Chapter XX: Introduction (5)

In the Grotto of Pausilippo, darkness continues to augment as we advance towards the interior; but when once we have passed the middle, day-light again appears at the other end and shows us the way; so also in this case: just at the point where the outwardly directed light of the understanding with its form of causality, gradually yielding to increasing darkness, had been reduced to a feeble, flickering glimmer, behold! we are met by a totally different light proceeding from quite another quarter, from our own inner self, through the chance circumstance, that we, the judges, happen here to be the very objects that are to be judged. The growing difficulty of the comprehension of the causal nexus, at first so clear, had now become so great for perception and for the understanding--the agent in it--that, in animal actions, the very existence of that nexus seemed almost doubtful and those actions appeared to be a sort of miracle. But, just at this point, the observer receives from his own inner self the direct information that the agent in them is the will--that very will, which he knows better and more intimately than anything that external perception can ever supply. This knowledge alone must be the philosopher's key to an insight into the heart of all those processes in unconscious Nature, concerning which causal explanation--although, here, to be sure, more satisfactory than in the processes last considered, and the clearer, the farther those processes were removed from these--nevertheless had still left an unknown _x_, and could never quite illumine the inside of the process, even in a body propelled by impact or attracted by gravity. This _x_ had continued expanding till finally, on the highest degrees of the scale, it had wholly repelled causal explanation. But then, just when the power of causal explanation had been reduced to a minimum, that _x_ revealed itself as _the will_--reminding us of Mephistopheles when, yielding to Faust's learned exorcisms, he steps forth out of the huge grown poodle whose kernel he was. In consequence of the considerations I have here set forth at length, we can surely hardly avoid recognising _the identity of this x_, even on the lowest degrees of the scale, where it was but faintly perceptible; then higher up, where it extended its obscurity more and more; and finally on the highest degrees, where it cast a shadow upon all things--till, at the very top, it reveals itself to our consciousness in our own phenomenal being, as _the will_. The two primarily different sources of our knowledge, that is to say the inward and the outward source, have to be connected together at this point by reflection. It is quite exclusively out of this connection that our comprehension of Nature, and of our own selves arises; but then the inner side of Nature is disclosed to our intellect, which by itself alone can never reach further than to the mere outside; and the mystery which philosophy has so long tried to solve, lies open before us. For then indeed we clearly see what the Real and the Ideal (the thing in itself and the phenomenon) properly are; and this settles the principal question which has engaged the attention of philosophers since Descartes: that is to say, the question as to the relation between these two, whose complete diversity Kant had shown most thoroughly and with unexampled depth, yet whose absolute identity was immediately afterwards proclaimed by humbugs on the credit of intellectual intuition. But if we decline to avail ourselves of this insight, which is really the one strait gate to truth, we can never acquire comprehension of the intrinsic essence of Nature, to which absolutely no other road leads; for then indeed we fall into an irremovable error. Then, as I have already said, we maintain the view, that motion has two radically different primary principles with a solid partition-wall between them: _i.e._ movement by means of causes, and movement by means of the will. The first of these must then remain for ever incomprehensible as to its innermost essence, because, after all its explanations, there is still left that unknown _x_ which contains the more, the higher the object under consideration stands in the scale of beings; while the second, movement by the will, presents itself as entirely disconnected from the principle of causality; as without reason; as freedom in individual actions: in other words, as completely opposed to Nature and utterly unexplainable. On the other hand, if the above-mentioned union of our external and internal knowledge has once been accomplished at the point where both meet, we then recognise two identities in spite of all accidental differences. That is to say, we recognise the identity of causality with itself on every degree of the scale of beings, and the identity of the _x_, which at first was unknown (_i.e._ of physical forces and vital phenomena), with the will which is within us. We recognise, I say, firstly the essential identity of causality under the various forms it is forced to assume on the different degrees of the scale, as it may manifest itself, now as a mechanical, chemical, or physical cause, now as a stimulus, and again as a perceptible or an abstract motive: we know it to be one and the same, not only when a propelling body loses as much movement as it imparts by impact, but also when in the combats of thought against thought, the victorious one, as the more powerful motive, sets Man in motion, a motion which follows with no less necessity than that of the ball which is struck. Where we ourselves are the things set in motion, where therefore the kernel of the process is well and intimately known to us, instead of allowing ourselves to be dazzled and confused by this light and thereby losing sight of the causal connection as it lies before us everywhere else in the whole of Nature; instead of shutting out this insight for ever, we now apply the new knowledge we have acquired from within as a key to the knowledge of things outside us, and then we recognise the second identity, that of our will with the hitherto mysterious _x_ that remains over after all causal explanation as an insoluble residue. Consequently we then say: even in cases in which the effect is brought about by the most palpable cause, the mysterious _x_ in the process, the real innermost core of it, the true agent, the _in-itself_ of all phenomena--which, after all, is only given us as representation and according to the forms and laws of representation--is essentially one and the same with what is known to us immediately and intimately as _the will_ in the actions of our own body, which body is likewise given us as intuition and representation.--This is (say what you will) the basis of true philosophy, and if the present age does not see this, many following ages will. _Tempo è galant' uomo!_ (_se nessun altro_).--Thus, just as, on the one hand, the essence of causality, which appears most clearly only on the lowest degree of the objectification of the will, is recognised by us again at every ascending step, even at the highest; so also, on the other hand, is the essence of the will recognised by us at every descending step in that ladder, even at the lowest, although this knowledge is only immediately acquired at the very highest. The old error asserts, that where there is will, there is no causality; and that where there is causality, there is no will. But we say: everywhere where there is causality, there is will; and no will acts without causality. The _punctum controversiæ_ therefore, is, whether will and causality can and must subsist together in one and the same process at the same time. What makes the knowledge, that this is indeed the case, so difficult, is the circumstance, that we know causality and will in two fundamentally different ways: causality entirely from outside, quite indirectly, quite through the understanding; will entirely from inside, quite directly; and that accordingly the clearer the knowledge of the one in each given instance, the less clear is the knowledge of the other. Therefore we recognise the essence of the will least readily, where causality is most intelligible; and, where the will is most unmistakably evident, causality becomes so obscured, that the vulgar mind could venture to deny its existence altogether.--Now, as Kant has taught us, causality is nothing but the form of the understanding itself, knowable _à priori_: that is, the essence of _representation_, as such, which is one side of the world; the other side is _will_: which is the thing in itself. That relative increase and decrease of clearness in inverse proportion of causality and of the will, that mutual advancing and receding of both, depends consequently upon the fact, that the more a thing is given us as mere phenomenon, _i.e._ as representation, the more clearly does the _à priori_ form of representation, _i.e._ causality, manifest itself: this is the case in inanimate Nature; conversely, the more immediate our knowledge of the will, the more does the form of representation recede into the background: this is the case with ourselves. That is: the nearer one side of the world approaches to us, the more do we lose sight of the other.

