Chapter III: Part 3

On the first Monday in December, 1857, Mr. Douglas took his seat in the Senate with many anxious eyes upon him, for it had already been rumored that he would differ with the administration upon its conduct of Kansas affairs, and would take issue with the President in his forthcoming message. Rumor was right--the message was read--it did in effect recommend the indorsement of the Lecompton Constitution--and Mr. Douglas had the courage and boldness to stand up in defence of his peculiar doctrines of popular sovereignty, which he thought had been violated by the Lecompton Constitution. His great opening speech was delivered on the ninth of December, 1857. The President's message had been read the day previous and Mr. Douglas had indicated his purpose on the next day to speak upon it. Accordingly when the Senate assembled on Tuesday, the old Senate-hall was crowded to its utmost capacity and hundreds were unable to effect an entrance. The curiosity of the public to learn the position which the Illinois senator would take upon this important question was intense, and many of the members of the house were present. Mr. D. rose, apparently as cool as he ever was in his life, although, in the opinion of some of his Democratic friends, his decision, which after careful thought he had reached, to oppose the Lecompton Constitution, would ruin all his political prospects. He began by quoting the peculiar language of the President's message, and, perhaps in a vein of irony, contended that the President was opposed to this Lecompton Constitution, which, though under the circumstances he was for accepting, he did not like. It was evident that the President, in his absence at a foreign court, had fallen into an error in reference to the principle of the Nebraska bill. We now quote Mr. Douglas:

"Now, sir, what was the principle enunciated by the authors and
supporters of that bill, when it was brought forward? Did we not
come before the country and say that we repealed the Missouri
restriction for the purpose of substituting and carrying out as a
general rule the great principle of self-government, which left
the people of each State and each Territory free to form and
regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject
only to the Constitution of the United States? In support of that
proposition, it was argued here, and I have argued it wherever I
have spoken in various States of the Union, at home and abroad,
everywhere I have endeavored to prove that there was no reason why
an exception should be made in regard to the slavery question. I
have appealed to the people, if we did not all agree, men of all
parties, that all other local and domestic questions should be
submitted to the people. I said to them, 'We agree that the people
shall decide for themselves what kind of a judiciary system they
will have; we agree that the people shall decide what kind of a
school system they will establish; we agree that the people shall
determine for themselves what kind of a banking system they will
have, or whether they will have any banks at all; we agree that
the people may decide for themselves what shall be the elective
franchise in their respective States; they shall decide for
themselves what shall be the rule of taxation and the principles
upon which their finance shall be regulated; we agree that they
may decide for themselves the relations between husband and wife,
parent and child, guardian and ward; and why should we not then
allow them to decide for themselves the relations between master
and servant? Why make an exception of the slavery question, by
taking it out of that great rule of self-government which applies
to all the other relations of life? The very first proposition in
the Nebraska bill was to show that the Missouri restriction,
prohibiting the people from deciding the slavery question for
themselves, constituted an exception to a general rule, in
violation of the principle of self-government; and hence that that
exception should be repealed, and the slavery question, like all
other questions, submitted to the people, to be decided for
themselves.

"Sir, that was the principle on which the Nebraska bill was
defended by its friends. Instead of making the slavery question an
exception, it removed an odious exception which before existed.
Its whole object was to abolish that odious exception, and make
the rule general, universal in its application to all matters
which were local and domestic, and not national or federal. For
this reason was the language employed which the President has
quoted; that the eighth section of the Missouri act, commonly
called the Missouri Compromise, was repealed, because it was
repugnant to the principle of non-intervention, established by the
compromise measures of 1850, 'it being the true intent and meaning
of this act, not to legislate slavery into any territory or State,
nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof
perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in
their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United
States.' We repealed the Missouri restriction because that was
confined to slavery. That was the only exception there was to the
general principle of self-government. That exception was taken
away for the avowed and express purpose of making the rule of
self-government general and universal, so that the people should
form and regulate all their domestic institutions in their own
way.

"Sir, what would this boasted principle of popular sovereignty
have been worth, if it applied only to the negro, and did not
extend to the white man? Do you think we could have aroused the
sympathies and the patriotism of this broad Republic, and have
carried the Presidential election last year, in the face of a
tremendous opposition, on the principle of extending the right of
self-government to the negro question, but denying it as to all
the relations affecting white men? No, sir. We aroused the
patriotism of the country and carried the election in defence of
that great principle, which allowed all white men to form and
regulate their domestic institutions to suit
themselves--institutions applicable to white men as well as to
black men--institutions applicable to freemen as well as to
slaves--institutions concerning all the relations of life, and not
the mere paltry exception of the slavery question.

