Chapter VI: Part 6

In July, 1885, the Venezuelan minister to the United States addressed a communication to Secretary of State Bayard, setting forth the correspondence which had already taken place between our Government and that of Venezuela touching the boundary dispute, and referring to the serious condition existing on account of the renewed aggressions of Great Britain.

Mr. Bayard thereupon sent a despatch on the subject to Mr. Phelps, our diplomatic representative to England, in which, after stating that the Venezuelan Government had never definitely declared what course she desired us to pursue, but, on the contrary, had expressed a desire to be guided by our counsel, he said: “The good offices of this Government have been tendered to Venezuela to suggest to Great Britain the submission of the boundary dispute to arbitration; but when shown that such action on our part would exclude us from acting as arbitrator, Venezuela ceased to press the matter in that direction”; and the next day after writing this despatch Mr. Bayard informed the Venezuelan minister that the President of the United States could not entertain a request to act as umpire in any dispute unless it should come concurrently from both contestants.

In December, 1886, our minister to Venezuela addressed a despatch to Mr. Bayard, in which he reported that matters looked very angry and threatening in Venezuela on account of fresh aggressions on the part of Great Britain in the disputed territory; and he expressed the fear that an open rupture might occur between the two countries. He inclosed a statement made by the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs, containing a list of grievances, followed by this declaration: “Venezuela, listening to the advice of the United States, has endeavored several times to obtain that the difference should be submitted to the award of a third power.... But such efforts have proven fruitless, and the possibility of that result, the only one prescribed by our constitution, being arrived at, becomes more and more remote from day to day. Great Britain has been constant in her clandestine advances upon the Venezuelan territory, not taking into consideration either the rights or the complaints of this Republic.” And he adds the following declaration: “Under such circumstances the Government has but two courses left open: either to employ force in order to recover places from which force has ejected the Republic, since its amicable representations on the subject have failed to secure redress, or to present a solemn protest to the Government of the United States against so great an abuse, which is an evident declaration of war--a provocative aggression.”

Thereupon, and on the twentieth day of December, 1886, a despatch was sent by Mr. Bayard to Mr. Phelps, in which the secretary comments on the fact that at no time theretofore had the good offices of our Government been actually tendered to avert a rupture between Great Britain and Venezuela, and that our inaction in this regard seemed to be due to the reluctance of Venezuela to have the Government of the United States take any steps having relation to the action of the British Government which might, in appearance even, prejudice the resort to our arbitration or mediation which Venezuela desired; but that the intelligence now received warranted him in tendering the good offices of the United States to promote an amicable settlement of the difficulty between the two countries, and offering our arbitration if acceptable to both countries--as he supposed the dispute turned upon simple and readily ascertainable historical facts.

Additional complaints against Great Britain on account of further trespasses on Venezuelan territory were contained in a note from the Venezuelan minister to Mr. Bayard, dated January 4, 1887. I shall quote only the following passage:

My Government has tried all possible means to induce that
of London to accept arbitration, as advised by the United
States; this, however, has resulted in nothing but fresh
attempts against the integrity of the territory by the colonial
authorities of Demerara. It remains to be seen how long my
Government will find it possible to exercise forbearance
transcending the limits of its positive official duty.

Pursuant to his instructions from Mr. Bayard, our minister to Great Britain formally tendered to the English Government, on the eighth day of February, 1887, the good offices of the United States to promote an amicable settlement of the pending controversy, and offered our arbitration, if acceptable to both parties.

A few days afterward Lord Salisbury, on behalf of Great Britain, replied that the attitude which had been taken by the President of the Venezuelan republic precluded her Majesty’s Government from submitting the question at that time to the arbitration of any third power.

The fact that Lord Salisbury had declined our offer of mediation and arbitration, was promptly conveyed to the government of Venezuela; and thereupon, on the fourth day of May, 1887, her minister at Washington addressed another note to our Secretary of State indicating much depression on account of the failure of all efforts up to that time made to induce Great Britain to agree to a settlement of the controversy by arbitration, and expressing the utmost gratitude for the steps taken by our Government in aid of those efforts. He also referred to the desire his government once entertained that, in case arbitration could be attained, the United States might be selected as arbitrator, and to the fact that this desire had been relinquished because the maintenance of impartiality essential in an arbitrator would “seriously impair the efficiency of action which for the furtherance of the common interests of America, and in obedience to the doctrine of the immortal Monroe, should possess all the vitality that the alarming circumstances demand”; and he begged the secretary to instruct our representative in London “to insist, in the name of the United States Government, upon the necessity of submitting the boundary question between Venezuela and British Guiana to arbitration.”

