Chapter VI: Part 6

I fell just in front of the enemy's hastily thrown up breastworks of fence rails in the vanguard after advancing under a murderous fire about a hundred yards or more, in the open field after passing through the woods. I saw no other line officer with his men anywhere in my vicinity so far in front, and there was no other officer there in the open field except Adjutant Wyllys Lyman who was lauded for it, but I, being a boy, got nothing but my two wounds as compliments for my steadfastness, and they will stay with me through life. I wonder if when across the Great River and in another world I will be remembered any better for my faithfulness when so many others failed at such an important moment?[19]

[19] Major Lyman was afterwards honored with a brevet as Major, but
I was only mentioned in routine official papers as wounded. Why he,
being Adjutant, and therefore representing the regimental commander,
and the only officer who saw me, didn't see to it that my services
were duly recognized as well as his, I have never been able to
understand. It always stirs my spirit when I think of it, for if
anyone deserved recognition for that day's work it was the leaders
in such an assault, for on such largely depended its success; and
certainly if Lyman deserved recognition who had no command, then
why shouldn't one who did, whose men largely followed him, as well
as some of the men of five other companies which I had successfully
led in other fights? It is hard to be reconciled to such unfair
discriminations. But brevets in many regiments were quite as apt to
be given for scheming and favoritism as for merit, and some of the
most meritorious line officers who fought gallantly on the front
line of battle through almost the entire war, received no such
recognition from their regimental commanders, although such line
officers' exhibitions of dash and daring, especially in the Tenth
Vermont, which was one thing that gave the regiment an enviable
reputation both in the field and at home, were very frequent. The
company commanders of this regiment did not follow their men into
battle, at any rate to commence with, but led them continually when
fleet enough to do so, and I always did. Being almost invariably
selected when a lieutenant to command a company without an officer,
I was with one exception alone with no company commander to observe
and report my work, and my different regimental commanders didn't
take sufficient interest to do so, even if where they could observe
it; but the fact that I was almost invariably selected to command
different companies in battle when needed and that I overslaughed
several lieutenants when promoted Captain, should have been reason
enough for at least one brevet during the war, if nothing more,
which since, in the regular army, would have saved me from frequent
undeserved embarrassment. A long experience, however, both in the
Civil War and the regular army since in the observance of the
bestowal of brevets and medals of honor has caused me to regard
with very little respect in many instances the recipient's methods
in obtaining such favors, and especially the system of bestowal of
the same, which is a sacred trust. And certainly if in most cases
such consideration was warranted, then many of my acquaintances who
were not recognized even once, especially in the Civil War, could
have been repeatedly decorated with the far greater propriety. But
with me such distinctions were not worth having except earned in
the estimation of others competent to judge, and came unsolicited.
Such, however, is rarely the case, even when repeatedly deservedly
won, and the only reward for such is to tell the truth about
it historically whenever the opportunity offers, regardless of
criticism.

I found the men of Company E good fighters, Corporal Walker and another big man of my Company whose name I can't recall, being so short a time with the Company--but believe it was one of the Brownells, also of Pownal, Vt.--who helped me occasionally going to the ambulance as I felt faint and weak, were brave fellows. They followed me closely all through the assault as though they expected me to be hit, fighting like heroes as they were at the same time, and when I fell wounded they dropped close by me, Corporal Walker, a giant, coolly saying: "Don't get up Lieutenant, they'll riddle you if you do!" but I thought they already had. However, the nervous shock of both wounds was too great to think of rising at once, and almost immediately the rebs were running for dear life all branches of the service mixed together in confusion--a perfect jumble. We had licked them in a square stand up open field fight of their own choice--and a very poor one, too, for them in case of defeat, as it proved--and it was clean cut, the worst stampede and rout I ever saw.

Sheridan was as brave as a lion, and unlike some commanders who hunt cover when their commands are fighting, went seemingly fearlessly anywhere he wanted to in order to see what was going on and what if any part of the line needed reinforcing. As before stated, my position on the battlefield was sufficiently high to see nearly all of it. It being a beautiful sunny Fall day with a clear atmosphere, it was the most spectacular, and before the Infantry broke, the most beautiful battlefield sight seen, and better yet, the most snappy, brilliant fighting witnessed during the war. Sheridan hovered near the centre in the neighborhood of the high ground where I was twice wounded, and dashed back and forth the line on horseback like a restless lion, an ideally alert fighter, almost as unmindful of shot and shell as though both deaf and blind. It was here that I formed my opinion that he was not only the ideal fighter, but the second, if not the greatest military genius developed by the Civil War, and I have never changed my opinion. Honest, alert, aggressive, dashing and brave with splendid judgment, his equal will be hard to find, and probably rarely surpassed. He was generally conceded a brilliant cavalry fighter, but if the world has ever produced a better planned, executed, dashing, brilliant, spectacular, snappy battle or commander than he and this Battle of Winchester, where the different branches of the service were combined, take it from first to last during the day, it would be interesting to know on what occasion. It was so unlike any battle ever seen by me that all others sink into insignificance as dull affairs. Language or words even with the most gifted talkers or writers can never describe this battle; no pen picture, or ever so gifted talker can do it justice; it would have to be seen by an expert to be fully appreciated. Ever afterwards the Sixth Corps of all others was Sheridan's favorite. Said he later: "Give me the Sixth Corps and I will charge anywhere."

