Chapter I: Part 1

ON THE MANNER OF
NEGOTIATING WITH
PRINCES;

on the Uses of Diplomacy; the
Choice of Ministers and Envoys;
and the Personal Qualities necessary
for Success in Missions abroad; by
MONSIEUR DE CALLIÈRES

Councillor-in-Ordinary to the King in Council, Private
Secretary to His Majesty, formerly Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of His late Majesty
entrusted with the Treaties of Peace concluded at
Ryswick, one of the Forty of the French Academy.

Published at Paris by MICHEL BRUNET at the _Mercure
Galant_, 1716; under Royal Privilege and Approval.

Translated from the French by

A. F. WHYTE

Boston and New York
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO.
1919

Edinburgh: T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty

INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy is one of the highest of the political arts. In a well-ordered commonwealth it would be held in the esteem due to a great public service in whose hands the safety of the people largely lies; and it would thus attract to its ranks its full share of national ability and energy which for the most part to-day passes into other professions. But the diplomatic service, at all times, and in almost all countries, has suffered from lack of public appreciation: though perhaps at no time has it had so many detractors as to-day. Its almost unparalleled unpopularity is due to a variety of causes, some of which are temporary and removable, while others must be permanent in human affairs, for they were found to operate in the days when the author of this little book shone in French diplomacy. The major cause is public neglect; but it is also due, in no small measure, to the prevalent confusion between policy, which is the substance, and diplomacy proper, which is the process by which it is carried out. This confusion exists not only in the popular mind, but even in the writings of historians who might be expected to practise a better discernment. Policy is the concern of governments. Responsibility therefore belongs to the Secretary of State who directs policy and appoints the agents of it. But the constitutional doctrine of ministerial responsibility is not an unvarying reality. No one will maintain that Lord Cromer’s success in Egypt was due to the wisdom of Whitehall, or to anything but his own sterling qualities. Nor can a just judgment of our recent Balkan diplomacy fail to assign a heavy share of the blame to the incompetence of more than one ‘man on the spot.’ The truth is, that the whole system, of which, in their different measure, Downing Street and the embassies abroad are _both_ responsible parts, is not abreast of the needs of the time, and will not be until Callières’s excellent maxims become the common practice of the service.

These maxims are to be found in the little book of which a free translation is here presented. François de Callières treats diplomacy as the art practised by the _négotiateur_--a most apt name for the diplomatist--in carrying out the instructions of statesmen and princes. The very choice of the word _manière_ in his title shows that he conceives of diplomacy as the servant, not the author, of policy; and indeed his argument is not many pages old before he is heard insisting that it is ‘the agent of high policy.’ Observance of this distinction is the first condition of fruitful criticism. It is therefore worth while, at the outset, to clear away the obscurity and confusion which surround the subject, and thus, in some measure, to relieve both diplomacy in general and the individual diplomatist in particular from the burden of irrelevant and unjust criticism.

‘Secret diplomacy’ has played so large a part in recent public discussion that the confusion between foreign policy and diplomacy proper has only been worse confounded. And even where the critics of diplomacy have restricted the range of their attack to the question of the efficiency of our representation abroad, the nature of their criticism leaves it to be supposed that diplomacy is the dazzling and perilous craft which figures in the pages of Mr. Le Queux. The picture of brilliant youths and cunning greybeards sedulously lying abroad for the good of their country continues to fill the popular imagination, though a reading of any one of the excellent memoirs of the great diplomatists of the past would suffice to prove that Sir Henry Wotton’s famous witticism far outran the truth. For every occasion on which deceit has been practised, there are a dozen on which the negotiation has followed the obvious course of a practical discussion in which ‘the application of intelligence and tact’ led to an agreement. In substance, therefore, diplomacy demands the same qualities as any other form of negotiation. Its true method bears a close resemblance to a business transaction. The one essential difference between a high commercial negotiation and a diplomatic transaction is that in the former the contracting parties are constrained to observe certain rules, and are bound not only by certain strict conventions but by enforceable laws; in the latter case the parties recognise no bounds to their claims and ambitions except those laid down by a concern for their own convenience, or by the limits of their own military forces. Hence the diplomatist gains an altogether fictitious eminence among his fellow-men and assumes an excessive pride of office because he represents a sovereign state which recognises no master.

Now a discussion of the problems raised by the unrestricted sovereignty claimed by each nation in foreign affairs would carry this argument far beyond the limits of diplomacy proper and must be left to those who are now trying to find a firm basis for a League of Nations. But since this claim is the parent cause of all armed conflict, it cannot be entirely ignored; for as long as it persists it will exercise a profound influence on the character of diplomacy itself, and has a direct bearing on the question of the efficiency of the diplomatist. The action of our representatives abroad carries with it the constant alternative of peace and war. ‘The art of negotiating with princes,’ says Callières, ‘is so important that the fate of the greatest states often depends upon the good or bad conduct of negotiations, and upon the degree of capacity in the negotiators employed.’ The consciousness that the negotiator is performing one of the functions of sovereignty must give him a deep sense of responsibility and a constant concern for his own efficiency. And the Home Government has the prior obligation, in Callières’s words once more, to ‘examine with the greatest care the natural or acquired qualities of those citizens whom they despatch on missions to Foreign States.’

