Chapter XVIII: Appendix: Military PsyWar Operations, 1950-53

On 25 June 1950, when the invasion of the Republic of Korea began, no real military PsyWar organization was tangibly evident. A planning staff headed by Colonel J. Woodall Greene had been re-created in the Far East Command's GHQ in 1947, but it was hardly prepared to direct full-scale propaganda operations on such short notice, especially with a total lack of field operating units. Yet the staff with hasty augmentation did go into action--in effect, became its own operating unit--two days following the invasion, using both leaflets and radio in a strategic campaign that was continued without interruption for over three years.

At the same time that General MacArthur made provision for the PsyWar planning staff in the Far East Command, the Department of the Army's G2 in 1947 directed the inauguration of a long-range program of extension courses to be administered primarily to the specialists of the Military Intelligence Reserve. One such specialty in the military intelligence career program was psychological warfare.[64]

Parallel with the development of training literature based on World War II experience, the Army experimented with the use of PsyWar in field maneuvers. A special unit, called the Tactical Information Detachment,[65] was formed at Fort Riley, Kansas.

=Organization of Field Operational Units.= Less than a month after the 1950 invasion, the Department of the Army announced the approval of a new organizational concept for PsyWar field operational units. The new concept, profiting by the organizational happenchance in all theaters of operations during World War II, established two functional units: one for _strategic_ propaganda support, the other for _tactical_ propaganda support.

=Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group.= Although the concept for new unit organization and function was not conceived overnight, FEC's Psychological Warfare Section (PWS) with its dual planning and operating responsibilities pointed up the urgent need for a unit properly manned and equipped to support full-scale strategic operations in any area. So the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was born. Not only was it designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations, but it likewise was created to support the national world-wide propaganda effort when so directed. It was built on a basic framework of three companies:

_Headquarters and Headquarters Company_, containing the command, administrative, supervisory and creative personnel necessary for propaganda operations.

_Reproduction Company_, containing intricate equipment and skilled personnel capable of producing leaflets and newspapers of varying sizes and multiple color.

_Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company_, designed to replace or augment other means of broadcasting radio propaganda.

In 1953 a fourth type company was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina--the _Consolidation Company_. This unit was very flexible and had the job of creating and conducting PsyWar in support of consolidation operations in areas under Military Government control.

=Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company.= The Group's junior partner in the conduct of PsyWar support operations was the Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company. This unit specifically supported an army in the field with adequate _tactical_ propaganda support. Like the Group, it supported the national propaganda objectives, but it interpreted the directives that came from the theater commander in terms of more immediate objectives. Its targets were smaller, lived under unusual circumstances, and presented highly vulnerable, rapidly changing propaganda opportunities--a real challenge for the L&L Company. Organizationally it was a trimmed-down version of the Group. Its _company headquarters_ and _propaganda platoon_ were the offspring of Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The _publications platoon_ was a smaller, more adaptable version of Reproduction Company. And the _loudspeaker platoon_ was the tactical counterpart of the strategic Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company.

The Tactical Information Detachment, moving from Fort Riley to Korea in the fall of 1950, was reorganized as the _1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company_ and, attached to EUSAK, served as Eighth Army's tactical propaganda unit throughout the campaign. It adjusted its location, equipment and propaganda tone to keep pace with the ups and downs of the Korean war.

=Psychological Warfare Center.= Paralleling the creation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in the Department of the Army PsyWar training was started in the spring of 1951. A faculty was collected at the Army General School to start the world's first formal school of military propaganda.

At the same time, reserve officers whose civilian specialties were in or related to mass communications were recalled to PsyWar assignments. Several RB&L groups and L&L companies were activated and trained at Fort Riley. One of these, the _1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group_, was deployed to Japan to become the strategic propaganda support unit in FEC, thereby relieving the hard-pressed Psychological Warfare Section of its operational functions. The Group left Fort Riley in July 1951 at the height of the Missouri Valley floods, forcing the unit to take emergency detours by bus and train in order to meet its scheduled port of embarkation call. The 1st was the only group to have been used in active operations. Other groups were employed in training missions. In addition, Reserve groups and companies trained periodically at key locations where sufficient specialized personnel were available to keep the units on a ready, stand-by basis.

In April 1952, the PsyWar training activities at Fort Riley were moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where the new Psychological Warfare Center was located. This Center not only provided unit training supervision and facilities, but it fathered a new activity, the Psychological Warfare Board, designed to evaluate and test new PsyWar equipment and techniques. And the Psychological Warfare School, an outgrowth of the classes conducted by the Army General School, was formally recognized and established as one of the Army's specialist schools. More than four hundred officers have received diplomas as PsyWar officers at the time of this writing (1953). Most of the graduates have been Army officers, although successfully completing the course have been students from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, U.S. Information Agency, and from nine Allied nations.

=Psychological Warfare Staff, FEC.= For nearly two years, the Psychological Warfare Section operated under the general staff supervision of Intelligence (G2). Since World War I days G2 had been given the responsibility for monitoring PsyWar activity, a practice that was evident throughout World War II. In 1947 the Department of the Army transferred the monitorship and supervision of PsyWar to Plans and Operations (G3). The shift was effected in FEC in 1952.

Early in 1953 PWS was transferred to the staff of the commander, Army Forces Far East (AFFE), a paper transaction to put the staff in a closer position to coordinate the plans and operations of the supporting army PsyWar units.

Throughout the Korean conflict, PWS, like its area commander, wore two hats: PWS was also the PsyWar operations coordinating agency for the United Nations Command.

Broad objectives made possible throughout the war years the development of literally thousands of appropriate themes. One theme so prominent in World War II propaganda, that of _unconditional surrender_, was never used. UN policy denied its use, and PWS enforced the prohibition.

=Psychological Warfare Staff, EUSAK.= Recognizing the need for PsyWar officers on army and corps staffs, the Department of the Army hastened to make an allocation for these officers to be integrated into headquarters structures. The PsyWar officers finally came to rest in the G3 staff section.

Eighth Army's PsyWar division of G3 had the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company under its operational control. EUSAK's PsyWar officer kept a tight control over the propaganda output of the L&L Company by physically moving the propaganda platoon into his EUSAK staff office.

