Chapter II: Part 2

When Hardin's Ranch, 16 miles from Fort R----, was reached, I bivouacked my men and taking Charlton proceeded to reconnoitre-- I found two tall, gaunt, leathery, bony, unprepossessing, sour-looking females-- With some hesitation, I approached my delicate mission or undertaking and began to interview them, using all of the engaging manners and suave (?) diplomacy I was capable of--which, as a soldier--so I have been told--has never been of a very pronounced character. It availed me nothing-- To the inquiry as to whether any of the men were at home, and if any carbines had been left at the ranch by these soldiers when going down the country, the reply was curtly snapped out--"No"!-- They 'lowed they hadn't never seen no carbines; the "old man" wasn't home-- I _politely_ asked if I might "look about the ranch and premises"-- That stirred the gall of these specimens of the gentle, tender sex-- "No! you can't"!-- Then I began a mild form of the "Third Degree"--and bringing up the man who had--under pressure--"Squealed"--to identify the women--and to make an even stronger statement as to the disposal of their carbines--we were met with nothing but repulses, followed by foul abuse--such as: "You blue-bellied Yankees better go away from here--if the "old man" was here he would lick you uns outen yer boots", etc.-- I was not, at this point, inclined to spoil the reputation I had already acquired or sacrifice my good name, or make any slip by any "Violation of the Civil Law" now in full force in all parts of Texas--in view of Mackenzie's explicit instructions on that point-- Neither did I feel inclined to be beaten just at this stage of the game--the end of this frightfully exhausting and most momentous trip, or to be balked and bluffed by these two raw bone, belligerent termagants, and lose the fruits of my thus far assured success-- I wanted to make a clean "sweep up" of my trip, and, in order to do so--_I must have those carbines_, now that I felt I was so close to them-- So I swung around to other tactics--or, rather _Grand Strategy_-- "If you don't produce those carbines from their places of concealment, which I know to be here or about your premises, I shall be compelled to search your ranch"-- This last shot hit hard-- More and more abuse, coupled with more threats of what the "old man" would do to me. The climax had now come-- I could not see my way clear to bluff any longer-- I felt that I must act at once and decisively-- "Corporal Charlton, call the men at once-- Search this ranch thoroughly-- If necessary rip up the floors, and turn over the "_loft_"; ransack all of the out buildings, but be careful that you do not injure these _ladies_" (?) "If they resist or try to use any guns, treat them as you would 'he' _men_; jump on them, and securely rope them--and don't let them get 'the drop' on you-- You take charge of the job and see that it is well done"-- His steel-blue eyes flashed-- My musketeer Corporal--"d'Artagnon"--sprang at it with a relish-- He had heard, and been the object--of much of the abuse of these scolding viragos-- The ranch was thoroughly searched--the "rough-neck" women offering no resistance except with their bitter tongues which shot off the vilest sort of "_Billings gate_"-- It was without avail. The carbines were evidently concealed at some point distant from the house-- As we were about to leave--the women, unconquered--again spat out-- "If the 'old man' wuz heah he would lick you uns out o' yer boots". Here was a fine chance for another bluff. I walked up to them, and in my most impressive manner gave here this decisive Coup d'Etat-- "_If your old man doesn't deliver those carbines into Fort Richardson by 10 o'clock to-morrow morning--I will bring this same detachment out here with a raw hide lariat and hang him to that oak tree_"-- They had seen me ransack the ranch, they had known what that threat of hanging meant in the reconstruction days among the "bad men"--the "gun men" and desperadoes of the far South West-- They showed signs of wilting--and I departed, inwardly cursing the luck which had deserted me at the last moment and compelled me to make a raw bluff which I knew full well I could not carry out or enforce in view of Mackenzie's _most strenuous official objections_--

Land the Prisoners--The "Old Man" Makes Good

Reaching Fort R---- in a few hours and reporting to Mackenzie the prisoners were "turned over"--and I was just seeking a shave, a hot bath--some good grub and a rest from the dreadful "wear and tear" of one of the most wearing and completely exhaustive duties I had ever performed, either during the Civil War or later, when Mackenzie sent for me-- I was still in a very dirty and bedraggled suit of citizen clothes-- I needed complete relaxation and rest from my week's gruelling trip--during which, with the exception of two nights, I had slept, or tried to sleep--"out in the open" in this howling icy "Norther"--and with much responsibility pressing upon me. "Ask the General to please excuse me until I shave, wash, and change my clothes"-- Word came back at once-- "Tell him that Gen. Hardie is here and wishes to see him particularly. Never mind his personal appearance--come now just as he is"! It was virtually an order-- So I went but in a condition of wilted militarism. Mackenzie opened up with a most cordial introduction to Gen. H---- and the remark: "Gen. Hardie, I want you to see what my officers of _Civil War record_" (I inwardly grew profane) "can accomplish when they are sent out in weather like this to get results under merely '_verbal instructions_', and acting alone under their own initiative, good judgment and discretion-- He has done far more than I expected of him and I am extremely gratified". He continued with profuse congratulations, thanks and personal commendations.