The epigram which tells us that nations have the governments they deserve has a close bearing on this aspect of diplomacy. The main question is the efficiency of the service, which has received but little public attention owing to the popularity of the campaign against the secrecy of diplomatic action. The secrecy of diplomacy is commonly held to be the accomplice of European militarism; and many of those who yearn for a better world after the war hope that by letting in light upon the manœuvres of the Great Powers their evil designs may be checked before they create those recurring crises of animosity with which we were so familiar before the war. There is so much obvious truth in this view that even _The Times_ acknowledged it thus: ‘Who, then, makes war? The answer is to be found in the Chancelleries of Europe, among the men who have too long played with human lives as pawns in a game of chess, who have become so enmeshed in formulas and the jargon of diplomacy that they have ceased to be conscious of the poignant realities with which they trifle. And thus war will continue to be made until the great masses who are the sport of professional schemers say the word which shall bring, not eternal peace, for that is impossible, but a determination that wars shall be fought only in a just and righteous and vital cause’ (_The Times_, 23rd November 1912). The justification of the growing demand for popular control of foreign policy could not be more succinctly put.

In the customary argument against diplomatic secrecy, however, there is some confusion of thought. It is against secret _policies_, in which the national liability may be unlimited, that the only genuine protest can be raised; for such policies are the very negation of democracy, and the denial of the most fundamental of all popular rights, namely, that the citizen shall know on what terms his country may ask him to lay down his life. But this justification of popular control does not presuppose the publication of diplomatic negotiations. On the contrary, it rests on the assumption that the People and Parliament will know where to draw the line between necessary control in matters of principle and the equally necessary discretionary freedom of the expert in negotiation. It follows, therefore, that the case for reform is only weakened by those who make indiscriminate attacks against the whole Diplomatic Service--how richly deserved in some cases, how flagrantly unjust in others--and especially by those who profess to believe that the machinery of diplomacy could be made to run more smoothly by publicity. The modern Press is not so happy a commentator as all that; and we may here recall Napoleon’s apposite reflection: ‘_Le canon a tué la féodalité: l’encre tuera la société moderne_.’ If it is necessary for the public welfare that foreign policy should be known and intelligently discussed by the people whom it so closely concerns, it is just as necessary that the people should not meddle with the actual process of diplomacy, but, having made sure of getting the best of their public servants in their Foreign Service, should confidently leave such transactions undisturbed in the hands of the expert. In all the activities of government that is clearly the proper division of labour between the common people and the expert adviser; and in no department should it be more scrupulously observed than in foreign affairs.

Readers of this little book--which Sir Ernest Satow recently called ‘a mine of political wisdom’--will quickly realise how much this introductory review of modern diplomacy owes to the suggestive maxims of François de Callières. And if they receive as much stimulus and pleasure from the following pages as the translator has enjoyed in preparing them, Louis Fourteenth’s plenipotentiary should gain a host of new friends.

A. F. WHYTE.

_To His Royal Highness, Monseigneur le Duc d’Orléans, Regent of the Kingdom._

MONSEIGNEUR,--This work, which I have the honour to present to your Royal Highness, has for its aim: to give an idea of the personal qualities and general knowledge necessary in all good negotiators; to indicate to them the paths which they should follow and the rocks which they should avoid; and to exhort those who destine themselves to the foreign service of their country, to render themselves capable of discharging worthily that high, important, and difficult office before entering upon it.

The honour which the late King did me in charging me with his commands and his full powers for foreign negotiation, and particularly for those which led to the Treaty of Ryswick, has redoubled the attention which I have ever paid since my youngest years to my own instruction in the power, the rights, and the ambitions of each of the principal monarchies and states of Europe, in their divergent interests and the forms of their government, in the causes of their understandings and misunderstandings, and finally in the treaties which they have made one with another; in order to employ this knowledge to the best advantage whenever occasion offered in the service of my King and Country. After the loss which France has just suffered of that great King, whose reign was so full of glory and triumph, she did indeed need that the Hand of God, which has always upheld her in her necessities, should continue to guide her. We had indeed to look for Divine Help to support us during the minority of his present Majesty, so that we might hope that the All-Powerful Hand should mould a prince of like blood and spirit to him who has gone. The Regency needed an intelligence of the highest order, a capacity without limit, a clear insight into the character of persons and events, and an indefatigable activity which would increase at every new demand made by the interests of state--all these united in the person of a prince at once just, lovable, beneficent, whose character might earn for him the title of a veritable father of his country. These are the traits so strongly and so profoundly marked in you, Monseigneur, which have brought all France on its knees in homage before you, with full confidence and happiness, and a glorious prestige which shall pass undimmed to our remotest descendants as a worthy symbol of your great rule.