Each of the corps PsyWar officers had under his operational control one loudspeaker section (with a varying number of teams) from the L&L Company.

=Radio Operations.= Radio in the Korean conflict was used jointly as a strategic and a consolidation medium. From the beginning of the war, radio was the voice of our military policy. An ambitious network, supervised in 1950-51 directly by PWS and thereafter by the 1st RB&L Group, became known and recognized as the Voice of the United Nations Command. The Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and the Japan Broadcasting System (JBS) transmitted on a cooperative basis, with the U.S. Government buying air time. The 1st RB&L Group's radio unit furnished programming assistance through key stations in Seoul (KBS), Taegu (KBS), Pusan (KBS) and Tokyo (JBS). In addition, the Group furnished technical assistance to KBS in order to keep as many as twelve network stations on the air.

=Leaflet Operations.= As in World War II, leaflets were delivered primarily by two means: aircraft and artillery. B-29s of the Far East Air Force ferried leaflet bombs on night missions deep into strategic areas. Light bombers and liaison craft in support of EUSAK dropped both leaflet bombs and bundles on tactical targets. The leaflet bundle was a Korean war development. It was wrapped, tied, and fuzed in such a manner that it would open and release its leaflets in mid-air. The 105mm. howitzer remained the principal artillery piece for placing propaganda-loaded shells on pinpoint targets.

Tremendous quantities of leaflets were printed. The 1st RB&L Group on many occasions averaged better than twenty million pieces of printed propaganda every week. To this, the 1st L&L Company in Korea added an average of three and a half million leaflets per week.

=Loudspeaker Operations.= The airborne loudspeaker was the object of experimentation, but the bulk of loudspeaker broadcasts were made from vehicle mounts, such as tanks, and from emplacements. During the static battle situation of 1951-53, most of the broadcasts were of the latter kind. Range of the voice casts was short, something like two thousand yards under ideal conditions. Personnel and equipment were supplied by the 1st L&L Company, and scripts were prepared by PsyWar Division, G3, EUSAK.

=Results of Military PsyWar Operations.= When the question was asked, "Just how effective was PsyWar?" the answer was vague. Clear-cut immediate evaluation of the effects of each propaganda campaign was often impossible to ascertain because of the many intangible conditions that were prevalent in the target area--conditions that were constantly changing.

Some critics of the PsyWar operations in the Far East Command charged that there were exaggerated claims of prisoners of war who surrendered as a result of propaganda. They pointed out that a head count of prisoners is an inaccurate measure of _direct_ effects of PsyWar used in support of military operations, because rarely is the taking of prisoners the _sole_ goal of any major PsyWar campaign.

Other critics expressed the belief that emphasis had been placed on _quantity_ rather than _quality_ of propaganda. By quantity they meant propaganda measured by bookkeeping statistics. By quality they meant propaganda that, planned with potent intelligence, was capable of exploiting propaganda opportunities with maximum psychological impact.

Did PsyWar achieve its goal?

The effects of planned persuasion in a thousand days of radio broadcasts, in tens of thousands of loudspeaker appeals, in billions of leaflets, may be measured only in retrospect. The question may be answered when reaction in the target area has reached (or fails to reach) favorable proportion, provided that the tangible results of the military operations can be clearly separated from those of concurrent and subsequent strategic international information operations.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Histories of warfare, of politics (though there are no good recent ones, Edward Jenks' little book being half a century out of date), of political theory (especially the excellent though dissimilar volumes by G. H. Sabine and by G. E. C. Catlin), of particular countries, of diplomacy, of religion, and even of literature all cast a certain amount of light on the subject. No writer known to the author specializes in the topic of historical propaganda; none takes up the long-established historical role of non-violent persuasion in warfare. Some of the sociologists and anthropologists, such as Karl Mannheim, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Geoffrey Gorer, Ruth Benedict (to mention a few at random) have presented approaches which would justify re-evaluations of history in a way useful to propaganda students; but they have not yet persuaded the historians to do the work.

[2] 7 Judges 22-23.

[3] Leon Wieger, S. J., _Textes Historiques_, Hsien-hsien, 1929, vol. 1, pp. 628-633.

[4] The author's attention to this reference was drawn by an unpublished undated typescript article in the War Department files by Lt. Col. Samuel T. Mackall, Inf.

[5] Lo Kuan-chung, _San Kuo chih Yen-i_, translated by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor as _San Kuo or Romance of the Three Kingdoms_, Shanghai, 1929, vol. 1, p. 46.

[6] Recent writers on Genghis, such as Lamb, Vladimirtsov, Fox and Lattimore all credit the Mongols with a higher technological level of warfare than has been the custom among most Western historians. H. G. Wells' simple but compelling description of the Mongols in his _Outline of History_ is worth re-reading in this connection.

[7] Petis de la Croix, _The History of Genghizcan the Great, First Emperor of the Antient Moguls and Tartars_ ..., London, 1722, p. 154.

[8] Benedict Figken, _Historia Fanaticorum_, Danzig, 1664.

[9] Philip Davidson's _Propaganda and the American Revolution_, Chapel Hill, 1941, is a careful scholarly study of this period. Comparable studies have not yet been written concerning other American wars. Military and civilian historians have a fascinating piece of research awaiting them in the material concerning Confederate and Federal psychological warfare. Each participant in the Civil War was vulnerable to the propaganda of the other. Subversive and clandestine pro-Confederate propaganda in the North is outlined in George Fort Milton's engrossing _Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column_, New York and Washington, D. C., 1942, but no comparable study covering all forms of propaganda on either side is yet available.

[10] Various new editions of Paine's chief works are available in popular and inexpensive form. They are worth study as good propaganda.

[11] In his _The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen_, Baltimore, 1937, page 17 and following, this author attempted to present some of the relationships of ideology to other methods of social control and, in connection with that enterprise, was furnished by the philosopher, A.O. Lovejoy, with a definition of "ideology" more systematic and more elaborate than the one used here.