"Sir, I have spent too much strength and breath, and health, too,
to establish this great principle in the popular heart, now to see
it frittered away by bringing it down to an exception that applies
to the negro, and does not extend to the benefit of the white man.

* * * * *

"So far as the act of the territorial Legislature of Kansas,
calling this convention, was concerned, I have always been under
the impression that it was fair and just in its provisions. I have
always thought the people should have gone together, _en masse_,
and voted for delegates, so that the voice expressed by the
convention should have been the unquestioned and united voice of
the people of Kansas. I have always thought that those who stayed
away from that election stood in their own light, and should have
gone and voted, and should have furnished their names to be put on
the registered list, so as to be voters. I have always held that
it was their own fault that they did not thus go and vote; but
yet, if they chose, they had a right to stay away. They had a
right to say that that convention, although not an unlawful
assemblage, is not a legal convention to make a government, and
hence we are under no obligation to go and express any opinion
about it. They had a right to say, if they chose, 'We will stay
away until we see the Constitution they shall frame, the petition
they shall send to Congress; and when they submit it to us for
ratification, we will vote for it if we like it, or vote it down
if we do not like it.' I say they had a right to do either, though
I thought, and think yet, as good citizens, they ought to have
gone and voted; but that was their business, and not mine.

"Having thus shown that the convention at Lecompton had no power,
no authority, to form and establish a government, but had power to
draft a petition, and that petition, if it embodied the will of
the people of Kansas, ought to be taken as such an exposition of
their will, yet, if it did not embody their will, ought to be
rejected. Having shown these facts, let me proceed and inquire
what was the understanding of the people of Kansas when the
delegates were elected? I understand, from the history of the
transaction, that the people who voted for delegates to the
Lecompton Convention, and those who refused to vote, both parties,
understood the Territorial act to mean that they were to be
elected only to frame a constitution, and submit it to the people
for their ratification or rejection. I say that both parties in
that territory, at the time of the election of delegates, so
understood the object of the convention. Those who voted for
delegates did so with the understanding that they had no power to
make a government, but only to frame one for submission; and those
who stayed away did so with the same understanding.

* * * * *

"Now, let us stop to inquire how they redeemed the pledge to
submit the constitution to the people. They first go on and make a
constitution; then they make a schedule, in which they provide
that the constitution, on the 21st of December, the present month,
shall be submitted to all the _bona fide_ inhabitants of the
territory, on that day, for their free acceptance or rejection, in
the following manner, to wit: Thus acknowledging that they were
bound to submit it to the will of the people, conceding that they
had no right to put it into operation without submitting it to the
people, providing in the instrument that they should take effect
from and after the date of its ratification, and not before;
showing that the constitution derives its vitality, in their
estimation, not from the authority of the convention, but from
that vote of the people to which it was to be submitted for their
acceptance or rejection. How is it to be submitted? It shall be
submitted in this form: 'Constitution with Slavery, or
Constitution with no Slavery.' All men must vote for the
constitution, whether they like it or not, in order to be
permitted to vote for or against slavery. Thus a constitution made
by a convention that had authority to assemble and petition for a
redress of grievances, but not to establish a government. A
constitution made under a pledge of honor that it should be
submitted to the people before it took effect; a constitution
which provides on its face, that it shall have no validity, except
what it derives from such submission, is submitted to the people
at an election where all men are at liberty to come forward
freely, without hindrance, and vote for it, but no man is
permitted to record a vote against it.

"That would be as fair an election as some of the enemies of
Napoleon attributed to him when he was elected first consul. He is
said to have called out his troops, and had them reviewed by his
officers with a speech, patriotic and fair in its professions, in
which he said to them: 'Now, my soldiers, you are to go to the
election, and vote freely just as you please. If you vote for
Napoleon, all is well; vote against him, and you are to be
instantly shot.' That was a fair election. This election is to be
equally fair. All men in favor of the constitution may vote for
it--all men against it shall not vote at all. Why not let them
vote against it? I presume you have asked many a man this
question. I have asked a very large number of the gentlemen who
framed the constitution, quite a number of the delegates, and a
still larger number of persons who are their friends, and I have
received the same answer from every one of them. I never received
any other answer, and I presume we never shall get any other
answer. What is that? They say, if they allowed a negative vote,
the constitution would have been voted down by an overwhelming
majority, and hence the fellows shall not be allowed to vote at
all.