I am, with profound respect, and with a zealous and affectionate attachment to your Person, Monseigneur,

Your Royal Highness’s most humble, obedient, and faithful servant,

DE CALLIÈRES.

[Sidenote: _The Art of Negotiation._]

The art of negotiation with princes is so important that the fate of the greatest states often depends upon the good or bad conduct of negotiations and upon the degree of capacity in the negotiators employed. Thus monarchs and their ministers of state cannot examine with too great care the natural or acquired qualities of those citizens whom they despatch on missions to foreign states to entertain there good relations with their masters, to make treaties of peace, of alliance, of commerce or of other kinds, or to hinder other Powers from concluding such treaties to the prejudice of their own master; and generally, to take charge of those interests which may be affected by the diverse conjunctures of events. Every Christian prince must take as his chief maxim not to employ arms to support or vindicate his rights until he has employed and exhausted the way of reason and of persuasion. It is to his interest also, to add to reason and persuasion the influence of benefits conferred, which indeed is one of the surest ways to make his own power secure, and to increase it. But above all he must employ good labourers in his service, such indeed as know how to employ all these methods for the best, and how to gain the hearts and wills of men, for it is in this that the science of negotiation principally consists.

[Sidenote: _French Neglect of Diplomacy._]

Our nation is so warlike that we can hardly conceive of any other kind of glory or of honour than those won in the profession of arms. Hence it is that the greater number of Frenchmen of good birth apply themselves with zeal to the profession of arms in order that they may gain advancement therein, but they neglect the study of the various interests which divide Europe and which are a source of frequent wars. This inclination and natural application in our people result in a rich supply of good general officers, and we need have no surprise that it is considered that no gentleman of quality can receive a high command in the armies of the King who has not already passed through all these stages by which a soldier may equip himself for war.

But, alas, it is not the same with our negotiators. They are indeed rare among us because there has been in general no discipline nor fixed rules of the foreign service of his Majesty by which good citizens destined to become negotiators might instruct themselves in the knowledge necessary for this kind of employment. And indeed we find that instead of gradual promotion by degrees and by the evidence of proved capacity and experience, as is the case in the usages of war, one may see often men who have never left their own country, who have never applied themselves to the study of public affairs, being of meagre intelligence, appointed so to speak over-night to important embassies in countries of which they know neither the interests, the laws, the customs, the language, nor even the geographical situation. And yet I may hazard a guess that there is perhaps no employment in all his Majesty’s service more difficult to discharge than that of negotiation. It demands all the penetration, all the dexterity, all the suppleness which a man can well possess. It requires a widespread understanding and knowledge, and above all a correct and piercing discernment.

[Sidenote: _Diplomacy an Expert Craft._]

It causes me no surprise that men who have embarked on this career for the sake of titles and emoluments, having not the least idea of the real duties of their post, have occasioned grave harm to the public interest during their apprenticeship to this service. These novices in negotiation become easily intoxicated with honours done in their person to the dignity of their royal master. They are like the ass in the fable who received for himself all the incense burned before the statue of the goddess which he bore on his back. This happens above all to those who are employed by a great monarch on missions to princes of a lower order, for they are apt to place in their addresses the most odious comparisons, as well as veiled threats, which are really only a mark of weakness. Such ambassadors do not fail to bring upon themselves the aversion of the court to which they are accredited, and they resemble heralds of arms rather than ambassadors whose principal aim is ever to maintain a good correspondence between their master and the princes to whom they are accredited. In all cases they should represent the power of their own sovereign as a means of maintaining and increasing that of the foreign court, instead of using it as an odious comparison designed to humiliate and contemn. These misfortunes and many others, which are the result of the lack of capacity and of the foolish conduct of many citizens employed by princes to deal with public affairs abroad, occasioned in me the belief that it is by no means impertinent to set down some observations on the manner of negotiating with sovereigns and with their ministers, on the qualities necessary for those who mean to adopt the profession of diplomacy, and on the means which wise princes will take to secure a good choice of men well adapted at once to the profession of negotiation and to the different countries where they may be sent. But before I take my subject in detail it is perhaps well that I should explain the use and the necessity for princes to maintain continual negotiation in the form of permanent embassies to all great states, both in neighbouring countries and in those more distant, in war as well as in peace.