[12] For example, in the 1920's the Soviet press expressed resentment and amusement over a ruse adopted by the British during the course of operations along the Northwest Frontier. Plane-mounted loudspeakers had told the tribesmen, in Pushtu, that God was mad at them for having broken the pledged peace, with the result that they scattered and gave up. This maneuver exasperated the Russians, who themselves were making equally sweeping propaganda inroads on the other side of the Pamirs. The Russians were attacking religion, and having heavy going; it struck them as improper warfare to make use of local superstition.

[13] _Webster's New International Dictionary_, Second Edition, Springfield, 1944.

[14] The late Huey Long is reported to have created a new word in the language of rustic Louisiana, the word "damlyingnewspapers." By instilling in his followers contempt for the "capitalist" press, he got them to the point where they _disbelieved_ anything which they saw in print, and _believed_ everything which "Ol' Huey, the Kingfish" himself told them. This operation was technically competent, since one of the most effective means of putting propaganda across is to draw alarmed attention to unfriendly propaganda and then just "happening to mention" the "truth" (that is, the promoted side). Long attributed to the newspapers a large number of lies which they did not print, along with the "lies" (which were in historical fact true) that they _did_ actually print. Since most of his followers either boycotted the press or read it in a hostile frame of mind, they never found out whether the newspapers said what Huey said they said, or not. You can try this out on your neighbors or friends by making up some idiotic "quotation" (such as, "The Jewish _Vorwaerts_ says that pickled onions are a cause of immorality" or "_Le Temps_ of Paris says that Alaska is preparing to secede") and the listener will be so busy scoffing at _what_ the paper allegedly said that he will take no time to find out whether the paper _did_ say it or not. Such attributions occur in everyday life; the smart propagandist attributes plenty of rich, ripe, silly quotations to his opponent. How many people actually _know_ what the Communists have said on any given topic? Or bother to check on the actual claims of the Zionist organization? Or the statements of the Arabs in Palestine?

[15] The literature in this field is carefully described in two volumes by a three-man team consisting of Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey and Bruce Lannes Smith, the first being _Propaganda and Promotional Activities, An Annotated Bibliography_, Minneapolis, 1935, and the sequel being _Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion, A Comprehensive Reference Guide_, Princeton, 1946. The booklists provide material in plenty for any academic-minded inquirer. The essays in the two volumes are well worth reading, although the authors have undergone the professorial delight of inventing a private language of their own. Parts of the latter book, especially, read like proceedings out of an unfamiliar lodge meeting; but there is sound sense and acute observation behind the vocabulary. It must, however, be parenthetically noted that during World War II the key propaganda jobs were held by a radio commentator, a dramatist, a newspaperman, a New York banker, and an absolutely astonishing number of men from commercial radio--along, of course, with a sprinkling of Army and Navy officers in Washington, and a heavy majority of non-specialist officers in the field. The propaganda experts were not, in most instances, called in to do the actual chore of propaganda. Among the exceptions were Leonard W. Doob, author of _Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique_, New York, 1935, who served in the War Department's Psychological Warfare Branch and in the Washington propaganda center at OWI; C. A. H. Thomson, who served as a propaganda staff officer both in Washington and overseas after being a collaborator with the Lasswell group; and Drs. Edwin Guthrie and A. L. Edwards, whose chapter "Psychological Warfare" in [E. G. Boring, editor] _Psychology for the Fighting Man_, Washington, 1943, pp. 430-447, is a lucid epitome of the topic.

[16] This means that if you want to get baptised, you've got to get _all_ the way under the water or it doesn't count.

[17] See Doob's book, mentioned above, especially pages 71 through 89 and 413 through 417.

[18] See the bibliographies by Harold Lasswell and others, mentioned above, for a wealth of literature giving more technical and scientific breakdowns than this. The formula STASM represents what was actually used in preparation of up-to-the-minute propaganda spot analysis for the War Department General Staff by Propaganda Branch during World War II. Some further aspects of this formula are presented in my article, "Stasm: Psychological Warfare and Literary Criticism" in _The South Atlantic Quarterly_, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 1947, pp. 344-348.

[19] See Harold Lasswell's _Propaganda Technique in the World War_, New York, reissue 1938, Chapter II, "Propaganda Organization," for a description of the attempts to coordinate policy and propaganda in World War I.

[20] Chicago, 1946. The discussion of what censorship authorities regarded as propaganda material possessing value for the enemy, of the wartime OC-OWI relationship, and of censorship of short-wave broadcasts are of particular interest to the student of psychological warfare.

[21] In a somewhat different context, it is interesting to note that Chinese Protestant churches, made up of Chinese church members, like to hire ministers who mouth their Chinese with a strong American accent. The American missionaries established the American accent as part of the liturgical paraphernalia of Protestantism, and the Chinese preachers trained under them accepted the American mispronouncing of Chinese as a part of the religion. It is odd to see a church full of Chinese using absolutely unbelievable tones while singing hymns or making appropriate individual responses. At that, they are no funnier than the Chinese Buddhists, who memorize long Indian sutras without understanding a single syllable.

[22] On World War I, see Harold Lasswell's _Propaganda Technique in the World War_, previously cited; George Creel's _How We Advertised America_, New York and London, 1920, the very title of which is an indication of its chief shortcoming; Lt. Col. W. Nicolai, _Nachrichtendienst, Presse und Volksstimmung im Weltkrieg_, Berlin, 1920, by the German general staff officer chiefly responsible for staff work on propaganda and public opinion, a very thoughtful though prejudiced book; Heber Blankenhorn's enjoyable little classic, _Adventures in Propaganda_, Boston, 1919 (Blankenhorn was the only American officer to see field service in propaganda in both wars, as a Captain in I and a Lieutenant Colonel in II); and George G. Bruntz' scholarly monograph _Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire_ in 1918, Stanford, 1938. Readers desiring further references should consult the bibliographies by Lasswell, Casey and Smith, cited above.

[23] Colonel Nicolai, book cited in footnote 1. pages 160-161.