"Congratulations"--"Thanks"--"Special Commendations," Etc.--A Soothing Balm (?)

Gen. James A. Hardie, then an Assistant Inspector General U. S. Army--the one time friend and confidential Military Adviser of Abraham Lincoln, whom he selected to send on that delicate mission to Frederick City, Md., to relieve Gen. Hooker from command of the Army of the Potomac just prior to the Battle of Gettysburg--appointing Gen. Meade to succeed him--happened to be at Fort R---- on his annual tour of inspection of the frontier posts. After such an introduction from Mackenzie--Gen. Hardie was very informal-- He was a very handsome man, then about 48 years of age-- He was very courteous and had an exceedingly attractive personality-- With the disparity in our ages, he seemed, at that period, to be a very "old man". He had served in the Mexican War, and died as a Brevet Maj. General, Dec. 14, 1876-- Placing both hands on my shoulders he said: "Young man, I am proud of you-- General Mackenzie ought to be proud of having such an officer in his regiment." "I want to personally congratulate and warmly thank you for the fine work you have done-- It was a duty of very great responsibility, and you should be commended not only by the Department, but by the entire Army. I believe it is a record that you should be very proud of." In rehearsing my adventures to them, I came to the incident at Hardin's ranch, and my encounter with the two "Jezabels"-- Mackenzie flared up-- "Didn't I particularly impress upon you in my '_verbal instructions_' that you must not '_violate the Civil Law_' in any way--I----" Without waiting for him to finish his sentence, I replied: "Well, Sir! I have violated no Civil Law. I have hung nobody as yet, only made a huge bluff. You will see those carbines here to-morrow morning". The "old man" who was going to "lick me out of my boots"--promptly at 10 o'clock--rolled into Fort R---- _with all of the carbines_. I happened to be at the Adjutant's office-- "Is the Gineral in"? "He is"!-- "I've brought in them guns"!-- After making a statement more or less satisfactory of how they happened to come into his possession, and after Mackenzie had "hauled him over the coals" for a "send off"--the rancher departed--"a sadder but a wiser" man. I never got any _sweet looks_ from the "ladies" after that when duty called me past that ranch.

Lawton came in a day or two later. He certainly was "out of luck"-- The deserters had not headed his way. He had gone farther than the writer-- Way up into the Indian Nation (now Oklahoma), and not only had not succeeded in "bagging" anybody, but, most unfortunately, one of the best men in his detachment deserted, taking his horse, arms and entire equipment with him. After ascertaining what had come my way, he seemed to be much crest fallen.

A few days afterwards Mackenzie, upon hearing that another man of Troop "F" was known to be a deserter, and had been located rather vaguely as being in the "Keechi Valley"--sent for me, and, after smilingly giving me as well as he was able, the location of the ranch--and announcing that as I had been proved the "_champeen_" catcher of deserters, he was going to send me out after him-- He trusted that I would not belie my "reputation"-- After a day's trip in fine weather I was able to definitely place him, and after watching the ranch all day--surrounded it, and, without any trouble, captured him as he came in from his work in the field-- My record now was: 11 deserters and 3 citizens, two of them Constables--with all the arms carried away from the post. Corporal Charlton had proved himself a very invaluable man. As a soldier he was wonderfully resourceful and active; in action he was intense, energetic and decisive. With his intelligence and good, horse sense, he would, even without the complete education which some men have _without sense_--have made a good all round commissioned officer--a credit to the regiment and to the Army-- It is a pity that we did not have more of his type with which to build up the army with practical men of his caliber--instead of having so much over educated material.

I had gained much valuable experience in the methods of unearthing rascality, and in accomplishing results, under dreadful exposure and hardships; many trials and difficulties.

Shortly after this the writer received a letter of thanks from the Department. As it is the only one that he ever received, and as he never expects to receive another--it is esteemed as a rare curiosity--and it is modestly added to complete the record and round out the story.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
Office of Ass't Adjutant General,
_San Antonio, Texas, Jan. 4, 1872_.

Second Lieutenant ROBERT G. CARTER, 4th Cavalry,
(Through Headquarters, Fort Richardson, Texas)--

SIR:--

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your report of the
9th ultimo, relative to your pursuit of deserters under Special
Orders No. 280, Fort Richardson, Texas, dated November 29,
1871,--which resulted in the capture of ten deserters.

The Department Commander desires me to express to you his
_gratification at your success_, and his _special commendation
for the zeal and ability displayed by you_.

The good conduct and faithful services of the enlisted men
composing the detachment, and Mr. Rhodes, citizen guide, is
deemed a proper subject for a letter of commendation to the
Post Commander.

