Chapter XX: The Training of the Man

1. That soldiers should make it their function to exert themselves
to the utmost of their loyalty and patriotism.

2. That they should strictly observe decorum.

3. That they should prize courage and bravery.

4. That they should treasure faith and confidence.

5. That they should practise frugality.

(_Order issued by the Emperor of Japan in 1882._)

The standard of proficiency in cavalry work to which we wish to attain is a very high one; our men must, in the first place, be taught--

(A) To ride well.

(B) To be able to look after their horses.

(C) Rifle-shooting and fire discipline.

(D) The use of at least one personal weapon, when mounted, with
good effect.

(E) Individuality, and to use their brains.

(F) Bodily and muscular development.

(A) RIDING

There is no doubt that our methods of teaching riding have greatly improved of late years.[99] The recruit is not made afraid of his horse, and of his work in the riding-school, as he often was under the old régime. From the day he joins, no opportunity should be lost of teaching the recruit that amongst his first duties is to love, honour, and have a pride in his horse. He certainly will not recognize this duty, if, as under the old “cast-iron” system, his horse becomes the means of applying an unpleasant discipline to him.

Further, he is now taught to ride in the open, and over a natural country in many cases, picking his own line. In fact he is taught campaign riding, rather than as formerly the elements of _haute école_; the latter plan was by no means unsuitable if the man had the previous knowledge of riding which many men, brought up in the country, joined with forty or fifty years ago.

(B) SOLDIER’S CARE OF HORSES

Of all instructions to be given to the young soldier the most difficult is that in campaigning horse-management.

It should be explained that the care of his own horse in a campaign is quite a different matter in the cavalry from what it is in the artillery; in the latter the horses are always under the master’s eye in the first place, and in the second they are kept at a uniform pace, whereas in the cavalry men are detached here and there, and it is only by the individual’s care of his mount that the latter can win through a campaign. In fact the difference is as great as if, instead of carrying on his business under one roof, Mr. Whiteley had to send out all his young men and women in troops and sections and as individuals to effect sales. It would certainly lead to a very great diminution of profits, and just as in any great business the profits are effected by small and seemingly petty economies, so in a regiment it is the small economies of horse-flesh which mount up to a great sum in a month or so of campaigning. It is the regiment or squadron, in which, from the start, the man has been taught always to dismount at every opportunity, always to off-saddle and massage his horse’s back when a spare quarter of an hour affords him time to do so, always to give his horse a chance to nibble the short grass, or drink a few go-downs of water, always to report without fail a loose clinch or a swelling on the back, even if the latter is only the size of a shilling, that will constantly show a good return of sound horses. A bad system of horse-management will in a week incapacitate as many horses from work as will a general engagement.

As a rule great things are expected of cavalry in the first week of a campaign; these great things are often to be carried out _at all costs_--all costs in this case meaning in many instances half the horses overridden and a crop of sore backs[100] and incipient injuries incurred which the cavalry will not get over for months after. There is also another difficult matter to cope with in the cavalry; it is as follows:--

The ordinary soldier has no idea of the limit of his horse’s capacity for work such as that soon gained by the hunting man or traveller on horseback. In peace-time he will not once in one thousand times be given a task which can possibly injure or cause him to override his horse; further, the latter invariably gets back to his stable, gets the best of food and a rest, or goes to the sick lines if he is evidently out of sorts; the responsibility of overriding his horse is thus not fixed, and the man escapes any punishment. As the man is riding a Government horse and not his own animal, he does not suffer pecuniarily.

We believe that enough has been shown to warrant our saying that the cavalry of an army where (1) a good system of campaigning horse-management[101] has been instilled into the individual, and where (2) the officers, from those who order the task to those who superintend it, have the knowledge to do so with a sense of the horse’s capacity as affected by work, food, and drink, weight carried, nature of terrain, will, at the end of one month’s work, possibly have lost 15 per cent of its horses; whereas in the cavalry where these matters are not understood, only 15 per cent of the horses will remain available. What was the case in Napoleon’s invasion of Russia? A statement called for by the emperor at Witebsk on the 29th July, twenty-five days after the river Niemen had been crossed, gave the loss as follows: Murat’s cavalry[102] reduced from 22,000 to 14,000 horses, the cavalry of army corps by half, Latour Maubourg’s from 10,000 to 6000. Later, on the 9th November, only 1900 horses were left to this immense force of cavalry. The loss by fatigue in the campaign of Ulm, lasting little more than a fortnight, was less, 46 per regiment. One campaign resulted in a victory within eighteen days, whereas the other went on long enough to bring the loss and criminal waste of horses home to those responsible. In campaigns brought to a close in a few days by desperate though successful strategy, these matters, like many matters which occur in small campaigns against natives, never come to notice.

This subject has been gone into at some length under the training of the man, because without his co-operation in the individual care of his horse no cavalry general can hope to be successful. His best-laid schemes “gang aft agley.” The cavalry soldier should feel that he will get a horse, good, bad, or indifferent, accordingly as he shows himself a good, bad, or indifferent horseman and horsemaster, and should be made perfectly aware that he will be punished with the greatest severity for every act of carelessness, neglect, or ill-treatment of his horse. Whilst, on the other hand, a well-cared-for horse should be a certain passport to the good graces of his leader. A squadron leader, careless of this mode of procedure, never has good and well-cared-for horses on service.

A very successful way of teaching the soldier to care for his horse is to let it form part of the test before he passes from the recruit stage to that of the trained soldier, that he should by himself ride his horse to a place 70 to 100 miles away, report on some bridge or other topographical feature, and return, enough money being given him for the subsistence of himself and his horse for the necessary number of days--the condition of the latter being carefully scrutinized on his return.

Other forms of long-distance rides and patrols (as distinct from long-distance races, a cruel form of competition with which no horse-lover can have any sympathy) are most useful, as they teach the men how to regulate their paces, spare their horses, and judge distance by time and pace.

Often arrangements have been made to take some N.C.O.’s out with the regimental pack of hounds, local pack, or on a drag-hunt or paper-chase; all these forms of instruction teach the men to ride fast in a reasoned fashion and not in the Johnny Gilpin and “making the running” style of the amateur horseman or horsewoman, and to think properly of their horse, and not as the old lady, who said to the coachman, when he had reported the brougham horse was lame, “He is a horse and he _must go_.”

That the care of the horse is the weak link in the cavalry chain, and the most difficult one in which to give such instruction as may render it strong and reliable, is clear. Every day we get fewer men accustomed before they are recruited, to work with horses, and the use of the horse as a means of locomotion, by all ranks in Great Britain, is quickly dying out. Strong measures are needed to counteract our daily growing ignorance of horsemastership.[103]

(C) SHOOTING AND FIRE DISCIPLINE

The cavalry are now armed with a rifle equal to that of the infantry, and can hold their own in rifle-shooting. The greatest interest is taken in this exercise; tests similar in all respects to those in vogue in the infantry are exacted before the man is entitled to get his full rate of pay. Practically all officers and many N.C.O.’s of cavalry now possess Hythe certificates,[104] and there is no reason why fire discipline in the cavalry should not be equal to that in the infantry. In many cavalry regiments it undoubtedly is so. In others there is too much talking and the Jack ashore kind of behaviour, which renders difficult the control of the larger parties. If the officers recognize that good fire discipline is essential in order to kill their enemy, they will take more trouble to instil it. As our cavalry are undoubtedly the best shooting cavalry in the world, it is a pity to spoil the ship for this ha’porth of tar (fire discipline).