* * * * *

"Let me ask you, why force this constitution down the throats of
the people of Kansas, in opposition to their wishes and in
violation of our pledges. What great object is to be attained?
_Cui bono_? What are you to gain by it! Will you sustain the party
by violating its principles? Do you propose to keep the party
united by forcing a division? Stand by the doctrine that leaves
the people perfectly free to form and regulate their institutions
for themselves, in their own way, and your party will be united
and irresistible in power. Abandon that great principle, and the
party is not worth saving, and cannot be saved after it shall be
violated. I trust we are not to be rushed upon this question. Why
shall it be done? Who is to be benefited? Is the South to be the
gainer? Is the North to be the gainer? Neither the North nor the
South has the right to gain a sectional advantage by trickery or
fraud.

"But I am beseeched to wait until I hear from the election, on the
21st of December. I am told that perhaps that will put it all
right, and will save the whole difficulty. How can it? Perhaps
there may be a large vote. There may be a large vote returned. But
I deny that it is possible to have a fair vote on the slavery
clause; and I say that it is not possible to have any vote on the
constitution. Why wait for the mockery of an election, when it is
provided, unalterably, that the people cannot vote when the
majority are disfranchised?

"But I am told on all sides, 'Oh, just wait; the pro-slavery
clause will be voted down.' That does not obviate any of my
objections; it does not diminish any of them. You have no more
right to force a free-State constitution on Kansas than a
slave-State constitution. If Kansas wants a slave-State
constitution, she has a right to it; if she wants a free-State
constitution she has a right to it. It is none of my business
which way the slavery clause is decided. I care not whether it is
voted down or voted up. Do you suppose, after the pledge of my
honor that I would go for that principle, and leave the people to
vote as they chose, that I would now degrade myself by voting one
way if the slavery clause be voted down, and another way if it be
voted up? I care not how that vote may stand. I take it for
granted that it will be voted out. I think I have seen enough in
the last three days to make it certain that it will be returned
out, no matter how the vote may stand.

"Sir, I am opposed to that concern, because it looks to me like a
system of trickery and jugglery to defeat the fair expression of
the will of the people. There is no necessity for crowding this
measure, so unfair, so unjust as it is in all its aspects, upon
us. Why can we not now do what we proposed to do in the last
Congress? We then voted through the Senate an enabling act, called
'the Toombs bill,' believed to be just and fair in all its
provisions, pronounced to be almost perfect by the senator from
New Hampshire (Mr. Hale), only he did not like the man, then
President of the United States, who would have to make the
appointments. Why can we not take that bill, and, out of
compliment to the President, add to it a clause taken from the
Minnesota act, which he thinks should be a general rule, requiring
the constitution to be submitted to the people, and pass that?
That unites the party. You all voted, with me, for that bill, at
the last Congress. Why not stand by the same bill now? Ignore
Lecompton, ignore Topeka; treat both those party movements as
irregular and void; pass a fair bill--the one that we framed
ourselves when we were acting as a unit; have a fair election, and
you will have peace in the Democratic party, and peace throughout
the country, in ninety days. The people want a fair vote. They
never will be satisfied without it. They never should be satisfied
without a fair vote on their constitution.

"If the Toombs bill does not suit my friends, take the Minnesota
bill of the last session--the one so much commended by the
President in his message as a model. Let us pass that as an
enabling act, and allow the people of all parties to come together
and have a fair vote, and I will go for it. Frame any other bill
that secures a fair, honest vote, to men of all parties, and
carries out the pledge that the people shall be left free to
decide on their domestic institutions, for themselves, and I will
go with you with pleasure, and with all the energy I may possess.
But if this constitution is to be forced down our throats in
violation of the fundamental principle of free government, under a
mode of submission that is a mockery and insult, I will resist it
to the last. I have no fear of any party associations being
severed. I should regret any social or political estrangement,
even temporarily; but if it must be, if I cannot act with you and
preserve my faith and my honor; I will stand on the great
principle of popular sovereignty, which declares the right of all
people to be left perfectly free to form and regulate their
domestic institutions in their own way. I will follow that
principle wherever its logical consequences may take me, and I
will endeavor to defend it against assault from any and all
quarters. No mortal man shall be responsible for my action but
myself. By my action I will compromise no man."