I am Sir, very respectfully, your ob't servant,
(Signed) H. CLAY WOOD,
_Assistant Adjutant Gen_

Military Experience and Common Sense vs. Military Education and "Intensive Training"

If a man is not endowed with good common sense, or it is not an inherent trait--no amount of training he might receive at West Point or any other Military institution for the purpose of educating that sense into him, or cultivating what little sense he possesses--especially the military or fighting sense--or, any effort to convert him into a practical soldier, could make him one, and the time and effort will have been worse than wasted-- It is simply impossible to supply in him by mere education what he is lacking through nature's gift--and this truth--absolutely axiomatic--applies to all walks of life-- Good sense, combined with a liberal education well directed along right lines, makes for success in all pursuits, whether as President, lawyer, doctor, minister, the business man or the professional soldier-- But all the education in the wide universe, unaccompanied by good sense, spells defeat for any class--and would not rescue a man from common mediocrity-- The world's trail is strewn with such senseless wrecks-- They are mere human derelicts on the ocean of life--and the more a man of that type is educated or over educated the worse it is; and the more accentuated does his failure become--the more apparent his lack of common sense, and the more liability there is to wreckage-- In no other profession does this become so painfully apparent or more pronounced than in that of the professional soldier, when some desperate effort is being made to create--manufacture, or transform a little man in uniform, a parvenue or a man of mediocre caliber--into a great commander of men--one whose horse sense is particularly lacking--or which cannot by any amount of education or training be developed--and worse still when he himself through an over supply of egotism or conceit is not, nor can he be made aware of his failing, but bungles along until disaster overtakes him and his command, and every thing connected with him and them--

The writer claims that there has not been, nor is there now sufficient care taken in the selection of candidates for entrance to the Military Academy. Little or no heed is taken of their aptitude or fitness for a Military career--and that there are in the service to-day many officers who, from this lack of fitness and deficiency in common sense, are an incubus to the Army--and should be "canned"-- Competitive examinations in Congressional Districts develop a class of bright students--some honor men ranking high in their class studies and highly specialized along certain lines, but who, from lack of inherent qualities, fail in the essentials that go to make up an alert, well-balanced, clear-headed, resourceful, decisive, "cracker-jack"--rough and tumble soldier in the field-- It is not in them-- Those who have had campaign and battle-field experience--have all seen this-- Entrance to West Point on certificates or diplomas from High Schools do not altogether fill the bill either--for they are apt to be guided by political favoritism or Congressional pull rather than a selection on general merit and fitness for a military life[A]--based generally upon good health--a sound body and a clear, receptive mind--"Mens sana in corpore sano" but, above all things the one dominating desire to adopt the Army as a life career alone--combined with plenty of good, sound--horse sense--West Point will do the rest in the way of preparation and training-- Many of the College and School systems are not uniform or in any way co-ordinated with the class instructions at West Point--and much that these students have gone over in Freshmen--Sophomore--Junior or even Senior courses have to be undone--gone over again--or entirely reversed-- The writer has seen a College junior utterly fail or "fall down" at his preliminary examination for lack of thoroughness and drill in the _three "R's"_-- All this is a waste of time-- If then, the student's bent is not inclined to an Army life--and his heart is not in it--but to the law, medicine or the ministry--there is more waste and loss of time--in trying to convert a good minister, lawyer, doctor or grocer into a mighty poor soldier-- All of these qualifications, and predilections--the individual tastes and preferences of the young candidates should be considered, looked into and carefully weighed in selecting, educating and launching men into a career where they, by rapid promotion, are bound to become the future ranking officers and commanders of our Armies-- Many a slip and disaster have occurred in an Army by misplaced judgment--slowness of decision and lack of common sense in trying to fit a "square peg into a round hole" or by educating a man for the service and permitting him to attain high rank and high command before it shall have been discovered that he not only does not possess the necessary qualifications for the same but is absolutely deficient in good sense--good judgment, decisive action, or even the ordinary military instincts to maintain the high standard of efficiency and success pertaining thereto--and upon which all depends-- In a garrison of 10 troops of Cavalry and three Companies of Infantry--Mackenzie had not only carefully gone over the entire roster from which to select two officers upon whose experience and good judgment he could absolutely depend for the performance of a duty in which he not only wanted but expected and demanded decisive results, but he had revolved all the possibilities and probabilities of dismal failure had he selected any other than Lawton and myself.

[A] Theodore Roosevelt in his "Letters to His Children"--pp.
87-89, referring to his son "Ted" entering West Point, says: "It
would be a great misfortune for you to start into the Army or
Navy as a career and find that _you had mistaken your desires_
and had gone in without fully weighing the matter. You ought not
to enter _unless you feel genuinely drawn to the life as a
life-work_. If so, go in, but not otherwise." * * "Mr. Loeb
(Secretary to President Roosevelt) says he wished to enter the
army _because he did not know what to do_, could not foresee
whether he would succeed or fail in life, and felt that the army
_would give him a living and a career_. Now, if this is at
bottom of your feeling I should advise you not to go in. I
should say _yes_ to _some boys, but not to you_." If all fathers
had given as good advice to their sons who have been aspirants
to that kind of military glory which would give them "_a living
and a career_", we would have been saved the mortification of
"canning" some of our graduates of West Point during this world
war, who having acquired the "_career_" were not worth the
powder with which to blow them out of their O. D. (Olive Drab)
uniforms.

It is hoped that the writer will neither be charged with petty conceit, undue egotism nor personal vanity in making these simple declarations of facts the absolute truth of which never was, nor ever could be gainsayed by any officer of that period in the Fourth Cavalry.

