Chapter VIII: Part 8

I do not know what other arguments can be used to show that we sometimes _experience_ sensibles in a sense quite other than that of directly apprehending them. But I do not know how to show that we do not; and since people whose judgment I respect, seem to hold that we do, I think it is worth while to say something as to what this sense of "experience" can be, in case it does occur.

I have said that sometimes when people say that a given entity is "experienced" they seem to mean that it belongs to some individual, in the sense in which my acts of belief belong to me. To say that sensibles were experienced by me in this sense would, therefore, be to say that they sometimes have to my acts of belief and acts of direct apprehension the same relation which these have to one another--the relation which constitutes them _mine._ But that sensibles ever have this kind of relation to my mental acts, is a thing which I cannot believe. Those who hold that they are ever experienced at all, in some sense other than that of being directly apprehended, always hold, I think, that, whenever they are directly apprehended by us, they also, at the same time, have to us this other relation as well. And it seems to me pretty clear that when I do directly apprehend a sensible, it does _not_ have to me the same relation which my direct apprehension of it has.

If, therefore, sensibles are ever experienced by us at all, in any sense other than that of being directly apprehended by us, we must, I think, hold that they are so in an entirely new sense, quite different both from that in which to be experienced means to be directly apprehended, and from that in which to be experienced means to occur in some individual's mind. And I can only say that I see no reason to think that they ever are experienced in any such sense. If they are, the fact that they are so is presumably open to the inspection of us all; but I cannot distinguish any such fact as occurring in myself, as I can distinguish the fact that they are directly apprehended. On the other hand, I see no way of showing that they are _not_ experienced in some such sense; and perhaps somebody will be able to point it out to me. I do not wish to assume, therefore, that there _is_ no such sense; and hence, though I am inclined to think that the _only_ sense in which they are experienced is that of being directly apprehended, I shall, in what follows, use the phrase "experienced" to mean _either_ directly apprehended _or_ having to something this supposed different relation, if such a relation there be.

(3) We may now, therefore, raise the question: Do sensibles ever exist at times when they are not being experienced at all?

To this question it is usual to give a negative answer, and two different _a priori_ reasons may be urged in favour of that answer.

The first is what should be meant by Berkeley's dictum that the _esse_ of sensibles is _percipi._ This should mean, whatever else it may mean, at least this: that to suppose a sensible to exist and yet _not_ to be experienced in self-contradictory. And this at least seems to me to be clearly false. Anything which was a patch of colour would be a sensible; and to suppose that there are patches of colour which are not being experienced is clearly not self-contradictory, however false it may be.

It may, however, be urged (and this is the second argument) that, though to suppose a thing to be a sensible and _yet_ not experienced is not self-contradictory, yet we can clearly see that nothing can have the one property without having the other. And I do not see my way to deny that we may be able to know, _a priori_ that such a connection holds between two such properties. In the present case, however, I cannot see that it does hold, and therefore, so far as _a priori_ reasons go, I conclude that there is no reason why sensibles should not exist at times when they are not experienced.

It may, however, be asked: Is there any reason to suppose that they ever do? And the reason, which weighs with me most, is one which applies, I think, to a certain class of sensibles _only_; a class which I will try to define by saying that it consists of those which _would_ (under certain conditions which actually exist) be experienced in a _sensation proper, if only_ a living body, having a certain constitution, existed under those conditions in a position in which no such body does actually exist. I think it is very probable that this definition does not define at all accurately the kind of sensibles I mean; but I think that what the definition aims at will become clearer when I proceed to give my reasons for supposing that sensibles, of a kind to be defined in _some_ such way, do exist unexperienced. The reason is simply that, in Hume's phrase, I have "a strong propensity to believe" that, _e.g.,_ the visual sensibles which I directly apprehend in looking at this paper, still exist unchanged when I merely alter the position of my body by turning away my head or closing my eyes, _provided_ that the physical conditions outside my body remain unchanged. In such a case it is certainly true in some sense that I _should_ see sensibles like what I saw the moment before, _if only_ my head were still in the position it was at that moment or my eyes unclosed. But if, in such a case, there is reason to think that sensibles which I should see, if the position of my body were altered, exist in spite of the fact that I do not experience them, there is, I think, an equal reason to suppose it in other cases. We must, for instance, suppose that the sensibles which I should see now, if I were at the other end of the room, or if I were looking under the table, exist at this moment, though they are not being experienced. And similarly we must suppose that the sensibles which _you_ would see, if you were in the position in which I am now, exist at this moment, in spite of the fact that they may be more or less different from those which I see, owing to the different constitution of our bodies. All this implies of course, that a vast number of sensibles exist at any moment, which are not being experienced at all. But still it implies this only with regard to sensibles of a strictly limited class, namely sensibles which would be experienced _in a sensation proper,_ if a body, having a certain constitution, were in a position in which it is not, under the given physical conditions. It does not, for instance, imply that any _images,_ of which it may be true that I _should_ have them, under present physical conditions, if the position of my body were altered, exist now; nor does it imply that sensibles which _would_ be experienced by me now in a sensation proper, if the physical conditions external to my body were different from what they are, exist now.