Among the most admirable pictures of the fight--barring the orderly, majestic advance to battle of the whole army in unbroken lines--except after a little our division being unmercifully shelled from the start on the pike it could not withstand it, nor could any other have done so--as a whole after through the wood resembling an immense gracefully waving blue ribbon along the surface of the ground, caused by that enchantingly swinging, billowy motion characteristic of regulars when marching in large bodies, its fluttering banners, glittering arms, equipments and its blue uniforms looking prettier than ever in the bright September sunlight under a bright blue sky specked with fleecy white clouds making a picture beautiful with perfect harmony of color,--was the beauty, grandeur and majesty of both Russell and Custer's splendid debouch on the battlefield with their valiant, intrepid commands, the former's proudly and majestically en masse in perfect order and cadence, line and bearing, coolly confident as though at parade, and the latter's also in perfect lines and order, as well as dashing, intrepid, spirited and assured bearing even the horses as though vieing with each other in speed to run down the unfortunate enemy, entering into the spirit of the occasion and sweeping rapidly like an avalanche down on the demoralized, fleeing and awe-stricken enemy with the fury and apparently almost certain destruction of a tornado. These were pictures comprising awe, beauty, power, grandeur, order and disorder, dash, magnificence, valor, terror, confusion, inspiration and majesty to such an extent as to defy the pen picture of any writer however gifted. This battle was different from any other I ever saw. It was Sheridan's way of doing things--a revelation in warfare.

So far as this first assault is concerned it can be summed up quite briefly. The only considerable amount of the enemy's infantry in the _immediate_ front of the Union infantry line of battle was in the ravine in front of our division, and it was about two hundred and fifty yards away from where we formed line behind the woods; it was a very strong force. If the troops to our right and left instead of instinctively obliquing away from us veteran like to an easier place in their right and left fronts respectively, had guided on our division as it is claimed they were directed to do, they would have had an enfilading fire on the enemy on our front, the same as General Russell's division would have had when it filled the gap to my right which the enemy knew would make their position untenable and so instantaneously retreated in a rout when it saw him coming dangerously near, his right flank overlapping their left. When Russell's movement was executed the Nineteenth Corps' lines of battle hadn't even broken. There was no considerable number of the enemy before it within striking distance so far as I could see, and therefore _nothing_ to break its lines so far as the enemy was concerned until it reached the breaks in its front.

The Vermont Brigade could have easily advanced at any time of the assault or any other part of the Second Division, as there was nothing to speak of--as virtually acknowledged by Colonel Aldace F. Walker of that brigade in his "History of the Vermont Brigade in the Shenandoah Valley, 1864"--in its immediate front except about a regiment of the enemy which crossed the pike from his right and the left of our Brigade to my front.[20] (See No. 7 illustration). Had the Vermont Brigade borne to its right instead of its left it would have done much more effective service, as it would have been on high ground overlooking the enemy in my front when out of the ravine. In this instance the credit given this excellent brigade in at least one Civil War history is erroneous, without the Third Division was expected to whip _at once_ and alone a considerable part of the infantry and artillery of Early's army in its immediate front, no small part of which was in our regimental front and its immediate right. In proof that there was no considerable rebel force in front of the Second Division to the _left_ of the pike until Early's second stand, the reader is invited to examine the official War Department map of this battle and note the fact; but aside from this I _know_ there was none. What, therefore, was to prevent the Second Division or Vermont Brigade from advancing? Unlike our front, where the strip of timber was narrow, with the enemy strongly posted just beyond, the scrub or second growth oak, etc., in front of a part of the Second Division next to us, extended from the top of the ridge or divide which ran several hundred yards southerly, down to the bottom of the ravine a hundred yards more or less, which covered here the Second Division's advance and the cleared ground beyond, after emerging from the wooded side hill and ravine towards Winchester, contained no force of the enemy, as there was no immediate protection for it, sufficient to prevent its or even the Vermont Brigade's advancing, or the enemy would have done so. (See Nos. 3, 7 and 8 illustrations.) I mention this here because I _know_ the facts in the premises, and because this Division is complimented--unfortunately, but probably unwittingly so--in one or more histories for advancing, in unpleasant contrast to our Division, which was up against the _real_ thing, and its advancing depended largely on the help or enfilading fire along our front, we had a right to expect from the troops which should have guided on us from both flanks, but which we never got, as they pulled away from us. It was useless to try to take such a place as confronted the right of our regiment and Division by assaulting from its immediate front (see Nos. 5 and 6 illustrations), as the enemy had to be flanked out of its position, which is what Russell's men would have done on the rebel left in case the enemy hadn't seen them in season to get away and thereby saved many casualties on both sides, and probably largely there the enemy's capture.