(D) THE PERSONAL WEAPON

Fencing and single stick (and other exercises such as boxing, non-essential in themselves, but which quicken the eye and make the man cool in combat) will do a great deal towards teaching men the use of the sword, while a little tent-pegging and a great deal of work at the dummies will teach the unrivalled value of the queen of weapons.

In many cavalry training-grounds can now be seen an acre of ground in which are a score or more of self-adjusting dummies of varying heights, and representing horse and foot; there is no better practice than to send half-a-dozen horsemen into this tilting ground at a sharp gallop, and let them practise for the mêlée for a minute or so.

The French cavalry lay great stress on these pointing exercises; they do not expect to turn out many real swordsmen in a squadron, but they want every man to be able to ride his horse at an enemy, and run him through.

(E AND F) MENS SANA IN CORPORE SANO

In addition to the four headings mentioned above, there is the preparation requisite to meet the hundred-and-one eventualities of detached work and miscellaneous duties.

Whilst it is quite impossible to foresee or delimitate these, there are a number of exercises and sports which tend to make a young man (and keep an old man) not only supple in his body and sound in wind and limb, but also alert in mind: to put it shortly, they make him more “handy,” more able when left to himself or with a few others to carry out his duty; they give him more confidence in himself; they make the town-bred man approximate more to the pioneer. The ordinary lad of eighteen brought up in a town knows nothing of the country in which his soldiering and scouting will be done, and is not able to do a great many things which a country-bred lad has learnt as a matter of course. On the other hand, the town-bred lad is undoubtedly quicker at picking up and assimilating knowledge. Both have their good qualities, and both can be made into excellent cavalry soldiers by training in the particular points in which they are by breeding deficient.[105]

Let us now glance at the sports which tend to make men handy and useful.

Every cavalryman should learn to swim, since, unless he can do so, he may either not attempt to cross a swollen river, or he may get drowned in doing so. Not only this, but he should be able to make his horse cross a deep and rapid river whether he can swim or not himself. Some of us still remember the disaster to a cavalry regiment when crossing a river on the frontier.

Many sports and exercises--to be able to swim, to row a boat, and so on--are not essentials in the training of a cavalryman, but they are very desirable; and when an opportunity of practising them occurs, every commanding officer should make his men take advantage of it.

Again, in the _Manual of Military Engineering_ there is a great deal which may be said to be more suited to pioneers, and a knowledge of which cannot be expected from every cavalry soldier. Knotting and lashing, construction of rafts, scientific demolitions of railways and telegraph lines come under this heading. A certain number of men in each squadron are detailed to act as pioneers, but since in most cavalry operations there is a very good chance of these not being available at the critical moment, it is well that every man should be brought up to a good standard of knowledge in all forms of pioneering, rough field fortifications, and in tapping a wire, blowing up a culvert, etc., etc.

Another point over which too much time must not be spent, but which is for the benefit of the soldier, especially in his first few trying days of active service, is a slight knowledge of cooking, and especially how to make use of flour; otherwise you may find the men throwing away the flour because they do not know how to cook it. The poorer classes in Great Britain nowadays nearly all buy bread instead of making it from flour once a week, on baking day, as in the old days.

It will obviously be for the good of a regiment or brigade of cavalry that it should leave its barracks for a month in the summer, and go for choice to some seaside place where there is an estuary, and practise exhaustively the various non-essential items of instruction indicated above. Such a change of scene is immensely appreciated by the men, who get very tired of barrack routine, and it gives the officers opportunities for instruction which they do not usually possess in barracks.

New ground is worked over, practice in camping duties and expedients takes place, and, last of all, there is time and opportunity to carry out thoroughly and practically the instruction; there is time for the men, because they are freed from many duties which are necessary in barracks, and for the officers, because they have the whole day before them, and do not go on leave. If a whole cavalry brigade has gone to such a camp of instruction, the element of competition may be introduced in many ways, which will help to stir the most sluggish. The desire of the distinction of being the best swimming squadron in the brigade will make his comrades hurry up many a slow, inert lout, who could do better if he tried, and this will, indirectly, cause him to have more confidence later in himself.

Again, if two rival squadrons are marched down to a river, and find, a hundred yards apart, for each squadron a similar amount of rafting and bridging material, and instructions are given to them to prepare means for a small column to cross the river, the interest excited by the competition will be considerable. In a case like this marks may be given for (1) the most thorough arrangements for the crossing, including orders by the commanding officer; (2) the best and most workmanlike construction of boats, rafts, etc.; (3) the speed in carrying out the work; (4) silence; (5) tidiness, such as, for instance, all arms, extra clothing, etc., being placed in an orderly manner, so that they can be resumed, if necessary, after dark, or at a moment’s notice.

In the sands, usually to be found at any seaside place, good practice can be gained in digging hasty field fortifications without the labour involved in doing so in the stiffer soils.

In the late South African War one might sum up the situation in a few words: our regular soldiers had need to be more like colonials, and our colonials more like regular soldiers. Some of our soldiers lost their way a mile from camp; our colonials never did this, but their views of military discipline were curiously lax. Our soldiers were the victims of routine, and it cost them their lives often enough; our colonials could hardly be trusted to lay sufficient stress on an order to carry it out, but they were never at a loss for an expedient. Both looked after their own interests at the expense of the enemy, or even their own side.[106] Both were very brave; both fought and scouted cunningly; but it came first and naturally to the colonial, who gave his enemy credit for slimness, and had a more cultivated imagination and better appreciation of the value of ground. In rearguards both “stuck it out,” if anything, too long, rather than give the enemy an idea that they could be hustled.

It is suggested that instruction should never stop short of the actual and practical. Few educated people are able to understand how very little words convey to the ordinary untrained intelligence, and for how short a time, even if understood, theory is retained in the mind.[107]

Anything which is worth learning must be learnt as a well-known amateur billiard player and game shot taught himself. In billiards he first placed the balls again and again till he could make the difficult cannon; he then went on till he could make it twenty times running. Similarly, in regard to a difficult kind of shot, he went to a shooting school and had clay pigeons shot out in a particular way; at length having hit, he went on till he practically could not miss.

THEORY

The theoretical instruction given by our officers to the men in lectures benefits, we verily believe, the former quite as much as the latter. It benefits the officer, in the first place, because it compels him, if he is anxious to do his work well, to look up his subject thoroughly beforehand; and in the second place, because it accustoms him to speak in public more readily; and this may be of value not only to him but to the army and nation later. But his instruction should not be devoted entirely to professional subjects. It is a part of his duty to attend to the education of his subordinates in the subject of _moral_, and to develop by every means in his power their sentiments of bravery, straightforwardness, confidence in their leaders, and devotion to duty and patriotism. Without these as a foundation there are few who will adhere to the requirements of that discipline, without which, in the absence of religious fanaticism,[108] no difficult task in war will be carried through. There are sound grounds for saying that “if we examine the condition of the people we shall find that _moral_ deteriorates in inverse proportion to advance in education.”[109] Officers who have to deal with such conditions must not only know how to teach thoroughly, minutely, and convincingly, but must also study all branches of their profession in such a way that by their intellectual ability they may earnestly and loyally interpret the true spirit that should animate a soldier.

In all the professions, trades, and handicrafts nowadays, with increased facilities for reading and book-learning, theory is overriding practice, apprenticeship is shortened or even dispensed with, the boy of to-day has read about and thinks he understands what the man of yesterday has been through and is still pondering over; and it is chiefly because we see so much weight being laid on theory, to the detriment of practice in the profession of arms, that we register this protest.