[Sidenote: _The Usefulness of Negotiation._]

To understand the permanent use of diplomacy and the necessity for continual negotiations, we must think of the states of which Europe is composed as being joined together by all kinds of necessary commerce, in such a way that they may be regarded as members of one Republic and that no considerable change can take place in any one of them without affecting the condition, or disturbing the peace, of all the others. The blunder of the smallest of sovereigns may indeed cast an apple of discord among all the greatest Powers, because there is no state so great which does not find it useful to have relations with the lesser states and to seek friends among the different parties of which even the smallest state is composed. History teems with the results of these conflicts which often have their beginnings in small events, easy to control or suppress at their birth, but which when grown in magnitude became the causes of long and bloody wars which have ravaged the principal states of Christendom. Now these actions and reactions between one state and another oblige the sagacious monarch and his ministers to maintain a continual process of diplomacy in all such states for the purpose of recording events as they occur and of reading their true meaning with diligence and exactitude. One may say that knowledge of this kind is one of the most important and necessary features of good government, because indeed the domestic peace of the state depends largely upon appropriate measures taken in its foreign service to make friends among well-disposed states, and by timely action to resist those who cherish hostile designs. There is indeed no prince so powerful that he can afford to neglect the assistance offered by a good alliance, in resisting the forces of hostile powers which are prompted by jealousy of his property to unite in a hostile coalition.

[Sidenote: _The Diplomat: An Agent of High Policy._]

Now, the enlightened and assiduous negotiator serves not only to discover all projects and cabals by which coalitions may arise against his prince in the country where he is sent to negotiate, but also to dissipate their very beginnings by giving timely advice. It is easy to destroy even the greatest enterprises at their birth; and as they often require several springs to give them motion, it can hardly be possible for a hostile intrigue to ripen without knowledge of it coming to the ears of an attentive negotiator living in the place where it is being hatched. The able negotiator will know how to profit by the various dispositions and changes which arise in the country where he lives, not merely in order to frustrate designs hostile to the interests of his master, but also for the positive and fruitful purpose of bringing to an apt result those other designs which may work to his advantage. By his industry and application he may himself produce changes of opinion favourable to the office which he has to discharge; indeed, if he do but once in an apt moment catch the tide at the flood he may confer a benefit on his prince a hundredfold greater than any expense in treasure or personal effort which he may have put forth. Now if a monarch should wait, before sending his envoys to countries near and far, until important events occur--as for instance, until it is a question of hindering the conclusion of some treaty which confers advantage on an enemy Power, or a declaration of war against an ally which would deprive the monarch himself of the assistance of that very ally for other purposes--it will be found that the negotiators, sent thus at the eleventh hour on urgent occasions, have no time to explore the terrain or to study the habits of mind of the foreign court or to create the necessary liaisons or to change the course of events already in full flood, unless indeed they bring with them enormous sums whose disbursement must weigh heavily on the treasury of their master, and which run the risk, in truth, of being paid too late.

[Sidenote: _Cardinal Richelieu._]

Cardinal Richelieu, whom I set before me as the model for all statesmen, to whom France owes a very great debt, maintained a system of unbroken diplomacy in all manner of countries, and beyond question he thus drew enormous advantage for his master. He bears witness to this truth in his own political testament, speaking thus:--

‘The states of Europe enjoy all the advantages of continual negotiation in the measure in which they are conducted with prudence. No one could believe how great these advantages are who has not had experience of them. I confess that it was not till I had had five or six years’ experience of the management of high affairs that I realised this truth, but I am now so firmly persuaded of it that I will boldly say that the service which a regular and unbroken system of diplomacy, conducted both in public and in secret in all countries, even where no immediate fruit can be gathered, is one of the first necessities for the health and welfare of the state. I can say with truth that in my time I have seen the face of affairs in France and in Christendom completely changed because under the authority of his Majesty I have been enabled to practise this principle which till my time had been absolutely neglected by the ministers of this kingdom.’ The Cardinal says further: ‘The light of nature teaches each of us in his private life to maintain relations with his neighbours because as their near presence enables them to injure so it also enables them to do us service, just as the surroundings of a city either hinder or facilitate the approach to it.’ And he adds: ‘The meaner sort of men confine their outlook within the cities where they were born. But those to whom God has given a greater light will neglect no means of improvement whether it come from near or from far.’ The evidence of this great genius demands all the greater consideration because the high services which he rendered to his King by means of negotiation convincingly prove that he speaks the truth. No considerable event occurred in Europe during his ministry in which he did not play a great part, and he was often the principal agent in the great movements of his time. He it was who designed the revolution in Portugal in 1640, by which the legitimate heir to the Crown resumed the throne. He profited by the discontent of the Catalans who rose in revolt in that same year. He did not hesitate to encourage negotiations even with the African Moors. Previously he brought his labours to success in the north by persuading Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, to invade Germany, and thus to deliver her from slavery to the House of Austria which then reigned despotically, dethroning her princes and disposing of their states and their titles to its own court minions. Rumour even attributes the revolution in Bohemia to the action of Cardinal Richelieu. He formed and maintained several leagues; he won for France many great allies who contributed to the success of his high designs, in which the abasement of the prodigious power of the House of Austria was always the chief; and throughout all these designs we can trace the unbroken thread of a well-maintained system of diplomacy, acting as the obedient and capable agent of the great minister himself, whose profound capacity and vast genius thus found a favourable field of action.