LINGUISTIC.

All that I have to record under this head is an observation of my own, made within the last few years, which seems hitherto to have escaped notice. Yet, that it is worthy of consideration, is attested by Seneca's utterance:[273] _Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat._ Lichtenberg too says: "If one thinks much oneself, one finds a good deal of wisdom deposited in language. It is hardly likely that we have laid it all there ourselves, but rather that a great deal of wisdom really lies there."

[273] Seneca, "Epist." 81.

In many, perhaps in all, languages, the action even of those bodies which are without intellect, nay of inanimate bodies, is expressed by the words _to will_, so that the existence of a will in these bodies is thus taken for granted; but they are never credited with a faculty for knowing, representing, perceiving or thinking: I know of no expression which conveys this.

Seneca, when speaking of lightning shot down from heaven, says:[274] "_In his, ignibus accidit, quod arboribus: quarum cacumina, si tenera sunt, ita deorsum trahi possunt, ut etiam terram attingant; sed quum permiseris, in locum suum exsilient. Itaque non est quod eum spectes cujusque rei habitum, qui illi non_ ex voluntate _est. Si ignem permittis ire quo velit, cœlum repetet._" In a more general sense Pliny says: _nec quærenda in ulla parte naturæ ratio, sed voluntas_.[275] Nor do we find Greek less fertile in instances. Aristotle, when explaining gravity, says: μικρὸν μὲν μόριον τῆς γῆς, ἐὰν μετεωρισθὲν ἀφεθῇ, φέρεται, καὶ μένειν οὐκ ἐθέλει (_parva quædam terræ pars, si elevata dimittitur, neque vult manere_).[276] And: Δεῖ δὲ ἕκαστον λέγειν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὃ φύσει +βούλεται+ εἶναι, καὶ ὃ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὃ βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν (_unumquodque autem tale dicere oportet, quale naturâ suâ esse vult, et quod est; sed non id quod violentiâ et præter naturam est_).[277] Of great and more than merely linguistic importance is what Aristotle says in his "Ethica magna,"[278] where not only animals, but inanimate beings (fire striving upwards and earth downwards) are explicitly in question, and he asserts that they may be obliged to do something contrary to their nature or their will: παρὰ φύσιν τι, ἢ παρ' ἃ +βούλονται+ ποιεῖν,--and therefore rightly places παρ' ἃ βούλονται as a paraphrase of παρὰ φύσιν.--Anacreon, in his 29th Ode, εἰς Βάθυλλον, in ordering the portrait of his lady-love, says of her hair: Ἕλικας δ' ἐλευθέρους μοι πλοκάμων, ἄτακτα συνθείς, ἄφες, ὡς +θέλωσι+, κεῖσθαι (_capillorum cirros incomposite jungens, sine utut volunt jacere_).[279] In German, Bürger says: "_hinab_ will _der Bach, nicht hinan_" (the brook _will_ go downwards not upwards). In daily life we constantly hear: "the water boils, it _will_ run over,"--"the glass _will_ break,"--"the ladder _will_ not stand;"--"_le feu ne_ veut _pas brûler_."--"_la corde, une fois tordue_, veut _toujours se retordre_."--In English, the verb '_to will_' is even the auxiliary of the future of all the other verbs, thus expressing the notion, that there lies a will at the bottom of every action. In English moreover, the endeavours of all inanimate and unconscious things, are expressly designated by the word _want_, which denotes every sort of human desire or endeavour: "the water _wants_ to get out,"--"the steam _wants_ to find an issue."--In Italian too we have "vuol _piovere_;" "_quest' orologio non_ vuol _andare_."--The conception of willing is besides so deeply rooted in this last language, that it seems to indicate everything that is requisite or necessary: "_ci_ vuol _un contrappeso_;" "_ci_ vuol _pazienza_."