In this entire campaign after these deserters, success was dependent, not upon any study or knowledge of tactics, strategy, or any game of war, but largely upon good, common sense, sound judgment--almost intuition--a ready resourcefulness and quick, decisive action-- It was practically outside of a theoretical conception of any war problem--as we understand it, but included within the scope of its practical activities. No book has ever been written, or ever will be, which could begin to lay down any cut and dried plan of action, rules, or any fundamental principles in a case like this, or hundreds of other cases similar to the performance of such special duties, any more than a text book could have been written prior to 1914 on how to deal with the German methods of conducting a war for the subjugation of the world by trench, barbed wire and dug-out systems along the Hindenberg lines, etc. All the study of a life time involving such problems, or military knowledge, would be of no avail to some men,--whether civilians or soldiers--unless they possessed, at the same time, plenty of resourcefulness and horse sense and could readily adjust themselves to the ever changing conditions of those same problems. The factors never remain fixed or constant. It is the same in battle and with the factors controlling it--which accounts for the lack of success of many so called soldiers by their failure to get away from fixed rules. There is one word that seems to involve the main spring of a soldier's action in all such emergencies--and that is--_Experience_--and the practical application of that experience to all of the problems of life whether great or small, but especially in puzzling situations like this, where the factors are dependent on no fixed rules--are never constant--and therefore events so shape themselves in such rapid succession that without quick, decisive action based upon one's resources and sound judgment gained by experience--the dependence upon study of any books which might bear in any way upon such conditions would, not only prove a most ridiculous farce, but would be offering a premium on commonplace student soldiers--obtuseness and asinine stupidity.

There is such a thing in the development of a soldier along certain lines for practical work, as _over education_, as well as _over training_-- In the one case he thinks he knows so much that he cannot be taught any more, and is apt, therefore, to eliminate entirely the element of common sense--the one factor for success upon which he must largely depend--and to neglect to apply some of the most simple and practical principles in his earlier education--and, in the other case he may go stale, and lose much of his spirit, enthusiasm and energy while waiting to test out his knowledge in the real field of endeavor and practical experience.

Soldiers Not Born

It has been said that "artists and poets are born"--and "_soldiers are made_". True it is, however, that Soldiers are not born. There is not, and there never will be such a thing as a born soldier, not even in a hereditary sense. They must be trained. But--to educate and train a man to be a soldier certain basic elements are absolutely necessary. Ever since the world began, and hero worship and the cheers, applause and adulations were first bestowed on such warriors as Caesar, Hannibal, Alexander and Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and on numerous other returning conquerors, it has become well known that certain elements or basic principles have been necessary upon which to build in order to develop and produce the really great soldier.

Taking the raw material to educate and train, it has been found essential that a man should possess one or more of the following requisites. Military bent, instinct or intuition-- Military aptitude and spirit--and any one or all of these must necessarily be combined with good, sound, common sense. All, or any one of these elements must either be inherent or latent and ready for development--for it is--and has been found--absolutely impossible to develop these essentials in any one man by a mere process of military education or intensive training-- Unless a man possesses one or more of these necessary requisites or material to work on, such education or training is so much wasted effort or labor lost.

It has frequently happened that men, without possessing any of these basic elements, not even military sense--or instinct, or the military spirit--have undergone a military education and severe intensive training to fit them for what they have been led to believe through their theoretical instruction are the problems of battle which they have got to face up to and overcome. Sometimes it has been found necessary that this initiatory effort shall be made on a real (not a sham) battle-field. The shock--the rude awakening, the stress, strain and disillusionment of real battle has then come with such a startling surprise to some men not physically up to a soldier's standard as to throw them off their feet--break them down before it is discovered that lack of physical strength alone debars them from the military profession, and so destroys their morale and esprit de corps as to render them unfit for further field service. The ever changing and rapid developments of battle are so great and constantly pressing that they call for all there is in any man--and in the twinkling of an eye; his cool courage--his level-headed judgment--his every ounce of resourcefulness--and instant decision is called into such rapid action and it is so quickly drawn upon as to afford no opportunity for much study, long deliberation, or the privilege of consulting with others. During this sudden trying out process--the most strenuous that can be applied to any human being as a complete test of the would be and so called professional soldier--he may develop just this lack of stamina and courage-- Of what possible use then is the swivel chair soldier who, without military bent, instinct or spirit--the military coup d'oeuil or sense--rushes into battle only to find that it is not what has been described to him--that the spectacular and moving picture feature of it is all lacking--and that he is, in every sense out of place in command of battle service soldiers and an entire "misfit." Could anything be more pitiful or pathetic than to see an over educated, over trained soldier of twenty or thirty years' service who has never been "tried out" when he first makes this discovery? The writer has seen it! These men when faced up with responsibility, and an emergency, exigency or crisis arises--always "fall down". They are soon led to recognize their absolute unfitness for the military profession, for a military command or to handle any problem growing out of a military position requiring ripe experience along the lines of ready judgment, rapid action and quick decision. It is generally too late then, however, few having the good sense to recognize their failure and leave the service in time to avoid the disaster that is sure to overtake either themselves or the unfortunate men under their command and subject to their blunders and almost criminal short comings. This disposes of an officer's going into battle before he is ripe--or has been given the battle instinct and battle sense to try out his theoretical battle knowledge in the presence of any enemy on the assumption that the book knowledge he has gained has fitted him for such a test out.