I have heretofore refrained from stating in detail the quite numerous instances of quarrel and collision that occurred in and near the disputed territory, with increasing frequency, during this controversy. One of these, however, I think should be here mentioned. It seems that in 1883 two vessels belonging to English subjects were seized and their crews taken into custody by Venezuelan officials in the disputed region, for alleged violations of the laws of Venezuela within her jurisdiction, and that English officials had assumed, without any judicial determination and without any notice to Venezuela, to assess damages against her on account of such seizure and arrests, in an amount which, with interest, amounted in 1887 to about forty thousand dollars. On the seventh day of October in that year, the governor of Trinidad, an English island near the mouth of the Orinoco, in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Venezuela, declared that her Majesty’s Government could not permit such injuries to remain unredressed, or their representations to be disregarded any longer, and thereupon it was demanded that the money claimed, with interest, be paid within seven days from the delivery of said letter. The letter concluded as follows:

Failing compliance with the above demands Her Majesty’s
Government will be reluctantly compelled to instruct the
Commander of Her Majesty’s naval forces in the West Indies
to take such measures as he may deem necessary to obtain
that reparation which has been vainly sought for by friendly
means; and in case of so doing they will hold the Venezuelan
Government responsible for any consequences that may arise.

Venezuela did not fail to appreciate and frankly acknowledge that, in her defenseless condition, there was no escape from the payment of the sum which England, as a judge in its own cause, had decreed against her. The President of the republic, however, in a prompt reply to the governor’s note, characterized its terms as “offensive to the dignity of the nation and to the equality which, according to the principles of the rights of nations, all countries enjoy without any regard to their strength or weakness.” Thereupon he sought the good offices of our minister to Venezuela in an effort to procure a withdrawal of the objectionable communication. This was attempted in a note sent by the American minister to the governor of Trinidad, in which he said:

I hope your Excellency will permit me to suggest, as a mutual
friend of both parties, the suspension or withdrawal of your
note of the 7th instant, so that negotiations may at once
be opened for the immediate and final settlement of the
afore-mentioned claims without further resort to unpleasant
measures. From representations made to me, I am satisfied
that if the note of the 7th instant is withdrawn temporarily
even, Venezuela will do in the premises that which will prove
satisfactory to your Government.

A few days after this note was sent, a reply was received in which the governor of Trinidad courteously expressed his thanks to our minister for his good offices, and informed him that, as the Government of Venezuela regarded his note of October 7 “as offensive, and appeared desirous of at last settling this long-pending question in a friendly spirit,” he promptly telegraphed to her Majesty’s Government asking permission to withdraw that note and substitute a less forcible one for it; and that he had just been informed by his home government in reply that this arrangement could not be sanctioned.

Our minister reported this transaction to his home government at Washington on the fourth day of November, 1887, and stated that the money demanded by Great Britain had been paid by Venezuela under protest.

Venezuela may have been altogether at fault in the transaction out of which this demand arose; the amount which England exacted may not have been unreasonable; and the method of its assessment, though not the most considerate possible, has support in precedent; and even the threat of a naval force may sometimes be justified in enforcing unheeded demands. I have not adverted to this incident for the purpose of inviting judgment on any of its phases, but only to call attention to the fact that it was allowed to culminate with seemingly studied accompaniments of ruthlessness and irritation, at a time when a boundary question was pending between the two nations, when the weaker contestant was importuning the stronger for arbitration, and when a desire for reconciliation and peace in presence of strained relations should have counseled considerateness and magnanimity--all this in haughty disregard of the solicitous and expressed desire of the Government of the United States to induce a peaceful adjustment of the boundary dispute, and in curt denial of our request that this especially disturbing incident should be relieved of its most exasperating features.

In the trial of causes before our courts, evidence is frequently introduced to show the animus or intent of litigating parties.

Perhaps strict decorum hardly permits us to adopt the following language, used by the Venezuelan minister when reporting to our Secretary of State the anticipated arrival of a British war-steamer to enforce the demand of Great Britain:

Such alarming news shows evidently that the Government of Her
Britannic Majesty, encouraged by the impunity on which it has
counted until now for the realization of its unjust designs
with regard to Venezuela, far from procuring a pacific and
satisfactory agreement on the different questions pending with
the latter, is especially eager to complicate in order to
render less possible every day that equitable solution which
has been so fully the endeavor of my people.

On the fifteenth day of February, 1888, the Venezuelan minister, in communicating to our Government information he had received touching a decree of the governor of Demerara denying the validity of a contract entered into by the Government of Venezuela for the construction of a railway between certain points in the territory claimed by Venezuela, commented on the affair as follows:

England has at last declared emphatically that her rights are
without limit, and embrace whatever regions may be suggested
to her by her insatiate thirst for conquest. She even goes
so far as to deny the validity of railway grants comprised
within territory where not even the wildest dream of fancy
had ever conceived that the day would come when Venezuela’s
right thereto could be disputed. The fact is that until now
England has relied upon impunity. She beholds in us a weak and
unfriended nation, and seeks to make the Venezuelan coast and
territories the base of a conquest which, if circumstances are
not altered, will have no other bounds than the dictates of her
own will.