I feel, of course, that I have only succeeded in defining miserably vaguely the kind of sensibles I mean; and I do not know whether the fact that I have a strong propensity to believe that sensibles of a kind to be defined in some such way, do exist unexperienced, is any good reason for supposing that they actually do. The belief may, of course, be a mere prejudice. But I do not know of any certain test by which prejudices can be distinguished from reasonable beliefs. And I cannot help thinking that there may be a class of sensibles, capable of definition in _some_ such way, which there really is reason to think exist unexperienced.

But, if I am not mistaken, there is an empirical argument which, though, even if it were sound, it would have no tendency whatever to show that _no_ sensibles exist unexperienced, would, if it were sound, show that this very class of sensibles, to which alone my argument for unexperienced existence applies, certainly do not so exist. This, it seems to me, is the most weighty argument which can be used upon the subject; and I want, therefore, to give my reasons for thinking that it is fallacious.

The argument is one which asserts that there is abundant empirical evidence in favour of the view that the existence of the sensibles which we experience at any time, always depends upon the condition of our nervous system: so that, even where it also depends upon external physical conditions, we can safely say that sensibles, which we should have experienced, if only our nervous system had been in a different condition, certainly do not exist, when it is not in that condition. And the fallacy of this argument seems to me to lie in the fact that it does not distinguish between the existence of the sensibles _which_ we experience and _the fact that we experience them._ What there _is_ evidence for is that _our experience_ of sensibles always depends upon the condition of our nervous system; that, according as the condition of the nervous system changes, different sensibles are _experienced_, even where other conditions are the same. But obviously the fact that our experience of a given sensible depends upon the condition of our nervous system does not directly show that the existence of _the sensible experienced_ always also so depends. The fact that I am now experiencing this black mark is certainly a different fact from the fact that this black mark now exists. And hence the evidence which does tend to show that the former fact would not have existed if my nervous system had been in a different condition, has no tendency to show that the latter would not have done so either. I am sure that this distinction ought to be made; and hence, though I think there may be other reasons for thinking that the very existence of the sensibles, which we experience, and not merely the fact that we experience them _does_ always depend upon the condition of our nervous systems, it seems to me certain that this particular argument constitutes no such reason.

And I think that those who suppose that it does are apt to be influenced by an assumption, for which also, so far as I can see, there is no reason. I have admitted that the only reason I can see for supposing that sensibles which we experience ever exist unexperienced, seems to lead to the conclusion that the sensibles which would be seen by a colour-blind man, if he occupied exactly the position which I, who am not colour-blind, now occupy, exist now, just as much as those which I now see. And it may be thought that this implies that the sensibles, which he would see, and which would certainly be very different from those which I see, are nevertheless at this moment in exactly the same place as those which I see. Now, for my part, I am not prepared to admit that it is impossible they should be in the same place. But the assumption against which I wish to protest, is the assumption that, if they exist at all, they _must_ be in the same place. I can see no reason whatever for this assumption. And hence any difficulties there may be in the way of supposing that they could be in the same place at the same time as the sensibles which I see, do not at all apply to my hypothesis, which is only that they exist _now, not_ that they exist _in the same place_ in which mine do.

On this question, therefore, as to whether sensibles ever exist at times when they are not experienced, I have only to say (1) that I think there is certainly no good reason whatever for asserting that _no_ sensibles do; and (2) that I think perhaps a certain amount of weight ought to be attached to our instinctive belief that certain kinds of sensibles do; and that here again any special arguments which may be brought forward to show that, whether some sensibles exist unexperienced or not, _this_ kind certainly do not, are, so far as I can see, wholly inconclusive.

(II)

I now pass to the question how sensibles are related to physical objects. And here I want to say, to begin with, that I feel extremely puzzled about the whole subject. I find it extremely difficult to distinguish clearly from one another the different considerations which ought to be distinguished; and all I can do is to raise, more or less vaguely, certain questions as to how certain _particular_ sensibles are related to certain _particular_ physical objects, and to give the reasons which seem to me to have most weight for answering these questions in one way rather than another. I feel that all that I can say is very tentative.

To begin with, I do not know how "physical object" is to be defined, and I shall not try to define it. I shall, instead, consider certain propositions, which everybody will admit to be propositions _about_ physical objects, and which I shall assume that I know to be true. And the question I shall raise is as to how these propositions are to be interpreted_--in what sense_ they are true; in considering which, we shall at the same time consider how they are related to certain sensibles.