This speech made a deep impression upon the country, but Mr. Douglas was unable to carry any considerable portion of his party in Congress with him. The history of the struggle is well known. The Republicans, a few Democrats, and a like number of Americans, united, were able to force the administration into an abandonment of the original Lecompton bill, and the English bill was substituted therefor. This bill was opposed by Mr. Douglas; but inasmuch as it gave the people of Kansas the privilege to reject the Lecompton Constitution, it passed by a small majority.

In the summer and autumn of 1858, Mr. Douglas went through a terrible ordeal in Illinois--a campaign, the issue of which was political life or death to him. He triumphed by a small majority--indeed the majority was the other way before the people--which shows that Mr. D. was wise in opposing the Lecompton measure, for if he had supported it, and thus trampled upon his own principle of Popular Sovereignty, he would have lost his election by thousands of votes.

We now come to still later issues--to the discussion between Mr. Douglas and his southern enemies, in the last session of the thirty-fifth Congress--the present year--upon Congressional intervention in favor of slavery. This great debate took place Feb. 23, 1859, in the Senate, and looked like a preconcerted attack upon Mr. Douglas by some of his southern opponents. We have not the space for the official report of the debate, and will endeavor faithfully to abridge it. The debate opened on an amendment by Senator Hale to the Appropriation bill before the Senate to repeal the restrictive clause of the Kansas Admission act. This amendment was offered the day previous, and the debate took an unexpected turn upon it.

Mr. Seward, of New York, said Congress had decided that Kansas should come in with the Lecompton Constitution, without reference to population; but, on the other hand, should not come in outside of the Lecompton Constitution unless she had 92,400 population. There was, therefore, a discrimination by the Congress of the United States, as against freedom, in favor of slavery. Oregon, because she was a Democratic State, was admitted without reference to population, and Kansas, because of her different politics, was excluded. He was glad of this occasion to renew his vote. He was glad, also, to hear that so many gentlemen on the other side will give Kansas a fair hearing. It indicates that the time is coming when any State applying for admission will be heard on its merits, apart from all other considerations. He thought it goes to show that if Texas should be divided, or free States, as he thought they would, be formed in Mexico, they will come in as free States.

Mr. Brown, of Mississippi, made a strong southern speech.

He held to the doctrine of State rights; denied the squatter sovereignty of territories; and threatened secession, with banners flying, if the South was deprived of her rights. His address was directed to northern Democrats. He placed his views frankly on record, and desired neither to cheat nor be cheated.

Mr. Douglas felt it incumbent on him, as a northern Democrat, to make a reply. He admired the frankness, candor, and directness with which Mr. Brown had approached the question. He (Douglas), too, would put his opinions on record in such a manner as will acquit him of a desire to cheat or be cheated. He agreed at the outset with Mr. Brown, and with the decision of the Supreme Court, that slaves are property, and that their owners have a right to carry them into the territories as any other property. Having the right of transit into the territory, the question arises, how far does the power of the territorial legislature extend to slave property? And the reply is, to the same extent, and no further, than to any other description of property. Mr. Brown has said that slave property needs more protection than any other description. If so, it is the misfortune of the owners of that kind of property. Mr. Douglas's remarks, from the frequent interruptions, assumed so much the form of question and reply, and running comments on the various issues started, that we can only notice the salient points of the main discussion, which extended throughout many hours, he sustaining the principal part. His general scope was, that he would leave all descriptions of property, slaves included, to the operation of the local law, and would not have Congress interfere in any way therewith. If the people of the territory want slavery there, they will foster and encourage it, and if they do not find it for their advantage, they will do otherwise. So it becomes a question of soil, climate, production, etc. He illustrated by saying, that if any discrimination is to be made in any description of property, the owner of stock, or liquors, or any other, might claim it likewise.

After some other illustrations, he went into discussion of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which, he said, was passed by a distinct understanding between northern and southern Democrats, however differing on some points, to give to the territorial legislature the full power, with appeal to the Supreme Court, to test the constitutionality of any law, but not to Congress to repeal it. If the court decides such law to be constitutional, it must stand; if not, it must fall to the ground, without action of Congress. That doctrine of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and territories, has been a fundamental principle of the Democratic platform, and every Democrat is pledged to it by the Cincinnati platform. Here Mr. Douglas, in reply to a question by Mr. Clay (who also made the remark that, according to Mr. Douglas's interpretation, squatter sovereignty is superior to the Constitution), said that the limit of territorial legislation is the organic act and the Constitution. In reply to Mr. Clay's question, "Can a slaveholder take his slave property into the territory?" he would reply, Yes; and hold it as other property. To the question, "Will Congress pass a law to protect other kinds of property in the territories?" he would answer, No; for the doctrine that Congress is to legislate on property and persons without representation, is the doctrine of the parliament of George III., that brought on the Revolutionary war. We said then it was a violation of the rights of power to assume to legislate for Englishmen without their consent. Now, was he (Mr. Douglas) to be called on to force this same odious doctrine on the people of the territories without their consent? He answered, No; let them govern themselves. If they make good laws, let them enjoy the blessings; if bad, let them suffer until they are repealed. Referring to the great battles fought and gained in 1854 and 1856, he said he would like to know how many votes Mr. Buchanan would have got in Pennsylvania or Ohio, if he had then understood the doctrine of popular sovereignty as he claims to do now.

