Chapter I: Principles of Operations Over the Sea

Since steamers have supplanted sailing ships for commercial intercourse it is possible to transport our large troop forces in them; but fixed plans should be formulated with the view of making use of these strong and numerous vessels in over-seas operations. The main difficulty arises in the fact that all sea and land fighting forces must be combined. However, any consequent friction can easily be avoided if the army and fleet, in time of peace, become familiar with their mutual dependence and with the need of individual cooperation. It is plain, therefore, that operations over the sea should be planned for in advance. There is no prospect of success unless the parts of the complicated mechanism are individually prepared.

The selection of a favorable time and situation for operations is an important factor in its success. If an unexpected landing could be made the opponents would not succeed in making a strong defense, nor would they be able to concentrate sufficient forces to oppose the invasion. Hence the preparation of the land operations must be so thoroughly advanced that in case of war the rapidity of mobilizing and transporting would assure an advantageous surprise. How difficult and costly this task is has been demonstrated by the United States in its expedition to Cuba and by England in transporting its first troops to South Africa.

The object of the operation must by all means be concealed and the preliminary preparations should be planned so as to delude the opponents. Napoleon's expedition against Egypt and the manner in which it was undertaken even to-day remains a standard example.

A landing operation on an enemy's shore is generally possible only where one is superior in naval strength to that which the enemy can muster at a critical time. After a landing a victory at sea by our opponents would not be of benefit to them, in case they have not provided sufficient land fighting forces successfully to combat the invasion. Therefore, it is imperative at least to strengthen our German battle fleet so greatly that it would assure the troops a safe passage, and also defeat or hold in check that portion of the enemy's naval forces which they could readily employ.

If the transports sail ahead of the fleet there is the possibility that with a reverse at sea the landing operations could not be carried through. The rule to be followed is to employ for operations over the sea all available battleships, part in the regular fleet and part as an escort for the protection of the transports. In no case should the land forces be transported on battleships, for they would restrict the fighting value of the ships. So, for example, the French admiral Gauthaunce--1801--in spite of his superior battle fleet was compelled to withdraw to Toulon before the English fleet because his ships had suffered in fighting value through the presence of land troops.

Only the largest steamships are to be considered for transports because they have a greater field for action, can carry more troops and require a smaller escort of battleships, thereby giving a small battle fleet like ours more available strength, which is, of course, of great value.

Naturally, the ships should be loaded to a capacity in proportion to the length of the voyage. In cases where the distance is not great the transport ships can make the trip twice, but it is important that the principal part of the expedition go in the first transports so as not to land an inefficient force on the enemy's coast. The whole purpose of the enterprise might be defeated through lack of aggressive strength of the landing troops. The number of troops to be landed must be greater than the estimated number of the enemy. As they must be able to assume the offensive, it is desirable that the militia be debarred and only well drilled forces, under experienced officers, be sent over. Such a combination gives the required fighting value.

In spite of the difficulty experienced in transporting horses, the cavalry is an extremely valuable adjunct in operations of invasion, playing a great part in offensive movements and in assisting the field and heavy artillery. The cavalry will also be able to prevent an attack on the infantry, which might otherwise inflict damage hard to retrieve. In the Crimean War Marshal St. Arnault was hindered in the pursuit of the routed Russians because of the deficiency in the cavalry and artillery in the French army. He had only one hundred troopers at his disposal, and his guns, drawn by only four horses, were greatly hampered in their movements.

The difficulties in transporting large cavalry and artillery divisions can be overcome through modern methods. The extent of our merchant marine makes it possible to forward the necessary number of troops, but it must be remembered that on account of our present political position we can send only as strong a force as we can afford to dispense with at home, without endangering the country.

The management of the complete operation over the sea as a rule can be better executed by an army officer than by a naval officer, for the success of the enterprise depends principally on the land operations. This leadership would usually fall to the commanding officer of the transport fleet and escorting squadron. It is out of the question to change commands at such a critical period as disembarking. With us the commander-in-chief of the transport troops is lower in rank than the commander of the escorting squadron, a designation which the vicissitudes of war have found very disadvantageous. More than one well-planned operation has been restrained by the commanding admiral because he sacrificed favorable conditions from the standpoint of land operations to gain a slight advantage from a naval standpoint. On the other hand, Napoleon I, against the advice of his admirals, disembarked his troops in Egypt, and thereby kept them from sharing the fate of the fleet.

After successful landings it may be necessary to place the transport fleet and its escort in command of the chief of the land troops. Even the battle fleet should be under his direction when a change of base is necessary or when the land and sea forces are in joint action. For technical naval questions the chief command would be assigned to an officer of the Admiral Staff. In a joint attack on a coast city the advantage of harmony and cooperation is readily seen. In the battle on the Alma this fact was demonstrated, the striking of the fleet on the flank was not ordered by the commander of the land forces and was not brought about in unison with the land attack.