I am looking at two coins, one of which is a half-crown, the other a florin. Both are lying on the ground; and they are situated obliquely to my line of sight, so that the visual sensibles which I directly apprehend in looking at them are visibly elliptical, and not even approximately circular. Moreover, the half-crown is so much farther from me than the florin that _its_ visual sensible is visibly smaller than that of the florin.

In these circumstances I am going to assume that I know the following propositions to be true; and no one, I think, will deny that we can know such propositions to be true, though, as we shall see, extremely different views may be taken as to what they mean. I know (_a_) that, in the ordinary sense of the word "see" I am _really seeing two coins;_ an assertion which includes, if it is not identical with, the assertion that the visual experiences, which consist in my direct apprehension of those two elliptical patches of colour, _are_ sensations proper, and are not either hallucinations nor mere experiences of "images"; (_b_) that the upper sides of the coins are _really_ approximately circular, and not merely elliptical like the visual sensibles; (_c_) that the coins _have_ another side, and an inside, though I don't see it; (_d_) that the upper side of the half-crown is really _larger_ than that of the florin, though its visual sensible is _smaller_ than the visual sensible of the upper side of the florin: (_e_) that both coins continue to exist, even when I turn away my head or shut my eyes; but in saying this, I do not, of course, mean to say that there is absolutely _no_ change in them; I daresay there must be _some_ change, and I do not know how to define exactly what I do mean. But we can, I think, say at least this: viz., that propositions (_h_), (_c_), and (_d_) will still be true, although proposition (_a_) has ceased to be true.

Now all these propositions are, I think, typical propositions of the sort which we call propositions about physical objects; and the two coins themselves _are_ physical objects, if anything is. My question is: _In what sense_ are these propositions true?

And in considering this question, there are, I think, two principles which we can lay down as certain to begin with; though they do not carry us very far.

The one is (_a_) that the upper side of the coin, which I am said to _see,_ is not simply identical with the visual sensible which I _directly apprehend_ in seeing it. That this is so might be thought to follow absolutely from each of the two facts which I have called (_b_) and (_d_); but I am not quite sure that it does follow from either of these or from both together: for it seems to me just possible that the two sensibles in question, though _not_ circular _in my private space,_ may yet be circular in _physical_ space; and similarly that though the sensible of the half-crown is smaller than that of the florin _in my private space,_ it may be larger _in physical space._ But what I think it does follow from is the fact that another person may be seeing the upper side of the coin in exactly the same sense in which I am seeing it, and yet his sensible be certainly different from mine. From this it follows absolutely that the upper side of the coin cannot be identical with _both_ sensibles, since they are _not_ identical with one another. And though it does not follow absolutely that it may not be identical with _one_ of the two, yet it does follow that we _can_ get a case in which it is not identical with _mine_ and I need only assume that the case I am taking is such a case.

From this it follows that we must distinguish that sense of the word "see" in which we can be said to "see" a physical object, from that sense of the word in which "see" means merely to directly apprehend a visual sensible. In a proposition of the form "I see A," where A is a name or description of some physical object, though, if this proposition is to be true, there must be some visual sensible, B, which I am directly apprehending, yet the proposition "I see A" is certainly not always, and probably never, identical in meaning with the proposition "I directly apprehend B." In asserting "I see A" we are asserting not only that we directly apprehend some sensible but also something else about this sensible--it may be only some proposition of the form, "and this sensible has certain other properties," or it may be some proposition of the form "and _I know_ this sensible to have certain other properties." Indeed we have not only to distinguish that sense of the word "perceive" in which it is equivalent to "directly apprehend," from _one_ sense in which we can be said to perceive a physical object; we have also to distinguish at least two different senses in which we can be said to perceive physical objects, different both from one another and from "directly apprehend." For it is obvious that though I should be said to be now seeing _the half-crown_, there is a narrower, and more proper, sense, in which I can only be said to _see_ one side of it_--not_ its lower side or its inside, and not therefore the whole half-crown.

The other principle, which we can lay down to start with is (_β_) that my knowledge of all the five propositions (_a_) to (_e_), is based, in the last resort, on experiences of mine consisting in the direct apprehension of sensibles and in the perception of relations between directly apprehended sensibles. It is _based_ on these, in at least this sense, that I should never have known any of these propositions if I had never directly apprehended any sensibles nor perceived any relations between them.

What, in view of these two principles, can be the sense in which my five propositions are true?