[20] Haynes' "History of the Tenth Vermont Infantry," p. 253.

There were none of the Second Brigade of our Division on my right after advancing through the woods, nor had there been up to the time General Russell's command filled the gap occasioned by the Second Brigade's absence, together with the space caused by the Nineteenth Corps obliquing to its right. It being level, shell and bullet swept, it was untenable until a force came large enough to drive the enemy's infantry from cover, as Russell did. (See No. 5 illustration). I was the only officer except Adjutant Wyllys Lyman, who is deceased, so far ahead at that time on my part of the battlefield, and I can make affidavit to this statement. We and a goodly number of scattering men who generally led in most assaults were within a rod of the enemy's _strongest_ manned works, _which no map in existence shows_ that I have seen, where I was twice almost instantaneously wounded when the enemy ran as it saw General Russell's Division coming, as though their lives depended upon it, and I _know_ whereof I am writing.

General Sheridan made no mistake when he selected the First Brigade for the centre and most important point of his line of battle, nor was it a mistake to place our regiment and the Fourteenth New Jersey--with direction for the rest of the army to guide on our Division in the first assault, for the road was practically straight--squarely across the pike, with their colors on it, with such men as Corporals Alexander Scott, F. H. Hoadley, Tenth Vermont, and other of the color guard like them, to keep them there, for such men would go wherever told to, if into the very jaws of death. The leaving off from the official map of this battle of the enemy's infantry in the ravine in front of the Third Division (see Nos. 6 and 8 illustrations), is a great injustice to our regiment, which never wholly fell back, but the usual per cent. of men under such circumstances stubbornly pressed forward under the most trying circumstances at any rate where I was. The leaving off of the enemy's infantry in my front, where it was strongest, is misleading and is doubtless what has caused so many wrong descriptions of this fight. No one can give a correct description of it where I was except at that point during the fight. The enemy contested this point more stubbornly than any other during the day and it was here the most intrepid of our men assaulted; it was the doorway to the great battlefield, and if the enemy couldn't hold this point it couldn't hope to any other, and didn't. Although our division was smaller than either of the other divisions of our Corps, its loss was much heavier. General Grant had one hundred shotted guns fired on his lines in front of Petersburg in honor of this day's victory by Sheridan. A citizen of Winchester told me that one of the saddest things he saw during the day was a horse going through the streets of the city with two badly wounded and one dead Confederate soldiers on it--probably chums--the latter thrown over the horse's back with his head and arms hanging on one side and his feet on the other; but war is a cruel teacher and produces the most shocking sights imaginable. It is not pleasant to record and much less dwell on them.

Straight view of about a half mile of the pike looking westerly towards Winchester, Va., from the divide on Sheridan's battle-field, Sept. 19, 1864. Observe the cut through the divide for the road.]

The following pertaining to Sheridan's battle of Winchester has been discovered since writing the foregoing. It will be answered in detail. Says Col. Aldace F. Walker in his "History of the Vermont Brigade in the Shenandoah Valley, 1864," pp. 91-100:

"Our movement commenced at 3 o'clock Monday morning, September
19th, Getty's Division having the advance, the Vermont Brigade
being the last in the Division. Striking directly across the
country, at first in the darkness, we presently reached the
main road from Berryville to Winchester, and moved down it to
the crossing of the Opequan. This stream is considerably below
the level of the adjoining country, and the road on its further
side keeps the low level of the stream for a mile or more,
winding through a long, tortuous wooded ravine, our unobstructed
passage whereof was for the time a mystery. It seems that
Wilson's Division of cavalry had already cleared the way and
was then holding desperately a position that it had gained with
considerable loss, but which proved a most admirable one in
which to deploy our line of battle.

"As we filed out of the ravine which toward the last was lined
with wounded cavalrymen, we found Sheridan, his headquarters
fixed on a conspicuous elevation, personally superintending from
the commencement the operations of the day. It was to be our
first battle under his command, as well as his first independent
battle; the troops were hitherto destitute of all enthusiasm for
him; fortunately, however, no impression save a favorable one
had as yet been received, it being universally conceded that he
had so far handled his army handsomely. And it was with great
satisfaction that we found him in this early twilight at the
very front, and under the fire of the enemy, carefully attending
to details which we had been accustomed to see more celebrated
commanders entrust to their staff.

"Our Division promptly relieved the cavalry and formed its line
facing west, the Third Brigade which was in advance going to
what was to be the extreme left of the infantry line, resting
on Abraham Creek; the First Brigade following, took up its
position on the right of the Third, and our own Brigade filled
the remaining distance between the First and the road on which
we had reached the battlefield. It had been intended to place us
in two lines, but the unexpected extent of the ground we had to
cover forbade that formation. We were just on the hither edge of
a narrow fringe of wood that concealed us from the enemy; the
Sixth Vermont was thrown forward as a skirmish line perhaps one
hundred yards to the further side of the little forest, and at
once engaged the enemy's skirmishers."