[274] _Ibid._ "Quæst. nat." ii. 24.

[275] Plin. "Hist. nat." 37, 15.

[276] Aristot. "De Cœlo." ii. c. 13, "If a small particle of earth
is lifted and let loose, it is carried away and will not rest."
[Tr.'s add.]

[277] _Ibid._ c. 14, "But each thing ought to be named as it wills
to be and really is according to its nature, not as it is by force
and contrary to its nature." [Tr.'s add.]

[278] Arist. "Eth. Mag." i. c. 14.

[279] "Let the freely curling locks fall unarranged as they _will_
[_like_]." [Tr.'s add.]

A very striking instance of this is to be found even in Chinese--a language which differs fundamentally from all those belonging to the Sanskrit family--it is in the commentary to the Y-King,[280] accurately rendered by Peter Regis as follows: "_Yang, seu materia cœlestis_, vult _rursus ingredi, vel_ (_ut verbis doctoris Tsching-tse utar_) vult _rursus esse in superiore loco; scilicet illius naturæ ratio ita fert, seu innata lex_."

[280] "Y-King," ed. J. Mohl, vol. i. p. 341.

The following passage from Liebig[281] has decidedly much more than a linguistic signification, for it expresses an intimate feeling and comprehension of the way in which a chemical process takes place. "Aldehyd arises, which with the same _avidity_ as sulphurous acid, combines directly with oxygen to form acetic acid."--And again:[282] "Aldehyd, which absorbs oxygen from the air with _great avidity_." As Liebig uses this expression twice in speaking of the same phenomenon, it can hardly be by chance, but rather because it was the only adequate expression for the thing.[283] That most immediate stamp of our thoughts, language, shows us therefore, that every inward impulse must necessarily be conceived as volition; but it by no means ascribes knowledge to things as well. The agreement on this point between all languages, perhaps without a single exception, proves that here we have to do with no mere figure of speech, but that the verbal expression is determined by a deeply-rooted feeling of the inner nature of things.

[281] Liebig, "Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung auf Agrikultur," p.
394.

[282] _Ibid._ "Die Chemie in Anwendung auf Physiologie."

[283] French chemists likewise say: "_Il est évident que les
métaux ne sont pas tous également_ avides _d'oxygène_." ... "_La
difficulté de la réduction devait correspondre nécessairement à
une_ avidité _fort grande du métal pour l'oxygène_."--(See Paul de
Rémusat, "La Chimie à l'Exposition." "L'Aluminium," "Revue des Deux
Mondes," 1855, p. 649).

Vaninus ("De Amirandis Naturæ Arcanis," p. 170) had said:
"_Argentum vivum etiam in aqua conglobatur, quemadmodum et in
plumbi scobe etiam: at a scobe non refugit_ (this is directed
against an opinion expressed by Cardanus) _imo ex ea quantum
potest colligit: quod nequit (scil. colligere), ut censeo_,
invitum _relinquit_: natura enim et sua appetit, et vorat." This
is evidently more than a form of words. He here quite decidedly
attributes a will to quicksilver. And thus it will invariably be
found that where, in physical and chemical processes, there is
a reference to elementary forces of Nature and to the primary
qualities of bodies which cannot be further deduced, these are
always expressed by words which belong to the will and its
manifestations. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC.

In 1818, when my chief work first appeared, Animal Magnetism had only begun to struggle into existence. But, as to its explanation--although, to be sure, some light had been thrown upon the passive side of it, that is, upon what goes on within the patient, by the contrast between the cerebral and the ganglionic systems, to which Reil had drawn attention, having been taken for the principle of explanation--the active side, the agent proper by means of which the magnetiser evokes all these phenomena, was still completely shrouded in darkness. People groped about among all sorts of material principles of explanation, such as Mesmer's all-permeating ether, or the exhalations from the magnetiser's skin, assumed by Stieglitz to be the cause, &c. &c. At the utmost a nerve-spirit had been recognised and, after all, this was but a word for an unknown thing. The truth had scarcely begun to dawn upon a few persons, whom practice had more deeply initiated. But I was still far from hoping for any direct corroboration of my doctrine from Magnetism.