Mr. Bigler asked how many votes Mr. Buchanan would have received in 1856, had the senator from Illinois and those who acted with him told the people that the Kansas act was not intended to extend to the territories the sacred right of self-government, but simply to give the people the right to petition for redress of grievances--a right not denied to any citizen, white or black?

Mr. Douglas said that there are no colored citizens, and he trusted in God there never would be. He did not recognize the black brothers.

Mr. Bigler knew that as well as the senator, and should have said inhabitants.

Mr. Douglas resumed. In 1856, he took the same ground as now, and Mr. Buchanan, when he accepted the nomination, took the same ground. His letter of acceptance to the Cincinnati Convention shows he then understood that the people of the territories should decide whether slavery should or should not exist within their limits. When gentlemen called for Congressional intervention, they step off the Democratic platform. He (Mr. Douglas) asserted that the Democratic creed was non-intervention by Congress, and the right of the people to govern themselves. He would frankly tell gentlemen of the South, that no Democratic candidate can carry one State North but on the principles of the Cincinnati platform, as construed by Mr. Buchanan when he accepted his nomination, and which he (Mr. Douglas) stood here to-day to defend.

Mr. Davis replied to Mr. Douglas elaborately, denying that he (Douglas) rightly interpreted the obligations of the Democratic party.

Mr. Pugh said, Mr. Brown had asked if northern Democrats would vote for Congressional intervention to protect the people against local legislation. He would answer, Never. It is monstrous. It is against the plighted faith both of the South and North. Mr. Pugh discussed the question at length, and said he stood on the platform of his party with the interpretation which he explained.

Mr. Green was sorry that this subject of contention had been brought forward. It was to try and bring discord into the Democratic party, the only party able to override the Republican party. He hoped and believed there was no difference between the North and the South. A government is formed to protect persons and property; and when it ceases to do either, it ceases to perform its one great function. Mr. Hale's amendment had brought up the question, "What is property?" He (Green) maintained that, under the Constitution and by the decision of the Supreme Court, slaves are property; and he argued the subject in many aspects, concluding by calling on the Democratic party to stand united, and not permit a combination to make use of a mere figment to disorganize them. In the course of his remarks, he quoted from Mr. Douglas's Springfield speech, to show that he had therein proposed Congressional intervention in Utah. He could not see the consistency of the senator's course, then and now.

Mr. Douglas denied that he had proposed Congressional intervention to regulate the internal affairs of Utah. The intervention he proposed was alone on the ground of rebellion--not on account of their domestic affairs, but as aliens and rebels.

Mr. Green, in speaking of how territorial legislation could destroy the rights of slave property, said he had before him a copy of the bill passed by the Kansas Legislature to abolish slavery.

Mr. Douglas remarked that several speeches had been made very pointedly at him, making him out no better than an Abolitionist, for leaving the territories to carry out their own affairs. It does well to attack one man for his opinion; but when was the most aggravated act ever committed, that he did not say it was committed, in manumitting your slaves and confiscating your property? The gentleman who spoke thus, says: "It is not yet time." There is no better time than the present, to introduce a bill to repeal that act of the Kansas Legislature. Senators say that he (Douglas) may go out. No; he stands on the platform, and it is for those who jump off, to go out.

The chair called the Senate to order, threatening to clear the galleries, unless it was maintained.

Mr. Green said he had received information of the bill by telegraph; but could not legislate on such information.

Mr. Douglas would take it for granted that Mr. Green meant that he received authentic information, and would introduce a bill to repeal the act. The South, he said, had reluctantly acquiesced in the movement with the Democrats of the North to settle the question. He went at some length into a discussion and approval of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dred Scott. He did not agree with Senator Douglas's views as to the power of the people of a territory, and did not believe that the Nebraska-Kansas bill gave them independent power. The senator from Virginia then gave his ideas as to the people of the territories, and the people of the States. The right of property is recognized in the former, but the inhabitants of a territory are unknown to the Constitution. Congress cannot divest itself of its power over the property of the territories, but it can grant them nothing. South of the Potomac River, to the confines of Mexico, there is not one dissentient voice. The South would be recreant to itself; if it would give one vote for its rights to be taken from the Constitution, and remitted to the pleasure of the people temporarily in the territories.