Sometimes--all this effort to make a man a soldier who does not possess the necessary elements, is attempted through the "Plattsburg system" of intensive training with the same result-- Again it may be tried through numerous service schools--the General Staff--the War College course, etc. But--eventually and inevitably without some one or all of these basic elements to build on--to unfold, develop and train whatever of the military spirit that there is in him, it will become necessary, sooner or later to eliminate him from the game--i. e., to "Can" him. The writer has scarcely ever seen it fail-- And when there has been any exception to the rule through political pull or favoritism--and this incompetent, would-be professional soldier is retained, disaster has been written all over the pages of his unfortunate military career. All of our wars--the Civil War--Spanish-American--and now our great World War have clearly demonstrated this. It is pitiful therefore to see men struggling along in uniform--absolutely incapable of acquiring battle instinct or battle sense (simply because they cannot be taught) and the requisites for a rough and tumble soldier in the field, capable of commanding men under all circumstances of the emergencies and crises continually arising to test out a man's military resources--and his ready adaptation to the problems before him, etc.--because of the lack of just those elements that go to make up the ever ready soldier. The education of such men along military--but, more especially along the line of battle problems is an offense to the nostrils and a clear violation of common sense, besides giving most battle-service soldiers an indescribable weariness.

Courage Alone Not Effective

Courage, either in the Army or civil life, is a cheap commodity. Almost every soldier should and does possess it to a certain degree. All combative animals have it more or less. It certainly is not a rare virtue in our service. The man who does not possess it is an exception to the rule-- The point is, however, whether he has that amount of physical and moral courage to a degree which, without common sense and the military spirit--would make his acts a military success. The writer thinks not-- Too much stress has been laid on the mere physical brute courage of the soldier. Without it is combined with good military sense--it is doubtful if possessing courage alone could ever make a success of anything in which any of the military elements cited enter as a factor. Nothing so surprises a man of mediocre caliber--one who has been mistakenly or wrongfully steered into a military career without there being the slightest evidence of his fitness for it--one who has been stuffed full of the theory of war and of battle conditions, as to--suddenly butt up against the real article--a genuine wild-cat battle with all of its quickly varying conditions and phases. And by such a battle I do not mean one afar off; at some observation or listening post within sound of the guns--or in some bomb proof or sheltered dug out--where he can talk over the telephone; or look upon it as he would a moving picture--but directly on, or right in rear of an infantry battle-line under direct rifle, shrapnel, canister, or machine-gun fire--a bullet-swept field--such as many of us Civil War men saw on the battle-field of Fredericksburg, Va., Dec. 13-14, 1862. One hundred and fifty yards from the "Sunken Road"--at the foot of "Maryes Heights". With no cover except the shell-mangled, disemboweled bodies which we rolled up in front of us and used for breast works, behind which we sought the only shelter we had for 30 long winter hours in the half frozen mud--the plane of fire just grazing our heads on that bullet-swept terrain--and the bodies being whipped, frazzled and torn to pieces in front of our noses by terrific rifle and shrapnel fire as we vainly endeavored to relieve our weary frames by turning over from right to left or on our backs and stomachs.

That was a battle-field where the soldier not only had to use his courage, his wits and common sense, but all of his resources. He will doubtless discover in a few minutes that this situation and this crisis was not included in what he has studied and booked up as theoretical battle knowledge and does not apply or fit in to any battle scheme that has been--without consulting him--staged on his front--and particularly to such a frightful and perilous situation. Right here will come in his aptitude and true merit as a soldier--and his real practical test out. It applies to any other military problem where the element of common sense must enter as a determining factor. It enters into all walks of business where business sense is so absolutely necessary. It entered into this problem of the pursuit of deserters. All of our varied campaign and battle service, and experience and knowledge gained during that great Civil War--and our practical activities in scouting and campaigning after wild, hostile Indians subsequent to that war entered into this chase and capture, as _Military factors_--without which we would have been as helpless as two children.

Who could look ahead into that long, trackless, desolate hundred miles of thinly settled country--almost a wilderness--with small towns more than 40 miles apart--in the midst of a bitter cold tempest of rain, snow, sleet and ice--and rely upon any Service School scheme of study, or War College papers and compositions upon obsolete campaigns and battles--or any extended use of war games--annual maneuvers or sham battles, etc., things that many of our young officers have been fed upon for years to fit them for great wars, emergencies, crises, etc.--and predicted any success for either Lawton or the writer? Any experience (?) gained in such theoretical military knowledge as would fit into such a case--would have been about as effective for Lawton and myself as our study of the Sanskrit and Chinese languages.

