Chapter V: Of Broussais

Broussais appears to have been born solely for the purpose of imagining or propagating systems.

Guided by facts which he seized upon with a rare sagacity, Broussais begins by bringing back certain affections to their real seats;[161] but soon, by an immoderate generalization of this fine result, he perceives all affections in the same affection, all diseases in the same malady; he imagines one _abstract affection_, by means of which he explains all other affections: _fevers_ are nothing but irritations of the digestive apparatus; _insanity_ is nothing but an _irritation_ of the brain;[162] and he who is so intolerant of the _personifications_ proposed by others, makes one _personification_ more; in fine, his exclusive and headstrong genius carries him beyond himself, and, as if merely to amuse him after the fatigue of forming his systems, plunges him into the question of _phrenology_, where he enjoys himself so much the more, because he finds in it his own accustomed method, his own ideas, and his own language: there are plenty of faculties to bring back to their organs, plenty of localizations to establish.

Broussais ought not to be judged of by his “Cours de Phrénologie.”[163] The five or six first _lessons_, or, as he calls them, _generalities_,[164] are merely a confused mixture of ideas: the notions of Condillac rejected by Cabanis, and the ideas of the phrenologists.

He says that sensibility is the _common origin_ of the faculties;[165] he calls _perception_ a _primary faculty_,[166] &c. &c.; and Condillac would not speak differently.

But, on the other hand, he says that there are as many _memories_ as there are organs;[167] that the instincts and the sentiments possess a memory, as the _external perceptions_[168] have theirs; that the mind is the _sum of the faculties_,[169] &c.; and Gall could not say it more clearly.

Broussais is particularly opposed to the _moi_ of Descartes. “Seduced,” says he, “by the _moi_ of Descartes, philosophers have been led to reason according to the testimony of their consciousness....”[170] And according to what testimony does Broussais think they ought to reason?

He thinks it very funny to call the _moi_ an _intra-cranial entity_,[171] _intra-cranial central being_,[172] _person_ par excellence, &c.[173]

He laughs at the _moi_ of Descartes; he forgets that the _moi_ of Gall is either nothing else than the sum (_ensemble_) of the intellectual faculties, or nothing else than a word; and he makes for himself a _peculiar moi_,[174] which he locates in the organ of _comparison_. “We owe,” says he, “to the organ of general comparison the distinction of one person expressed by the sign _me_.”[175]

Broussais was never designed for compliance with the ideas of others; a yoke oppresses him; he is never truly Broussais, except in the midst of conflict. In 1816 he publishes a volume,[176] and the medical doctrines are shook for half a century: we ought to read that volume over again, and forget the “Cours de Phrénologie.”