Mr. Davis took an animated part in the debate against Mr. Douglas, who in the Kansas-Nebraska act, had made a great error, and drawn the Senate into a great error.

Mr. Douglas resumed, saying it won't do to read him out, because they had fallen from the faith. There is no middle ground. It is either intervention or non-intervention.

Mr. Gwin said, if the senator from Illinois had given the same interpretation to the Kansas-Nebraska bill when it was before the Senate, he (Gwin) would not have voted for it, and believed those around him would not. When the senator proposed to speak for the Democracy of the free States, he had no right to speak for California, which thought otherwise.

Mr. Broderick contradicted Mr. Gwin's statement of the views of California. He considered the views of his State were those expressed by Mr. Douglas.

Mr. Gwin replied that he was sent here to do his duty in representing the Democracy of California, and he knew they indorse the action of the Administration, and do not at all indorse the interpretation given by the senator from Illinois.

Mr. Douglas (to Mr. Gwin.) I do say the records show a very general concurrence in the views I then expressed.

Mr. Iverson raised the question of order, that Mr. Douglas had spoken many times. He and Mr. Davis had occupied the floor four or five hours. The point of order was sustained.

Mr. Hunter said it was with reluctance that he occupied the time at the late period of the evening, but the turn the debate had taken rendered an explanation necessary, in justice to himself. He differed with the senator from Illinois, both in the history of the Kansas-Nebraska act, and what was intended by it. When the proposition was made to pass that, he maintained, as he has always done since he has had a place on that floor, that the South had a right to protection for their slave property in the territories.

Mr. Hunter read from his speech of that date, showing the views he then expressed. The case stood thus: southern men on one side maintained they had right, under the Constitution, to protection to their slave property; northern men thought the contrary, and there was no chance of agreement between them, as the act was very carefully framed, neither affirming nor disaffirming the power of the territory to abolish slavery, but reserving the question of right, and agreeing to refer to the judiciary any points arising out of it. It was in itself a compromise, in which neither party conceded their opinions or their rights. They were but placed in abeyance until a case affecting them might arise. No southern man with whom he acted ever considered he was conferring on the Territorial Legislature the absolute right to deal with this subject. They agreed to this settlement as a consequence, acting together upon points wherein they agreed, and expressing no opinion upon points where the differences were irreconcilable. By this they secured the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, upon which the Democrats were agreed, by confining the act to the general purpose to be accomplished. Justice to himself and the distinguished senator from South Carolina, now no more, with whom he had acted and consulted on the matter, required the explanation. Mr. Hunter then drew the attention of the Senate to the time consumed in the debate, and urged a vote upon the amendment.

Mr. Stuart, after some general remarks on the subject under discussion, asked, why should the Democratic party be racked and torn by the thought of the contingences which may not happen? If the Democratic party in a body, if its able and efficient members throughout the country, stand faithfully together, their flag will remain in the ascendant, and the party will rise out of all the difficulties which now beset it.

Mr. Bigler was opposed to Congress extending slavery in the territories, and against Congressional intervention with slavery, and would stand by the Baltimore and Cincinnati platforms of the Democratic party. He believed the best interests of the country were in the hope of the Democracy.

Mr. Douglas is a powerful debater, quick, ready at repartee, strong in his logic, and possessing that animal courage which is so necessary to the successful debater. Few men equal him in senatorial debate for rough power. There are many who surpass him in silvery eloquence, who excel him in winning, courteous debate, but no one in the present Senate who has quite his _force_ and overwhelming courage. In the debate, which we have abbreviated, Mr. Douglas was for hours--from noon till nine o'clock in the evening--obliged to defend himself against a half-dozen able and eloquent senators. His manner, his voice, were at times like that of a wounded lion--deep, strong and melancholy; but he fought to the last without a moment's thought of quailing.