It was a problem based purely upon military experience gained by hard knocks and campaigns and in battles--seasoned up with plenty of good, sound horse sense--combined with our battle discipline and morale; courage, resourcefulness and powers of endurance entered, of course, as factors. These were our guides. One's complete education, and years of the most violent intensive training ever devised by any military machine of West Point Manufacture would have accomplished absolutely nothing along the lines we worked to secure the unqualified success--that was expected and demanded of us by such an exacting soldier as Mackenzie. There was nothing the writer had so laboriously studied and learned in his course at West Point that could by any construction or stretch of the imagination, have fitted in, or been of the slightest use in this problem. No Mathematics--No Algebra with its "Binomial Theorem;" no plane Geometry with its fascinating "Pons Asinorum"; No Trigonometry with its sines and co-sines; no Descriptive or Analytical Geometry with planes of reference, etc. No Calculus with its integrations and differentiations; or equations "A" and "B". No Spherical Astronomy with its "Polaris"--or projections of the Eclipse; No Optics or Acoustics. No spectral Analysis. No trays of Minerals--with the blow pipe and testing acids to determine "Fools Gold" or Iron Pyrites from the real article, would have fitted one for the real acid test when the most critical stage of the game--confronted him. Neither would the perfect tactical drills--magnificent parades and inspections which have so delighted foreign visitors and the American people who have a right to be so proud--as the writer is himself--of our great National Military Academy--probably the finest Academy in the world-- But--and here comes the crux of one's best endeavors along military lines where complete success is the goal--the education the writer gained during that Civil War--the daily experience--the frequent campaign and battle tests--the self control--the patience--the confidence--the discipline and morale, tried out as in a crucible--the strength, steadiness and tenacity of purpose under battle conditions--with rifle, shrapnel and canister fire--for there were no machine guns or grenades in those days--in such battles as Bull Run--Antietam, Fredericksburg--Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, etc., and the influences which they wrought upon one's character in later years to deal with things that to some men would appear to be simply impossible--all these combined with the true military spirit--and good, common sense were the determining factors in that strange adventure so far as they are able to guide us in this mysterious and complex game of life--or can enter into the human problems in which we engage and are ever attempting to solve to our satisfaction and credit. Such was the philosophy and logical reasoning of we two "hold overs" of the Civil War, as we plodded our weary way across the black prairies--in the howling "Norther"--in our pursuit of these deserters. Little or no thought was given to the training received at the Military Academy beyond a well nourished pride in its motto of "Honor--Duty--Country"--the balance was in our pride as battle-service soldiers of the Civil War--and all of our knowledge and experience gained thereby--but especially so far as the writer was concerned to a short period of service at a huge conscript and "substitute" camp[B] where he acted as a provost guard--and as a young detective among many deserters from every Army and Navy in the world--hardened and desperate criminals of the worst description--intent on receiving a large bounty only to desert at the first opportunity and enlisting at another rendezvous--repeating this trick ad libitum. Here was real human character depicted in its worst forms of iniquity--depravity--greed--selfishness--low cunning--trickery, treachery--atrocity--and the most desperate crimes--not stopping short of black-jacking--garroting--sand-bagging--robbery and frequent murders. To mingle with them was to know their types--their methods--habits, resources, etc. All this knowledge was of incalculable value to the writer when the plunge was made into darkness and the depths of an uncertainty--of an adventure the outcome of which could be but problematical or only to be guessed at.

[B] Note--Men who had been paid large bounties during the draft
period to take the place of men who were _long_ on money, but
were _short on gall_--and who had no stomach for a fight of any
kind.

All this applied to Lawton, who, although he was not a graduate of West Point, had had the same campaign and battle experience as the writer--and as Lieut. Colonel Commanding the 30th Indian Volunteer Infantry had developed in him all of the necessary elements at Chickamauga--Missionary Ridge--Dalton--Resaca--Kenesaw Mountain and in his march with Sherman "from Atlanta to the sea"--which, as essential factors would fit into our problem--and which, many years later, he fully exemplified in the Philippines by his push, energy, iron will, resourcefulness, well-balanced judgment and quick, decisive action which strongly marked every movement in his campaigns, and characterized him as the personification of an ever ready and perfectly trained--although not _intensively_ trained--soldier--the magnificent soldier without frills, furbelows, fuss or feathers--that he was--

Training of the "Rough Riders"

Too much stress has been given to a long, intensive training as absolutely necessary to fit men to become good, reliable battle-service soldiers, or to enable them to tackle either purely military problems, or such problems as confronted us in our long, exhaustive pursuit of those deserters. Perfection of drill and military training is one thing through a continuous and harassing barrack or field training. To fit men to become alert, resourceful, obedient soldiers for quick and ready service through discipline and a minimum of tactical drill is altogether another thing when a war is fully on. Theodore Roosevelt in his Autobiography (p. 250) says: "The reason why it takes so long to turn the average citizen, etc., into a good infantryman or cavalryman is because it takes a long while to teach the average untrained man how to shoot, to march, to take care of himself in the open, to be alert, resourceful, cool, daring and resolute, and to fit himself to act on his own responsibility (individual initiative). If he already possesses these qualities there is very little difficulty in making him a good soldier (nor should it take a long time). All the drill necessary to enable him to march and to fight is of a simple character. _Parade ground and barrack square maneuvers are of no earthly consequence in real war._ When men can readily change from line to column, and column to line, can form front in any direction, and assemble and _scatter_ (deploy), and can do other things with speed and precision they have got a fairly good grasp on the essentials."