_Dies diem docet_ however, and the great teacher, experience, has since brought to light an important fact concerning this deep-reaching agent which, proceeding from the magnetiser, produces effects apparently so contrary to the regular course of Nature that the long lasting doubt as to their existence, the stiff-necked incredulity, the condemnation of a Committee of which Lavoisier and Franklin were members, in short, the whole opposition that Magnetism encountered both in its first and second period (with the sole exception of the coarse, unintelligent condemnation without inquiry, which till very lately, prevailed in England) is quite excusable. The fact I allude to is, that this agent is nothing but the _will_ of the magnetiser. To-day not a doubt exists on this point, I believe, among those who combine practice with insight; therefore I think it superfluous to quote the numerous assertions of magnetisers in corroboration of it.[284] Time has thus not only verified Puységur's watchword and that of the older French magnetisers: "_Veuillez et croyez!_" _i.e._ "Will with belief!" but this very watchword has even developed into a correct insight of the process itself.[285] From Kieser's "Tellurismus," still probably the most thorough and detailed text book of Animal Magnetism we have, it clearly results, that no act of Magnetism can take effect without the will; on the other hand the bare will, without any outward action, is able to produce every magnetic effect. Manipulation seems to be only a means of fixing, and so to say incorporating, the will and its direction. In this sense Kieser says: "Inasmuch as the human hand--being the organ by which Man's outward activity is most visibly expressed--is the efficient organ in magnetising, manipulation arises." De Lausanne, a French magnetiser, pronounces himself with still greater precision on this point in the Fourth Book of his "Annales du Magnétisme Animal" (1814-1816), where he says: "_L'action du magnétisme dépend de la seule volonté, il est vrai; mais l'homme ayant une forme_ extérieure et sensible, _tout ce qui est à son usage, tout ce qui doit agir sur lui, doit nécéssairement en avoir une, et pour que la volonté agisse, il faut qu'elle employe un mode d'action._" As, according to my doctrine, the organism is but the mere phenomenon, the visibility, the objectivity of the will; nay, as it is properly speaking only the will itself, viewed as representation in the brain: so also does the outward act of manipulation coincide with the inward act of the will. But where magnetic effects are produced without manipulation, they take place as it were artificially, in a roundabout way, the imagination taking the place of the outer act and even occasionally that of personal presence: wherefore it is much more difficult and succeeds less frequently. Kieser accordingly alleges that the word "Sleep!" or "You must!" said aloud, has a more powerful effect upon a somnambulist than the mere inward willing of the magnetiser.--On the other hand manipulation, and in general outward action, is really an infallible means of fixing the magnetiser's will and promoting its activity; precisely because outward acts are quite impossible apart from all will, the body and its organs being nothing but the visibility of the will itself. This explains the fact, that magnetisers at times magnetise without any conscious effort of volition and almost without thinking, and yet produce the desired effect. On the whole, it is not the consciousness of volition, reflection upon it, that acts magnetically, but pure volition itself, as detached as possible from all representation. In Kieser's directions to magnetisers therefore,[286] we find all thinking and reflecting upon their respective doing and suffering, all conversation between them, forbidden both to physician and patient; also all outward impressions which arouse representations, the presence of strangers, and even daylight. He advises that everything should proceed as unconsciously as possible, as is likewise recommended in charm-cures. The true reason of all this is, that here the will operates in its primariness, as thing in itself; and this demands the exclusion, as far as possible, of representation, as a different sphere, as secondary to the will. Facts to prove that the real agent in magnetising is the will and each outward act only its vehicle, may be found in all the more recent and more trustworthy writings upon Magnetism, and it would be needless prolixity to repeat them here. Nevertheless I will quote _one_ case, not as being especially striking, but as furnished by a remarkable person and having a peculiar interest as his testimony. Jean Paul says in a letter:[287] "Twice in a large company I have made Frau von K. nearly go to sleep by merely looking at her with a _firm will_, no one else knowing anything about it, and before that, I had brought on palpitation of the heart and pallor to such a degree that Dr. S. had to be summoned to her assistance."[288] Nowadays too, merely laying and keeping hold of the patient's hands while fixing the eye steadily upon him, is frequently substituted with complete success for the customary manipulation; precisely because even this outward act is suited to fix the will in a determined direction. But this immediate power which the will can exercise over other persons, is brought to light best of all by the admirable experiments made, even in public, by M. Dupotet and his pupils in Paris, in which a stranger is guided and determined at pleasure by the magnetiser's mere will, aided by a few gestures, and is even forced into the most extraordinary contortions. An apparently quite honestly written pamphlet, entitled "First glance into the wonder-world of Magnetism," by Karl Scholl (1853), contains a brief account of this.

[284] I only mention _one_ work which has recently appeared, the
explicit object of which is to show that the magnetiser's will is
the real agent: "Qu'est ce que le Magnétisme?" par E. Gromier.
(Lyon, 1850.)

[285] Puységur himself says in the year 1784: "_Lorsque vous avez
magnétisé le malade, votre but était de l'endormir, et vous y avez
réussi par le seul acte de votre volonté; c'est de même par un
autre acte de volonté que vous le réveillez._" (Puységur, "Magnét.
Anim." 2me édit. 1820, "Catéchisme Magnétique," p. 150-171.) [Add.
to 3rd ed.]

[286] Kieser, "Tellur." vol. i. p. 400, _et seqq._

[287] See "Wahrheit aus Jean Paul's Leben," vol. viii. p. 120.