About three regiments, I believe, of the First Brigade, Third Division, Sixth Corps, were to the left or south of the road, so the Vermont Brigade didn't reach to the pike.

"Near us in the road at our right was a rebel field work, taken
by Wilson in the night. The hill on which it was situated
commanded the country in both directions, and it was already
occupied by a battery engaged in feeling the enemy, which was
answered vigorously, many of the rebel shell plunging over into
the troops as they successively came up the road.

"Our Division thus formed in a single line was the only
Division on the south or left of the road. The Third Division,
Ricketts', followed us and prolonged the line across and on the
north of the road, placing its two Brigades in two lines. The
First Division, Russell's, came next, and was drawn up behind
the Third as a third line or reserve, also somewhat overlapping
the right of our Brigade."

About three regiments or more of the Third Division, Sixth Corps, I believe, were south of the road, on the right of the Second Division. When General Russell's Division charged it was about two hundred yards to the right of the Tenth Vermont, or about seven hundred yards or more to the right of Col. Walker's brigade.

"Then to our surprise no more troops appeared, and our Corps was
alone confronting the enemy. There were two or three anxious
hours, but Early was engaged in hurrying up his detachment from
Bunker Hill, which this delay gave him ample time to do, and
made no assault. It was said that the Nineteenth Corps, being
ordered to follow the Sixth, had filed into the road behind our
wagon train, instead of keeping closed up on our column. It is
certain that with this loss of time, from whatever reason it
occurred, we lost the opportunity of attacking the enemy in
detail, and gave him time to prepare for our reception. It was
noon before the Nineteenth Corps had reached its place and was
formed in three or four lines on the right of the Sixth."

The Nineteenth Corps was formed in two lines on the right of the Sixth.

"Our men during the forenoon had been resting, sitting or lying
on the ground. When at last the disposition was completed and
the signal gun was fired, they sprang to the ranks, and the
line advanced. Particular instructions had been received to the
effect that the road was to give the direction of attack, and
that the guiding regiment was to be the left regiment of the
Third Division, just across the road from our right."

The guiding regiments were the Tenth Vermont and Fourteenth New Jersey, on the right of the First Brigade, about the center of the Third Division.

"In passing through the bit of trees in our front, which was
filled with underbrush, our line was necessarily thrown somewhat
into confusion. When we emerged from the wood and the ground
over which we must make our attack was developed, the prospect
was appalling. The hill gradually sloped away before us, for a
quarter of a mile, to a long ravine, irregular in its course,
but its windings extending either way as far as we could see.
The ascent beyond it was in most places sharp, and the enemy
held its crest in force, perfectly commanding with musketry and
artillery the long slope down which we must pass, though the
acclivity on the further side of the hollow was so steep as to
actually present a cover from their fire--if it could once be
reached.

"When this fearful prospect opened the line involuntarily
halted, and the men threw themselves on the ground as was their
wont when under fire. Our own Brigade was properly waiting for
the movement of the guiding regiment which lay across the road
a little to our rear, and which could not be prevailed upon to
stir. To add to the peril of the situation, the road, instead
of continuing straight on, as seems to have been expected,
here made a bend to the left so that our original orders could
not be obeyed without an amount of obliquing that would have
resulted in demoralization; from this cause our own Brigade was
soon afterwards thrown into temporary confusion, and the Third
Division was presently so disorganized as to be unable to
resist a counter-charge made against it by the enemy."

The whole line in front of the enemy's infantry in the ravine in front of the Third Division halted after through the narrow belt of timber behind which we had formed, as the trees, brush and terrible shelling had broken the lines and the advanced men where I was laid down to avoid the storm of shells which filled the air till the men got together, which they soon largely did. It was here found the Second Brigade on my right had excusably gone to pieces, the ground in its front being untenable, which caused some delay; but soon we advanced alone without that Brigade, as did the Nineteenth Corps. This was why the Tenth Vermont or guiding regiment, at this time where I was, didn't move forward sooner. The bend to the left in the road is largely a myth. The line of battle wasn't formed at right angles with it which, as the line advanced led to some confusion, as our colors had to be kept on the pike. There was no counter charge in front of where I was in the Tenth Vermont or disorganization, except in the Second Brigade, but what was soon remedied. The enemy could do more effective work by remaining in cover with little loss, which it did.

"At length the commander of the Brigade at our right crossed to
our side of the road and urged us to set his men the example.
Col. Warner took the responsibility, brought the Brigade to its
feet, corrected the alignment, and gave the command to advance,
which was promptly obeyed. The Third Division followed and the
line was again in motion. But our point of direction was lost,
for we were in advance of our guides, and when it was seen
that owing to a curve in the ravine before us the cover on its
further side could be reached much sooner by obliquing sharply
to the left, we took that direction almost by common consent,
and left the road-side."