(1) It seems to me possible that the only _true_ interpretation which can be given to any of them is an interpretation of a kind which I can only indicate rather vaguely as follows: Namely, that all of them express only a kind of fact which we should naturally express by saying that, _if_ certain conditions were fulfilled, I or some other person, _should_ directly apprehend certain other sensibles. For instance the only _true_ thing that can be meant by saying that I really see _coins_ may be some such thing as that, _if_ I were to move my body in certain ways, I should directly apprehend _other_ sensibles, _e.g._ tactual ones, which I should not directly apprehend as a consequence of these movements, if these present visual experiences of mine were mere hallucinations or experiences of "images." Again, the only true thing that can be meant by saying that the upper sides of the coins are _really_ approximately circular may be some such thing as that, _if_ I were looking straight at them, I should directly apprehend circular sensibles. And similarly, the only true interpretation of (_c_) may be some such fact as that, _if_ I were to turn the coins over, or break them up, I _should_ have certain sensations, of a sort I can imagine very well; of (_d_) that _if_ I were at an equal distance from the half-crown and the florin, the sensible, I should then see corresponding to the half-crown would be bigger than that corresponding to the florin, whereas it is now smaller; of (_e_) that, _if,_ when my eyes were closed, they had been open instead, I should have seen certain sensibles.

It is obvious, indeed, that if any interpretation on these lines _is_ the only true interpretation of our five propositions, none of those which I have vaguely suggested comes anywhere near to expressing it in its ultimate form. They cannot do so for the simple reason that, in them, the conditions under which I _should_ experience certain other sensibles are themselves expressed in terms of _physical objects,_ and not in terms of sensibles and our experience of them. The conditions are expressed in such terms as "if I were to move my body," "if I were to look straight at the coins," "if I were to turn the coins over," etc.; and all these are obviously propositions, which must themselves again be interpreted in terms of sensibles, if our original five propositions need to be so. It is obvious, therefore, that any _ultimate_ interpretation of our five propositions, on these lines, would be immensely complicated; and I cannot come anywhere near to stating exactly what it would be. But it seems to me possible that _some_ such interpretation could be found, and that it is the _only_ true one.

The great recommendation of this view seems to me to be that it enables us to see, more clearly than any other view can, how our knowledge of physical propositions can be based on our experience of sensibles, in the way in which principle (_β_) asserts it to be. If, when I know that the coins are round, all that I know is some such thing as that if, after experiencing the sensibles I do now experience, I were to experience still others, I should finally experience a third set, we can understand, as clearly as we can understand how any knowledge can be obtained by induction at all, how such a knowledge could be based on our previous experience of sensibles, and how it could be verified by our subsequent experience.

On the other hand, apart from the difficulty of actually giving any interpretation on these lines, which will meet the requirements, the great objection to it seems to me to be this. It is obvious that, on this view, though we shall still be allowed to say that the coins _existed_ before I saw them, are _circular_ etc., all these expressions, if they are to be true, will have to be understood in a Pickwickian sense. When I know that the coins existed before I saw them, what I know will not be that anything whatever existed at that time, in the sense in which those elliptical patches of colour exist now. _All_ that I know will be simply that, since the elliptical patches exist now, it is true, that, _if_ certain unrealised conditions had been realised, I should have had certain sensations that I have not had; or, _if_ certain conditions, which may or may not be realised in the future, were to be so, I _should_ have certain experiences. Something like this will actually be the _only true_ thing that can be meant by saying that the coins existed before I saw them. In other words, to say of a _physical object_ that it _existed_ at a given time will always consist merely in saying of some sensible, _not_ that _it_ existed at the time in question, but something quite different and immensely complicated. And thus, though, when I know that the coins exist, what I know will be merely some proposition about these sensibles which I am directly apprehending, yet this view will not contradict principle (_a_) by _identifying_ the coins with the sensibles. For it will say that to assert a given thing of the _coins_ is not equivalent to asserting the _same thing_ of the sensibles, but only to asserting of them something quite different.

The fact that these assertions that the coins exist, are round, etc., will, on this view, only be true in this outrageously Pickwickian sense, seems to me to constitute the great objection to it. But it seems to me to be an objection only, so far as I can see, because I have a "strong propensity to believe" that, when I know that the coins existed before I saw them, _what_ I know is that something existed at that time, in the very same sense in which those elliptical patches now exist. And, of course, this belief _may_ be a mere prejudice. It _may_ be that when I believe that I _now_ have, in my body, blood and nerves and brain, _what_ I believe is only true, if it does _not_ assert, in the proper sense of the word "existence," the _present_ existence of anything whatever, other than sensibles which I directly apprehend, but only makes assertions as to the kind of experiences a doctor _would_ have, if he dissected me. But I cannot feel at all sure that my belief, that, when I know of the present Existence of these things (as I think I do), I am knowing of the present existence (in the proper sense) of things other than any sensibles which I or any one else am now directly apprehending, is a mere prejudice. And therefore I think it is worth while to consider what, if it is not, these things, of whose existence I know, can be.