[288] I had the good fortune in the year 1854 myself to witness
some extraordinary feats of this kind, performed here by Signor
Regazzoni from Bergamo, in which the immediate, _i.e._ magical,
power of his will over other persons was unmistakeable, and of
which no one, excepting perhaps those to whom Nature has denied all
capacity for apprehending pathological conditions, could doubt the
genuineness. There are nevertheless such persons: they ought to
become lawyers, clergymen, merchants or soldiers, but in heaven's
name not doctors; for the result would be homicidal, diagnosis
being the principal thing in medicine.--Regazzoni was able at
will to throw the somnambulist who was under his influence into
a state of complete catalepsy, nay, he could make her fall down
backwards, when he stood behind her and she was walking before
him, by his mere will, without any gestures. He could paralyze
her, give her _tetanos_, with the dilated pupils, the complete
insensibility, and in short, all the unmistakeable symptoms of
complete catalepsy. He made one of the lady spectators first play
the piano; then standing fifteen paces behind her, he so completely
paralyzed her by his will and gestures, that she was unable to
continue playing. He next placed her against a column and charmed
her to the spot, so that she was unable to move in spite of the
strongest efforts.--_According to my own observation_, nearly
all his feats are to be explained by his _isolating the brain
from the spinal marrow_, either completely, in which case the
sensible and motor nerves become paralyzed, and total catalepsy
ensues; or partially, by the paralysis only affecting the _motor_
nerves while sensibility remains--in other words, the head keeps
its consciousness, while the body is apparently lifeless. This
is precisely the effect of strychnine: it paralyzes the motor
nerves only, even to complete _tetanos_, which induces death by
_asphyxia_; but it leaves the sensible nerves, and with them
consciousness, intact. Regazzoni does this same thing by the
magic influence of his will. The moment at which this isolation
takes place is distinctly visible in a peculiar trembling of the
patient. I recommend a small French publication entitled "Antoine
Regazzoni de Bergame à Francfort sur Mein," by L. A. V. Dubourg
(Frankfurt, Nov. 1854, 31 pages in 8vo.) on Regazzoni's feats and
the unmistakeably genuine character they bear for everyone who is
not entirely devoid of all sense for organic Nature.

In the "Journal du Magnétisme," edit. Dupotet, of the 15th August,
1856, in criticizing a treatise: "De la Catalepsie, mémoire
couronné," 1856, in 4to, the reviewer, Morin, says: "La plupart
des caractères qui distinguent la catalepsie, peuvent être obtenus
artificiellement et sans danger sur les sujets magnétiques, et c'est
même là une des expériences les plus ordinaires des séances
magnétiques." [Add. to 3rd ed.]

In the "Communications concerning the somnambulist, Auguste K. in Dresden" (1843), we find the truth in question confirmed in another way by what the somnambulist herself says, p. 53: "I was half asleep and my brother wished to play a piece he knew. As I did not like it, I requested him not to play it; nevertheless he tried to do so and then, by means of my firm will that he should not, I succeeded in making him unable to remember the piece, in spite of all his endeavours."--The thing is however brought to a climax when this immediate power of the will is extended even to inanimate bodies. However incredible this may appear, we have nevertheless two accounts of it coming from entirely different quarters. In the book just mentioned,[289] it is related and testified by witnesses, that Auguste K. caused the needle of the compass to deviate at one time 7° and at another 4°, this experiment moreover being repeated four times. She did this moreover without any use of her hands, through her mere will, by looking steadily at it.--The Parisian somnambulist, Prudence Bernard, again in a public _séance_ in London, at which Mr. Brewster, the physicist's son and two other gentlemen from among the spectators acted as jurors, made the compass needle deviate and follow her movements by simply turning her head round.[290]

[289] "Mittheilungen über die Somnambüle, Auguste K., in Dresden."
1845, pp. 115, 116, and 318.

[290] See extract from the English periodical "Britannia," in
"Galignani's Messenger," of the 23rd October, 1851.

Now, if we thus see the will--stated by me to be the thing in itself, the only real thing in all existence, the kernel of Nature--accomplish through the human individual, in Animal Magnetism and even beyond it, things which cannot be explained according to the causal nexus, _i.e._ in the regular course of Nature; if we find it in a sense even annulling Nature's laws and actually performing _actio in distans_, consequently manifesting a supernatural, that is, metaphysical, mastery over Nature--what corroboration better founded on fact could I desire for my doctrine? Was not even Count Szapary, a magnetiser who certainly did not know my philosophy, led by the results of his own experience, after writing the title of his book: "A word about Animal Magnetism, soul-bodies and vital essence,"[291] to add the following remarkable explanatory words: "or physical proofs that the current of Animal Magnetism is the element, and _the will the principle of all spiritual and corporeal life_?"[292]--According to this, Animal Magnetism presents itself directly as _practical Metaphysic_, which was the term used by Bacon of Verulam[293] to define Magic in his classification of the sciences: it is empirical or experimental Metaphysic.--Further, because the will manifests itself in Animal Magnetism downright as the thing in itself, we see the _principium individuationis_ (Space and Time), which belongs to mere phenomenon, at once annulled: its limits which separate individuals from one another, are destroyed; Space no longer separates magnetiser and somnambulist; community of thoughts and of motions of the will appears; the state of _clairvoyance_ overleaps the relations belonging to mere phenomenon and conditioned by Time and Space, such as proximity and distance, the present and the future.