V

Mr. Bayard, in a despatch transmitting this to our minister to England, says that our Government has heretofore acted upon the assumption that the boundary controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela was one based on historical facts, which without difficulty could be determined according to evidence, but that the British pretension now stated gives rise to grave disquietude, and creates the apprehension that their territorial claim does not follow historical traditions or evidence, but is apparently indefinite. He refers to the British Colonial Office list of previous years, and calls attention to the wide detour to the westward in the boundaries of British Guiana between the years 1877 and 1887, as shown in that record. He suggests that our minister “express anew to Lord Salisbury the great gratification it would afford our Government to see the Venezuelan dispute amicably and honorably settled by arbitration or otherwise,” and adds: “If indeed it should appear that there is no fixed limit to the British boundary claim, our good disposition to aid in a settlement might not only be defeated, but be obliged to give place to a feeling of grave concern.”

It was about this time that the Venezuelan minister, in a note expressing his appreciation of our efforts to bring about a settlement of the dispute, made the following statement:

Disastrous and fatal consequences would ensue for the
independence of South America if, under the pretext of a
question of boundaries, Great Britain should succeed in
consummating the usurpation of a third part of our territory,
and therewith a river so important as the Orinoco. Under the
pretext of a mere question of boundaries which began on the
banks of the Essequibo, we now find ourselves on the verge of
losing regions lying more than five degrees away from that
river.

On May 1, 1890, Mr. Blaine, Mr. Bayard’s successor as Secretary of State, instructed Mr. Robert T. Lincoln, our minister to England, “to use his good offices with Lord Salisbury to bring about the resumption of diplomatic intercourse between Great Britain and Venezuela as a preliminary step toward the settlement of the boundary dispute by arbitration.” He also requested him “to propose to Lord Salisbury, with a view to an accommodation, that an informal conference be had in Washington or in London of representatives of the three powers.” The secretary added: “In such conference the position of the United States is one solely of impartial friendship toward both litigants.”

In response to this instruction Mr. Lincoln had an interview with Lord Salisbury. On this occasion his Lordship said that her Majesty’s Government had not for some time been keen in attempts to settle the dispute, in view of their feeling of uncertainty as to the stability of the present Venezuelan Government and the frequency of revolutions in that quarter; but that he would take pleasure in considering our suggestion after consulting the Colonial Office, to which it would first have to be referred. Mr. Lincoln, in giving his impressions derived from the interview, says that “while Lord Salisbury did not intimate what would probably be the nature of his reply, there was certainly nothing unfavorable in his manner of receiving the suggestion”; and he follows this with these significant words: “If the matter had been entirely new and dissociated with its previous history, I should have felt from his tone that the idea of arbitration in some form, to put an end to the boundary dispute, was quite agreeable to him.”

On the 26th of May, 1890, Lord Salisbury addressed a note to Mr. Lincoln, in which his Lordship stated that her Majesty’s Government was at that moment in communication with the Venezuelan minister in Paris, who had been authorized to express the desire of his Government for the renewal of diplomatic relations, and to discuss the conditions on which it might be effected; that the terms on which her Majesty’s Government considered that a settlement of the question in issue between the two countries might be made, had been communicated to Venezuela’s representative; that his reply was still awaited, and that the British Government “would wish to have the opportunity of examining that reply, and ascertaining what prospect it would afford of an adjustment of existing differences, before considering the expediency of having recourse to the good offices of a third party.”

No mention was made, in this communication, nor at any time thereafter, so far as I can discover, of Mr. Blaine’s proposal of a conference among representatives of the three nations interested in an adjustment.

Lord Salisbury, in a despatch to the English representative at Washington, dated November 11, 1891, stated that our minister to England had, in conversation with him, renewed, on the part of our Government, the expression of a hope that the Government of Great Britain would refer the boundary dispute to arbitration; that his Lordship had expressed his willingness to submit to arbitration all the questions which seemed to his government to be fairly capable of being treated as questions of controversy; that the principal obstacle was the rupture of diplomatic relations caused by Venezuela’s act; and that before the Government of Great Britain could renew negotiations they must be satisfied that those relations were about to be resumed with a prospect of their continuance.

While our Government was endeavoring to influence Great Britain in the direction of fair and just arbitration, and receiving for our pains only barren assurances and procrastinating excuses, the appeals of Venezuela for help, stimulated by allegations of constantly increasing English pretensions, were incessantly ringing in our ears.

Without mentioning a number of these appeals, and passing over a period of more than two years, I shall next refer to a representation made by the Venezuelan minister at Washington on March 31, 1894, to Mr. Gresham, who was then our Secretary of State. In this communication the course of the controversy and the alleged unauthorized acts of England from the beginning to that date were rehearsed with circumstantial particularity. The conduct of Great Britain in refusing arbitration was again reprobated, and pointed reference was made to a principle which had been asserted by the United States, “that the nations of the American continent, after having acquired the liberty and independence which they enjoy and maintain, were not subject to colonization by any European power.” The minister further declared that “Venezuela has been ready to adhere to the conciliatory counsel of the United States that a conference, consisting of its own Representative and those of the two parties, should meet at Washington or London for the purpose of preparing an honorable reëstablishment of harmony between the litigants,” and that “Great Britain has disregarded the equitable proposition of the United States.”