(2) It is certain that if, when I know that that half-crown existed before I saw it, I am knowing that something existed at that time in other than a Pickwickian sense, I only know this something _by description_; and it seems pretty clear that the description by which I know it is as _the_ thing which has a certain connection with this sensible which I am now directly apprehending. But _what_ connection? We cannot simply say, as many people have said, that by "that half-crown" I mean _the_ thing which _caused_ my experience of this sensible; because events which happen between the half-crown and my eyes, and events in my eyes, and optic nerves, and brains are just as much _causes_ of my experiences as the half-crown itself. But it may perhaps be the case that the half-crown has some particular _kind_ of causal relation to my experience, which these other events have not got--a kind which may be expressed, perhaps, by saying that it is its "source." And hence, when I know that that half-crown is circular, I may perhaps be knowing that the _source_ of this experience is circular.

But what sort of a thing can this "source" be?

One kind of view, which I think is very commonly held, is that it is something "spiritual" in its nature, or something whose nature is utterly unknown to us. And those who hold this view are apt to add, that it is not really "circular," in any sense at all; nor is the "source" of my half-crown experience, in any sense at all, "bigger" than that of my florin experience. But if this addition were seriously meant, it would, of course, amount to saying that propositions (_b_) and (_d_) are not true, in any sense at all; and I do not think that those who make it, really mean to say this. I think that what they mean is only that the only sense in which those "sources" are circular, and one bigger than the other, is one in which to say this merely amounts to saying that the sensibles, which they _would_ cause us to experience, under certain conditions, _would_ be circular, and one bigger than the other. In other words, in order to give a true interpretation to the propositions that the coins are circular and one bigger than the other, they say that we must interpret them in the same kind of way in which view (1) interpreted them; and the only difference between their view and view (1), is that, whereas _that_ said that you must give a Pickwickian interpretation _both_ to the assertion that the coins _exist, and_ to the assertion that they are _circular_, they say that you must _not_ give it to the former assertion, and must to the latter.

To this view my objection is only that any reason there may be for saying that the "sources" exist in other than a Pickwickian sense, seems to me to be also a reason for saying that they are "circular" in a sense that is not Pickwickian. I have just as strong a propensity to believe that they are really circular, in a simple and natural sense, as that they exist in such a sense: and I know of no better reason for believing either.

(3) It may be suggested, next, that these "sources," instead of being something spiritual in their nature or something of a nature utterly unknown, consist simply of sensibles, of a kind which I have previously tried to define; namely of all those sensibles, which anybody _would,_ under the actual physical conditions, experience in _sensations proper_ of which the half-crown and the florin were the source, _if_ their bodies were in any of the positions relatively to those coins, in which they would get sensations from them at all. We saw before that it seems _possible_ that all these sensibles do really exist at times when they are not experienced, and that some people, at all events, seem to have a strong propensity to believe that they do. And in favour of the view that some such huge collection of sensibles _is_ the upper side of the half-crown, is the fact that we do seem to have a strong propensity to believe that any particular sensible, which we directly apprehend in looking at the upper side of the half-crown, and of our direct apprehension of which the upper side is the source, is _in the place_ in which the upper side is. And that _some_ sense might be given to the expression "in the same place as," in which it could be true that sensibles of all sorts of different shapes and sizes, and of all sorts of different colours, were in the same place at the same time, seems to me to be possible. But the objection to this view seems to me to be the same as to the last; namely that if the upper side of the half-crown were identical with such a collection of sensibles, then the only sense in which it could be said to be "circular," or bigger than that of the florin, would certainly be very Pickwickian, though not the same as on that view.

(4) If, for the reasons given, we reject both (1), (2), and (3) as interpretations of our five propositions, the only alternative I can think of that remains, is one which is roughly identical, so far as I can see, with Locke's view. It is a view which asserts that the half-crown and the florin really did exist (in the natural sense) before I saw them; that they really are approximately circular (again in the natural sense); that, therefore, they are not composed of sensibles which I or others should directly apprehend under other conditions; and that therefore also neither these sensibles (even if such do now exist) nor those which I am now directly apprehending are in the place in which the coins are. It holds, therefore, that the coins do really _resemble_ some sensibles, in respect of the "primary" qualities which these have; that they really are round, and one larger than the other, in much the same sense in which some sensibles are round and some larger than others. But it holds also that no sensibles which we ever do directly apprehend, or should directly apprehend, if at a given time we were in other positions, are _parts_ of those coins; and that, therefore, there is no reason to suppose that any parts of the coins have any of the "secondary qualities"--colour, etc.--which any of these sensibles have.