[Sidenote: _Value of Diplomacy._]

It is not necessary to turn far back into the past in order to understand what can be achieved by negotiation. We see daily around us its definite effects in sudden revolutions favourable to this great design of state or that, in the use of sedition in fermenting the hatreds between nations, in causing jealous rivals to arm against one another so that the _tertius gaudens_ may profit, in the formation of leagues and other treaties of various kinds between monarchs whose interests might otherwise clash, in the dissolution by crafty means of the closest unions between states: in a word, one may say that the art of negotiation, according as its conduct is good or evil, gives form to great affairs and may turn a host of lesser events into a useful influence upon the course of the greater. Indeed, we can see in diplomacy thus conducted a greater influence in many ways upon the conduct and fortunes of mankind than even in the laws which they themselves have designed, for the reason that, however scrupulous private man may be in obedience to the law, misunderstandings and conflicts of ambition easily arise between nations, and cannot be settled by a process of law but only by a convention between the contending parties. It is on the occasion of such conventions that diplomacy plays a decisive part.

It is thus easy to conclude that a small number of well-chosen negotiators posted in the different states in Europe may render to their sovereign and their state the greatest services; that a single word or act may do more than the invasion of whole armies because the crafty negotiator will know how to set in motion various forces native to the country in which he is negotiating, and thus may spare his master the vast expense of a campaign. Nothing can be more useful than a timely diversion thus set on foot.

It is also of high interest to all great princes that their negotiators should be of such character and standing as to act appropriately as mediators in the disputes between other sovereigns and to produce peace by the authority of their intervention. Nothing can contribute more to the reputation, the power, and the universal respect of a monarch, than to be served by those who themselves inspire respect and confidence. A powerful prince who maintains a constant system of diplomacy served by wise and instructed negotiators in the different states of Europe, and who thus cultivates well-chosen friendships and maintains useful sources of information, is in a position to influence the destiny of neighbouring foreign states, to maintain peace between all states, or to pursue war where it is favourable to his design. In all these concerns the prosperity of his plans and the greatness of his name depend first and last on the conduct and qualities of the negotiators to whom he entrusts his services. So now we examine in detail the qualities necessary for a good negotiator.

[Sidenote: _Personal Qualities of the Good Negotiator._]

God having endowed men with diverse talents, the best advice that one can give is to take counsel with themselves before choosing their profession. Thus he who would enter the profession of diplomacy must examine himself to see whether he was born with the qualities necessary for success. These qualities are an observant mind, a spirit of application which refuses to be distracted by pleasures or frivolous amusements, a sound judgment which takes the measure of things as they are, and which goes straight to its goal by the shortest and most natural paths without wandering into useless refinements and subtleties which as a rule only succeed in repelling those with whom one is dealing. The negotiator must further possess that penetration which enables him to discover the thoughts of men and to know by the least movement of their countenances what passions are stirring within, for such movements are often betrayed even by the most practised negotiator. He must also have a mind so fertile in expedients as easily to smooth away the difficulties which he meets in the course of his duty; he must have presence of mind to find a quick and pregnant reply even to unforeseen surprises, and by such judicious replies he must be able to recover himself when his foot has slipped. An equable humour, a tranquil and patient nature, always ready to listen with attention to those whom he meets; an address always open, genial, civil, agreeable, with easy and ingratiating manners which assist largely in making a favourable impression upon those around him--these things are the indispensable adjuncts to the negotiator’s profession. Their opposite, the grave and cold air, a melancholy or rough exterior, may create a first impression which is not easily removed. Above all the good negotiator must have sufficient control over himself to resist the longing to speak before he has really thought what he shall say. He should not endeavour to gain the reputation of being able to reply immediately and without premeditation to every proposition which is made, and he should take a special care not to fall into the error of one famous foreign ambassador of our time who so loved an argument that each time he warmed up in controversy he revealed important secrets in order to support his opinion.

[Sidenote: _The Air of Mystery._]

But indeed there is another fault of which the negotiator must beware: he must not fall into the error of supposing that an air of mystery, in which secrets are made out of nothing and in which the merest bagatelle is exalted into a great matter of state, is anything but a mark of smallness of mind and betokens an incapacity to take the true measure either of men or of things. Indeed, the more the negotiator clothes himself in mystery, the less he will have means of discovering what is happening and of acquiring the confidence of those with whom he deals. A continual reserve is like the lock on a door which is never turned and becomes so rusty that in the end no man can open it. The able negotiator will of course not permit his secret to be drawn from him except at his own time, and he should be able to disguise from his competitor the fact that he has any secret to reveal; but in all other matters he must remember that open dealing is the foundation of confidence and that everything which he is not compelled by duty to withhold ought to be freely shared with those around him. He will thus gradually establish terms of confidence with his neighbours, from which he may draw immense profit, for it may not infrequently happen that in exchange for some trivial information given by himself, the negotiator may, as it were by accident, receive important news from his colleague in another embassy. The practised negotiator will know how to employ the circumstances of his life and of the lives of those around him in such a manner as to lead them naturally and without restraint to talk of the conditions and affairs of their own country, and the more extended his view and the wider his knowledge the more surely will he thus gather important news every day of his life.