On July 13, 1894, Mr. Gresham sent a despatch to Mr. Bayard, formerly Secretary of State, but then ambassador to England, inclosing the communication of the Venezuelan minister, calling particular attention to its contents, and at the same time briefly discussing the boundary dispute. In this despatch Mr. Gresham said:

The recourse to arbitration first proposed in 1881, having been
supported by your predecessors, was in turn advocated by you,
in a spirit of friendly regard for the two nations involved.
In the meantime successive advances of British settlers in the
region admittedly in dispute were followed by similar advances
of British Colonial administration, contesting and supplanting
Venezuelan claims to exercise authority therein.

He adds: “Toward the end of 1887, the British territorial claim, which had, as it would seem, been silently increased by some twenty-three thousand square miles between 1885 and 1886, took another comprehensive sweep westward to embrace” a certain rich mining district. “Since then,” the secretary further states, “repeated efforts have been made by Venezuela as a directly interested party, and by the United States as the impartial friend of both countries, to bring about a resumption of diplomatic relations, which had been suspended in consequence of the dispute now under consideration.”

This despatch concludes as follows:

The President is inspired by a desire for a peaceable and
honorable adjustment of the existing difficulties between an
American state and a powerful transatlantic nation, and would
be glad to see the reëstablishment of such diplomatic relations
between them as would promote that end. I can discover but
two equitable solutions to the present controversy. One is the
arbitral determination of the rights of the disputants as the
respective successors to the historical rights of Holland and
Spain over the region in question. The other is to create a
new boundary-line in accordance with the dictates of mutual
expediency and consideration. The two Governments having so far
been unable to agree on a conventional line, the consistent
and conspicuous advocacy by the United States and England of
the principle of arbitration, and their recourse thereto in
settlement of important questions arising between them, makes
such a mode of adjustment especially appropriate in the present
instance; and this Government will gladly do what it can to
further a determination in that sense.

In another despatch to Mr. Bayard, dated December 1, 1894, Mr. Gresham says:

I cannot believe Her Majesty’s Government will maintain that
the validity of their claim to territory long in dispute
between the two countries shall be conceded as a condition
precedent to the arbitration of the question whether Venezuela
is entitled to other territory, which until a recent period was
never in doubt. Our interest in the question has repeatedly
been shown by our friendly efforts to further a settlement
alike honorable to both countries, and the President is pleased
to know that Venezuela will soon renew her efforts to bring
about such an adjustment.

Two days afterward, on December 3, 1894, the President’s annual message was sent to the Congress, containing the following reference to the controversy:

The boundary of British Guiana still remains in dispute
between Great Britain and Venezuela. Believing that its early
settlement on some just basis alike honorable to both parties
is in the line of our established policy to remove from this
hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the
sea, I shall renew the efforts heretofore made to bring about
a restoration of diplomatic relations between the disputants
and to induce a reference to arbitration--a resort which Great
Britain so conspicuously favors in principle and respects in
practice, and which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversary.

On the twenty-second day of February, 1895, a joint resolution was passed by the Congress, earnestly recommending to both parties in interest the President’s suggestion “that Great Britain and Venezuela refer their dispute as to boundaries to friendly arbitration.”

A despatch dated February 23, 1895, from Great Britain’s Foreign Office to the English ambassador at Washington, stated that on the twenty-fifth day of January, 1895, our ambassador, Mr. Bayard, had, in an official interview, referred to the boundary controversy, and said “that his Government would gladly lend their good offices to bring about a settlement by means of an arbitration.” The despatch further stated that Mr. Bayard had thereupon been informed that her Majesty’s Government had expressed their willingness to submit the question, within certain limits, to arbitration, but could not agree to the more extensive reference on which the Venezuelan Government insisted; that Mr. Bayard called again on the twentieth day of February, when a memorandum was read to him concerning the situation and a map shown him of the territory in dispute; that at the same time he was informed that the Venezuelans had recently made an aggression upon the territory of English occupation, and, according to report, ill-treated some of the colonial police stationed there, and that it was the boundary defined by the Schomburgk line which had thus been violated in a marked manner by the Venezuelans.

This despatch concludes as follows:

On Mr. Bayard’s observing that the United States Government
was anxious to do anything in their power to facilitate a
settlement of the difficulty by arbitration, I reminded his
Excellency that although Her Majesty’s Government were ready
to go to arbitration as to a certain portion of the territory
which I had pointed out to him, they could not consent to any
departure from the Schomburgk line.

It now became plainly apparent that a new stage had been reached in the progress of our intervention, and that the ominous happenings embraced within a few months had hastened the day when we were challenged to take our exact bearings, lest we should miss the course of honor and national duty. The more direct tone that had been given to our despatches concerning the dispute, our more insistent and emphatic suggestion of arbitration, the serious reference to the subject in the President’s message, the significant resolution passed by Congress earnestly recommending arbitration, all portended a growth of conviction on the part of our Government concerning this controversy, which gave birth to pronounced disappointment and anxiety when Great Britain, concurrently with these apprising incidents, repeated in direct and positive terms her refusal to submit to arbitration except on condition that a portion of the disputed territory which Venezuela had always claimed to be hers should at the outset be irrevocably conceded to England.