[24] For a pro-Hitler view of the world, see Wyndham Lewis' _Hitler_, London, 1931, if a copy is to be found. The author would probably prefer for the book to disappear. It is an eloquent, very pro-Nazi book, putting the Hitlerite terminology into the English language and--what is more important--infusing into the clumsy German pattern of thinking-and-feeling a lightness of touch which makes Naziism more palatable. The book converted no one in its time, and is not apt to do harm at this late date; but it will make the English-reading reader understand some of the novelty, the revolutionary freshness, the bold unorthodoxy which made millions of people turn to Hitlerism as an escape from the humdrum heartbreak of Weimar Germany. Much of the book is devoted to the problem of power--street-fighting, mass demonstrations, slogans, symbolisms--which so fascinated the Nazis.

[25] See Carl J. Friedrich, _The New Belief in the Common Man_, Brattleboro (Vermont), 1945, chapter III, "Independence of Thought and Propaganda," pp. 81-120, for a cogent discussion of this mentality. The present author, in _Government in Republican China_, New York, 1938, pp. 18-23, describes in epitome the method whereby the ancient Confucian leadership of China, while propaganda-conscious, used ideology as an economical, stable method of control and avoided its maleficent features. In one of the few poorly argued passages of a great work, Arnold J. Toynbee overlooks this peculiar characteristic of Confucianism and merely equates the Confucian dogma with those of other "universal churches" (_A Study of History_, London, 1939, vol. V, especially pages 654-5).

[26] People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., _Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotzkyite Centre ..., Verbatim Report_, Moscow, 1937, page 111. These trials were themselves propaganda; in this particular instance, propaganda of a rather poor order, since they failed to convince the foreign public and presumably persuaded only those portions of the Russian public who were so gullible that they needed no further persuading. For a brilliant illumination of them in terms of a readable novel, see Arthur Koestler, _Darkness at Noon_, New York, 1941; the same author also has a book of essays on the totalitarian mentality under the rather fancy title, _The Yogi and the Commissar_, New York, 1945. On the same subject, see Louis Fischer's _Men and Politics_, New York, 1942.

[27] This document establishing the COI, along with the other major documents pertaining to American psychological warfare, may be found in J. P. Warburg's book cited above, _Unwritten Treaty_.

[28] In the course of a routine day of work on overseas propaganda in 1942, the author, who was then in SSG of MIS, found it necessary to get in touch with Military Intelligence proper, Naval Intelligence, the State Department, the office of the Assistant to the President, the Office of Facts and Figures, the British Political Warfare group (which was vainly seeking its American opposite number), the Office of Civilian Defense, the Research and Analysis Branch of the office of the Coordinator of Information, the office of the Librarian of Congress, the Foreign Information Service, and the Department of Agriculture. Each of these either operated propaganda, or had policy or intelligence contributions to make. The Board of Economic Warfare naturally came into the field too. This was during a period of German and Japanese victories, so that even if propaganda had been coordinated, it probably would not have been much more effective than it was. From what could be figured out later, no real harm was done at this time. Nor was much achieved.

[29] The bibliographies are cited above, on page 38. The journal comes out, as its title indicates, four times a year; it is published by the School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. Every major library has it. The review section provides a good survey of new writing in the field. Journals such as _The American Political Science Review_, _The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_, _The Infantry Journal_, and _The American Historical Review_ often have significant articles or book reviews in this field. _International Affairs_ (Royal Institute for International Affairs, London) has excellent reviews of books arranged by geographic subheads. Opinion and propaganda topics are usually lumped together in academic studies; material on the one is apt to lead to the other.

[30] San Tzu Ching, translated and annotated by Herbert A. Giles, Shanghai, 1910, pages 2 and 3. The translation quoted is not by Giles.

[31] On the transmitting side, nothing could be more ruinous than mere translation, the more literal the worse, of a single basic broadcast for all audiences irrespective of language or culture. For the text of war communiqués or of official documents, this is permissible, but for news or feature broadcasts, few things could be worse. It is not possible to translate subtle psychological appeals embedded in news or commentary; such materials by their nature must follow forms acceptable to the audience, building up confidence with familiar allusions and creating a sense of "we-ness" between the actual announcer and his listeners. Equivalents can be worked out. The same basic policies can be transposed. The same source of news and intelligence can be exploited. But the actual program cannot be translated verbatim from one language to another; it must be transposed not only from one language but from one culture to another.

[32] Free advertisement.

[33] Bad news about his side is not necessarily the only kind of bad news for the enemy to know. Gloomy news about our side can harm the enemy listener if his government is running a propaganda campaign to raise production, promote thrift, etc., by claiming things are worse on _their_ side. In such a case, good news about us would be good for him. News must be fitted to the propaganda plan and to the propaganda situation.

[34] Walter Lippmann's book, _Public Opinion_, was first published in New York in 1922 but it is still clean-cut as a basic statement of the problems of public opinion. The author's own life as a commentator is remarkable in fulfilling the mission which he implicitly set himself when writing about public opinion: the job of lifting issues into emotional and psychological contexts in which the resulting judgment will be based on socially sound factors.

[35] The American newspapers between 1942 and 1945 carried intermittent accounts of these personal and political problems, frequently in the columns of commentators rather than in the regular news sections. (The book by Warburg is of course _Unwritten Treaty_, mentioned above.)

[36] For popular histories of the OSS, see _Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and American Espionage_ by Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden (New York, 1946) or Corey Ford and Alastair MacBain, _Cloak and Dagger_ (New York 1946). An exciting thriller novel by Darwin Teilhet gives an oblique and guarded description of black propaganda and clandestine polling: _The Fear Makers_ (New York, 1945); Teilhet was himself in OSS. For an interesting description of OSS field operations, see Nicol Smith's _Into Siam_ (New York, 1946). OSS was picturesque from the very start, and it is likely that other participants in OSS work will from time to time bring out books on their adventures.

[37] Bureau of the Budget, _United states Government Manual, 1946, First Edition_, Washington, 1946, says of the Military Intelligence Division, "It has charge of propaganda and psychological warfare" (page 198). The fiat may be a little more precise than circumstances warrant, but it at least shows where, for the record, psychological warfare belonged.

[38] See Charles E. Merriam's study, _Political Power_, Chicago, 1933, and his later works for suggestive approaches to the political setting of propaganda problems. He developed the terms miranda and credenda for modern political science usage.