On this view, it is plain, there is nothing to prevent us from holding that, as suggested in I (3), all sorts of unexperienced sensibles do exist. We are only prevented from holding that, if they do, those which have the same source all exist in the _same place_ as their source. And the natural view to take as to the status of sensibles generally, relatively to physical objects, would be that none of them, whether experienced or not, were ever in the same place as any physical object. That none, therefore, exist "anywhere" in physical space; while, at the same time, we can also say, as argued in I (2), that none exist "in the mind," except in the sense that some are directly apprehended by some minds. And the only thing that would need to be added, is that some, and some only, _resemble_ the physical objects which are their source, in respect of their shape.

To this view I can see no objection except the serious one that it is difficult to answer the questions: How can I ever come to know that these sensibles have a "source" at all? And how do I know that these "sources" are circular? It would seem that, if I do know these things at all, I must know _immediately_, in the case of _some_ sensibles, both that they have a source and what the shape of this source is. And to this it may be objected that this is a kind of thing which I certainly cannot know immediately. The argument in favour of an interpretation of type (i) seems to me to rest wholly on the assumption that there are only certain kinds of facts which I can know immediately; and hence that if I believe I know a fact, which is not of this kind, and which also I cannot have learnt immediately, my belief must be a mere prejudice. But I do not know how it can be shown that an assertion of the form: Facts of certain kinds are the only ones you can know immediately; is itself not a prejudice. I do not think, therefore, that the fact that, if this last view were true, we should have to admit that we know immediately facts of a kind which many people think we cannot know immediately, is a conclusive objection to it.

THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY

The fourth chapter of Mr. Bradley's _Appearance and Reality_ is a chapter headed "Space and Time," and he begins the chapter as follows:--

"The object of this chapter is far from being an attempt to discuss fully the nature of space or of time. It will content itself with stating our main justification for regarding them as appearances. It will explain why we deny that, _in the character which they exhibit_, they either _have_ or _belong_ to reality."[1]

Here, it will be seen, Mr. Bradley states that, in his opinion, Time, _in a certain character_, neither has nor belongs to reality; this is the conclusion he wishes to maintain. And to say that Time _has not_ reality would seem to be plainly equivalent to saying that Time _is not_ real. However, if anybody should doubt whether the two phrases are meant to be equivalent, the doubt may be easily set at rest by a reference to the concluding words of the same chapter, where Mr. Bradley uses the following very emphatic expression: "Time," he says, "like space, has most evidently proved _not to be real,_ but to be a contradictory appearance" (p. 43). Mr. Bradley does, then, say here, in so many words, that Time _is not_ real. But there is one other difference between this statement at the end of the chapter, and the statement at the beginning of it, which we must not forget to notice. In the statement at the beginning he carefully qualifies the assertion "Time neither has nor belongs to reality" by saying "Time, _in the character which it exhibits,_ neither has nor belongs to reality," whereas in the final statement this qualification is not inserted; here he says simply "Time is not real." This qualification, which is inserted in the one place and omitted in the other, might, of course, be meant to imply that, in some _other_ character--some character which it does _not_ exhibit--Time _has_ reality and does belong to it. And I shall presently have something to say about this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, because it might be thought that this distinction is the explanation of the difficulty as to Mr. Bradley's meaning, which I am going to point out.

However, so far it is clear that Mr. Bradley holds that _in some sense,_ at all events, the whole proposition "Time is not real" can be truly asserted. And, now, I want to quote a passage in which he says things which, at first sight, seem difficult to reconcile with this view. This new passage is a passage in which he is not talking of Time in particular, but of "appearances" in general. But, as we have seen, he does regard Time as one among appearances, and I think there is no doubt that what he here declares to be true of all appearances is meant to be true of Time, among the rest. This new passage is as follows:--

"For the present," he says,[2] "we may keep a fast hold upon this, that appearances _exist._ That is absolutely certain, and to deny it is nonsense. And whatever exists must _belong to reality._ This is also quite certain, and its denial once more is self-contradictory. Our appearances, no doubt, may be a beggarly show, and their nature to an unknown extent may be something which, _as it is,_ is _not_ true of reality. That is one thing, and it is quite another thing to speak as if these facts had no actual existence, or as if there could be anything but reality to which they might belong. And I must venture to repeat that such an idea would be sheer nonsense. What appears, for that sole reason, most indubitably _is;_ and there is no possibility of conjuring its being away from it."