That we cavalry have learnt that parrot-like instruction cannot replace demonstration is evidenced by our _Method of Instruction in Riding in Cavalry_; in it we find first “that the instructor, after describing fully and clearly what he requires, should _illustrate_ it,” and later, “these instructions _carefully illustrated_ by the instructor and understood by the recruit,” etc., etc. At present in most cavalry regiments each squadron has a sand table, on which models of country are made, and map-reading is taught in a most practical manner.

The more the officers see of the men the better, and the horse gives an invaluable mutual ground of interest. We read in _The Truth about Port Arthur_:

The battle for these hills was severe, and the coolness of our men
was remarkable. If any of them ran away, or if any panic set in, it
was the fault of the officers, for any officer whom the men respect
and love in peace-time can rely on their steadiness in war.

How many Russian officers know and care for their men? For some
reason or other they rarely mix with or among them, and know
nothing of them or their habits, and bitter are the fruits they
reap in war.

This is plain speaking, but it is in accordance with the dictates of common-sense that the superior and inferior must become of one mind in order to carry out their duties adequately.

By whatever means it may be done, it is the duty of every officer to check cynicism and grumbling amongst his subordinates, and to develop a high _moral_. It has been said that it is the “soldier’s privilege to grumble.” This is an absolutely wrong view; it is, instead, his glory not to grumble, but to face every kind of danger and trouble unflinchingly, and to make the best of it. Small worries overcome prepare the mind for facing great emergencies.[110]

With such a feeling throughout a regiment, what may it not do? Every man becomes a hero and a leader. The conduct of 500 heroes may temper the mind of an army.

INDEX

Abd-el-Kader, 23

Abdur-Rahman, 2

Afghan War, officers of the 9th Lancers in the, 14

Afghans, Sir Montague Gerard and the, 11

Aids, conventional, 194;
natural, 195

Alexander the Great, 1

Alexander, General, 26, 145

Amateur officers entirely out of place in war, 97

American Civil War, 73, 135

American view of British cavalry in South African operations, 8

Arab horses, a type bred for war, 23;
proverb, 52

Arabs’ old-world wisdom as regards the horse, 23

Aristocracy in the armies of the French Republic, 97

Armament, 10

Artillery fire, relative effect of, 46

Artillery, horse, 26, 41

Atlanta campaign, 149

Attachment to other arms on the part of officers, 159

Attila with his Hunnish squadrons, 2

_Australian Commonwealth, Manual of_, 55

Australians as horsemen, 13

Ballistics from horseback, 5

Basuto pony, 21

Batteries of horse artillery, 5

Bayonet of German cavalry, 10

Bernhardi, Von, on bayonet, 11, 147;
cavalry literature by, 17;
_Cavalry in Future Wars_, 52, 77, 90, 94, 99, 169, 187;
_Cavalry in War and Peace_, 62, 66, 95, 208;
on fundamental principles of action, 101

Birch, Major Noel, 192

Boers, 71, 75, 82, 99, 133, 134

Boer system of training a horse, 197

Bloch, De, 5, 113

Blücher, 3, 85, 128

Bonie, Colonel, 6, 7

Botha, General, 75

“Boy Scouts,” 142

Brack, De, 7, 35, 37, 126, 135, 147, 171, 173

Brigade, the, 41-48

British cavalry ahead of continental cavalry in fire tactics, 17;
ignorance of horses, 18;
inflation of idea as to size of horse required, 21;
horse bred for size, speed, etc., 23

Campaigning, horse-management in, 24

Canadians as horsemen, 13

Canterbury system of horse training, 196

Cape Colony as a source of horse-supply, 21

Carrago nose-band, 201

“Casse cou,” 87

Cavalry, expense of, 8;
leader, 8, 73;
brigade in action, 59;
in the general engagement, 69;
disposition of, in a campaign, 86;
masses of, 99, 109;
screen, 135;
shooting and fire discipline of, 208

_Cavalry Training, Manual of_, 111

Cavalry _v._ Cavalry, 37

“Charge,” the, 2, 4

Cherfils, 69, 98

Chest measurement as sign of stamina of horse, 20

Chivalry, 2;
Norman, 2

Colonials in the South African War, 75

Competition of squadrons, 212

Convoy duty, 144

Cooking, knowledge of, 211

Cossacks, 75, 150;
activity of the, 135

Cost of horse-flesh in South African operations, 18

Country-bred men, 210

Cromwell, 3, 6, 34, 69

Cronje, General, 84

Culverwell, Professor, on teaching, 214

Curély, 3, 7, 134

Cyclists, 94, 96

Cynic, 143;
cynicism, 217

Daumas, General, book on Arab horses by, 23

Delarey, 75

Denison on cavalry recruits, 208

Despatch-riding, 139

Detached duties of cavalry, 139

De Wet, raids of, 147

Direction of cavalry by higher leaders, 88

Dismounted action of cavalry, 57;
work, 11, 73, 186

Disposition of cavalry in a campaign, 86

Dissemination of squadrons, 68

Divisional cavalry, 91

Doctrine, Langlois’, 171;
Napoleon’s, 172

Dogger Bank, 131

Dragoons of Napoleon, 11

Drives in South Africa, 93

Drying tent, 125

Dundonald, Lord, Preface to his _Cavalry Training_, 55

Duty, sense of, 160

Echelon attack, advantages of the, 39

Elliot, on the possibilities of cavalry, 6;
inspiriting regulation mentioned by, 178

_En bondes_, to work towards the enemy, 59

Enemy, in contact with the, 122

_Engineering, Manual of Military_, 211

English cavalry, 59

Europe, supply of food for horses when campaigning in, 21

Expenses in cavalry, 154, 155

Expensive, want of cavalry is, American view, 8

Exploration, cavalry of, 90

Fanaticism, religious, 215

Field Service Regulations, 90, 94

Fire action in tactics, 50;
action by cavalry, German opinion on, 57;
effect, horse artillery, compared with rifle fire, 117

Fixed principles of the great cavalry leaders, 3

Flags, use of, 78

Flank, forming to the, 37

Forage supply and its carriage, 95, 96

Forming to the flank, 37

Frederick the Great, 3, 6, 90;
sayings of, 25, 105, 177;
his horses duly considered, 27;
on the rapid rallying of squadrons, 33;
success of the cavalry of, 81;
horse artillery and cavalry of, 102, 103;
and his officer Seydlitz, 193

Free-jumping lane, 198

French, General Sir John, 84

French cavalry, 7, 209;
regulations, 90, 134, 136, 159, 171

French dragoons in the Peninsular War, 15;
nation and the war of 1870, 7;
Republic, the armies of the, 97;
_Manuel du gradé de cavalerie_, 160, 217

Frossard, General, and the episode at Vionville, 73

Galliffet, General, 6, 31, 88

Gambling spirit necessary in cavalry leader, 9

Gerard, Sir Montague, 11

German cavalry, bayonet substituted for the sword in, 10;
and the lance, 16;
rifle and fire tactics, 16;
at Loigny-Poupry, 72;
regulations, 70, 71, 79, 80, 92, 107, 109, 115, 170;
considered too weak, 95

German officers in the 1870 war, 139;
opinion on mounted infantry, 56;
opinion on fire action by cavalry, 57