Mr. Douglas has no sympathy with the anti-slavery sentiment of the free States, but plants himself upon his principle, and puts slavery and freedom upon the same footing. If the people want slavery, let them have it. If they want freedom--no interference in favor of slavery. This we understand to be his position, though some of his southern friends claim that he admits that the Supreme Court is bound to give slavery an existence _in all the territories_. In his New Orleans speech of last winter, Mr. Douglas is reported to have said:

"Whenever a territory has a climate, soil and production, making
it the interest of the inhabitants to encourage slave property,
they will pass a slave code, and give it encouragement. Whenever
the climate, soil and production preclude the possibility of
slavery being profitable, they will not permit it. You come right
back to the principle of dollars and cents. I do not care where
the migration in the southern country comes from; if old Joshua R.
Giddings should raise a colony in Ohio, and settle down in
Louisiana, he would be the strongest advocate for slavery in the
whole South; he would find, when he got there, his opinion would
be very much modified; he would find on those sugar plantations
that it was not a question between the white man and the negro,
but between the negro and the crocodile.

"He would say that, between the negro and the crocodile, he took
the side of the negro. But, between the negro and the white man,
he would go for the white man. The Almighty has drawn the line on
this continent, on one side of which the soil must be cultivated
by slave labor; on the other, by white labor. That line did not
run on thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, for thirty-six
degrees and thirty minutes runs over mountains and through
valleys. But this slave line meanders in the sugar-fields and
plantations of the South--[the remainder of the sentence was lost
by the confusion around the reporter.] And the people living in
their different localities and in the territories must determine
for themselves whether their 'middle bed' is best adapted to
slavery or free labor.

"Hence, under the Constitution, there is no power to prevent a
southern man going there with his slaves, more than a northern
man."

Mr. Douglas is a man of very short stature, but of large body, and a frame and constitution capable of great endurance. He lives in Washington half the year, where he has a handsome residence, and the other half in Illinois among his constituents, where he has a country mansion. The mother of Mr. Douglas, who was so faithful to him and whom he has never ceased to love and reverence, still lives, and has witnessed his rise from the cabinet-maker's shop to the senatorial chair.

SALMON P. CHASE.

Salmon Porland Chase was born in Cornish, New Hampshire, Jan. 13th, 1808. He was seven years old when his father removed to the town of Keene, where he attended the village school. In 1817 his father died, and two years later the boy, then only twelve years old, went to Worthington, Ohio. His uncle, Philander Chase, was then Bishop of Ohio, and he superintended the education of his nephew. Shortly after this, he entered Cincinnati College, of which institution his uncle became president. He soon was promoted to the sophomore class. After a year's residence in Cincinnati, he returned to New Hampshire and his mother's house; and, in 1824, entered the junior class of Dartmouth College. He graduated in 1826. The following winter Mr. Chase went to the city of Washington, and opened a classical school for boys. Among his pupils were the sons of Henry Clay, William Niel, and other distinguished men. Many of the citizens of Washington at this day well remember Mr. Chase's efforts as a teacher among them, and at that time learned to esteem and respect the man who has since risen to so high a position as a politician and statesman. He closed his school in 1829, and soon was admitted to the bar, having studied law under Mr. Niel while teaching his school, manifesting by his industry and courage that he was possessed of the qualities which must certainly in the end bring him position and reputation.

In 1830, Mr. Chase left Washington for Cincinnati, where he has always since resided, save when serving his State in an official capacity, and pursued his profession. He was poor, unknown, and before he could hope to attract the attention of the public, must earn his bread and endure months, if not years, of serious toil and drudgery. During these early years in his professional career, he prepared an edition of Statutes of Ohio, and a preliminary sketch of the history the State. The work made three large volumes, and at once became an authority in the courts. The authorship of this volume was a happy idea, for it not only brought him a moderate pecuniary reward directly, but it also gave him the ear of the people, and practice at once flowed in upon him.

In 1834, Mr. Chase became solicitor of the Bank of the United States in Cincinnati, and other corporations. In 1837, he first gave public utterance to his views upon the slavery question in its legal aspects. The article in Appleton's Encylopaedia upon Mr. Chase, which on many points is our authority in this sketch, gives the subjoined history of Mr. Chase's early legal arguments in reference to slavery:

