Chapter II: The Composition of the British Army

The _Regular Army_ 317
Three classes of reserves 318
The _Army Reserve_ 318
The _Special Reserve_ 319
The _Territorial Army_ 320
The numbers of trained soldiers immediately available for war 321
These were inadequate to redress the balance against the
Triple Entente 322
In the _onset_ period untrained and half-trained troops
were of no use 322
Shortage of officers capable of training raw troops 323
Lord Haldane's failure to carry out his own principles 324
Moral effect of our support of France at Agadir crisis 326
Adverse changes between 1911 and 1914 326
Size of British striking force necessary as complete
were of against a coolly calculated war 327
Reserves required behind this striking force 328
South African War no precedent for a European war 330

CHAPTER III

LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS

The Manchester speech (October 22, 1912) 332
Liberal denunciation and Unionist coolness 332
Attack concentrated on three passages 333
Two of these have been proved true by events 334
The other was misinterpreted by its critics 335
Liberal criticism 336
Unionist criticism 341
Ministerial rebukes 343
No regret has ever been expressed subsequently for any of
these attacks 347

CHAPTER IV

LORD KITCHENER'S TASK

All Lord Roberts's warnings were proved true 350
Many people nevertheless still believed that the voluntary
system was a success 351
Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War 353
His previous record of success 354
His hold on public confidence 354
His grasp of the simple essentials 355
His determination to support France and make a New Army 355
His remarkable achievements 356
His want of knowledge of British political and industrial
conditions 356
His colleagues, however, understood these thoroughly 357

CHAPTER V

MATERIAL OF WAR

Industrial congestion at the outbreak of war 358
Need for looking far ahead and organising production of war
material 359
The danger of labour troubles 360
Outcry about shortage of supplies 360
Official denials were disbelieved 361