No amount of long drawn out drill will give him battle instinct or battle sense; not until he goes in under fire and faces up to what he sooner or later has got to encounter,--drill or no drill--does he acquire it.

Leaving out the non-essentials and endless repetitions of drill during a war crisis (and by the non-essentials the writer means a cut and dried program from 5.00 A. M. to 10 P. M., with "manual of arms by the count"--all dress parades, reviews and other ceremonies, marching or "hiking" with a full infantry pack in a temperature of 109 deg. in the shade, to see how men can _intensively_ endure such heat, or, in other words, a persistent effort to break these men down and determine whether they have any courage, endurance or guts)--it should take less than three months to make an alert, steadfast, reliable and efficient battle soldier in time of war, and not more than six months in time of peace if more perfection is arrived at, unless it is desired to specialize in artillery, engineering and the Scientific Corps. Much less time was taken during the Civil War. Most of these intensive training sharps and cranks harp incessantly about the absolute necessity for a long period of "_discipline_". The writer is nearly a crank on that subject, for discipline is the real, true and vital basis on which to build for a battle soldier. Then employ most of the few weeks, taken as a limit for training, in discipline alone--making that the one objective upon which to concentrate the intensive effort, devoting the balance of the time to sufficient tactical drill to readily handle them under fire, and no more, or until the first deployment and the shrapnel or machine gun fire of battle demonstrates the fact that any and all tactical formations whether perfect or more loosely co-ordinated are soon broken up. Any more tactical drill than is sufficient for such a purpose in time of war--when all preparation must necessarily be hastened--is simply a mere repetition looking to more perfect formations and movements and therefore a sheer waste of time and effort.

Both Theodore Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood were then right in their grasp of the situation and summing up of five weeks of _training_ and _battle activities_ of the "Rough Riders". Neither had had any military training, either theoretical or practical--one having been a college student, writer, ranchman, police commissioner, Secretary of the Navy, etc., while the other had been a medical officer. Both, however, had been out in the open under the stars, were alert, self-reliant, versatile, many-sided, broad-guaged, tense, strenuous, level-headed, far-sighted, sagacious, but withal, endowed with a large stock of good judgment and plenty of good, sound horse sense. Neither had drilled a troop of cavalry--much less a regiment--but they had had some good regular officers and old non-commissioned officers assigned to start them off, and furthermore, in the face of a war, then on, and quick preparation for immediate battle service absolutely necessary, both saw at a glance what every good soldier--whether theoretical or otherwise--should see, that there was no time to waste in the mere niceties of a perfect tactical drill; that all of the non-essentials would have to be cut out--and the one essential, which they kept steadily in view, in dealing with and licking into shape such a body of men as the "Rough Riders" were, and which they were so suddenly called upon to organize and put into battle--was _discipline_, more _discipline_, and then _some_; to control the unruly elements, eliminate the really vicious, and administer the severest punishment, tempered with justice and mercy, for any and every infraction of the disciplinary laws governing any large bodies of men trying to adjust themselves to the novelty of control by superior authority appointed by the Government to hold them in check, and to give them just sufficient tactical drill to get them into and out of a battle mess, in a fairly orderly fashion. The "Rough Riders" had been gathered from the "four corners of the earth." What good could six months or a year, or even longer, of hard drill or long drawn out intensive training have done these men with war already on? They would soon have "bucked"--grown disgusted--gone stale--lost their spirit and enthusiasm--their morale and force, and given their officers no end of trouble by their restlessness and eagerness to try out their mettle and "get in". They needed plenty of hard discipline and proper guidance daily, and Theodore Roosevelt says they _got it_. They already possessed most of the other qualifications which he so clearly enumerates. They needed to be taught prompt obedience to lawful authority, and they soon found that out and who were their leaders. What more did they need to fit them for battle than what he so concisely states in the way of tactical drill, to enable them to get on and off a battle-field, and the courage-born stimulus of good competent officers and non-commissioned officers? Most of them already knew the use of arms, and nobody ever stands up on a battle line and exercises in the manual of arms, either "by the count" or "at will". There was no time to put them into large cantonments with other troops and intensively train them according to a War College prescribed schedule. _Everything had to be sacrificed to time._

The late Col. Arthur Wagner, U. S. Army, is reported to have said shortly after the Spanish-American war, when asked what his experience had been at Santiago--"There was nothing I saw there that fitted into my text books in any way."

No cut and dried plans such as might be worked out in a Staff War College to fit into every program could be used, unless, perchance, the conditions which we were constantly meeting fitted into such plans--which they seldom do--and we could not afford to fall back on any "perchances", necessitating, as they would, the rapid changing of such plans, in the face of a situation or crisis which might and did demand immediate and decisive action.