[291] Szapary, "Ein Wort über Animalischen Magnetismus,
Seelenkörper and Lebensessenz" (1840).

[292] "Oder physische Beweise, dass der Animalisch-magnetische
Strom das Element, and _der Wille das Princip alles geistigen und
Körperlichen Lebens sei_."

[293] Bacon, "Instaur. Magna," L. III.

In consequence of these facts, notwithstanding many reasons and prejudices to the contrary, the opinion has gradually gained ground, nay almost raised itself to certainty, that Animal Magnetism and its phenomena are identical with part of the Magic of former times, of that ill-famed occult art, of whose reality not only the Christian ages by which it was so cruelly persecuted, but all, not excepting even savage, nations on the whole of the earth, have been equally convinced throughout all ages. The Twelve Tables of the Romans,[294] the Books of Moses, and even Plato's Eleventh Book on Laws, already made its practice punishable by death, and Apuleius' beautiful speech[295] before the court of justice, when defending himself against the charge of practising magic by which his life was menaced, proves how seriously this matter was taken even in the most enlightened Roman period, under the Antonines; since he merely tries to clear himself personally from the charge in question, but by no means contests the possibility of witchcraft and even enters into a host of absurd details such as are wont to figure in all the mediæval trials for witchcraft. The eighteenth century makes an exception as regards this belief in Magic, and this is mainly because Balthasar Becker, Thomasius and some others, with the good intention of putting an end once for all to the cruel trials for witchcraft, declared all magic to be impossible. Favoured by the philosophy of the age, this opinion soon gained the upper hand, although only among the learned and educated classes. The common people have never ceased to believe in witchcraft, even in England; though here the educated classes contrive to unite a degrading religious bigotry with the firm incredulity of a Saint Thomas (or of a Thomasius) as to all facts transcending the laws of impact and counter-impact, acids and alkalis, and refuse to lend an ear to their great countryman, when he tells them that 'there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in their philosophy.' One branch of Magic is still notoriously preserved and practised among the lower orders, being tolerated on account of its beneficent purpose. This is _curing by charms_ (_sympathetische Kuren_, as they are called in German), the reality of which can hardly be doubted. Charming away warts, is one of the commonest forms of this practice, and of this Bacon of Verulam, cautious and empirical though he was, attests the efficacy from personal experience.[296] The charming away of erisypelas in the face by a spell, is another instance, and so often succeeds, that it is easy to convince oneself of its existence. Fever too is often successfully combated by spells, &c. &c.[297]--That, in all this, the real agents are not the meaningless words and ceremonies, but that it is the will of the operator which acts, as in Animal Magnetism, needs no further explanation after what has been said above. For such as are still unacquainted with charm-cures, instances may be found in Kieser.[298]--These two facts therefore, Animal Magnetism and Charm-curing, bear empirical evidence to the possibility of magical, as opposed to physical, influence, which possibility had been so peremptorily rejected by the past century; since it refused to recognise as possible any other than physical influences brought about in the way of the intelligible nexus of causality.

[294] Plin. hist. nat. L. 30, c. 3. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

[295] Apuleius, "Oratio de Magia," p. 104. Bip.

[296] Bacon, "Silva Silvarum," § 997.

[297] In the "Times" of June the 12th, 1855, we find, p. 10, the
following:--

"A Horse-charmer.

"On the voyage to England the ship 'Simla' experienced some
heavy weather in the Bay of Biscay, in which the horses suffered
severely, and some, including a charger of General Scarlett, became
unmanageable. A valuable mare was so very bad, that a pistol was
got ready to shoot her and to end her misery; when a Russian
officer recommended a Cossak prisoner to be sent for, as he was
a 'juggler' and could, by charms, cure any malady in a horse. He
was sent for, and immediately said he could cure it at once. He
was closely watched, but the only thing they could observe him do
was to take his sash off and tie a knot in it three several times.
However the mare, in a few minutes, got on her feet and began to
eat heartily, and rapidly recovered." [Add. to 3rd ed.]

[298] Kieser, "Archiv, für den thierischen Magnetismus," vol.
v. heft 3, p. 106; vol. viii. heft 3, p. 145; vol. ix. heft 2,
p. 172; and vol. ix. heft 1, p. 128; Dr. Most's book likewise:
"Über Sympathetische Mittel und Kuren," 1842, may be used as an
introduction to this matter. (And even Pliny indicates a number of
charm-cures in the 28th Book, chaps. 6 to 17. [Add. to 3rd ed.])

