantages derived by all of our
producing interests from the existence of this American line,
which, as your Committee believe, are incalculable. The money
account will then stand as follows: Government debtor to
$256,453.80; Country creditor to $1,979,760.85 _in cash_; and if
the former be deducted from the latter, the balance in favor of
the country will stand $1,723,307.05, _in cash alone_, leaving out
of view the duties on increased importations caused by the
establishment of the American line."

Speaking of the Pacific Mail Steam Company, the Report says:

"It will be seen from the above, that the total cost of the six
vessels which have been accepted by the officers whose duty it was
to supervise them and decide whether they had been built in
accordance with the requisitions of the law and terms of the
contract, and whose decision is presumed, by your Committee, to be
conclusive in the premises, has been $1,555,069, and that their
aggregate tonnage is 7,365 tons, instead of 5,200 tons, the amount
agreed for. In addition to these ships, as your Committee are
informed, the company has in the Pacific seven steamers, with an
aggregate tonnage of five thousand tons, not yet accepted by the
Government. The additional steamers are, and have been, always
kept ready to replace the mail steamers in the event of detention.
The cost of these additional steamers has been, it is stated,
about two thirds of that of the accepted steamers of the same
class, say about $1,036,712, making in all an outlay for
steamships alone, of $2,518,337.

"It appears that the whole number of passengers, of all classes,
transported by the Pacific Mail Ship Company, the line in
question, previously to December 31, 1851, from Panama northward,
has been 17,016, and from Oregon southward, 13,332. The prices of
passage have constantly fluctuated, but, on the date above named,
the 31st of December, 1851, the average rates were, for the first
cabin, two hundred and twenty-two dollars; second cabin, one
hundred and sixty dollars, and steerage, one hundred and seven
dollars, between Panama and San Francisco. In the early stages of
emigration the prices were increased in consequence of the
enormous prices of labor and supplies on that comparatively
unsettled coast, but were subsequently reduced. At the
commencement of the undertaking, the Company incurred, of
necessity, vast expenses in the selection of proper harbors for
taking in provisions, water, coal, etc., and in the construction
of _depots_; and even at present, coal and supplies of every
description are sent to the Pacific _via_ Cape Horn, a distance of
from thirteen thousand to fifteen thousand miles.

"The freights from Panama northward, have been small in amount,
and confined to the lighter descriptions of articles sent by
express, while the mails have been very large, amounting in some
instances to one hundred and fifty bags, each, and, together with
coal, water, etc., occupying all of the space not required for
passengers. From California, the freights southward, have
consisted of treasure, amounting, it is supposed, to the value of
seventy millions of dollars, but it is extremely difficult to
compute the worth accurately, as a large portion of the gold,
etc., sent has been in the possession of passengers, and the value
does not appear in the manifests."

In noticing the Panama Railroad and the California lines, the Report says:

"Nearly two millions of dollars have already, as your Committee
are informed, been expended on this important work, by a company
possessed of ample means, and the completion of it can not fail to
open the way for a vast commerce, between the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans, and at the same time cause our fellow-citizens in
California and Oregon no longer to be regarded as exiles. This
road being once opened, the passage of the Isthmus, now so much
dreaded, will be effected with perfect ease and comfort in a
couple of hours, instead of two or three days, as at present, and
families, instead of individuals, will be enabled to seek homes in
the fertile valleys of our possessions on the Pacific coast. The
value of the lines of ocean steamers, of which your Committee have
been speaking, to the commercial and other great interests of our
country and the world at large, can not well be estimated until
this road shall have been finished and put into full operation.
When such shall be the case, the trade between California and
Oregon, as well as that of China and the islands of the Pacific
and Indian oceans and the Atlantic States and Europe, which now
passes around Cape Horn, a distance of some fifteen thousand
miles, will be enabled to take a direct course across the Isthmus
of Panama, the passage of which will require but two or three
hours. The United States mail, from San Francisco to New York, has
already been transported within the space of twenty-five days and
eighteen hours, a day less than the time claimed to have been
taken by any other route, at a period, too, when there were but
seven or eight miles of the road in operation. On a late occasion,
five hundred government troops were sent to California by this
route, and were placed at the point of their destination in a
little more than thirty-five days, without any serious desertion
or accident of any kind. A similar operation by the way of Cape
Horn would have occupied six months at least. The store-ship
Lexington, which sailed from New-York for San Francisco, during
the last year, arrived at the latter place on the last day of
February, 1852, after a passage of _seven months and one day_. In
a country the military establishment of which is so small as that
of the United States, facilities of concentrating troops at points
distant from each other, in a short time, are of incalculable
value, and may be said to add manifold to the efficiency of the
military force.

"From what has been already said, it will be seen that the Pacific
Mail Steamship Company, independently of the associate line on
this side of the Isthmus, and without taking into view the cost of
the railroad, has expended in the construction of mail steamers
alone $2,518,337; and if to this be added $2,606,440.45, the
expense incurred for a similar purpose by the Company on the
Atlantic side of the Isthmus, the entire cost of steamships, to
the two companies engaged in the transportation of the California
and Oregon mails, has been $5,124,777.