Goltz, Von der, his _Nation in Arms_, 10, 69, 93, 97, 161, 162, 167

Gordon, Lindsay, poem by, 32

Gourko, General, his raid across the Balkans, 146

Grumbling--the soldier’s privilege to grumble, 217

Gustavus Adolphus, 3

Haig, General Sir D., 35, 38, 51, 67, 71, 78, 113

_Haute école_, 196, 197, 203

Henderson, Colonel, in _Science of War_, 56, 117, 118, 128

Hood, General, and Wheeler’s raid, 149

Horse, the, 18;
Arab, 23;
in South African operations, 82;
what will the cavalry horse live on? 86;
despatch-riding, 139;
loss of many overriden, 149;
exhaustion of, 151;
Frederick the Great and his, 178;
efficiency for war in, 181;
training of the, 191

Horse artillery, 26, 41, 76, 78, 93, 101;
batteries of, 5;
German, 72;
and cavalry, 101;
co-operation of, with cavalry, 108;
fire effect compared with rifle fire, 117

Horse-management, good system of campaigning, 205;
theory of, 25, 26

Horse, training of the, 191;
economy in, 204

Hunting as an exercise for a cavalry officer, 159, 168, 197

Hutton, General Sir E., 55

Imagination, want of, 165

Inaction, 61

Independent cavalry, 94

India, cavalrymen in, 184

Infantry attack, cavalry practising the rôle of, 57

_Infantry Training, Manual of_, 114

Information and security, the two functions of cavalry, 87-88

Instruction, general, 140;
theoretical, 214

Instructional rides, manœuvres, etc., 77

Irish horse, beau-ideal for cavalry, 19

Japan, Emperor of, order by, 202

Japanese, 8, 75, 146, 149-51, 173

Jena, campaign of, 89

Katzbach, pursuit after battle of, 85

Kleber, General, and cowardice, 217

Kraft, Prince, on cavalry dismounting, 58;
_Letters on Cavalry_, 108, 119;
on expenses of cavalry officer, 157

Lance, 13, 14, 16

Lancers, 9th, in the Afghan War, 14

Langlois, General, in _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, 69, 71, 76,
88, 102, 165, 171, 175

Lasalle, 3, 131, 169

Leading, sticky, condoned in the past, 78

Lewal, 78

Liberty of manœuvre, 98, 100

Lindsay Gordon, poem by, 32

Line of communication, raid on a, 152

Liubavin, General, 76

Lloyd’s Maxims, extract from, 179

Loigny-Poupry, German cavalry at, in 1870, 72

Lonsdale Hale, Colonel, 72

McClellan, General, 145

Machine guns, 103, 109

Makarov, Admiral, 132

Mamelukes, 15, 193

Man, training of the, 202

Manchuria, Russians in, 7

Manchurian War, 75, 146

Map-reading, 184

Masses of cavalry, 99, 109;
column of, 46

Maude, Colonel, _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_, 110, 112, 148

May, General, _Guns and Cavalry_, 114

Mêlée, 14, 209

Michel’s brigade at the battle of Woerth, 112

Mischenko, General, 149, 150

Moltke, Yon, sayings of, 8, 155

_Moral_, 1, 5, 30, 49, 217

Mosby, 7

Mounted infantry, 56, 73, 75, 117, 205

Mounted infantry horse see finish of campaign, 22

Mukden, battle of, 110, 146

Murat, 3, 24, 82, 98, 141, 206

Nansouty and Murat, 24

Napier, on sword, 14

Napoleon and his dragoons of 1805, 11;
the mamelukes formidable antagonists to, 15;
light cavalry horse of, 20;
in Russian campaign, 24;
his lack of consideration for the horse, 27;
maxims of, 71, 88, 122, 167;
discerns the impossibility of co-ordinating the two functions of
cavalry--information and security, 88;
horse artillery and cavalry of, 102, 103;
sayings of, 108, 112, 167, 190;
and Lasalle, 131;
information easily gained by the French cavalry for, 135;
extensive use of despatch-riders in several of his campaigns, 141;
his doctrine of _moral_, 172;
on the mamelukes, 193;
his loss of horse in the invasion of Russia, 206

Napoleonic era, 3

New Zealanders as horsemen, 13

Ney, “the bravest of the brave,” 84
Napoleon’s appreciation of, 167

Night attack, a, 124

Norman chivalry, 2

Officer, cavalry, the training of the, 154, 167

Officers, amateur, 97

Officers’ want of experience in horse-flesh on joining a regiment, 18

Paardeberg, 82, 149

Pace, exercise in, 140

Pamirs, horse food in the, 25

Parthian tactics, 1, 82

Patriotism, 6, 97

Peace-time theorists, 79

Pelet Narbonne, Von, 111, 151

Peninsular War, 15, 135, 159

“Pepper-box” system, 93

Personal weapon, 209. _See also_ Armament

Personnel, 82

Petersburg, 27

Picard, 89, 206, 214

“Picket the enemy,” 133

Picq, Ardant du, 29, 49, 80, 87, 174

Pioneering, every man should possess a good knowledge of, in all its
forms, 211

Polo-playing as an exercise for cavalry officers, 168, 197

Polo pony, 20, 192

Pompom, use of the, 68

Pony, the, as adjunct to squadrons, 20-21

Preuil, General de, 73

Prince Imperial, death of, in Zululand, 191

Principles of cavalry leading, 3

Prisoners, Spanish, 10,000 captured by the French, 85;
the taking of, very desirable, 128;
as a means of obtaining information, 143

Problems, practical, and their proposed solutions, 188

Protective cavalry, their duty to secure positions for infantry
columns following them, 92

Punchestown, training horses, 198

Pursuit, 83;
parallel, 84

Rafts, 211

Raids, 145

Rally, the, 32;
instantaneous, 14

Rearguards, 1, 144, 189, 214

Recruits, 136, 207

Reich, Emil, 169

Rennenkampf, his reconnaissance to Kuan-tien-cheng, 150

Resolute offensive, 78

Revolver as a weapon in place of a sword, 15

Riding, methods of teaching, 202

Rifle, the, 16;
magazine, cavalry armed with, 50

Rifle fire compared with horse artillery fire effect, 117

Romer, General, 204

Royal Artillery Mounted Rifles, 12

Rozhestvenski, fleet of, 131

Rupert, his defeat, 34

Ruskin, sayings of, 25, 155

Russian successes in Central Asia, 7;
officers, 76, 217;
campaign of 1812, 89

Russians, 146, 149-51

Saddles, General Romer on, 204

St. Cyr, General, 85

Samsonov, General, 8

Sands, seaside, digging hasty field fortifications at, 213

Scabbard, steel, 10

Schmidt, Von, his _Instructions for Cavalry_, 4, 5, 29, 33, 38, 41,
108, 164, 177, 178

Scouts, 127, 130, 142

Section leaders, competition of, 184-185

Seydlitz, 3, 80, 193

Shaikh Sadi, sayings of, 128, 154

Shakespeare, 128, 167

Sherman, General, 149

Shock action, 4;
tactics, 4, 13, 52

Shooting of cavalry, 208

“Show” teams, 182

Small horse for war, 20;
wars distract attention from essentials, 18

South Africa, cost of horse-flesh in, 18;
mounting of our cavalry in, 21

South African War, 59, 74, 81, 97, 106, 134, 147, 161, 213;
operations, 1899-1902, erroneous conclusions from, 8