"In 1837, Mr. Chase acted as counsel for a colored woman claimed as a fugitive slave and in an elaborate argument, afterward published, controverted the authority of Congress to impose any duties or confer any powers in fugitive slave cases on state magistrates, a position in which he has since been sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court; and maintained that the law of 1793, relative to fugitives from service, was void, because unwarranted by the Constitution of the United States. The same year, in an argument before the Supreme Court of Ohio, in defence of James G. Birney, prosecuted under a State law for harboring a negro slave, Mr. Chase asserted the doctrine that slavery is local, and independent on state law for existence and continuance, and insisted that the person alleged to have been harbored, having been brought within the territorial limits of Ohio by the individual claiming her as master, was thenceforth, in fact and by right, free. In 1838, in a newspaper review of a report of the judiciary committee of the senate of Ohio against the granting of trial by jury to alleged slaves, Mr. Chase took the same ground as in his legal arguments. In 1846, he was associated with the Hon. W. H. Seward as defendant's counsel in the case of Van Zandt, before the Supreme Court of the United States. The case excited much interest, and in a speech which attracted marked attention, Mr. Chase argued more elaborately the principles which he advanced in former cases, maintaining that under the ordinance of 1787 no fugitives from service could be reclaimed from Ohio, unless there had been an escape from one of the original States; that it was the clear understanding of the framers of the Constitution, and of the people who adopted it, that slavery was to be left exclusively to the disposal of the several States, without sanction or support from the National Government; and that the clause of the Constitution relative to persons held to service was one of compact between the States, and conferred no power of legislation on Congress, having been transferred from the ordinance of 1787, in which it conferred no power on the Confederation, and was never understood to confer any. He was subsequently engaged for the defence in the case of Driskell _vs._ Parish, before the U.S. Circuit Court at Columbus, and re-argued the same positions."

Mr. Chase's _political_ history is thus summed up in the same article:

"Mr. Chase's sentiments of hostility to the nationalization of slavery were expressed by his position in the political movements of the country, as well as his efforts at the bar. Prior to 1841 he had taken little part in politics. He had voted sometimes with the Democrats, but more commonly with the Whigs, who, in the North, seemed to him more favorable to anti-slavery views than their opponents. He supported Gen. Harrison in 1840, but the tone of his inaugural address, and still more the course of the Tyler administration, convinced him that no effective resistance to the encroachments of slavery was to be expected from any party with a slaveholding and pro-slavery wing, modifying if not controlling its action; and in 1841 he united in a call for a convention of the opponents of slavery and slavery extension, which assembled in Columbus in December of that year. This convention organized the liberty party of Ohio, nominated a candidate for governor, and issued an address to the people defining its principles and purposes.--This address, written and reported by Mr. Chase, and unanimously adopted by the convention, deserves attention as one of the earliest expositions of the political movements against slavery. In 1843, a national liberty convention assembled at Buffalo. Mr. Chase was an active member of the committee on resolutions, to which was referred, under a rule of the convention, a resolution proposing 'to regard and treat the third clause of the Constitution, whenever applied to the case of a fugitive slave, as utterly null and void, and consequently as forming no part of the Constitution of the United States, whenever we are called upon or sworn to support it.' Mr. Chase opposed the resolution, and the committee refused to report it. It was, however, afterward moved in the convention by its author, and adopted. Having been charged in the U.S. Senate with the authorship and advocacy of this resolution, by Mr. Butler of South Carolina, who denounced the doctrine of mental reservation apparently sanctioned by it, Mr. Chase replied: 'I have only to say I never proposed the resolution; I never would propose or vote for such a resolution. I hold no doctrine of mental reservation. Every man, in my judgment, should speak just as he thinks, keeping nothing back, here or elsewhere.' In 1843 it became Mr. Chase's duty to prepare an address on behalf of the friends of liberty, Ireland, and repeal in Cincinnati, to the loyal national repeal association in Ireland, in reply to a letter from Daniel O'Connell.

"In this address Mr. Chase reviewed the relations of the federal government to slavery at the period of its organization, set forth its original anti-slavery policy, and the subsequent growth of the political power of slavery, vindicated the action of the liberal party, and repelled the aspersions cast by a repeal association in Cincinnati upon anti-slavery men. In 1845 Mr. Chase projected a southern and western liberty convention, designed to embrace 'all who, believing that whatever is worth preserving in republicanism can be maintained only by uncompromising war against the usurpations of the slave power, and are therefore resolved to use all constitutional and honorable means to effect the extinction of slavery in their respective States, and its reduction to its constitutional limits in the United States.' The convention was held in Cincinnati in June, 1845, and was attended by 4,000 persons; delegates were present to the number of 2,000. Mr. Chase, as chairman of the committee, prepared the address, giving a history of slavery in the United States, showing the position of the Whig and Democratic parties, and arguing the necessity of a political organization unequivocally committed to the denationalization of slavery and the overthrow of the slave power, and exhibiting what he regarded as the necessary hostility of the slaveholding interest to democracy and all liberal measures. This address was widely circulated.