During a period of more than fourteen years our Government, assuming the character of a mutual and disinterested friend of both countries, had, with varying assiduity, tendered its good offices to bring about a pacific and amicable settlement of this boundary controversy, only to be repelled with more or less civility by Great Britain. We had seen her pretensions in the disputed regions widen and extend in such manner and upon such pretexts as seemed to constitute an actual or threatened violation of a doctrine which our nation long ago established, declaring that the American continents are not to be considered subjects for future colonization by any European power; and despite all this we had, nevertheless, hoped, during all these years, that arrangement and accommodation between the principal parties would justify us in keeping an invocation of that doctrine in the background of the discussion. Notwithstanding, however, all our efforts to avoid it, we could not be unmindful of the conditions which the progress of events had created, and whose meaning and whose exigencies inexorably confronted us. England had finally and unmistakably declared that all the territory embraced within the Schomburgk line was indisputably hers. Venezuela presented a claim to territory within the same limits, which could not be said to lack strong support. England had absolutely refused to permit Venezuela’s claim to be tested by arbitration; and Venezuela was utterly powerless to resist by force England’s self-pronounced decree of ownership. If this decree was not justified by the facts, and it should be enforced against the protest and insistence of Venezuela and should result in the possession and colonization of Venezuelan territory by Great Britain, it seemed quite plain that the American doctrine which denies to European powers the colonization of any part of the American continent would be violated.

If the ultimatum of Great Britain as to her claim of territory had appeared to us so thoroughly supported upon the facts as to admit of small doubt, we might have escaped the responsibility of insisting on an observance of the Monroe Doctrine in the premises, on our own account, and have still remained the disinterested friend of both countries, merely contenting ourselves with benevolent attempts to reconcile the disputants. We were, however, far from discovering such satisfactory support in the evidence within our reach. On the contrary, we believed that the effects of our acquiescence in Great Britain’s pretensions would amount to a failure to uphold and maintain a principle universally accepted by our Government and our people as vitally essential to our national integrity and welfare. The arbitration, for which Venezuela pleaded, would have adjudged the exact condition of the rival claims, would have forever silenced Venezuela’s complaints, and would have displaced by conclusive sentence our unwelcome doubts and suspicions; but this Great Britain had refused to Venezuela, and thus far had also denied to us.

Recreancy to a principle so fundamentally American as the Monroe Doctrine, on the part of those charged with the administration of our Government, was of course out of the question. Inasmuch, therefore, as all our efforts to avoid its assertion had miscarried, there was nothing left for us to do consistently with national honor but to take the place of Venezuela in the controversy, so far as that was necessary, in vindication of our American doctrine. Our mild and amiable proffers of good offices, and the hopes we indulged that at last they might be the means of securing to a weak sister republic peace and justice, and to ourselves immunity from sterner interposition, were not suited to the new emergency. In the advanced condition of the dispute, sympathy with Venezuela and solicitude for her distressed condition could no longer constitute the motive power of our conduct, but these were to give way to the duty and obligation of protecting our own national rights.

Mr. Gresham, who since the fourth day of March, 1893, had been our Secretary of State, died in the latter days of May, 1895. His love of justice, his sympathy with every cause that deserved sympathy, his fearless and disinterested patriotism, and his rare mental endowments, combined to make him a noble American and an able advocate of his country’s honor. To such a man every phase of the Venezuelan boundary dispute strongly appealed; and he had been conscientiously diligent in acquainting himself with its history and in considering the contingencies that might arise in its future development. Though his death was most lamentable, I have always considered it a providential circumstance that the Government then had among its Cabinet officers an exceptionally strong and able man, in every way especially qualified to fill the vacant place, and thoroughly familiar with the pending controversy--which seemed every day to bring us closer to momentous duty and responsibility.

Mr. Olney was appointed Secretary of State early in June, 1895; and promptly thereafter, at the suggestion of the President, he began, with characteristic energy and vigor, to make preparation for the decisive step which it seemed should no longer be delayed.

The seriousness of the business we had in hand was fully understood, and the difficulty or impossibility of retracing the step we contemplated was thoroughly appreciated. The absolute necessity of certainty concerning the facts which should underlie our action was, of course, perfectly apparent. Whatever our beliefs or convictions might be, as derived from the examination we had thus far given the case, and however strongly we might be persuaded that Great Britain’s pretensions could not be conceded consistently with our maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, it would, nevertheless, have been manifestly improper and heedless on our part to find conclusively against Great Britain, before soliciting her again and in new circumstances to give us an opportunity to judge of the merits of her claims through the submission of them to arbitration.

It was determined, therefore, that a communication should be prepared for presentation to the British Government through our ambassador to England, detailing the progress and incidents of the controversy as we apprehended them, giving a thorough exposition of the origin of the Monroe Doctrine, and the reasons on which it was based, demonstrating our interest in the controversy because of its relation to that doctrine, and from our new standpoint and on our own account requesting Great Britain to join Venezuela in submitting to arbitration their contested claims to the entire territory in dispute.