The query then naturally arises--of what vital or practical use is much of these enforced student theoretical courses at Leavenworth and the Staff War College, especially in feeding up officers--who have no special aptitude for the profession--on sham battles and sham war maneuvers, if, after stacking up hundreds of these worked out war problems, such as four or five different plans for the invasion of Mexico, and the same number for the invasion of Canada, it shall be found that just at that particular time the conditions bear no relation whatever to, or fit into these carefully worked out and elaborate plans, all of which may, and probably will have to be hurriedly changed, when there is little or no time to do so, just as the crisis of a sudden campaign is forced upon us or is quickly culminating. Any commanding officer of our army who cannot then quickly change that cut and dried plan thrust into his hands by the War Department, and in the face of sudden and almost insurmountable obstacles, and all of these conditions entirely foreign to such plans, to work out in front of an enemy already mobilized for battle--why--his name is--_MUD_!!

In all measures of this kind we felt compelled to take relating to these deserters, the exigencies we had to face at any moment and the plan we hastily made to fit into them, proved to be the deciding factor. Such a thing as pursuing those deserters under any cut and dried programme would have been not only ridiculous, but a blithering farce. That is why, with a man of Mackenzie's horse sense, we were left to perfect freedom of action, and our own independence or individual initiative. Therefore, while it may seem almost treason for a graduate of West Point to declare it, nothing that the writer had ever learned there was of the slightest value to him in trailing these men. It was a problem absolutely separate from the ordinary military processes, and governed entirely by other factors than those to which an education at the Military Academy had any relation.

Intensive Training as a Fine Art (?)

The writer's son, a Major of Infantry (a temporary Lieut-Colonel), took over to France a training battalion of the Sixteenth U. S. Infantry from Syracuse, N. Y., in November, 1917. He was trained in the Toul Sector by a Major Rasmussen of the Canadian Infantry (later killed by an H. E. shell). He says that a few weeks of practical trench training and hand grenade work, etc., was of more value to him than months of such training as he had had in the Syracuse Camp.

The writer had a son-in-law who had had fifteen years' experience in the field as a Civil Engineer with the largest company in St. Louis--surveying, platting, laying out suburban tracts, including road building, sewer and culvert construction, etc. He lacked the elements of military engineering, pontoon bridge building, military trenches, with barbed wire placing, hand grenade work, etc. He entered the Fort Riley Training Camp in May, 1917, was transferred to Leavenworth, thence to Camp Meade, Washington Barracks, Laurel, Md., and then to Camp Lee, Va., where he was employed digging trenches for the third or fourth time, and building pontoon _land bridges_, when he had made a record throwing bridges again and again with his company across the Eastern Branch of the Potomac river. His skin was almost trained off his body. He lost his spirit and enthusiasm, became absolutely disgusted, but finally, through a "_pull_" at Headquarters, A. E. F., he got "over" in March, 1918. Was immediately assigned as a Captain of the 101st Pioneer Regiment, 26th N. E. ("Yankee") Division, and after some more _sector training_ was in the Chateau Thierry and St. Mihiel drives and "made good" under Colonel George Bunnel (a graduate of West Point, who was a practical soldier,) as a pioneer engineer on the battle line, opening the roads for the Infantry and Artillery, cutting barbed wire, etc. _No more army for him!_ But for my earnest protest and advice he would have resigned in disgust several times.

When the word goes forth from our intensive trainers and sham battle heroes that it takes nearly a year to make of such a man an efficient engineer in the field, when for practical road building, rough pioneer work under fire, and all round resourcefulness he could give many of our West Point graduates "cards and spades", most of such enforced training, which the writer has knowledge of, is a disgrace, and the would-be trainers should be "canned" before they reach a battle line.

The writer was credibly informed that some of the so called intensive training took this form. A lot of condemned rifle cartridges from one of the arsenals was sent to Camp Meade, Maryland, and, on the score of economy, it is presumed, they were issued for target practice on the range. Some of the officers knew of the danger in their use and protested--as it was "slow fire" ammunition-- But they were directed to instruct their men to "_hold on_" to the target so many seconds (20 more or less) to compensate for the time lost. Several men were badly injured (burned) by the "back fire" upon throwing the bolt. The ammunition was still used under protest-- _Fine training for sharpshooters_. Any battle soldier knows that these officers would have been fully justified in refusing to obey such orders--when it had become known what risks were involved--even life itself. These cartridges were not only absolutely useless for such training--but it was little less than a crime for any officer to compel his subordinates to expend such dangerous ammunition. It was reported that the men seized the balance and either buried or otherwise destroyed it. What a travesty on preparing men for battle! If _such intensive training_ was employed in these Cantonments to fit men for fighting, with a war already on, what could be expected of the Instructors, employed in that kind of work, who had got to taste the joy of battle? This matter was not made public, but was either concealed, camouflaged or treated so lightly as to suggest a case of "whitewash." Men were sent on "hikes" over hard, frozen roads, covered with snow and ice--in old, worn out shoes--their feet nearly bare; all under protest from their new, untried officers--who naturally wondered at such training and the necessity for it,--also the risk in the face of an epidemic of "_flu_"--

The True Test-Out--Acquiring the Fighting Sense