[39] While this statement is plainly a matter of individual opinion, the author considers that his own experience supports his opinion in this instance. He wrote plans on almost every operating level in the governmental and military hierarchy during World War II, all the way from drafting plans for the Joint (American) and Combined (British-American) Chiefs of Staff down to helping field agents in the China Theater work out practical little propaganda plans for their own missions, or planning the writing, use, and classification of leaflets one by one, in collaboration with OWI operators. He found planning to be fascinating at the top, and worthwhile at the bottom of the pyramid, but he found no significant correlation between the top and the bottom, save in the sense which he makes plain.

[40] In the pseudo-technical propaganda slang of the OWI people, this was called "spelling out." The same people "stockpiled" "campaigns" to "needle" the enemy.

[41] So far as he knows, the author was the first--about May of 1942--to urge that a surrender pass be made to look like an official document, with banknote-type engraving and with formal style. Unfortunately, it was printed in green, instead of the old-fashioned orange-gold of the U.S. Treasury yellowbacks, and was sent to the jungle areas of the South and Southwest Pacific, where everything was green to start with.

[42] These suggestions are based on the comment of Major Martin Herz, who prepared the leaflets at Anzio beachhead and subsequently was leaflet expert at SHAEF.

[43] No author, publisher, place or date. Issued by the unit. The reference is to page 55.

[44] The Department of the Army is understood to be preparing a Field Manual and Technical Manual for Psychological Warfare which will describe the doctrines and the equipment, respectively, to be used in combat propaganda situations.

[45] In the postwar period a great many reflective publications began to appraise what had happened in the PsyWar field. One of the best of these is Daniel Lerner's _Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day_ (New York, 1949), which covers the European operation in detail. This was followed by _Propaganda in War and Crisis_, edited by Daniel Lerner (New York, 1951). A heavier work, covering many of the same problems is _The Language of Politics_, by Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites and associates (New York, 1949). Leonard Doob's work on propaganda, long the leading American text in the field, was issued in a revised, postwar edition (New York, 1948); the postwar book does much to put "psychological warfare" in perspective. A simpler text than Doob's, useful for less advanced students, is Frederick C. Irion's _Public Opinion and Propaganda_ (New York, 1950). A manual directly pertaining to psychological warfare is _America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare_ edited by Robert E. Summers (New York, 1951); this also contains a bibliography which is helpful to the layman. Three outstanding works summarize the postwar propaganda position of the U.S. Government: Charles A. H. Thomson's _Overseas Information Service of the United States Government_ (Washington, 1950) shows the continuity of the problem from war to peace; Wallace Carroll's _Persuade or Perish_ (Boston, 1948) argues the necessity of maintaining an opinion offensive; and Edward Barrett's illuminating discussion, _Truth is Our Weapon_ (New York, 1953), brings the story down to the Eisenhower Administration.

[46] New insights into the nature of the Soviet antagonist were presented by three related monographs originally prepared inside RAND Corporation, the research facility which often works with the U.S. Air Force. Nathan Leites, _The Operational Code of the Politburo_ (New York, 1951), digests Soviet fundamentals of international behavior. Margaret Mead's _Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority_ (New York, 1951) applies anthropological and psychiatric methods of analysis; this book, to the military or general reader, should be prefaced by reading her distinguished work, _Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies_, which is now available in an inexpensive, paper-bound reprint (Mentor Books, New York, 1952). Philip Selznick makes the point that organization is itself a Communist power-achieving instrument in his _The Organizational Weapon_ (New York, 1952), the third of the RAND group. Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, a Regular Army officer, prepared the challenging study of the specific military content of Communist thinking in _The Front is Everywhere_ (Norman, Oklahoma, 1950). Among the many good recent books about the Communist challenge, R.N. Carew Hunt, _The Theory and Practice of Communism_ (New York, 1951), is outstanding for its dispassionateness while James Burnham's _The Coming Defeat of Communism_ (New York, 1951) is a ringing appeal to our side to meet the challenge. Stefan T. Possony, in _A Century of Conflict_ (Chicago, 1953), presents the most coldly damning and most far-ranging critique of Communist operations which this writer has seen. Willmoore Kendall rendered Americans a service with his careful translation, editing and introduction of A. Rossi, _A Communist Party in Action_ (New Haven, 1949), while Bob Darke, in a British counterpart, gives a less intellectual and much abbreviated description of the British Communist set-up and operations in _The Communist Technique in Britain_ (London, 1952). Communist revelations of "capitalist" conspiracies which tell more about the haunted, anxious, nasty minds of the Communists than about our own operations are, among others, L. Natarajan, _American Shadow Over India_ (Bombay, 1952), and Jean Cathala, _They are Betraying Peace_ (Moscow, 1951).

[47] Paul M. A. Linebarger, "Communism as a Competing Civilization in Southeast Asia," a contribution to _Southeast Asia in the Coming World_, Philip W. Thayer, editor (Baltimore, 1952).

[48] For a contrary point of view, see the works by Harry Stack Sullivan, Brock Chisholm, and others.

[49] Problematical in all such attempts of working officers to define "victory" is the serious intellectual issue of avoiding means which by themselves defeat the ends which are sought. If the means are "dangerous" or "immoral" by the standards of the society which applies them, their value becomes low indeed. For the covert side of U.S. operations, see the breezy and popular volumes on OSS: Lt. Col. Corey Ford and Major Alastair MacBain, _Cloak and Dagger: The Secret Story of OSS_ (New York, 1946); Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, _Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage_ (New York, 1946); and the most vividly concrete narration of the group, Elizabeth P. MacDonald, _Undercover Girl_ (New York, 1947). For an astonishing work which seems to violate security on every page, see Commander Roy Olin Stratton, _SACO--The Rice Paddy Navy_ (Pleasantville, N. Y., 1950); this is the description of a Navy group in China which the author shows to be more covert than OSS itself. A dry, German view of Anglo-American espionage in Holland is given in that superb, true-life adventure story, H. J. Giskes, _London Calling North Pole_ (London and New York, 1953).