South Africans, 13

Sowars, 12

Spaits, Captain, 110

Squadron, the training of a, 177;
leader, 179-80, 200

Squadrons, competition of, 212

Stamina of horse essential, 22

Sticky leading, 78;
action, 80

Stuart, General, 145, 146

Swimming as an exercise for cavalrymen, 210-11

Sword, 10-16

Tactics of Cavalry _v._ Cavalry, 29

Tactics, Parthian, 1, 82;
Zulu, 4

Tax-payer of Great Britain and lessons from war, 8

Telissu, cavalry at battle of, 8

Theoretical instruction, 214

Tracking, etc., 141

Ulm, campaign of, 98, 141;
despatch-riding in, 141

Union of arms, 88

Unison of arms, 50

Verdy du Vernois on the possibilities of cavalry, 6;
on the sword, 12

Veterinary Department and their book, _Animal Management_, 25

Volley firing, 17

Von der Goltz, 10, 69, 93, 97, 161, 162, 167

Walers (Australian), horses, bred for size, speed, etc., 23

Waterloo, battle of, 3

Weaker cavalry, rôle of, 95

Wellington, Duke of, 42, 185

Wet saddle-blankets to be carefully avoided, 204

Wheeler’s raid, 149

Wolseley, Lord, 122

Wood and Edmonds, their _Civil War in the United States_, 149

Wrangel, in _Cavalry in the Japanese War_, 135

Xenophon, advice _re_ stable management, 1;
on purchasing of horse, 23;
and Argesilaus, 208

Yeomanry as a national and imperial asset, 97

Yinkov, raid to, 150

Ziethen, 3, 80

Zulu tactics, 4

Zulus, _modus operandi_ of the, 190

THE END

_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_

FOOTNOTES

[1] Blücher, two days before Waterloo and then seventy years of age, but as hard as nails and quite indefatigable, was charging at the head of the Treskow Brigade, when his horse fell on him and he was left at the mercy of the French cuirassiers. Luckily he was not recognized, and when his own side again charged, he was pulled from under his horse and got away on that of a sergeant.

[2] Von Schmidt, p. 229.

[3] Von Schmidt, p. 188.

[4] All the principal students of war of the type of Von Hoenig, “A. A.,” Lewal, Von Schmidt, Galliffet, Kaehler, Prince Kraft, Verdy du Vernois, Cherfils, Meckel, Waldor de Heusch, Von Schell, and others in a minor degree, express unlimited confidence in the possibilities of cavalry if trained according to a sufficiently high standard.--Elliot, _Cavalry Literature_, Preface.

To preserve the superiority of an army in war, the system of tactics must be changed every ten years.--Colonel BONIE.

[5] Colonel Bonie, speaking of the French cavalry before the war of 1870-71, says: “In the midst of this indifference war suddenly broke out and we were obliged to appear on the field with our old ideas and our old mistakes.”

[6] This is written with the reservation that experience shows that much of the best and most useful work rendered to an army by its cavalry is never known and certainly not recorded. The effectual manner in which General Samsonov, after the battle of Telissu, checked pursuit, held off, and at the same time kept touch with the Japanese for three weeks or more, is dismissed in a few lines of history.

[7] An American, writing in 1899, delivered the following prophecy: “Cavalry may be an expensive arm to organize, equip, and subsist, but if it comes to a matter of dollars and cents the security of the British Army in recent reverses would have been worth a million times what an effective cavalry screen might have cost. From the moral effect of the recent defeats the war in South Africa is expected to cost the British Government between 100 million and 300 million dollars.” Later he adds: “Let not our legislators forget in the coming reorganization of our army the importance, nay the economy in money and lives which cannot be measured by money, of maintaining an adequate force of cavalry. Cavalry cannot be made in a month from militia. The transformation process is slow. Given brave and fearless men, well-bred horses, expert marksmen, improved arms and equipments, it is not necessarily cavalry. Training is necessary and training takes time, but when war begins, time is the one element which is most in demand.”

[8] A cavalry reformer, writing sixty or more years ago, says: “What is the use of trying to get the authorities to abolish the steel scabbard, when no attention was paid to a similar request fifty years ago?”

[9] _Cavalry in War and Peace_, p. 175.

[10] Though it is said that the Afghans point very effectively by means of an upward prod.

[11] _Leaves from the Diary of a Soldier and Sportsman_, p. 256.

[12] _Studies in Troop Leading_, p. 196, _note_.

[13] For the very good reason that they possessed nothing better for the purpose.

[14] The disadvantages of the lance, that it is conspicuous in detached and scouting work and is in the way to some extent on dismounted work, are defects easily got over.

[15] _The Campaign of Fredericksburg_, p. 129.

[16] It has been remarked that in Napoleon’s army the light cavalry, though they did more work, lost fewer horses than the heavy cavalry. This is attributed to the horses being better bred.

[17] Most interesting deductions are to be found in General Daumas’s book, _The Horses of the Sahara_, in which conversations with the celebrated Chief Abd-el-Kader are related.

[18] Von Schmidt, p. 72. But by cohesion is not meant that the men are to be jammed together, for this only produces disorder, men being forced out of their places, the number of ranks increased.

[19] The reader who desires full information, examples, and proof of this well-ascertained fact should consult Colonel Ardant du Picq’s book, one of the most interesting military works ever written and one constantly referred to by French writers on cavalry.

[20] Von Schmidt’s _Instructions for Cavalry_, p. 159. The great Frederick attached the greatest importance to the rapid rallying of squadrons from the most complete confusion. “It must be impressed upon the Hussar that he must be most attentive to the sound ‘Appell,’ on hearing which each man will join his squadron and rank with the utmost rapidity possible,” etc. And again: _N.B._--“His Majesty will most particularly observe that the squadrons learn to rally rapidly.” And also p. 77: “An acknowledged authority on our army says: ‘That cavalry remains master of the field and gains the victory which can most quickly rally and reform.’”

[21] _Cromwell_, by Captain P. A. Charrier, p. 11: “After Rupert’s defeat Cromwell rallied and re-formed ready for the next job at hand. The pursuit of Rupert’s troopers was entrusted to the smallest fraction sufficient to do the work efficiently.... After each attack he re-forms quickly and in good order ready for the next effort ... attacks the royal infantry.... Towards the end of the battle he is rallied and ready to meet yet another effort; ready to meet Lucas and Goring’s squadrons.”

[22] “The rally after an action, mounted or dismounted, and against an enemy mounted or dismounted, requires careful thinking out and constant practice. During peace training, operations are rarely worked out to a logical conclusion, and too often cease with a final charge; so that the problem is not faced of what is to happen _after_ the enemy has been routed, or the position captured or galloped through, or what is to happen should the attack fail.”--General Sir D. Haig’s _Report on the Cavalry Divisional Training_, 1909, p. 14.

[23] De Brack, Chapter on Charges, p. 252.

[24] Acrimonious discussion with officers of other branches of the service as to their relative powers is to be deprecated as not conducive to “the unison of arms.” Good cavalry will beat bad infantry, and _vice versa_. An officer of artillery or infantry should believe that he and his men cannot be ridden over so long as they keep steady and in good heart, whilst a cavalry officer should, on the contrary, believe that he and his men can ride over anything. These two propositions, speaking in a logical sense, it is impossible to bring into agreement. Officers on the staff and general officers have by their training risen superior to the petty jealousies between the various arms; but experience shows that this can never be the case throughout the army.

[25] _Cavalry in Future Wars_, Von Bernardi, page 115: “It is never permissible to wait until driven into action by superior commands, but one must always endeavour to reap, on one’s own initiative, the utmost possibilities the situation holds out.”