Why shouldn't Col. Warner with virtually no enemy in his immediate front be able to set an example of advancing his line when the Third Division was up against the real thing, it being confronted with overwhelming numbers of the enemy's infantry in the ravine and artillery back of it in our immediate front pretty much all that confronted the army in that midday assault? The situation in front of our lines is fully explained in this work elsewhere, and an alleged "bend" in the road or a "curve" in the ravine will not suffice to excuse the troops on our immediate left for not at once helping to flank the enemy's infantry from in front of us in the ravine, at once when on high ground across the ravine instead of running off on the field on a comparatively useless easy task and then have to come back. Where was there any infantry of any amount except in the ravine in front of the Third Division? Why not give the Third Division its due? The killed and wounded tell the story. Didn't our Division have about as many killed and wounded as both the First and Second Divisions together, although smaller than either? No fair-minded soldier or person can study the illustrations even, in this work, and fail to see the facts.

"Our whole Brigade, every man at the top of his speed, making
for the coveted protection of the hill beyond us, plunged pell
mell into the hollow. The troops at our right and left were
lost sight of. The ravine was of some considerable width and
its bottom was marshy, being the head waters of a little branch
of Abraham Creek. The steep slope on its further side was
covered with evergreens six or eight feet high. To our intense
consternation, as we reached its swampy bottom, we saw at our
right, at short pistol range, at least a full regiment of the
enemy drawn up in line near the point where the road crosses the
hollow, in anticipation of our taking precisely the course we
did, and firing coolly, as rapidly as they could load, directly
along our line, thus enfilading us completely. Its position
is indicated on the plan. The slaughter was for a few moments
murderous. We could not retreat, for we should again enter the
fire that had been mowing us down in the charge, now cut off by
the hill before us. We therefore floundered on, our coherence
entirely lost, entered the clusters of evergreens through which
the cruel bullets whistled fearfully, and at last, a confused
mass at best, those of us who escaped unhurt reached comparative
safety under the very crest of the hill, and high above the
deadly hollow."

The probabilities are that old soldier-like seeing or suspecting the true situation, the men intuitively or purposely obliqued away to an easier place of attack; at any rate they did it. Yes, the rebel regiment which was seen in the ravine was in front of the left of our brigade, but crossed to the north side of the pike to my front early in the fight leaving no rebel force in the ravine south of the pike in front of the Second Division on the left of ours.

"We now opened fire for the first time during the day, in the
direction of the regiment or brigade that had so frightfully
thinned our ranks, but they were almost out of reach from us,
as well as we from them. At this moment, however, the Third
Division approached them and they filed away."

It is difficult to conceive why if the enemy could fire at the union forces here they could not return the compliment, at any rate to one who has so recently studied the ground. It was a good thing the Third Division was 'round to drive the rebs away, otherwise they might have more "frightfully thinned" Col. Walker's ranks. It would be interesting to know exactly how many men Col. Walker lost here.

"When this was discovered, and after gaining breath, our own
advance was resumed, but with little pretense at order. Emerging
upon the plain before us at the summit of the hill we had
climbed, we again turned obliquely towards the road and charged
upon a long breastwork filled with rebels, in our immediate
front. The retreat of their comrades from the ravine apparently
demoralized them; many fled, many more were captured; in fact as
we clambered over the parapet it seemed as if the prisoners who
then surrendered exceeded in number our entire Brigade."

I saw this movement when the men advanced seemingly to me in an undeployed skirmish line over the open flat ground beyond the ravine not shown in No. 7 illustration, but further to the right. It was a weak force and could not have met any determined resistance from any considerable body; indeed there was but a small force of the enemy's infantry on that part of the field.

"But we did not stop to count them or to care for them. The
principal position of the enemy in this portion of the field had
now been gained, and we rushed onward toward the distant spires
of Winchester, with shouts and cheers, now thoroughly excited by
our unexpected success. A battery of the enemy was before us,
but it limbered up and retired as we advanced. Several times it
turned, fired a round of canister, and resumed its flight. At
our left the other Brigades of our Division were seen moving
on in our support. At our right an unfortunate ridge now rose,
parallel with our line of advance, along the top of which ran
the road so often referred to, and which hid our friends from
view; we could only hope that they were equally successful, and
push wildly forward. A point was reached probably three-fourths
of a mile beyond the entrenchments where we had captured
the prisoners, when luckily a ditch running across our path
suggested cover and a pause. This ditch was reached only by
the colors of the Fifth, with perhaps two hundred men from the
various regiments. Exhausted with running, they opened fire
as vigorously as they could, but a line of rebels was seen
gradually collecting in their front, as the fugitives were
rallied, and the position held by our troops was presently
dangerously threatened. And now to their dismay, the Brigade
on the higher ground to their left saw reason for retiring and
called for them to follow. What it could mean they did not know,
but it seemed prudent to withdraw, if only for the purpose of
keeping up the connection. An officer sent to investigate soon
reported that at least a Division of the enemy were far behind
their right in an orchard, which they supposed had been carried
by the Third Division. Orders were given therefore to fall back
to the line of the army, following the low ground on the left,
thus keeping under cover of the hill at the right, the enemy
meantime being absorbed in their movement against Ricketts;
and thus the detachment successfully escaped from its dangerous
position and re-formed with the balance of the Brigade near the
works we had carried, being as before on the right of the other
Brigades of our Division, connecting with and at first even in
front of the support which was put in to meet the emergency."