That is the passage which seems to me to raise a difficulty as to his meaning when contrasted with the former passage. And the reason why it seems to me to raise one is this. In the former passage Mr. Bradley declared most emphatically that Time is not real; he said: "Time has _most evidently_ proved not to be real." Whereas in this one he seems to declare equally emphatically that Time _does_ exist, and _is._ And his language here again is as strong as possible. He says it is sheer nonsense to suppose that Time does _not_ exist, is _not_ a fact, does _not_ belong to reality. It looks, therefore, as if he meant to make a distinction between "being real" on the one hand, and "existing," "being a fact," and "being" on the other hand--as if he meant to say that a thing may exist, and be, and be a fact, and yet _not_ be real. And I think there is, at all events, some superficial difficulty in understanding this distinction. We might naturally think that to say "Time exists, is a fact, and is," is equivalent to saying that it is real. What more, we might ask, can a man who says that Time _is_ real mean to maintain about it than that it exists, is a fact, and is? All that most people would mean by saying that time is real could, it would seem, be expressed by saying "There is such a thing as Time." And it might, therefore, appear from this new passage as if Mr. Bradley fully agreed with the view that most people would express by saying "Time is real"--as if he did not at all mean to contradict anything that most people believe about Time. But, if so, then what are we to make of his former assertion that, nevertheless, Time is _not_ real? He evidently thinks that, in asserting this, he is asserting something which is _not_ mere nonsense; and he certainly would not have chosen this way of expressing what he means, unless he had supposed that what he is here asserting about Time is incompatible with what people _often_ mean when they say "Time is real." Yet, we have seen that he thinks that what he is asserting is _not_ incompatible with the assertions that Time is, and is a fact, and exists. He must, therefore, think that when people say "Time is real" they often, at least, mean something _more_ than merely that there _is_ such a thing as Time, something therefore, which may be denied, without denying this. All the same, there is, I think, a real difficulty in seeing that they ever _do_ mean anything more, and, _if_ they do, what more it is that they can mean.

The two expressions "There _is_ such a thing as so and so" and "So and so is real" are certainly sometimes and quite naturally used as equivalents, even if they are not always so used. And Mr. Bradley's own language implies that this is so. For, as we have seen, in the first passage, he seems to identify belonging to reality with being real. The conclusion which he expresses in one place by saying that Time does not belong to reality he expresses in another by saying that it is not real; whereas in the second passage he seems to identify the meaning of the same phrase "belonging to reality" with _existing;_ he says that whatever exists must belong to reality, and that it is self-contradictory to deny this. But if both being real and existing are identical with belonging to reality, it would seem they must be identical with one another. And, indeed, in another passage in the Appendix to the 2nd Edition (p. 555) we find Mr. Bradley actually using the following words: "Anything," he says, "that in any sense _is,_ qualifies the absolute reality and so is real." Moreover, as we have seen, he declares it to be nonsense to deny that Time _is_; he must, therefore, allow that, _in a sense,_ at all events, it is nonsense to deny that Time is real. And yet this denial is the very one he has made. Mr. Bradley, therefore, does seem himself to allow that the word "real" may, _sometimes_ at all events, be properly used as equivalent to the words "exists," "is a fact," "is." And yet his two assertions cannot both be true, unless there is _some_ sense in which the whole proposition "Time is real" is _not_ equivalent to and cannot be inferred from "Time is," or "Time exists," or "Time is a fact."

It seems, then, pretty clear that Mr. Bradley must be holding that the statement "Time is real" is in _one_ sense, _not_ equivalent to "Time exists"; though he admits that, in _another_ sense, it is. And I will only quote one other passage which seems to make this plain.

"If," he says later on (p. 206) "Time is not unreal, I admit that our Absolute is a delusion; but, on the other side, it will be urged that time cannot be mere appearance. The change in the finite subject, we are told, is a matter of direct experience; it is a fact, and hence it cannot be explained away. And so much of course is indubitable. Change is a fact and, further, _this fact, as such,_ is _not_ reconcilable with the Absolute. And, if we could not in any way perceive how _the fact_ can be _unreal,_ we should be placed, I admit, in a hopeless dilemma.... But our real position is very different from this. For time has been shown to contradict itself, and so to be appearance. With this, its discord, we see at once, may pass as an element into a wider harmony. And with this, the _appeal to fact_ at once becomes worthless."

"It is mere superstition to suppose that an appeal to experience can prove _reality._ That I find something in existence in the world or in my self, shows that this something _exists_, and it cannot show _more._ Any deliverance of consciousness--whether original or acquired--is but a deliverance of consciousness. It is in no case an oracle and a revelation which we have to accept as it is a fact, like other facts, to be dealt with; and there is no presumption anywhere that any _fact_ is better than appearance."