It is a fortunate circumstance, that the rectification of this view in our time should have come from medical science; because it ensures us at the same time against the danger of the pendulum of opinion receiving too strong an impulse in the contrary direction, and thus carrying us back to the superstition of ruder ages. Besides, as I have said, Animal Magnetism and Charm-curing only save the reality of a part of Magic, which included a good deal more, a considerable portion of which must, for the present at least, remain under the old sentence of condemnation or be left in uncertainty; whereas another portion will at any rate have to be conceived as possible, through its analogy to Animal Magnetism. For Animal Magnetism and Charm-cures are but salutary influences exercised for curative purposes, like those recorded in the "History of Magic" as practised by the so-called (Spanish) _Saludadores_,[299] who nevertheless were also condemned by the Church; whereas Magic was far oftener practised with an evil intent. Nevertheless, to judge by analogy, it is more than probable, that the same inherent force which, by acting directly upon another individuality, can exercise a salutary influence, will be at least as powerful to exercise a prejudicial and pernicious one. If therefore there was reality in any part of ancient Magic beyond what may be referred to Animal Magnetism and curing by charms, it must assuredly have been in that which is called _maleficium_ and _fascinatio_, the very thing that gave rise to most of the trials for witchcraft. In Most's book, too, already mentioned,[300] a few facts are related which must undoubtedly be ascribed to _maleficium_; in Kieser,[301] also we find instances of diseases which had been transmitted, especially to dogs, who died of them. In Plutarch[302] we find that _fascinatio_ was already known to Democritus, who tried to explain it as a fact. Now admitting these stories to be true, they give us the key to the crime of witchcraft, the zealous persecution of which would therefore not have been quite without reason. For even if in most cases it may have been founded upon error and abuse, we are still not authorized to look upon our forefathers as having been so utterly benighted, as to persecute with the utmost vigour and cruelty for so many ages an absolutely impossible crime. From this point of view moreover, we can also understand that the common people should still even to the present day persist in attributing certain cases of illness to a _maleficium_, and are not to be dissuaded from this conviction. Now if we are thus induced by the progress of the age to modify the extreme view adopted by the last century concerning the absolute nullity of this ill-famed art--at any rate with respect to some part of it--still nowhere is caution more necessary than here, in order to fish out from the chaos of fraud, falsehood and absurdity contained in the writings of Agrippa von Nettesheim, Wierus, Bodinus, Delrio, Bindsfeldt, &c. &c., the few isolated truths that may lie in them. For, frequent though they may be throughout the world, nowhere have lies and deceit freer play than where Nature's laws are avowedly set aside, nay declared invalid. Here therefore we find the wildest fictions, the strangest freaks of the imagination worked up into an edifice, lofty as the skies, on the narrow foundation of the slight particle of truth there may have been in Magic, and in consequence of this, the most sanguinary atrocities perpetrated age after age. In contemplating such things, the psychological reflection on the unlimited capability of the human intellect for accepting the most incredible absurdities and the readiness of the human heart to set its seal to them by cruelty, prevails over every other.

[299] Delrio. "Disqu. Mag." L. III. P. 2, q. 4. 4, s. 7--and
Bodinus, "Mag. Dæmon," iii. 2.

[300] See note 2, p. 334, especially pp. 40, 41, and Nos. 89, 91,
and 97 of Most's book.

[301] Kieser, "Archiv. f. t. M." See the account of Bende Bensen's
illness, vol. ix. to vol. xii.

[302] Plutarch, "Symposiacæ quæstionis," qu. v. 7. 6.

Yet the modification which has taken place of late in the views of German _savants_ respecting magic, is not due exclusively to Animal Magnetism. The deep foundations of it had already been laid by the change in philosophy wrought by Kant, which makes German culture differ fundamentally from that of the rest of Europe, with respect to philosophy as well as to other branches of knowledge.--For a man to be able to smile beforehand at all occult sympathies, let alone magical influences, he must find the world very, nay completely, intelligible. But this is only possible if he looks at it with the utterly superficial glance which puts away from it all suspicion that we human beings are immersed in a sea of riddles and mysteries and have no exhaustive knowledge or understanding either of things or of ourselves in any direct way. Nearly all great men have been of the opposite frame of mind and therefore, whatever age or nation they belonged to, have always betrayed a slight tinge of superstition. If our natural mode of knowing were one that handed over to us things in themselves immediately and consequently gave us the absolutely true relations and connections of things, we might then, no doubt, be justified in rejecting _à priori_, therefore unconditionally, all prescience of future events, all apparitions of absent, of dying, let alone of deceased persons, and all magical influence. But if all that we know is, as Kant teaches, mere phenomenon, the forms and laws of which do not extend to things in themselves, it must be obviously premature to reject all foreknowledge, all apparitions and all magic; since that rejection is based upon laws, whose _à priori_ character precisely restricts them to phenomena; whereas things in themselves, to which even our own inner self must belong, remain untouched by them. But it is quite possible for these very things in themselves to have relations with us from which the above-mentioned occurrences may have arisen, concerning which accordingly we have to wait for the decision _à posteriori_, and must not forestall it. That the English and French should persist in denying _à priori_ all such occurrences, comes at the bottom from the influence of Locke's philosophy, under which these nations still stand as to all essential points, and by which we are taught that, after merely subtracting sensation, we know things in themselves. According to this view therefore, the laws of the material world are held to be ultimate, and no other influence than _influxus physicus_ is admitted. Consequently these nations believe, it is true, in a physical, but not in a metaphysical, science, and therefore reject all other than so-called "Natural Magic:" a term which contains the same _contradictio in adjecto_ as "Supernatural Physics," but is nevertheless constantly used quite seriously, while the latter was used but once, and then in joke, by Lichtenberg. On the other hand, the common people, with their universal readiness to give credit to supernatural influences, express by it in their own way the conviction, that all things which we perceive and comprehend are mere phenomena, not things in themselves; although, with them, conviction is only felt. I quote the following passage from Kant's "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten," as a proof that this is not saying too much: "There is an observation requiring no great subtlety of reflection, which we may on the contrary suppose the most ordinary understanding capable of making, albeit in its own way and by an obscure distinction of the faculty of judgment, which it calls feeling. It is this: that all our involuntary representations (such as those of the senses) give us no further knowledge of objects than as they affect us, whereby we are left in ignorance as to what those objects may be in themselves; that, as far as this sort of representation is concerned therefore, we are still only able by this means to attain knowledge of phenomena, but never of _things in themselves_, even by dint of the utmost clearness and the most strenuous attention the understanding is able to give to this point. When once this distinction is made, however, it stands to reason, that the existence of something else behind these phenomena, something which is not phenomenon, _i.e._ the thing in itself, has still to be admitted and assumed."[303]