Having watched this whole proceeding, which Sheridan saw, too, through his field glass just behind me, after I was wounded and the enemy from the ravine in my front and its artillery were in full retreat, it reads absurdly. The action of the enemy in Col. Walker's front largely depended on that of the enemy in ours, which had been routed and was in full pell mell retreat when Col. Walker's men were advancing in small irregular groups away from the before-mentioned ravine (see No. 7 illustration) they were so seemingly anxious to leave. As a matter of fact if they had swung to the right in and on the high ground west of the ravine, together with the left of our brigade, they would have done much more effective service. The retreating battery mentioned--and others further north not mentioned--retreated because its infantry in the ravine in my front was routed. As a matter of fact these Second Division men were operating comparatively uselessly far on the enemy's rear right flank and were in a dangerous situation as soon as the bulk of the enemy's infantry in my front should reach that neighborhood. I saw this, as did Sheridan, and it was one thing that caused him to put spurs to his horse and dash away to send a staff officer to recall these forces. The five succeeding quoted paragraphs are disingenuously conceived and misleading. They are worse than worthless for historical purposes because mischievous. The Vermont Brigade was too grand a body of men to be mortified by exaggerations and overdrawn situations. The truth is glorious enough, and to write on such a basis is dignified and fair.

"We afterwards learned that a break had taken place on the right
which for a time seemed likely to result in complete disaster.
The report in our Corps was, that the Nineteenth, advancing
through a long stretch of forest and at first successful, had
afterwards been repulsed, and fled in disorder, many of the
fugitives even going back to the Creek, and that our Third
Division had been checked soon after we lost sight of it,
presently becoming more or less involved in the flight of the
Nineteenth Corps. On the other hand Gen. Emory, commanding the
Nineteenth Corps, in a letter published in the _World_, which
was fortified with affidavits, insisted that the break began at
the right of our Third Division, which led to the turning of
his left and the consequent retiring of his Corps. The official
reports disagree as much as the letters of the correspondents,
who of course reflected the opinions of the several headquarters
to which they were attached, and who created considerable
ill-feeling by the discrepancies in their accounts, and by their
insinuations; the truth is probably between the claims of both,
and the real cause of the enemy's temporary success seems to
have been the unfortunate bend in the road above mentioned,
which interfered with and destroyed the symmetry of our first
advance. Our Third Division obliqued to the left as it moved
against the enemy, following the order to guide on the road,
(there were few or no fences in that vicinity) and so left
an interval between its right and the Nineteenth Corps, which
appears to have gone in impetuously and with little order; the
enemy presently made a counter-charge, and, luckily for them,
struck the gap with a heavy force, crumbling off the troops on
either side of it, and causing the troops on each side of the
interval to think that the others had let the enemy through.
The front line of the Nineteenth Corps was almost entirely
disorganized, and was replaced by the second line, while only
the right of our Third Division was broken up, its left with our
own Division merely retiring a short distance under orders, as
was necessary in order to keep a continuous front."

This is widely erroneous; Emery's left was somewhat broken at first by the terrific shelling from our front, but it was only in the edge of the shell storm at first when going through the wood. His alleged collapse virtually of the right of our Third Division, or Second Brigade, going through the narrow belt of timber behind which we formed, is correct as before stated, for it was immediately on my right, and I know it; it was largely what we halted and laid down for after getting through the timber. We feared being flanked; but the delay was short, for I almost immediately moved forward with my men and others alone over that flat, unsheltered ground, then being unmercifully swept by artillery and musketry till it was virtually untenable. The Nineteenth Corps instead of obliquing to the left towards us to shorten the interval and help us, intuitively obliqued the other way; but fortunately there was no road or bend in it to blame it to. In my opinion it was as clear a case of shirk as to the left of the Third Division, or a desire to find an easier point to attack. Emery's corps didn't retire that I know of, and our brigade I _know_ didn't. The marching of his troops in two long lines was one of the spectacular sights of the day; it was a beautiful feature. It assaulted to the north of the slight divide running east and west, where I saw no infantry nor artillery except a little of the latter far across the breaks. The enfilading infantry and artillery fire from our front at first was about all Emery had to fear, but his Corps soon obliqued away from it. There was _no_ counter charge by the enemy in my front or to either side, and in this I am _emphatic_, as well as in the fact that general officers were not where they could see as well as I. There has been more fiction written about this fight than any I was ever in.