[26] Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, p. 97: “Let us consider them (mounted infantry) next in the fight. They attack like infantry and leave their horses some way behind them. How easily could these groups of horses, held by a few men, be scattered by some squadrons of cavalry. But the squadrons, it is said, will be checked by the fire of dismounted men. To begin with, this will mean so many less carbines in the firing line. But can these moderate or at most ordinary shots--for they are not Boers--stop a resolute charge? Will it not be sufficient in any case to dismount a few men with carbines and so contain the few dismounted men who have to defend these herds of horses? And if needs be, would not fire alone be good enough to disperse the troops of riderless animals and reduce the men who are fighting some way off on foot to infantry without valises, without food, and soon even without cartridges?” And on page 98: “Does this mean that cavalry are never to use their carbines? No one has, I believe, and no one ever will, uphold such a theory. Improvements in firearms have rendered this particular weapon more and more useful, one may even say indispensable. Its employment has become more frequent and more justified in every phase of the engagement.”

[27] In Germany it is held that mounted infantry cannot hold the field against a highly trained cavalry, for sooner or later they would be caught when in the saddle, and then before they had time to dismount and fire it would be all over with them (Elliot, p. 31).

[28] The sword in its scabbard may be put through the shoulder cord, and so down the back and through the belt.

[29] A lesson taught us by our South African experiences, of which there is a danger of our losing sight, is the possible result of bringing large bodies of troops in close formation under the effective fire of modern guns and rifles.

[30] I altogether disagree with General von Bernardi where he says, p. 157, _Cavalry in War and Peace_: “It is at the same time advisable that a specially detailed cavalry escort should be _dismounted_ for this object.”

[31] This is still more applicable in the fight of the cavalry division, since two horse artillery brigades in action occupy a front of 475 yards, and once the guns are in position the direction in which this front faces can only be altered to any appreciable extent by limbering up.

[32] General Sir D. Haig’s _2nd Staff Ride_, p. 11: “With a force of greater strength than half a squadron, defiles should never be passed at a faster pace than the trot in order that each unit of the force may keep well closed up and the column be not unduly lengthened. After passing through, deployment should be made at a gallop so as to make room for units in rear.”

[33] The use of the pompom, as a hint to a flank guard not to spend too long in a specially attractive farmhouse, is an extremist’s view of this question.

[34] Cf. Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_. Speaking of the battle of Colenso, he says: “The cavalry _received no orders_, and did nothing. In the whole day’s fighting the cavalry brigade (six squadrons) lost two men altogether.” May not this want of direction have been due in some degree to the well-known prejudice of the generalissimo against the cavalry arm?

[35] Cf. p. 206, Von der Goltz, _Nation in Arms_: “It is not sufficient to have good cavalry, it must also be well handled by the superior authorities. These latter are really responsible for many mistakes unfairly laid at the door of the cavalry. Cavalry divisions must be allowed a proper liberty of action, without entirely slipping out of the hands of the commander-in-chief; whilst the masses of cavalry were formerly kept back to be employed in reserves or in the pursuit, the tendency now exists to send them forward at once, on the first day, to a great distance in a certain direction. This, again, may produce the inconvenience of cavalry being wanting one day when most urgently required. The despatch of squadrons to the front, and the choice of the direction in which they are to proceed, must also be in accordance with a definite plan. Moreover, the commander-in-chief must not only be clear as to his real intentions, but must also communicate them with perfect clearness to the cavalry.”

_German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, para. 395: “Attempts on the more distant hostile communication may produce valuable results; but they must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. In the event of an engagement, co-operation with a zest for victory must be the watchword for every formation, whether great or small.” See also section 104, para. 4, section 110, para. 4, of the British F.S.R.

[36] _German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, para. 393: “During the battle decisive intervention, whether to support or ward off the hostile attack, is possible only by throwing in large masses of cavalry.”

Also see p. 33 of the _Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride_, by General Sir D. Haig, where the co-operation of a cavalry division in ground to some extent obstructed by obstacles is described, and attention is drawn to the historical instances of Salamanca and Austerlitz, in which the co-operation of cavalry was a special feature.

[37] See Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, where the greatest stress is laid throughout on the depth of modern dispositions of troops on the battlefield.

[38] [This battle will be found well described by Colonel Lonsdale Hale, vol. liv., March 1910, _Journal of R.U.S.I._]

It was afternoon on this occasion before the twenty-four guns rightly belonging to the cavalry mass were released from employment alongside the batteries of the general defence and allocated to work with the cavalry.

[39] There are few more striking instances of this than the episode at Vionville, where General Frossard, who had desired General de Preuil to make a charge, replied to the latter when he pointed out that the charge was sure to result in failure, “Attack at once, or we are all lost.”

[40] The cavalry attack _en route_ to the relief of Kimberley and several other occasions, when General French galvanized the squadrons into action, afford us certain proof that energetic action on the part of one combatant compels the other to take similar action or, as happened in these cases, decamp.

[41] “The greatest error that the Russians made before even the outbreak of hostilities, and which continued throughout the course of the campaign, was, notoriously, the underrating of their opponents. It is said that the most influential authorities could not bring themselves, and did not deem it necessary, to detail a sufficient proportion of the good regular cavalry present in European Russia--guards and dragoons--for the theatre of war in Asia. Only three regiments were sent out, of which it may be added the 51st and 52nd Dragoons only reached their destination in the 17th Army Corps area at the end of July 1904. How blameworthy the action of the army leaders was in not devoting more attention to the employment of their best-trained and most reliable cavalry was most conclusively proved by both these regiments of dragoons. For they succeeded, in what the Cossacks up till then had had extremely limited success, namely, in thoroughly clearing up the situation as regards their opponents,...” etc., etc.--Supplement No. 86, _Internationale Revue über die gesammten Armeen und Flotten_.

[42] Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 81: “The cavalry should be forward and sideward to the line of battle.”

[43] General Sir D. Haig’s _Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride_, p. 33: “The main lessons are that the cavalry leader must be in close communication with the commander-in-chief, that the staff and all leaders must be carefully prepared for this kind of work, and the troops trained to take advantage of ground.”

[44] Ardant du Picq gives an account of how two parties of infantry, suddenly meeting each other as they advanced over a hill-crest, _both_ turned and ran away.

[45] Ney, “the bravest of the brave,” found riding alone in rear of the retreating French army, was asked, “Where is the rearguard?” “I am the rearguard,” was the reply.

[46] After the action at the bridge of El Rey, St. Cyr sent his cavalry in pursuit of the Spanish forces who were making for the defiles of Montserrat. The French cavalry, gaining ground at a gallop on the left flank of the column of fugitives, took up a position at the entrance to the defile, and captured the whole of the enemy’s supplies and baggage as well as 10,000 prisoners and twenty-five guns.

[47] “Casse cou,” a rare plant, and much smothered in Great Britain in the twenty-five years previous to the South African War with the inevitable effect.

[48] Un corps de réserve de cavalerie qui devait, à la fois, éclairer, couvrir et seconder l’armée.--Picard, vol. i. p. 257.

[49] In the campaign of Jena, 1806, the Prussian cavalry still maintained the Ziethen and Seydlitz tradition; they were well horsed, well trained, and extraordinarily exact in their evolutions; but the squadrons were mixed up with infantry divisions by groups of ten squadrons, and commanded by the aged lieutenants of the Great Frederick, still living on the traditions of their youthful successes. Direction was entirely wanting in the disposition of the cavalry, though it is said that at no time was military literature in a more flourishing condition than in the years following the death of Frederick the Great, and mathematical science was especially held in honour.

[50] Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 32 of Goldman’s translation.

[51] Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future War_, p. 28.

[52] In a well-reasoned article on “Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War” in the _Internationale Revue über die gesammten Armeen und Flotten_, it is said: “So it is seen that in this war it has been proved once again, and that to a high degree, that nothing great can be accomplished with improvisations of cavalry, and that cavalry, especially when incorporated in divisions, if it wishes to be led to high aims, cannot be stamped out of the ground immediately before great events.”