[Sidenote: _Dignity._]

Let it not be supposed, however, that the good negotiator requires only the light of a high intellect, dexterity, and other fine qualities of the mind. He must show that the ordinary sentiments of the human heart move in him, for there is no kind of employment in which at the same time elevation and nobility of spirit and a kindly courtesy in little things are more necessary. An ambassador indeed resembles in a certain sense the actor placed before the eyes of the public in order that he may play a great part, for his profession raises him above the ordinary condition of mankind and makes him in some sort the equal of the masters of the earth by that right of representation which attaches to his service, and by the special relations which his office gives him with the mighty ones of the earth. He must therefore be able to simulate a dignity even if he possess it not; but this obligation is the rock upon which many an astute negotiator has perished because he did not know in what dignity consisted. No negotiation was ever assisted by open or veiled menaces merely for their own sake, and negotiators too often confuse a proud and arrogant bearing with that careful dignity which ought to clothe their office. To advance pretensions or to demand excessive privileges is merely the sign of pride and of a desire to extract from the privileged position of an ambassador a personal and unworthy advantage, in the doing of which an ambitious negotiator may easily and utterly compromise the whole authority of his master. No man who enters diplomacy in a spirit of avarice or with a desire to seek interests other than those of his service, or merely with the desire to earn the applause of the crowd, or to attract esteem and recompense from his master, will ever make success in negotiation. And even if some important duty may be well discharged in his hands, it is only to be attributed to some happy conjuncture of events which in itself smoothed away all difficulties.

[Sidenote: _Influence of Women._]

To maintain the dignity of diplomacy the negotiator must clothe himself in liberality and generosity of heart, even in magnificence, but all with care and a frugality of design so that the trappings of his office do not by their display outshine the sterling merits of his own character and person. Let clean linen and appointments and delicacy reign at his table. Let him frequently give banquets and diversions in honour of the principal persons of the court in which he lives, and even in the honour of the prince himself, if he so cares to take part. Let him also enter into the spirit of the same diversions offered by others, but always in a light, unconstrained, and agreeable manner, and always with an open, good-natured, straightforward air, and with a continual desire to give pleasure to others. If the custom of the country in which he serves permits freedom of conversation with the ladies of the court, he must on no account neglect any opportunity of placing himself and his master in a favourable light in the eyes of these ladies, for it is well known that the power of feminine charm often extends to cover the weightiest resolutions of state. The greatest events have sometimes followed the toss of a fan or the nod of a head. But let him beware! Let him do all things in his power, by the magnificence of his display, by the polish, attraction, and gallantry of his person, to engage their pleasure, but let him beware lest he engage his own heart. He must never forget that Love’s companions are Indiscretion and Imprudence, and that the moment he becomes pledged to the whim of a favoured woman, no matter how wise he may be, he runs a grave risk of being no longer master of his own secrets. We have often seen terrible results follow from this kind of weakness into which even the greatest ministers are liable to fall, and we need go no further than our own time for remarkable examples and warnings.

[Sidenote: _Power of the Purse._]

Now, as the surest way of gaining the good-will of a prince is to gain the good graces of those who have most influence upon his mind, a good negotiator must reinforce his own good manners, his insight of character, and attraction of person by certain expenses which will largely assist in opening his road before him. But these expenses must be laid out in the proper measure. They must be made by a careful design; and wherever large gifts are offered, the giver must take care beforehand to know that they will be received in the right spirit and above all that they will not be refused. I do not mean that there are not countries where no great art is needed in the matter of giving gifts. In such a country they are no longer gifts but bribes; but it is always to be remembered that there is a certain delicacy to be observed in all commerce of this kind, and that a gift presented in the right spirit, at the right moment, by the right person, may act with tenfold power upon him who receives it. There are various established customs in different countries by which occasion arises for making small presents. This kind of expense, though it occasions but a small outlay of money, may contribute largely to the esteem in which an ambassador is held and acquire for him friends at the court to which he is accredited. And, indeed, the manner in which this little custom is carried out may have an important bearing upon high policy. And, of course, in such a matter the practised negotiator will soon be aware that at every court there are certain persons of greater wit than fortune who will not refuse a small gratification or secret subsidy which may bring in large results, for the wit of these persons enables them to maintain a confidential position at court without that personal splendour which the rich nobleman can display. Such persons I say may be of great use to the clever negotiator. Among amusements, for instance, the dancers, who by the fact of their profession have an _entrée_ less formal and in some degree more intimate with the prince than any ambassador can perhaps possess, are often to be found valuable agents in negotiation. Or again, it happens that a monarch has around him certain officers of low rank entrusted with duties which bring them in close contact both with their master and with his minister’s mind, and a timely present aptly given may reveal important secrets. And finally, even great ministers of state themselves may not be inaccessible by the same means.