[50] See the works of Freda Utley, Herbert Feis, the Linebarger-Djang-Burks political science text (New York, 1954), and others, not to mention the contributions by Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, and other Communist leaders.

[51] The author himself pleads guilty to having criticized the French unduly without accepting a reasonable share of U.S. responsibility for the situation in Indochina (Paul M. A. Linebarger, "Indochina: The Bleeding War," _Combat Forces Journal_, March 1951), and was deservedly rebuked from some French readers for his denigration of French imperialism. The author cannot endorse as wise, shrewd, or kind the French political decisions in Indochina, hut he can say that the Americans who made (or failed to make) basic policy concerning that area have been as irresponsible and foolish as the French. He trusts that, by the time this note reaches print, a more effectual Franco-American understanding will have replaced the previous difficulties.

[52] Psychological warfare is, of course, neither very psychological nor is it necessarily warfare. Indeed, within the context of a rigidly purist and scholastic definition, psychological warfare is not psychological, in that most of its operations are very definitely _not_ a part of present-day scientific psychology. Neither is it _warfare_ because it can be operated before war, during war, after war, or contemporaneously with and apart from war. As pointed out above, war involves the inescapable content of public lawful _violence_. It is hard to ascribe violence to a short-wave broadcast or to a leaflet. In Korea in 1951 the author heard that a Chinese soldier was found dead--mashed by a leaflet bomb which had failed to explode at the proper altitude. If this story is true, that particular soldier was one of the few genuine _war_ victims of military or strategic propaganda both so pretentiously called "psychological warfare" by Americans of the mid-twentieth century.

Anthony Leviero, who summarized American PsyWar in _The New York Times_ in a series of articles between 9 December and 14 December 1951, is both an experienced general staff officer and a first-class newspaper man. His comment in 1953 on the new Operations Coordinating Board was encouraging or ominous. He stated in his _Times_ dispatch of 4 September 1953 that the William Jackson committee had found that "psychological warfare did not exist as such." If this meant that the new OCB was to sweep aside the limitations of top-secret pedantic definitions and move toward a refreshingly concrete manipulation of the world scene, the news was encouraging indeed. If the new Board was, however, to be dedicated to the manufacture of new, complicated and secret definitions of its own, the news was bad. Given the time-lag on the declassification of Government materials, it may be twenty-five years, or 1978, before the precise definitions of 1953 are available to the public. The tendency of the Board to succeed or to fail will be evident by the time this material is in print; given the personalities involved, the prognosis appeared optimistic.

[53] This kind of issue has not been neglected in our public discussions or our schools. Two sides of one famous case are given in Owen Lattimore, _Ordeal by Slander_ (New York, 1951) and the bitterly anti-Lattimore book by John T. Flynn, _The Lattimore Story_ (New York, 1953). A serious intelligent attempt to answer some of the problems posed by PsyWar and the resulting loyalty issues within a democracy are the works of Nathaniel Weyl, _Treason: The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal in American History_ (Washington, 1950), and _The Battle Against Disloyalty_ (New York, 1951). A formidable presentation of what the Communists are doing is offered in Ralph de Toledano, _Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats_ (New York and Boston, 1952) and in Major General Charles A. Willoughby, _Shanghai Conspiracy_ (New York, 1952). The kind of round-table often intellectually conceived and executed within American schools is well portrayed in the special issue of _Columbia Journal of International Affairs_ (New York, spring, 1951), in which the entire issue is given to a synthesis of international problems in the propaganda field under the heading "Propaganda and World Politics." Stefan Possony's magistral _A Century of Conflict_ (Chicago, 1953) provides an excellent general framework.

[54] Nothing in previous U.S. experience prepared Americans for the invasion of the individual personality which has long been accomplished by the Communists but which was first publicized in adequate fashion after the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. The pioneer book in this field, and still the best, is Edward Hunter's _Brain-Washing in Red China_ (New York, 1951). This author has known Mr. Hunter for twenty-odd years and can vouch for him as a man with a sober respect for fact, though he does have a vivid taste in adjectives; he has seen not only Mr. Hunter but has gone over some of the raw material which Hunter used and can testify to the reality and sympathy with which Hunter portrays this rather gruesome process. On a different scale, Wilbur Schramm has given a description of what happens when _The Reds Take a City_ (New Brunswick, 1951), in a book of that name written jointly with John W. Riley.

[55] A sharp contrast between the old politics and the new is shown by the unfortunate book prepared in the Department of State and now hastily, even guiltily, allowed to go out of print by the United States Government Printing Office because it showed that some Americans were guilty or naïve enough to try to love and trust the Soviet state within the same system as our own. One does not know whether to laugh or to weep at the spectacle of men lamenting the fact that they were once innocent and hopeful. The book, prepared by the late Harley Notter and others, is Department of State Publication 3580, General Policy Series 15, _Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation_ (Washington, 1949). That not all was innocence, even when things so seemed, is amply attested by Freda Utley's controversial but brilliant summary, _The China Story_ (Chicago, 1951).

[56] The function of decision-making has been brilliantly though solemnly explored in Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, _Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics_ (Princeton, N.J., 1954.)

[57] For a contrary point of view, see _Tensions That Lead to War_, edited by Hadley Cantril (Princeton, 1950).

[58] The author had the opportunity of observing opsearch in the Korean war on three different occasions: September 1950, March 1951, and November and December 1952 and early January 1953. He visited Korea itself twice and also spent a great deal of time, part of it in a public capacity and part of it as a free-lance author, in the periphery of that war--areas such as Hong Kong, Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and India.

[59] Several novels have touched on PsyWar problems. The most hard-hitting of the lot is Jerome Weidman, _Too Early to Tell_ (New York, 1946). Covert PsyWar whispering techniques are thinly disguised and much improved, technically, in Darwin Teilhet, _The Fear Makers_ (New York, various dates). The covert side of some of these adventures is portrayed, among others, by W. Stanley Moss, _A War of Shadows_ (New York, 1952); Ray Franklin Kauffman, _The Coconut Wireless_ (New York, 1948); and Chin Kee Onn, _Silent Army_ (New York, 1953). As exciting as fiction are Mark Gayn and John Caldwell, _American Agent_ (New York, 1947), describing the work of an enthusiastic amateur, and L. C. Moyzisch, _Operation Cicero_ (New York reprint, 1952), portraying a first-class professional. Alexander Foote, _Handbook for Spies_ (London, 1949), and J. V. Davidson-Houston, _Armed Pilgrimage_ (London 1949), are interesting distillations of personal experience which touch on espionage and PsyWar.