[53] Von der Goltz, _The Nation in Arms_, p. 168, says: “The armies of the French Republic numbered many members of the highest aristocracy in the lower ranks, and there was no lack of intelligence, but it was an undisciplined intelligence wanting in uniform training--hence also an absence of unity of action. This latter is guaranteed by certain principles being engrafted into the flesh and blood of the commanders of troops by teaching and practice. The idea of utilizing our numerical superiority and the efficiency of our troops in a vigorous and rapid offensive pervaded all our minds, this principle having been imbibed with the very air of our military school. If such discipline of the intelligence exists, the commander may, with composure, leave much to the initiative of the individual.”

[54] Nor does the effect of the victory of masses end there. “It intensifies and invigorates the sense of superiority in individual combats, and is essential if the patrols are to carry out their duties in the true cavalry spirit.”--Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 31.

[55] Extract from Von Pelet Narbonne’s _Lectures on and Cavalry Lessons from the Manchurian War_.

[56] A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day, What should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my right, or on my left? If he have any difficulty in answering these questions, he is ill-posted and should seek to remedy it.--Napoleon’s Maxims, No. 8.

[57] In continuous heavy rain one tent should be made into a “drying” tent by putting a fire on a stone fireplace in it, and thus bringing the heat up to 120°, to 130°, or more. The wettest clothes hung up in it will dry in about twenty minutes.

[58] Blücher on one occasion shouted to a tottering regiment: “You scoundrels, do you then want to live for ever?”

[59] Napoleon considered it necessary, in 1807, to write to Lasalle as follows: “Be very careful to send out frequent reconnoitring parties, but do not let them go out each day by the same way and at the same time, and return in similar fashion, _so that what happened to you at Wischau occurs again_”!

[60] The French cavalry regulations state that between the service of _sûreté_ and exploration in the cases of small forces ill-provided with cavalry, the line is not drawn so clearly as in the case of large forces with their normal establishment of cavalry.--_Service de la cavalerie en campagne_, p. 58.

[61] Wrangel, in _Cavalry in the Japanese War_, puts tersely the true line to take:--“The idea of a thin cavalry screen surrounding their own army for protection against view of the enemy is very fallacious. An energetic enemy, full of enterprise, will easily pierce this thin web with his scouts. Only an active screen can be of any use, which really in practice is no longer a screen only, but is coincident with the true offensive reconnaissance. He who advances regardlessly into the hostile reconnaissance zone, and attacks the cavalry detachments of the enemy with determination wherever they are found, gives the death-blow to the information apparatus of the enemy. His patrols and detachments robbed of these supports are soon useless. They, like their reports, only in the fewest cases are able to reach their destination.”

[62] A regulation in the French army is as follows: “One of the most important missions on which young officers should be sent is the conduct of reconnaissance of discovery. Opportunity should be taken to give them practice in this, by sending them to reconnoitre the movement of troops of another garrison. These exercises where the officer stays out for two or three days at the head of his troop are extremely useful.”--_Service de la cavalerie_, p. 190.

[63] Plain English words should always be used, if possible, in instruction.

[64] Curély, in 1812, at Pultusk, with 100 men of the 20th Chasseurs, captured from the enemy twenty pieces of artillery, and took the general-in-chief of the Russian army a prisoner.

[65] Maude, _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_, p. 185.

[66] The Atlanta Campaign, p. 389 of Wood and Edmonds’ _Civil War in the United States_.

[67] Undoubtedly the press wrote against the cavalry and the medical departments far more than against other arms and departments during the late South African War. Both have made great progress since the war. _Sic itur ad astra!_

[68] True nobility is seen in the reply of Von Moltke, who, asked why he was so economical, as far as his person was concerned, whilst generous to others, replied, that it was in the hope that the officers of the army might be persuaded to follow his example, for that he knew how many families grudged themselves all possible luxuries to keep their sons in their position of officers of the army. “The less a man requires the greater he is,” he added.

[69] We like to call to mind Ruskin’s saying in _The Future of England_: “Riches, so far from being necessary to _noblesse_, are adverse to it. So utterly that the first character of all the nobility, who have founded past dynasties in the world, is to be poor; poor often by oath, always by generosity, and of every true knight in the chivalric age the first thing that history tells you is that he never kept treasure himself.”

[70] Prince Kraft points out how great a price a German officer pays for the swagger of belonging to a cavalry regiment. He enlarges on the trials to health entailed thereby, the long work in the riding school, with the shakes and jars given to the bowels and spine, which in many cases have sown the seeds of chronic illness, even during their first year of service as lieutenants, owing to which some of them have been invalided before their time. Then he goes on to point out the expenses entailed by good chargers and their upkeep. Finally, he says that in the German cavalry in no regiment can an officer live unless he can afford to pay £100 a year out of his own pocket, and so he reckons that a cavalry officer before he has twenty years’ service has expended £2000, that is, has sacrificed that sum to the Fatherland.

[71] The French rightly lay stress on ability to cross an intricate country. Their _Service de la cavalerie en campagne_, p. 191, says: “To ride hard across country and particularly over a steeplechase course is an excellent preparation for reconnaissance work. An officer accustomed to long gallops, not only at ordinary, but also at racing pace, may defy pursuit by one who has not had the same experience of leaping, and especially of leaping at full speed, and of the powers of his horse.”

Our British cavalry officers had justly a great reputation for their abilities in this respect in the Peninsular War.

[72] After a sharp fight one day in South Africa, a colonial officer remarked to his column commander, “We did not think there would be anything on to-day, because you were wearing your slacks and riding the black horse!” The column commander felt, though he did not acknowledge, the justice of the remark.

[73] In _Before Port Arthur in a Torpedo Boat_ the Japanese officer reflects: “Is there any situation which can happen for which I and my men have not been practised?”

[74] Cf. Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, p. 144: “The manner in which troops are to be employed in the different situations which arise must be left to the initiative of those in command in every degree of rank.”

[75] _Germany’s Swelled Head_, p. 165.

[76] Note the strong measures which Lasalle, one of Napoleon’s best cavalry leaders, is said to have taken at Pultusk in 1807. His brigade was about to attack the Russian artillery, and about 2 P.M. had hardly advanced twenty paces before the cry of “Halt!” was heard and at once passed down the line without any one knowing where it had started. The two regiments turned and began to retire at a gallop, though the Russian guns had not fired a shot. Rallied after seven or eight minutes and brought back, their brigadier-general, in a furious rage, kept them in line until midnight under the enemy’s fire. So heavy was this that the general had two horses killed under him. Men and horses fell at every minute, but it is said not a man stirred, nor was a murmur heard.--PICARD.

[77] On one occasion in the operations in South Africa, 1899-1902, a troop, ordered to gallop a kopje, halted at 700 yards from it, dismounted, and began to shoot; a troop of a rival corps was at once sent to gallop through them and did what they had been told to do--took the kopje; a salutary and effective lesson.

Another time a squadron attacking was held up by wire whilst under fire, and began to come back; another squadron was led at a gallop through them. The irresolute squadron at once turned and followed them. The art is to loose the support at the right moment and with due emphasis.

[78] _German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, par. 398.

[79] The French _Service de la cavalerie en campagne_, 1909, at page 190, thus lays down the rôle of the commanding officer: “To direct his officers towards a common doctrine, that of resolves which are determined, even rash, but well considered; to develop in them initiative and personality, and to make them not merely carriers-out of orders, but leaders who know how to reflect, decide, and take responsibility on themselves.”