"It is no more than sheer justice that your Committee should state
that the California lines, east as well as west of the Isthmus of
Panama, have proved themselves worthy in all respects of the
confidence of the country. In no single instance has an accident
occurred involving loss of life or serious injury in any way to
the travelling public. Such is the strength of the vessels
employed, that on two several occasion when, owing to dense fogs
and under-currents, cooperating with the defectiveness of the
charts of the Pacific coast, one of the ships of the Aspinwall
line struck, at one time, upon a soft bottom, and, at another,
upon a hard sandy bar, she was steamed off, after thumping,
without the slightest injury whatever. Facts such as these are the
more important, inasmuch as several steamers have lately been lost
on the same coast with a great sacrifice of human life, evidently
owing to a want of the strength necessary to resist, effectually,
the force of the winds and waves. In the opinion of your
Committee, the security afforded to travellers by the strong
fastenings and heavy timbers of the ocean mail steamers, built as
they are, under the supervision of naval officers, who are
selected on account of their thorough acquaintance with and
experience in such matters, and made capable of sustaining heavy
armaments, is a matter of the greatest moment. Experience has
shown that, in the race after gain, our countrymen are, perhaps,
more regardless of risk to human life than the people of any other
country in the world. Scarcely a day passes without fresh
evidences of the truth of this proposition. The river, as well as
the sea-going steamers, are generally built with reference to
speed and lightness, coupled with smallness of draft of water, and
hence, in case of touching the ground, or of violent storms, it is
found that if one portion of the frame gives way, the breaking up
of the entire structure follows with a rapidity that is but too
well calculated to show the slight manner in which these vessels
are constructed. Your Committee think that the additional
expenditure of a few hundreds of thousands of dollars is a matter
not worthy of consideration, when brought into comparison with the
loss of life, and would rather see even millions devoted to the
construction of _strong steamers_, than witness the sudden and
heart-rending ruptures of the dearest ties of our nature, caused
by the accidents that so frequently occur. Such is their feeling
of stern disapprobation of the reckless indifference respecting
the safety of passengers, daily manifested by some of the
proprietors and officers of steam lines, that they are resolved,
so far at least as they are concerned, not in any way to
countenance, directly or indirectly, such a course of proceeding.
In the extension of the system of ocean mail transportation which
they propose to recommend, care will be taken, that the steamers
which carry the Government mails shall be regarded as national
ships, to a certain extent, and as such, under the charge of the
law-making power, and be so built as to secure safety to
travellers; and that, in all contracts, this consideration shall
be regarded as one of paramount importance."

Regarding a few sailing-ship owners in New-York and Boston, who had memorialized Congress against the Collins and other lines, the Report says:

"The memorialists are loud in their complaints respecting the
alleged improper interference of the Government with matters that
should be left, as they say, entirely to individual enterprise,
which in their opinion becomes paralyzed under the effects of
Government patronage bestowed upon some to the exclusion of
others. If the authors of this memorial will take a fair and
dispassionate view of the matter, they will, as your Committee
think, be convinced that they are wrong in their supposition, and
that the Government has not gratuitously meddled in concerns with
which it should have nothing to do. The merchants and ship-owners
referred to seem to forget, in the first place, that the system of
ocean steam mail navigation is intended to secure adequate
protection for our commerce from foreign aggression in the event
of war; and in the second, that it was instituted at a moment when
the fine packet ships, to which the memorialists refer with such
becoming pride, had in fact been driven from the ocean to a
certain extent by the overwhelming power of a British mail steam
line, sustained by the British Government, which had monopolized
ocean mail and passenger steam transportation, as well as the
freights of lighter and more perishable descriptions of
merchandise. If, as these gentlemen have stated, the sailing ships
have been made to succumb, it has been under the force of an
agency more certain and not less powerful than the one named by
them--wielded by foreign capitalists and directed by a foreign
government claiming for itself the supremacy of the ocean. The
Cunard line of ocean steamers had been in possession of a monopoly
of freights, letter postage, and passage money for years, in
despite of the attempts of the memorialists to resist,
successfully, before the Government of the United States, seeing
that American interests were made tributary to foreign capital,
aided by a foreign government, adopted the wise course of
correcting the evil by kindred means, and placing, at least, to a
certain extent, American interests under the auspices of American
intelligence and enterprise. What would have been the condition of
the New-York lines and other ships had not the Government of the
United States thought proper to extend its aid to the
establishment of the Collins line? Would it have been any better
than at present? or rather would it not have been infinitely
worse? Had the Cunard line continued to prosper, as it must have
done in the natural course of things, would it not in all
probability have increased its number of ships until it would have
monopolized every description of ocean transportation? Would not
the trade with the United States have been entirely carried on in
British steamers, navigated at small expense, and therefore able
to do the carrying trade at low prices? Again, what would have
been the condition of the Southern coasting business, so far as
mails, passengers, and light freights, at least, are concerned,
had the fourteen British steamers then employed been permitted to
operate, unchecked by the American line of mail steamers, between
New-York and Chagres? Would it not have been entirely at the mercy
of the commissioned agents of the British crown, who so well know
how to avail themselves of opportunities to promote their own
interests by advancing those of their government? To carry the
inquiry further, what would have been the condition of our
possessions on the Pacific coast, visited as they would have been
by British steamers--for where is the spot on the inhabited or
inhabitable globe to which they do not bear the union jack of old
England--had not the Aspinwall line been established? Such is the
universal pervasion of the money power in British hands, that at
present, as is well known, the Cunard line has extended a branch
to Havre, to transport goods to England almost free of cost, with
a view to appropriate to itself the freights from that quarter,
and thus not only crush the American line of steamers to Havre,
but be enabled to underbid the Collins line, and, if possible,
again monopolize the trade with the United States over that route.
Would all this have raised the prices of freights in American
sailing vessels, and given an advantage to the memorialists in
question, who had at one time monopolized to themselves the
freights, postage, and passage money in sailing ships? or would
not, on the contrary, such a state of things have operated so to
give a British tendency to trade everywhere, and to furnish
freights to British ships, at prices at which the American ship
owners could not afford to navigate their vessels?

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