[60] The author professes he would like to write a preliminary work on this subject himself some day, if no one else essays the task first.

[61] V = Victory day.

[62] Edward Hunter, _Brain-Washing in Red China_ (New York, 1951).

[63] If one good book can be mentioned without prejudice to the many other good books in the same field, attention can be drawn to the excellent undergraduate text which explores the present U.S. position on the press, George I. Bird and Frederic E. Merwin, _The Press and Society_ (New York, 1951). At the opposite end of the spectrum, see Oleg Anesimov, _The Ultimate Weapon_ (New York, 1953). The first book takes the U.S. as it is and does not envisage profound responses coming as the inevitable accompaniment of frightful change; the second book states the outside problem in shocking terms, but asks of Americans things which neither they nor their press are ever apt to approve.

[64] The development of this activity was handed to the Chief of Army Field Forces, in whose G2 section Colonel Donald Hall was the PsyWar officer. The first of these courses with its supporting textbook was not ready for release by the Army General School until 1949, just one year before the Korean conflict began. In 1949 likewise appeared the first officially approved Army field manual on the subject of psychological warfare support of military operations.

[65] Teams from this detachment, armed with leaflets and loudspeakers, were sent to and participated in major maneuvers in continental United States, in the Caribbean area, and in Hawaii. These teams were attached to the "enemy" forces, and exposed the maneuver troops to military propaganda in action. The Tactical Information Detachment suddenly suspended its planning of simulated propaganda operations for Exercise Pluto in 1950. As the only PsyWar operational unit in the Army, the Detachment was hustled off to Korea.

Index

Abbeville, 164

Adams, Samuel, 23

Adipadi, 185

Aggression, timing, 43

Aims, long-range, 126

Air dropping, 229

Air rescue, 142, 231

Air support, 228

Aircraft, World War I, 69

Allen, George, 271

Alsop, Joseph, 273

Alsop, Stewart, 182

American Association of Public Opinion Research, 290

American Broadcasting Station in Europe, 270, 288

American Expeditionary Forces, 67. _See also_ Pershing's headquarters

American operations, effects, 103

American policy in Indochina, 260-262

American Revolution, 21
black leaflet, 20

American-Russian meeting, 202

Andersen, Hans Christian, 156

Anger motif, 233

Annamites, 263

Announcers, radio, 58

Anti-Communist appeals, 246

Anti-Semitic propaganda, 138

Anzio, 82, 212, 239

Appeals, black action, 237

Armed Forces Radio Service, 272

Armed Forces Radio Stations, 34

Army Air Forces, 183

Army Forces, Far East, 305

Army General School, 304

Aryan myth, 78

Aryan racialism, 25

Asia, Communism in, 251

Athenians, 7

Atrocities, 46, 79

Attu, 214

Audience, 123

Austria, 184

_Azad Hind_, 185

_Azad Hind Fauj_, 8

Aztecs, 17

Bakunin, Mikhail, 297

Balkan states, 163

Balloons, 21, 69

Barrett, Edward W., 271

Bataan, 223

Beaverbrook, Lord, 64

Belgium, 13

Belly tank, 170

Benedict, Ruth, 3

Bengal, 8

Benton, William, 184, 271

Black counterpropaganda, 148

Black, Lt. Col. Percy, 91

Black propaganda, 44, 88

Blaine, James G., 49

Blankenhorn, Heber, 64, 67

Boers, 24

_Bolshevik_, 71

Bombs
leaflet bombs, 172, 192
V-l, 130, 237
V-2, 237

Bonus troubles, 214

"Book that won the war," 23

Bose, Subhas Chandra, 8

Boxes, packing, 171

Braden, Thomas, 182

Brain-washing, 295_ff_

Breakdown of propaganda items, 122

Brest-Litovsk, 71

Brewitt-Taylor, C. H., 8

Britain in 1940, 163

British, 81

British Admiralty, 87

British Broadcasting Company, 45, 82, 87

British Foreign Office, 64, 87

British in Indochina, 260

British psychological warfare, 263-264

British War Office, 87

Brogan, Denis W., 277

Brown, Don, 208

Broz-Tito, Josip, 87, 89

Bruntz, George G., 64

Buchan, John, 64

Bulgaria, 132

Bullock, Gen. William, 266

Burden, Capt. J. A., 37

Burma, 23, 24, 168, 185, 209, 224. _See also_ North Burma

Buttles, Lt. Col. Bruce, 97

Byelorussia, 13

Cambodia, 186, 262

Canton, 96

Cantril, Hadley, 290

Capabilities, psychological, 158

Capacity, own, 164

Caribbean pirates, 17

Casablanca, 47

Casey, Ralph D., 38

Catholicism, 260

Catlin, G. E. C., 3

Censorship, Russian, 105

Central Intelligence Agency, 274, 276

Central Intelligence Group, 115, 184

Central Pacific, 187

Chandler, Douglas, 83

Changes of nations in wartime, 292-293

Cheka, 225

Chiang Kai-shek, 52, 75, 223

China, 5, 15, 185, 227, 255-257
Central China, 1944, 163
Communist China, 47, 52, 106, 204
Japanese garrisons in, 58
organization, 170
reorganized National Government, 185
OWI in, 57
Protestant churches in, 59
revolution of 1927, 75
Chungking Government, 106

China-Burma-India Theater, 10, 98
Forward Echelon headquarters, 57

China Theater, 187, 213

Chinese Communists, 262-263, 265, 289, 294

"Chinese Federal Reserve Bank," 141

Chinese prisoners, 288

Chinese railway campaigns, 209

Christmas cards, 213

Churchill, Winston, 24, 87, 157

Cinema, 210

Civil defense, 251

Civil Information and Education Section, 189

Civilians, friendly, 209

Clandestine stations, 45

Classification, 54

Clausewitz, Carl von, 28, 30

Clay, Gen. Lucius D., 189

Cleavage, 143

Cleveland, Grover, 49

Cold War, 244, 286, 298
description, 247
in Asia, 264
nature, 248
origins, 248-249
outcome, 254
termination, 253
warfare within, 249

