Chapter IV: Metaphysical Ethics

A.

=66.= The term ‘metaphysical’ is defined as having reference
primarily to any object of knowledge which is not a part of
Nature--does not exist in time, as an object of perception; but
since metaphysicians, not content with pointing out the truth
about such entities, have always supposed that what does not
exist in Nature, must, at least, _exist_, the term also has
reference to a supposed ‘supersensible reality’: 110

=67.= and by ‘metaphysical Ethics’ I mean those systems which
maintain or imply that the answer to the question ‘What is
good?’ _logically depends_ upon the answer to the question
‘What is the nature of supersensible reality?.’ All such
systems obviously involve the same fallacy--the ‘naturalistic
fallacy’--by the use of which Naturalism was also defined. 113

=68.= Metaphysics, as dealing with a ‘supersensible reality,’
may have a bearing upon _practical_ Ethics (1) if its
supersensible reality is conceived as something future, which
our actions can affect; and (2) since it will prove that
_every_ proposition of practical Ethics is false, if it can
shew that an eternal reality is either the only real thing
or the only good thing. Most metaphysical writers, believing
in a reality of the latter kind, do thus imply the complete
falsehood of every practical proposition, although they fail to
see that their Metaphysics thus contradicts their Ethics. 115

B.

=69.= But the theory, by which I have defined Metaphysical
Ethics, is _not_ that Metaphysics has a logical bearing upon
the question involved in _practical_ Ethics ‘What effects will
my action produce?,’ but that it has such a bearing upon the
fundamental ethical question ‘What is good in itself?.’ This
theory has been refuted by the proof, in Chap. I, that the
naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy: it only remains to discuss
certain confusions which seem to have lent it plausibility. 118

=70.= One such source of confusion seems to lie in the failure
to distinguish between the proposition ‘This is good,’ when
it means ‘This _existing_ thing is good,’ and the same
proposition, when it means ‘The existence of this _kind_ of
thing would be good’; 118

=71.= and another seems to lie in the failure to distinguish
between that which _suggests_ a truth, or is a _cause_ of
our knowing it, and that upon which it _logically_ depends,
or which is a _reason_ for believing it: in the former
sense fiction has a more important bearing upon Ethics than
Metaphysics can have. 121

C.

=72.= But a more important source of confusion seems to lie
in the supposition that ‘to be good’ is _identical_ with the
possession of some supersensible property, which is also
involved in the definition of ‘reality.’ 122

=73.= One cause of this supposition seems to be the logical
prejudice that all propositions are of the most familiar
type--that in which subject and predicate are both existents. 123

=74.= But ethical propositions cannot be reduced to this type:
in particular, they are obviously to be distinguished 125

=75.= (1) from Natural Laws; with which one of Kant’s most
famous doctrines confuses them, 126

=76.= and (2) from Commands; with which they are confused both
by Kant and by others. 127

D.

=77.= This latter confusion is one of the sources of the
prevalent modern doctrine that ‘being good’ is _identical_ with
‘being willed’; but the prevalence of this doctrine seems to be
chiefly due to other causes. I shall try to shew with regard
to it (1) what are the chief errors which seem to have led to
its adoption; and (2) that, apart from it, the Metaphysics of
Volition can hardly have the smallest logical bearing upon
Ethics. 128

=78.= (1) It has been commonly held, since Kant, that
‘goodness’ has the same relation to Will or Feeling, which
‘truth’ or ‘reality’ has to Cognition: that the proper method
for Ethics is to discover what is _implied_ in Will or Feeling,
just as, according to Kant, the proper method for Metaphysics
was to discover what is _implied_ in Cognition. 129

=79.= The actual relations between ‘goodness’ and Will or
Feeling, from which this false doctrine is inferred, seem to
be mainly (_a_) the _causal_ relation consisting in the fact
that it is only by reflection upon the experiences of Will and
Feeling that we become aware of ethical distinctions; (_b_) the
facts that a cognition of goodness is perhaps _always_ included
in certain kinds of Willing and Feeling, and is _generally_
accompanied by them: 130

=80.= but from neither of these _psychological_ facts does it
follow that ‘to be good’ is identical with being willed or
felt in a certain way: the supposition that it does follow
is an instance of the fundamental contradiction of modern
Epistemology--the contradiction involved in both distinguishing
and identifying the _object_ and the _act_ of Thought, ‘truth’
itself and its supposed _criterion_: 131

=81.= and, once this analogy between Volition and Cognition is
accepted, the view that ethical propositions have an essential
reference to Will or Feeling, is strengthened by another error
with regard to the nature of Cognition--the error of supposing
that ‘perception’ denotes _merely_ a certain way of cognising
an object, whereas it actually includes the assertion that the
object is also _true_. 133

=82.= The argument of the last three §§ is recapitulated; and
it is pointed out (1) that Volition and Feeling are _not_
analogous to Cognition, (2) that, even if they were, still ‘to
be good’ could not _mean_ ‘to be willed or felt in a certain
way.’ 135

=83.= (2) If ‘being good’ and ‘being willed’ are not
_identical_, then the latter could only be a _criterion_ of the
former; and, in order to shew that it was so, we should have
to establish _independently_ that many things were good--that
is to say, we should have to establish most of our ethical
conclusions, before the Metaphysics of Volition could possibly
give us the smallest assistance. 137

=84.= The fact that the metaphysical writers who, like Green,
attempt to _base_ Ethics on Volition, do not even attempt this
independent investigation, shews that they start from the false
assumption that goodness is _identical_ with being willed, and
hence that their ethical reasonings have no value whatsoever. 138

=85.= Summary of chapter. 139