This was accordingly done; and a despatch to this effect, dated July 20, 1895, was sent by Mr. Olney to her Majesty’s Government through Mr. Bayard, our ambassador.

The Monroe Doctrine may be abandoned; we may forfeit it by taking our lot with nations that expand by following un-American ways; we may outgrow it, as we seem to be outgrowing other things we once valued; or it may forever stand as a guaranty of protection and safety in our enjoyment of free institutions; but in no event will this American principle ever be better defined, better defended, or more bravely asserted than was done by Mr. Olney in this despatch.

After referring to the various incidents of the controversy, and stating the conditions then existing, it was declared:

The accuracy of the foregoing analysis of the existing status
cannot, it is believed, be challenged. It shows that status to
be such, that those charged with the interests of the United
States are now forced to determine exactly what those interests
are and what course of action they require. It compels them
to decide to what extent, if any, the United States may and
should intervene in a controversy between, and primarily
concerning, only Great Britain and Venezuela, and to decide
how far it is bound to see that the integrity of Venezuelan
territory is not impaired by the pretensions of its powerful
antagonist.

After an exhaustive explanation and vindication of the Monroe Doctrine, and after asserting that aggressions by Great Britain on Venezuelan soil would fall within its purview, the despatch proceeded as follows:

While Venezuela charges such usurpation, Great Britain denies
it; and the United States, until the merits are authoritatively
ascertained, can take sides with neither. But while this
is so,--while the United States may not, under existing
circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which of the
two parties is right and which is wrong,--it is certainly
within its right to demand that the truth be ascertained.
Being entitled to resent and resist any sequestration of
Venezuelan soil by Great Britain, it is necessarily entitled to
know whether such sequestration has occurred or is now going
on.... It being clear, therefore, that the United States may
legitimately insist upon the merits of the boundary question
being determined, it is equally clear that there is but one
feasible mode of determining them, viz., peaceful arbitration.

The demand of Great Britain that her right to a portion of the disputed territory should be acknowledged as a condition of her consent to arbitration as to the remainder, was thus characterized:

It is not perceived how such an attitude can be defended, nor
how it is reconcilable with that love of justice and fair
play so eminently characteristic of the English race. It in
effect deprives Venezuela of her free agency and puts her under
virtual duress. Territory acquired by reason of it will be as
much wrested from her by the strong hand as if occupied by
British troops or covered by British fleets.

The despatch, after directing the presentation to Lord Salisbury of the views it contained, concluded as follows:

They call for a definite decision upon the point whether Great
Britain will consent or decline to submit the Venezuelan
boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration. It
is the earnest hope of the President that the conclusion will
be on the side of arbitration, and that Great Britain will
add one more to the conspicuous precedents she has already
furnished in favor of that wise and just mode of settling
international disputes. If he is to be disappointed in that
hope, however,--a result not to be anticipated, and in his
judgment calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations
between this country and Great Britain,--it is his wish to be
made acquainted with the fact at such early date as will enable
him to lay the whole subject before Congress in his next annual
message.

VI

The reply of Great Britain to this communication consisted of two despatches addressed by Lord Salisbury to the British ambassador at Washington for submission to our Government. Though dated the twenty-sixth day of November, 1895, these despatches were not presented to our State Department until a number of days after the assemblage of the Congress in the following month. In one of these communications Lord Salisbury, in dealing with the Monroe Doctrine and the right or propriety of our appeal to it in the pending controversy, declared: “The dangers which were apprehended by President Monroe have no relation to the state of things in which we live at the present day.” He further declared:

But the circumstances with which President Monroe was
dealing and those to which the present American Government
is addressing itself have very few features in common. Great
Britain is imposing no “system” upon Venezuela and is not
concerning herself in any way with the nature of the political
institutions under which the Venezuelans may prefer to live.
But the British Empire and the Republic of Venezuela are
neighbors, and they have differed for some time past, and
continue to differ, as to the line by which their dominions are
separated. It is a controversy with which the United States
have no apparent practical concern.... The disputed frontier
of Venezuela has nothing to do with any of the questions dealt
with by President Monroe.

His Lordship, in commenting upon our position as developed in Mr. Olney’s despatch, defined it in these terms: “If any independent American state advances a demand for territory of which its neighbor claims to be the owner, and that neighbor is a colony of an European state, the United States have a right to insist that the European state shall submit the demand and its own impugned rights to arbitration.”

I confess I should be greatly disappointed if I believed that the history I have attempted to give of this controversy did not easily and promptly suggest that this definition of our contention fails to take into account some of its most important and controlling features.

Speaking of arbitration as a method of terminating international differences, Lord Salisbury said:

It has proved itself valuable in many cases, but it is not free
from defects which often operate as a serious drawback on
its value. It is not always easy to find an arbitrator who is
competent and who, at the same time, is wholly free from bias;
and the task of insuring compliance with the award when it is
made is not exempt from difficulty. It is a mode of settlement
of which the value varies much according to the nature of the
controversy to which it is applied and the character of the
litigants who appeal to it. Whether in any particular case
it is a suitable method of procedure is generally a delicate
and difficult question. The only parties who are competent
to decide that question are the two parties whose rival
contentions are in issue. The claim of a third nation which
is unaffected by the controversy to impose this particular
procedure on either of the two others cannot be reasonably
justified and has no foundation in the law of nations.