[Sidenote: _Secret Service._]

It frequently happens in negotiation as in war that well-chosen spies contribute more than any other agency to the success of great plans, and indeed it is clear that there is nothing so well adapted to upset the best design as the sudden and premature revelation of an important secret upon which it depends. And as there is no expense better designed nor more necessary than that which is laid out upon a secret service, it would be inexcusable for a minister of state to neglect it. The general will say with truth that he would sooner have one regiment the less than a poorly equipped system of espionage, and that he would perhaps even forgo reinforcements if he could be accurately informed of the disposition and numbers of the enemy armies. Similarly let an ambassador retrench all superfluous expense in order that he may have the funds at his disposal to maintain a secret service which will inform him of all that happens in the foreign country of his service. Yet despite the universal acknowledged truth of what I say, most negotiators will more readily spend vast sums on a great show of horses and carriages, on rows of useless flunkeys, than on the payment of a few well-chosen agents who could keep them supplied with news. In this matter we should learn a lesson from the Spaniards, who never neglect their secret agents--a fact which I am sure has contributed largely to the success of their ministers in many important negotiations. It is doubtless the success of Spanish agents which has led to the establishment of the wise custom of the Spanish Court to give Spanish ambassadors an extraordinary fund called _Gastos Secretos_.

[Sidenote: _The Honourable Spy._]

The ambassador has sometimes been called an honourable spy because one of his principal occupations is to discover great secrets; and he fails in the discharge of his duty if he does not know how to lay out the necessary sums for this purpose. Therefore an ambassador should be a man born with a liberal hand ready to undertake willingly large expenses of this kind; and he must be even prepared to do it at his own charges when the emoluments of his master are insufficient. For as his principal aim must be to succeed, that interest should eclipse all others in any man truly devoted to his profession and capable of succeeding in it. But, on the other hand, the sagacious prince will not neglect the equipment of his negotiators with every possible means for acquiring friends and secret agents in all countries where his interests are at stake, for these expenses well laid out bring back a large return with usury to the prince who makes them, and do much to smooth away the difficulties which lie in the path of his designs. And he will soon be aware that if he does not employ this expedient his ministers can indeed make but little progress in their negotiations. He will win no new allies but risk losing old ones.

[Sidenote: _Courage._]

Courage is a most necessary quality in a negotiator; for, though the law of nations should give him ample security, there are many occasions in which he will find himself in danger, where he will have to rely upon his own courage and resource to escape from a perilous position without compromising the negotiation on which he is engaged. Thus no timid man can hope to conduct secret designs to success: unforeseen accidents will shake his faith, and in a moment of fear he may too easily give away his secrets even by the passing expression of his countenance and by the manner of his speech. And indeed a too great concern for his personal safety may lead him to take measures highly prejudicial to the duties he has to discharge. And at times when the honour of his master is attacked his timidity may prevent him from maintaining with the necessary vigour the dignity of his office and the prestige of his King. A prelate who was an ambassador at Rome from King Francis I. brought disgrace on his master because he failed to defend him in the Consistory, where the Emperor, Charles V., attempted to cast upon the French King the whole responsibility for the continuation of the war, boasting falsely that he had offered to end it by a single combat with François himself, and that the French King had refused. The King was so furious that he gave the Emperor the lie in public, and made known to the world his displeasure with his own ambassador for failing to uphold the dignity of France. François there and then took the resolution never to employ any man as French ambassador who was not a practised swordsman, and thus he hoped to uphold the honour of his house.

[Sidenote: _Firmness in Dispute._]

A good negotiator must not only be courageous in danger but firm in debate. There are many men who are naturally brave, but cannot maintain an opinion in dispute. The kind of firmness that is needed is that which, having carefully and fully examined the matter, consents to no compromise but pursues with constancy a resolution once adopted till it is carried into effect. Compromise is the easy refuge of the irresolute spirit. The lack of firmness of which I speak here is a common fault of those who have a lively imagination for every kind of accident which may befall, and hinders them from determining with vigour and despatch the means by which action should be taken. They will look at a matter on so many sides that they forget in which direction they are travelling. This irresolution is most prejudicial to the conduct of great affairs which demand a decisive spirit, acting upon a careful balance of advantage and disadvantage, and pursuing the main purpose without abatement. It is said that Cardinal Richelieu, who perhaps took wider views than any man of his time, was somewhat irresolute when he came to action, and that Father Joseph, the Capuchin, a much narrower intelligence than the Cardinal, was of the greatest value to him because, once a decision was taken, he pursued it tenaciously, and often assisted the Cardinal in dismissing designs of compromise by which crafty persons hoped to destroy the original plan.