[80] Supplement No. 86 to the _International Revue über die gesammten Armeen und Flotten_, May 1907.

[81] Curély, the hero of countless brave deeds and daring reconnaissances in Napoleon’s campaigns, had by 1814 got as far as the command of a regiment, the 10th Hussars. On the 12th February at Château-Thierry he got an opportunity, and successfully threw his regiment at the flank of thirty squadrons of Landwehr. This gave an opportunity to Letort with the Dragoons of the Guard to charge the front. Napoleon in his bulletin only put: “Colonel Curély made himself conspicuous”; but he at once promoted him to the rank of general for this feat of arms.

[82] Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, p. 70.

[83] Von Schmidt, _Instructions for Cavalry_, p. 7.

[84] Von Schmidt, p. 227.

[85] _Ibid._ p. 73.

[86] _Ibid._ p. 13.

[87] Every manœuvre which is not founded upon the nature of the ground is absurd and ridiculous.--Lloyd’s Maxims.

[88] The tests in map-reading for a field officer for tactical fitness for command and for a cavalry trooper for service pay were at one time almost identical.

[89] There is an additional reason for this, in that, if one horse refuses, the next two or three who have seen him do so will probably do the same. Horses are extremely impressionable.

[90] Von Bernhardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 90.

[91] Taking an instance which comes to mind: a troop of cavalry on outpost duty at Colesberg found themselves cut off at dawn by some 500 Boers; instantly they rode at the enemy, and, with small loss and doing some execution with their lances, came out.

[92] The cavalry soldier is often required to perform independent duties and penetrate far into the enemy’s lines under conditions entailing danger and hardship. He should, therefore, not only be brave, strong, and determined, but also intelligent, enthusiastic, deliberate, and calm. He must be able to act on his own initiative in accordance with the orders he receives and the situation of the moment. His horse is the cavalryman’s best weapon. The soldier should prize his horse more than his own body, and thus in an emergency he will be able to rely without fail upon this weapon. It is only when the foregoing qualities have been acquired by training and experience in the field that a man can call himself a true cavalry soldier.--_Japanese, Cavalry Drill Regulations_, 1907, 44 (trans.).

[93] For practical riding, however, turning on the forehand is not advocated.

[94] At the same time these natural movements are not all that we demand of a horse; we must therefore add the proviso that with the weight of a rider on the horse’s back, some of the natural turns, and twists, and bearings can be, and need be, improved on. For instance, by means of the bit and legs, we pull a polo pony on to his haunches, and then turn him with the snaffle in order that on slippery ground we may save a slip, slide, or fall, which would very probably occur if we let him turn on the forehand in his own natural and easiest way. Nor does every horse, as he moves along at the walk, trot, or gallop, or as he jumps, necessarily do so in the best or safest way; he will often slouch, as we would describe it in a man, in doing so. We then use the aid of bit, leg, spur, or whip to make him go up to his bit, which we know by experience is a better fashion than his natural mode of carrying himself.

Many a slack rider has let his horse, when he was wearily plodding his way home after a long day’s hunting, fall and break his knees; whereas, if the animal had been well balanced by the strong pressure of the legs and warning spurs, and light hand on the curb, of a good and alert horseman, he would have reached home safely.

[95] The Boer system of training a horse not to fall in the antbear and porcupine holes was to put a native on the animal and lunge it where there were nests of these holes.

[96] The pose, however, of decrying _haute école_ methods is a totally mistaken one. The finest all-round horsemen in the world are the masters of _haute école_, whilst some of the worst horsemen are the butchering hard-riders to hounds, who bunch up their reins in their mutton fists, and hold on by them till their mount stops pulling and going. They are little better than, though of another class to, the viceroy who said to his A.D.C., “Don’t talk to me now; don’t you see I am busy riding?”

[97] _Cavalry Journal_, July 1910.

[98] Experience shows that the noisiest instructors are almost invariably the worst; they are usually trying to appeal by means of their lungs to the rider’s ears instead of demonstrating their meaning by an appeal to his sense of sight.

[99] The material common-sense changes made in regard to the comfort, amusements, health, and pay of the cavalryman, in common with the other arms, is one of the most marked advances in the army of to-day.

[100] General Romer, after the American Civil War, wrote as follows: “Bad saddles destroy more horses than are lost in action.”

It is certain that _wet_ horse blankets put on under a saddle will give more sore backs in one day’s march than will occur in a month of ordinary marching.

[101] It has been said that “it is a peace theory that mounted infantry are as good as trained cavalry; it is a war fact that their ignorance of horse-management makes them five times as costly at the commencement of a war.” However that may be, we know that under first-rate officers, a proportion of whom have since joined the cavalry to its advantage, there was exemplary horse-management in some corps of mounted infantry, not only in the late South African War of 1899-1902 but long ago in the eighties.

[102] Picard, _Cavalry of the Revolution and Empire_, vol. ii. p. 94.

[103] “The idea of drawing cavalry recruits from the best horse-breeding districts,” says Denison, “is not original. Zenophon says that Argesilaus did so” (p. 41). It is certain that our best cavalry soldiers come from Ireland now.

[104] Von Bernhardi, _Cavalry in Peace and War_, p. 273, says, speaking of German cavalry: “In the cavalry there is a want of trained instruction, and most regiments are even reduced to borrowing infantry under-officers and officers to assist in their musketry training, who are then also employed to teach the rudiments of the cavalry fight.”

[105] The Japanese realize how far strength and activity go to make up for the unsuitability of the race for cavalry work, and from the moment a recruit enters barracks, every effort is made to render him active and energetic.--_Education and Training of the Japanese Divisional Cavalry_, p. 13.

[106] Les Hussards étaient d’ailleurs les maraudeurs par excellence; ils se sentaient encore de leur premier recrutement. On respectait ce penchant des troupes légères pour leur donner plus de mordant dans la poursuite à laquelle elles se trouvaient ainsi plus particulièrement intéressées.--Picard, _La Cavalerie dans les guerres de la Revolution et de l’Empire_, p. 201.

[107] “In teaching it is not sufficient for the teacher to express clearly what he means--the words may be to him quite clear, but the real question is, are they clear to the pupil, do they put his mind into a condition in which he follows and grasps the idea that the teacher would emphasize?”--Professor Culverwell on the Herbartian Psychology.

[108] May not a trace of this religious fanaticism, however, be seen in the letter of an Irish soldier, who wrote home during the South African War of 1899-1902 as follows:--

“Dear mother, we are having a lovely time of it, shooting Protestants all day long, and no one to stop us.”

[109] This view was expressed in 1907 by the commander of the 1st Japanese cavalry regiment.

[110] General Kleber, when his men, overcome by fatigue, refused to move a step farther, called them cowards. As they protested that they were at any rate always brave in a fight, he replied, “Yes, you are brave men, but you are not soldiers. To be a soldier is not to eat when you are hungry, not to drink when you are thirsty, and to carry your comrade when you cannot drag yourself along.”--_Manuel du gradé de cavalerie._

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.

Some illustrations were moved closer to the text that referenced them.

The spelling of non-English words was not checked.

Index not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.

In the Table of Contents, one of the page numbers for Chapter IX was missing and the other was incorrect. Both remedied here.

Page 84: Transcriber added a closing quotation mark at the end of the paragraph ending with “a crossing of the Modder River.”

Footnote 62, originally on page 136: Transcriber added a closing quotation mark after “troop are extremely useful.”