Immediately following this statement his Lordship again touched upon the Monroe Doctrine for the purpose of specifically disclaiming its acceptance by her Majesty’s Government as a sound and valid principle. He says:

It must always be mentioned with respect, on account of the
distinguished statesman to whom it is due and the great nation
who have generally adopted it. But international law is founded
on the general consent of nations; and no statesman, however
eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to
insert into the code of international law a novel principle
which was never recognized before, and which has not since been
accepted by the Government of any other country. The United
States have a right, like any other nation, to interpose in any
controversy by which their own interests are affected; and they
are the judge whether those interests are touched and in what
measure they should be sustained. But their rights are in no
way strengthened or extended by the fact that the controversy
affects some territory which is called American.

In concluding this despatch Lord Salisbury declared that her Majesty’s Government “fully concur with the view which President Monroe apparently entertained, that any disturbance of the existing territorial distribution in that hemisphere by any fresh acquisitions on the part of any European state would be a highly inexpedient change. But they are not prepared to admit that the recognition of that expediency is clothed with the sanction which belongs to a doctrine of international law. They are not prepared to admit that the interests of the United States are necessarily concerned in any frontier dispute which may arise between any two of the states who possess dominions in the Western Hemisphere; and still less can they accept the doctrine that the United States are entitled to claim that the process of arbitration shall be applied to any demand for the surrender of territory which one of those states may make against another.”

The other despatch of Lord Salisbury, which accompanied the one upon which I have commented, was mainly devoted to a statement of facts and evidence on Great Britain’s side in the boundary controversy; and in making such statement his Lordship in general terms designated the territory to which her Majesty’s Government was entitled as being embraced within the lines of the most extreme claim which she had at any time presented. He added:

A portion of that claim, however, they have always been willing
to waive altogether; in regard to another portion they have
been and continue to be perfectly ready to submit the question
of their title to arbitration. As regards the rest, that which
lies within the so-called Schomburgk line, they do not consider
that the rights of Great Britain are open to question. Even
within that line they have on various occasions offered to
Venezuela considerable concessions as a matter of friendship
and conciliation and for the purpose of securing an amicable
settlement of the dispute. If, as time has gone on, the
concessions thus offered have been withdrawn, this has been the
necessary consequence of the gradual spread over the country of
British settlements, which Her Majesty’s Government cannot in
justice to the inhabitants offer to surrender to foreign rule.

In conclusion his Lordship asserts that his Government has

repeatedly expressed their readiness to submit to arbitration
the conflicting claims of Great Britain and Venezuela to large
tracts of territory which from their auriferous nature are
known to be of almost untold value. But they cannot consent
to entertain, or to submit to the arbitration of another
power or of foreign jurists however eminent, claims based on
the extravagant pretensions of Spanish officials in the last
century and involving the transfer of large numbers of British
subjects, who have for many years enjoyed the settled rule of
a British colony, to a nation of different race and language,
whose political system is subject to frequent disturbance, and
whose institutions as yet too often afford very inadequate
protection to life and property.

These despatches exhibit a refusal to admit such an interest in the controversy on our part as entitled us to insist upon an arbitration for the purpose of having the line between Great Britain and Venezuela established; a denial of such force or meaning to the Monroe Doctrine as made it worthy of the regard of Great Britain in the premises; and a fixed and continued determination on the part of her Majesty’s Government to reject arbitration as to any territory included within the extended Schomburgk line. They further indicate that the existence of gold within the disputed territory had not been overlooked; and they distinctly put forward the colonization and settlement by English subjects in such territory, during more than half a century of dispute, as creating a claim to dominion and sovereignty, if not strong enough to override all question of right and title, at least so clear and indisputable as to be properly considered as above and beyond the contingencies of arbitration.

If we had been obliged to accept Lord Salisbury’s estimate of the Monroe Doctrine, and his ideas of our interest, or rather want of interest, in the settlement of the boundary between Great Britain and Venezuela, his despatches would have certainly been very depressing. It would have been unpleasant for us to know that a doctrine which we had supposed for seventy years to be of great value and importance to us and our national safety was, after all, a mere plaything with which we might amuse ourselves; and that our efforts to enforce it were to be regarded by Great Britain and other European nations as meddlesome interferences with affairs in which we could have no legitimate concern.

The reply of the English Government to Mr. Olney’s despatch, whatever else it accomplished, seemed absolutely to destroy any hope we might have entertained that, in our changed position in the controversy and upon our independent solicitation, arbitration might be conceded to us. Since, therefore, Great Britain was unwilling, on any consideration, to coöperate with Venezuela in setting on foot an investigation of their contested claim, and since prudence and care dictated that any further steps we might take should be proved to be as fully justified as was practicable in the circumstances, there seemed to be no better way open to us than to inaugurate a careful independent investigation of the merits of the controversy, on our own motion, with a view of determining as accurately as possible, for our own guidance, where the divisional line between the two countries should be located.