"At the critical moment General Wright, who was for the day
in command of the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, though (as he
says) 'it was too early in the battle to choose to put in the
reserves, still, seeing that the fate of the day depended on
the employment of this force,' promptly ordered in the First
Division with two batteries; it marched gallantly down, with its
full Division front, to the very face of the enemy, relieving
the Third Division, which, reforming, presently took up its
position still further to the right, where the interval had
before been left. Sheridan held back General Upton's Brigade
of the First Division until it could strike the flank of the
charging column of the rebels, when it made the most remarkable
and successful charge of the day, completely breaking up the
rebel assault, and permitting our shattered line again to knit
itself into coherence. General Upton was there wounded and
the brave unostentatious Russell, the idol of the Division he
commanded, was shot dead, while personally employed restoring
the broken line.

"The two hours following were spent in re-arranging the troops,
issuing ammunition, and making dispositions for another
advance." * * *

General Russell's Division started to march on the field _en masse_ and deployed en route; it was one of the grandest sights of the day or entire war. I never saw such splendid discipline under fire in a large body of men. It didn't relieve our brigade in the sense taken above, but did in partially drawing the enemy's musketry and artillery fire from us, which was appalling and effective. Our Brigade didn't reform. I was close on the enemy's rail breastworks in the ravine with my men leading the assault. There was no chance to reform: it was give and take. Russell's men didn't even get the opportunity of getting near enough the rebels to get satisfaction, for they ran when my men and I were within a rod of their works directly in front. There was no considerable bend in the road or anything else that obliqued _my_ men either way to any great extent. The enemy ran before Russell was within effective striking or flanking distance. The enemy _didn't_ charge. If General Upton assaulted its flank it _wasn't_ here. I am _emphatic_ in this, for not twenty seconds after I was twice almost simultaneously wounded during the enemy's last volley, it was running for dear life and Sheridan thirty seconds later was on his horse on the high ground close in my rear looking through his field glass to see where the enemy was going to make a second stand, and at other things evidently displeasing to him on his left, where Colonel Walker and the Second Division were. The whole field of active fighting could be seen from here. Five of the battlefield views herein were taken from this point. Colonel Walker is such a graceful, fluent writer it is a pity he couldn't know the whole facts about the battles the Vermont troops were in. His works would doubtless then be charmingly interesting and entertaining.

As several eminent persons, mistakenly as I think, in recent years, in a moment of weakness and gush have classed General R. E. Lee as one of the greatest of modern field marshals, and as the battles of Opequan Creek or Winchester, Va., Sept. 19, 1864, and Gettysburg, Pa., July 1-3, 1863, both of which I have carefully studied, furnish an excellent opportunity for a few pertinent questions as to the ability of Generals Grant, Sheridan and Lee to plan and manage successfully great battles, I cannot refrain from taking up the matter at this point, and I defy any honest man of expert judgment to successfully controvert my stand.

It might as well be said of Sheridan or of Grant, as it has already been of Lee by partial and incompetent judges, that either of the former were the equal of Marlborough or Wellington, and far more truthfully so than of Lee. Had the fortunes of war placed Sheridan in command of the Army of the Potomac at any period of the Civil War, there is no doubt but what that war would have developed in him a field marshal exceeding in dash, ability and brilliancy any military genius of either ancient or modern times. He was a born soldier, unspoilt by training, success or anything else, and was blessed with splendid common sense. _He_ was a _genius_, for, says a popular poet:

"There is no balking Genius. Only death
Can silence it or hinder. While there's breath
Or sense of feeling, it will spurn the sod,
And lift itself to glory, and to God.
The acorn sprouted--weeds nor flowers can choke
The certain growth of th' upreaching oak."

One secret of Sheridan's success lay largely in his ability to so plan a battle as to fight his whole command _effectively_ all at once, and in such a way that with his dash and unexpected _coup de main_, the enemy was usually whipped before the fight was fairly commenced. With Sheridan in command during the Civil War, President Lincoln would never have had to urge action on the part of the Army of the Potomac as with McClellan and others, except Grant, when ready to fight, nor would it have been fought in detail, which was invariably a fatal fault with both armies, for Sheridan didn't fight that way; there were no unfought reserves in his army. When he struck it was with so much method, dash, determination and judgment it brought brilliant results, such as astonished even his own army, which always expected victory, as well as the enemy and every one else; and in consequence he could accomplish more with fewer men than any other General in the army; not only because he used his force to the best advantage by fighting it all at once, but because his personal magnetism, or hypnotism, enthused the men and gave them confidence, which is a great thing in battle; besides, they had implicit faith in his ability, splendid judgment and quick perception on the battlefield, which are indispensable gifts in a great General; and when combined with an alert, active temperament such as his, it was _grand_. _He_ was a _great_ field marshal. This is proven from the fact that anything he undertook in the Civil War was not only _well_ done if decently supported, but he proved himself grandly equal to any occasion on the field of battle, wherever the fortunes of war placed him--not tamely so, but _brilliantly_; he electrified his men as well as the world by his splendid dash, pluck and surprisingly overwhelming victories. A slight reverse not only left him undaunted but, like a raging lion, it seemed to arouse his wonderful gifts and raise him to such sublime heights it awed one; so that the moment the eye of his command caught a vision of him at any distance on the battlefield, his very pose and action was such it electrified and imbued his men with the same spirit of conquer or die that dominated him, and no enemy could or ever did stand for any length of time before his intrepid command.