[Sidenote: _Genius no Substitute for Good Manners._]

There are some geniuses born with such an elevation of character and superiority of mind that they have a natural ascendancy over all whom they meet. But a negotiator of this kind must take good care not to rely too much on his own judgment in order to voice that superiority which he has over other men, for it may earn for him a reputation for arrogance and hardness; and just on account of his very elevation above the level of common humanity, events may escape him, and he may be the dupe of his own self-confidence. He must sometimes consent to meet smaller men on their own ground.

[Sidenote: _Value of Good Faith._]

The good negotiator, moreover, will never found the success of his mission on promises which he cannot redeem or on bad faith. It is a capital error, which prevails widely, that a clever negotiator must be a master of the art of deceit. Deceit indeed is but a measure of the smallness of mind of him who employs it, and simply shows that his intelligence is too meagrely equipped to enable him to arrive at his ends by just and reasonable methods. No doubt the art of lying has been practised with success in diplomacy; but unlike that honesty which here as elsewhere is the best policy, a lie always leaves a drop of poison behind, and even the most dazzling diplomatic success gained by dishonesty stands on an insecure foundation, for it awakes in the defeated party a sense of aggravation, a desire for vengeance, and a hatred which must always be a menace to his foe. Even if deceit were not as despicable to every right-minded man as it is, the negotiator will perhaps bear in mind that he will be engaged throughout life upon the affairs of diplomacy, and that it is therefore his interest to establish a reputation for plain and fair dealing so that men may know that they can rely upon him; for one negotiation successfully carried through by the honesty and high intelligence of a diplomatist will give him a great advantage in other enterprises on which he embarks in the future. In every country where he goes he will be received with esteem and pleasure, and men will say of him and of his master that their cause is too good to be served by evil means. For if the negotiator is obliged to observe with faithfulness all the promises which he has made, it will be at once seen that both he himself and the prince whom he serves are to be relied on.

[Sidenote: _Perils of Deceit._]

This is surely a well-known truth and so indispensable a duty that it would appear superfluous to recommend it. At the same time many negotiators have been so corrupted by converse usages that they have forgotten the uses of truth--upon which I shall make but one observation, which is, that the prince or minister who has been deceived by his own negotiator probably began by teaching that negotiator the lesson of deception; or, if he did not, he suffers because he has made the choice of a bad servant. It is not enough to choose a clever and well-instructed man for the discharge of high political duties. The agent in such affairs must be a man of probity and one who loves truth, for otherwise there can be no confidence in him. It is true that this probity is not often found joined to that capacity for taking wide views which is so necessary to a diplomatist, nor is it always found in a man well stored with all the necessary knowledge which we have already described as the equipment of a good negotiator. I may be reminded that a prince is often obliged to use diverse instruments in order to accomplish his ends, and that there have been men of little virtue who proved themselves great negotiators and in whose hands high affairs of state have prospered, and that men of this type being restrained by no scruples have more often succeeded in delicate negotiations than have the right men who have employed none but honest means.

[Sidenote: _Monsieur de Faber rebukes Cardinal Mazarin._]

But let it be remarked that the prince who entrusts his negotiations to this type of diplomatist cannot count upon their good services except as long as he himself is prosperous. In difficult times, or at moments when disgrace seems to have fallen upon him, these master-rogues will be the first to betray him and to take service on the side of the strong. Here then we find the final recommendation of the necessity of employing honest men. I am reminded of the fine reply of Monsieur de Faber, who was Marshal of France, to Cardinal Mazarin when this great minister wished to bring over a man of substance, who shall be nameless, to his own party. He entrusted the delicate duty to Monsieur de Faber, charging him to offer great promises which he admitted he was not in a position to redeem. Monsieur de Faber refused the commission in these words: ‘Monseigneur, you will find many men ready to carry false messages; but you have some need of honest men to speak the truth. I beg of you to retain me for the latter service.’

[Sidenote: _Loose Livers make Bad Negotiators._]

Finally, it is in a high degree dangerous to entrust an important negotiation to a man of irregular life whose domestic and personal habits are disorderly. How can one expect of such a man a greater degree of order and of decency in public affairs than that which he shows in his own private concerns, which ought indeed to be the constant gauge of his capacity. If he is too fond of the gaming-table, of the wine-glass, and of frivolous amusements, he is not to be entrusted with the discharge of high diplomatic duty, for he will be so unreliable that at moments when he seeks the satisfaction of his ill-regulated desires he will be prepared to sell the highest secrets of his master.

[Sidenote: _The Cool Head._]