Here Mr. Bradley seems plainly to imply that to be "real" is something _more_ and other than to be a fact or to exist. This is the distinction which I think he means to make, and which, I think, is the real explanation of his puzzling language, and this is the distinction which I am going presently to discuss. But I want first to say something as to that other distinction, which I said might be supposed to be the explanation of the whole difficulty--the distinction implied by the qualification "Time, _in the character which it exhibits_"; the suggestion that, when we talk of "Time," we may sometimes mean Time in one character, sometimes in another, and that what is true of it in the one character may not be true of it in the other. It might, I think, be suggested that this is the explanation of the whole difficulty. And I want briefly to point out why I think it cannot be the only explanation.

Stated very badly and crudely, the difficulty which requires explanation is this: Mr. Bradley says, "It is sheer nonsense to say Time is not real." But this thing which he says it is sheer nonsense to say is the very thing which he himself had formerly said. He had said, "Time has most evidently proved not to be real." Now, Mr. Bradley certainly does not mean to say that this proposition of his own is sheer nonsense; and yet he says, in words, that it _is_ sheer nonsense. This is the difficulty. What is the explanation? Quite obviously, the explanation can only take one possible form. Mr. Bradley must be holding that the words "Time is real" may have two different _senses._ In one sense, the denial of them is sheer nonsense; in the other sense, so far from being sheer nonsense, denial of them is, according to him, evidently true. Now, what are these two different senses, between which the difference is so enormous? It is here that the two different explanations come in.

The first and, as I think, the wrong explanation (though I think Mr. Bradley's words do give some colour to it) is this. It might be said: "The whole business is perfectly easy to explain. When Mr. Bradley says that Time is _not_ real, what he means is that Time, _in the character which it exhibits,_ is not real. Whereas, when he says, Time does exist, is a fact, and is, and that it is nonsense to deny this, what he means is that Time does exist, _in some other character_--some character _other_ than that which it exhibits. He does _not_ mean to make any distinction, such as you suppose, between two meanings of the word I real '--the one of them merely equivalent to 'exists,' 'is,' 'is a fact,' and the other meaning something very different from this. The only distinction he means to make is a distinction between _two_ meanings of 'Time' or of the whole sentence 'Time is real.' He distinguishes between the meaning of this sentence, when it means, 'Time in the character which it exhibits, is real,' which meaning, he says, is evidently false; and its meaning when it means, 'Time in _some other_ character, is real,' and this meaning, he says, is evidently true. This is the complete explanation of your supposed puzzle, which is, in fact, therefore, very easy to solve."

This, I think, might be offered as an explanation of Mr. Bradley's meaning. And it must be admitted that it _would_ furnish a complete explanation of the particular puzzle I have just stated, it would completely absolve Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency; and would show that where he appears to contradict himself about the reality of Time, the contradiction is verbal only and not real. We might, indeed, object to this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another; on the ground that anything which has not got the character which Time exhibits, but only some _other_ character, ought not to be called Time at all. We are, indeed, perfectly familiar with the conception that one and the same thing may _at one time_ possess a character which it does _not_ possess at another, so that what is true of it at one time may not be true of it at another. We are, that is, familiar with the idea of a thing _changing_ its character. But Time itself as a whole obviously cannot change its character in this sense. Mr. Bradley cannot mean to say that it possesses the character "which it exhibits" and in which it is unreal _at one time,_ and possesses some other character, in which it is real, at _some other time._ And hence we might say it is certainly wrong to speak as if Time itself could have two incompatible characters; since nothing can have two incompatible characters, unless it has them _at different times._ And this is an objection which does seem to apply to Mr. Bradley's doctrine in any case, since he does in any case seem to imply this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, whether this distinction is the complete explanation of our particular puzzle or not. Yet this objection would not necessarily be more than an objection to Mr. Bradley's words; it would not necessarily be an objection to his meaning. Where he seems to imply that Time, in some character other than that which it exhibits, may be fully real, he may only mean that something completely different from Time, but which does in some sense correspond to it, is fully real; and if he does mean this, our objection would only amount to an objection to his giving the name of "Time" to this supposed counterpart of Time; we might say, and I think justly, that it is misleading to speak of this counterpart of Time as if it were Time itself in some other character; but this would go no way at all to show that there may not really be such a counterpart of Time, which _is_ real, while Time itself is unreal. We might ask, too, what this supposed counterpart of Time is like, or (to put it in Mr. Bradley's way) what the precise character is, in which Time Areal? And I think Mr. Bradley would admit that he cannot tell us. But this, you see, would also be no objection to his actual doctrine. He might quite well know, and be right in saying, that there is and must be a real _counterpart_ of Time, completely different in character from Time, as we know it, even though he has not the least idea what this counterpart is like.

We must, therefore, admit that this proposed explanation of our puzzle would be a complete explanation of it. It would completely vindicate Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency, and would give us, as his doctrine, a doctrine to which we have hitherto found no objection except verbal ones.