Mr. Olney’s despatch and Lord Salisbury’s reply were submitted to the Congress on the seventeenth day of December, 1895, accompanied by a message from the President.

In this message the President, after stating Lord Salisbury’s positions touching the Monroe Doctrine, declared:

Without attempting extended argument in reply to these
positions, it may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine
upon which we stand is strong and sound, because its
enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation,
and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and
the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government.
It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life,
and cannot become obsolete while our Republic endures. If the
balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among
the governments of the Old World and a subject for our absolute
non-interference, none the less is the observance of the Monroe
Doctrine of vital concern to our people and their Government.

Speaking of the claim made by Lord Salisbury that this doctrine had no place in international law, it was said in the message: “The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced.”

Referring to the request contained in Mr. Olney’s despatch that the entire boundary controversy be submitted to arbitration, the following language was used:

It will be seen from the correspondence herewith submitted that
this proposition has been declined by the British Government
upon grounds which in the circumstances seem to me to be far
from satisfactory. It is deeply disappointing that such an
appeal, actuated by the most friendly feelings toward both
nations directly concerned, addressed to the sense of justice
and to the magnanimity of one of the great powers of the world,
and touching its relations to one comparatively weak and small,
should have produced no better results.

The course to be pursued by this Government in view of the
present condition does not appear to admit of serious doubt.
Having labored faithfully for many years to induce Great
Britain to submit their dispute to impartial arbitration, and
having been finally apprised of her refusal to do so, nothing
remains but to accept the situation, to recognize its plain
requirements, and deal with it accordingly. Great Britain’s
present proposition has never thus far been regarded as
admissible by Venezuela, though any adjustment of the boundary
which that country may deem for her advantage and may enter
into of her own free will cannot, of course, be objected to
by the United States. Assuming, however, that the attitude of
Venezuela will remain unchanged, the dispute has reached such
a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United States to
take measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its
justification what is the true divisional line between the
Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana. The inquiry to that
end should, of course, be conducted carefully and judicially;
and due weight should be given to all available evidence,
records, and facts in support of the claims of both parties.

After recommending to the Congress an adequate appropriation to meet the expense of a commission which should make the suggested investigation and report thereon with the least possible delay, the President concluded his message as follows:

When such report is made and accepted, it will, in my opinion,
be the duty of the United States to resist by every means
in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and
interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or
the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory
which after investigation we have determined of right belongs
to Venezuela.

In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the
responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the
consequences that may follow.

I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that while it is a
grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking
peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly
competitors in the onward march of civilization, and strenuous
and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no
calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that
which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice, and
the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath
which are shielded and defended a people’s safety and greatness.

The recommendations contained in this message were acted upon with such promptness and unanimity that on the twenty-first day of December, 1895, four days after they were submitted, a law was passed by the Congress authorizing the President to appoint a commission “to investigate and report upon the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana,” and making an ample appropriation to meet the expenses of its work.

On the first day of January, 1896, five of our most able and distinguished citizens were selected to constitute the commission; and they immediately entered upon their investigation. At the outset of their labors, and on the fifteenth day of January, 1896, the president of the commission suggested to Mr. Olney the expediency of calling the attention of the Governments of Great Britain and Venezuela to the appointment of the commission, adding: “It may be that they would see a way entirely consistent with their own sense of international propriety to give the Commission the aid that it is no doubt in their power to furnish in the way of documentary proof, historical narrative, unpublished archives, or the like.” This suggestion, on its presentation to the Government of Great Britain, was met by a most courteous and willing offer to supply to our commission every means of information touching the subject of their investigation which was within the reach of the English authorities; and at all times during the labors of the commission this offer was cheerfully fulfilled.

In the meantime, and as early as February, 1896, the question of submitting the Venezuelan boundary dispute to mutual arbitration was again agitated between the United States and Great Britain.

Our ambassador to England, in a note to Lord Salisbury, dated February 27, 1896, after speaking of such arbitration as seeming to be “almost unanimously desired by both the United States and Great Britain,” proposed, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, “an entrance forthwith upon negotiations at Washington to effect this purpose, and that Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Washington should be empowered to discuss the question at that capital with the Secretary of State.” He also requested that a definition should be given of “settlements” in the disputed territory which it was understood her Majesty’s Government desired should be excluded from the proposed submission to arbitration.

Lord Salisbury, in his reply to this note, dated March 3, 1896, said:

The communications which have already passed between Her
Majesty’s Government and that of the United States have made
you acquainted with the desire of Her Majesty’s Government to
bring the difference between themselves and the Republic of
Venezuela to an equitable settlement. They therefore readily
concur in the suggestion that negotiations for this purpose
should be opened at Washington without unnecessary delay. I
have accordingly empowered Sir Julian Pauncefote to discuss the
question either with the representative of Venezuela or with
the Government of the United States acting as the friend of
Venezuela.