Who but Sheridan, as at Cedar Creek, Va., Oct. 19, 1864, just a month to a day after his splendid victory at Opequan Creek, Sept. 19, 1864, or Winchester, Va., as now more properly known, could have rallied a defeated and routed army en route to the front and after and so enthused it in the act, simply by dashing, alert and crafty through its broken ranks after a twenty mile race with time from Winchester, with flashing eyes, bared head and waving hat, on a spirited foaming horse, shouting to his men: "Get back into line, men! Get into line, _quick_! We can lick 'em! We can lick h----l out of 'em yet!" and do it almost at once, even as brilliantly so as at Winchester a month previous? How often are such things done? Such a man outclasses all others in military history, not excepting Wellington or Marlborough, for such a man as Sheridan is without a peer as a field marshal in the annals of warfare; and had he been found sooner and given greater responsibilities he would not only have surely proved it, but would have more fully electrified the world than he did and have been its idol as a military genius and hero for all time.

He or Grant would never have used such woefully poor judgment as to have assaulted an army equally as valiant, splendidly posted, fully as large, if not larger than their own, across an open, level space without cover quite a mile in extent, as Lee did at Gettysburg on July 3, 1864. If that act showed ability, good judgment, or a military genius, then I am lacking in mature sound judgment, and my lifetime of military training, including my three years and threescore battles or more in the Civil War and in Indian wars, has been in vain. This would be equally true even though the armies had been equal in numbers. General Longstreet's suggestion to Lee to place his army on General Meade's flank between him and Washington would have been a splendid substitute for Pickett's forlorn charge.[21] It was abler and just what Grant did with Lee hardly a year later, successfully and repeatedly and forced Lee back to Richmond and Petersburg, as the world now knows, which indicates superior generalship both on Grant's part as well as Longstreet's.

[21] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 29-30.

Would either Grant or Sheridan have lost their cavalry for several days, as Lee did, when on such a campaign in an enemy's country or anywhere else?[22] Would either, with three such splendid cavalry divisions as Meade, not have used a part of one division if necessary to have patrolled barely seventy-five miles between York, Pa., or the Susquehanna, and the Potomac river, in order to detect any movement by the enemy on Washington? Would this have made the Union Commander, whoever he might have been, timid about moving to any point where battle was offered, fearing a fake attack by Lee in order to cover a movement on Washington or Baltimore? One brigade would have established a line of patrol posts less than a quarter of a mile apart of six men each, which would have detected at once any movement south by Lee, or if preferred, posts one-eighth of a mile apart of three men each.

[22] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," p. 12.

Would Grant or Sheridan have remained so near a great battle as at Gettysburg, July 1, 1864, and not have furnished an opportunity for another soul-stirring poem like "Sheridan's Ride"? When they were informed that the enemy had attacked their forces barely three hours' ride away, would they have loitered a whole day away like dullards, as both army commanders did at Gettysburg?[23] Aye! either would have made the ride in two hours or even less, and even though their steeds were as black as night, on their arrival at Gettysburg they would have been as white as snow or as foam could have made them; and, still better, they would not only have known, too, through their cavalry, spies, etc., for we were at home among friends, where Lee's army corps were, but when each broke camp to concentrate at Gettysburg, and their own corps close by them would have been there in season to have met the enemy in at least equal numbers, instead of being outnumbered all day July 1, two to one, as was the case.[24] If necessary, too, as at Opequan Creek, Sept. 19, 1864, the different corps would have marched at 2 o'clock instead of 8 o'clock A. M. or even earlier if thought necessary.

[23] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 16-17.

[24] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 19-33.

Was there any excuse for the Confederates not driving the Union forces from the field in a rout on July first? They would have done so, too, except that their forces were fought in detail, its reserves not even being brought into action when needed.[25] Did Ewell take the best advantage of his opportunities? The enemy outnumbered us quite two to one the first day from first to last after the battle commenced, but still at the first dash of two brigades of our Infantry--Wadsworth's Division--against two brigades of the enemy, when Reynolds was killed, we placed _hors de combat_ over half of each of their brigades and captured Archer, a brigade commander; and still the enemy had two brigades in immediate reserve as support, but they were not used.[26] This is what I call fighting an army in detail, a total waste of material. In case Sheridan hadn't thrown his support or reserve--Russell's division--into the fight at the right moment at Winchester, Va., Sept. 19, 1864, his results would have been equally as ignominious as his victory was brilliant, because he did use his reserve correctly on that occasion; and so it would have been with the enemy at Gettysburg had it used its reserve. It would probably have captured many of our men and driven the balance of them from the field in a rout, as Sheridan did Early at Winchester, Sept. 19, 1864; there was nothing to prevent it.

[25] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 19-33.

[26] See Burrage, "Gettysburg and Lincoln," pp. 19-33.