[303] Kant, "First Principles of Ethical Metaphysic," 3rd edition,
p. 105.

When we read D. Tiedemann's "History of Magic,"[304] we are astonished at the persistency with which mankind have clung to the thought of Magic in all places and at all times, notwithstanding frequent failure; and we come to the conclusion, that this thought must, to say the least, be deeply rooted in human nature, if not in things in general, and cannot be a mere arbitrary creation of the fancy. Although Magic is differently defined by the various authors who have treated of it, the fundamental thought which predominates in all its definitions is nevertheless unmistakeable. For the opinion, that there must be another quite different way of producing changes in the world besides the regular one through the causal nexus between bodies, and one moreover which is not founded at all upon that nexus, has found favour in all ages and countries. Therefore also the means belonging to this second way appeared absurd, when they were viewed in the same light as the first; since the cause applied was obviously not suited to the effect intended and a causal nexus between them was impossible. But here it was assumed, that apart from the outer connection between the phenomena of this world on which the _nexus physicus_ is founded, there must exist another besides, passing through the very essence in itself of all things: a subterranean connection as it were, by means of which immediate action was possible from _one_ point of the phenomenon on to every other point, through a _nexus metaphysicus_;

[304] D. Tiedemann, "Disputatio de quæstione, quæ fuerit artum
magicarum origo." Marb. 1787. A prize-essay written for the
Göttingen Society.

_that_ accordingly, it must be possible to act upon things from inside, instead of from outside, as is usual;

_that_ it must be possible for phenomenon to act upon phenomenon by means of that being in itself, which is one and the same in all phenomena;

_that_, just as we act causally as _natura naturata_, we might probably be able to act also as _natura naturans_, and momentarily to enable the microcosm to play the part of the macrocosm;

_that_, however firm the partition walls of individuation and separation might be, they might nevertheless occasionally permit a communication to take place as it were behind the scenes, or like a secret game under the table; and

_that_, just as a neutralisation of individual isolation takes place in somnambulistic _clairvoyance_, so likewise might a neutralisation of the will in the individual be possible. Such a thought as this cannot have arisen empirically, nor can it have been confirmation through experience that has preserved it throughout all ages and in all countries: for in the majority of cases experience must result downright unfavourably to it. I opine therefore, that the origin of this thought, which has universally held its ground with the whole of mankind and, in spite of so much conflicting experience, in defiance of common sense, has never been eradicated, must be sought at great depth: namely in the inward feeling of the omnipotence of the will in itself--of that will, which constitutes at once the inner essence of Man and of the whole of Nature--and in the assumption connected with it that, somehow or other, this omnipotence might possibly for once make itself felt, even when proceeding from the individual. People were unable to investigate and distinguish the difference between the capabilities of the will as thing in itself and the same will in its individual manifestation; but they assumed without further ado, that under certain circumstances, the will might be enabled to break through the barriers of individuation. For the above-mentioned feeling rebelled obstinately against the knowledge forced upon it by experience, that

"Der Gott der mir im Busen wohnt,
Kann tief mein Innerstes erregen,
Der über allen meinen Kräften thront,
Er kann nach Aussen nichts bewegen."

According to the fundamental thought just expounded, we find that the physical medium used in all attempts at magic, never was regarded in any other light than in that of a vehicle for a thing metaphysical; otherwise it could evidently stand in no relation whatever to the effect contemplated. These media consisted in cabalistic words, symbolical actions, traced figures, wax images, &c. &c. We see too that, according to the original feeling, what this vehicle conveyed, was in the last resort always an act of _volition_ that had been connected with it. The very natural inducement to do this, was the observation, that every moment men became aware of a completely unaccountable, that is, evidently metaphysical, agency of the will, in the movements of their own bodies. Might not this agency, they thought, be extended to other bodies also? To find out a way to annul the isolation in which the will finds itself in each individual, and to extend the immediate sphere of the will's action beyond the organism of the person willing, was the aim of Magic.