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 174, 194

Command function, 98

Commanders, American theaters, 168

_Commando_, 24

Commands, contingency, 234

Commands, to enemy forces, 233

Commissioner General for South-East Asia, 264

Committee for a Free Asia, 273_ff_

Committee for a Free Europe, 273_ff_

Common causes, 282

Communist appeals, 246

Communist goal, 262-263

Communist-dominated governments, 294

Communist Manifesto, 74

Communism, 71, 78

Communist Party, 126

Communists, 155, 186

Confederate States, 24, 29

Confucianism, 78

"Conquest of probability," 251, 253

Consolidation company, 302

Consolidation plans, 201

Consolidation propaganda, 46

Continental Congress, 158

Contingency plans, 202

Conversion, process of, 13

Conversionary propaganda, 46

Coordination, 201

Coordination of U.S. facilities, 272

Coordinator of Information, 90

Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 182

Cortéz, Hernán, 17, 252

Counterespionage, 85, 225

Counterfeiting, 209

Countermeasures to black, 60

Counterpropaganda, 46
defensive, 146
instructions, 144
initiative, 60

Countersubversion, 225

Covert operations, 255
in peacetime, 297

Covert propaganda, 44

_Credenda_, 186

Creel Committee, 67

Creel, George, 64

Crisol, José, 259

Cromwell, Oliver, 16

Crow, Carl, 103

Czechoslovakia, 41, 64, 81

Dalai Lama, 168

Davidson, Philip, 21

Davis, Elmer, 93, 178

Davis, Jefferson, 30

D-day, 202

Decision-making, factors of, 284

Defeat, psychological, 194

"Democratic," 74

Desertion, 211, 237

Developmental research, 287_ff_
in PsyWar, 288

Dien Bien Phu, 261

Diplomacy, 36
dramatic intimidation, 41

Directives, 97

Distribution, artillery, 192

District Information Services Control Commands, 202

Doenitz, Adm. Karl, 30, 88

Doihara, Gen. Kenji, 187

Domei Agency, 105

Domestic Operations Branch, 179

Donovan, Gen. William J., 90

Doob, Leonard W., 38, 39, 97

Doolittle flyers, 99

Door gods, 188

Doriot, Jacques, 157

Dunkirk, 164

Dutch in Indonesia, 257-259

East India Company, 17

Economic Cooperation Administration, 273

Ed and Joe, 205

Education, 32

Edwards, A. L., 39

_Ei Sörrender_, 235

Eighth Army in Korea, 266-267, 303, 305

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 168, 189

Ellis, Havelock, 291

Enemy
definition, 50
lifeline, 215
propaganda situation, 127

England, 68

Environmental stimuli, 110

Espionage, 15

Estimate of the situation, 150

Estimates, written, 161

European Defense Community, 253

European Theater, 191

Ezekiel, Mordecai, 139

Fact, slanting, 117

Falsification, radio, 84

Farago, Ladislas, 41

_Fascismo_, 32

Fascist Italian Social Republic, 163

Fascists, 78

Federal Communications Commission, 115

Feis, Herbert, 257

_Feldpostkarte_, 70

Field maneuvers using PsyWar, 301

Field Manual, 241

Field operations, 151

Fifth Army, 228

Files, propaganda, 115

Films, 210

First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, 303, 305-306

First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group
assisting stations, 306
work in Far East Command, 304

Fischer, Louis, 79

Fisher, F. M., 182, 189

Flensburg, 88

Flexibility in PsyWar, 285-286

Food appeals, 232

Food propaganda, 152

Force short of war, 1

Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, 115

Foreign Information Service, 91

Foreign Operations Administration, 273, 276

"Four-Minute Men," 68

Fourteen Points, 62

Fourteenth Air Force, 168, 186, 231

Fox, Ralph, 15

France, 68
as a future ally, 282

Frederick the Great, 28

Free India, 185

Free India Army, 8, 212

French Foreign Office, 297

French in Indochina, 260-262

French Revolution, 23

French revolutionaries, 20

Freud, Sigmund, 26

Friedrich, Carl J., 78

Friendship in PsyWar, 281_ff_

Fromm, Erich, 290

_Führer_, 78

Future of PsyWar, 298_ff_

Fuzes, 170

_Gaimusho_, 204

Galahad Operation, 226

Gallup, Dr. George, 290

Gallup poll, 141

General Staff, 183

Geneva, 261

Geneva Convention, 203

Genghis Khan, 14

George III, 158

German failure in Ukraine, 293-294

_German Psychological Warfare_, 41

Germany, 184
black operations, 212
Imperial Government, 67
naval radio, 88
pastoralization of, 103
U.S. zone, 202
World War II accomplishments, 81

Gideon, 3

Gifts, 207

Giles, Herbert A., 110

Goals of PsyWar, 299
definition, 151
enemy goals, 127
specific propaganda goals, 151

Göbbels, Paul Josef, 90

Gorer, Geoffrey, 3, 154

Gray, Gordon, 274

Great Patriotic War, 104

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 186

Greene, Carleton, 264

Greene, Col. J. Woodall, 266, 301

Grenades, rifle, 228

Grew, Joseph C., 42

Guam, 187

Guerrilla warfare, 262

Guidance, 194
examples, 196

Gurney, Sir Henry, 264

_Gustav Siegfried Eins_, 205

Guthrie, Edwin, 39, 91

Hague Convention, 203

Hall, Col. Donald, 267

Han, 7

Han Military Emperor, 5

Han River, 265

Harvard College, 297

Haushofer, Gen. Karl, 31

Haw Haw, Lord, 59, 83

Hawaii, 203

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 302

Hegelian philosophy, 25

Henry, George W., 27

Herodotus, 7

Herz, Major Martin, 212

Hindustani, 11

Hiroshima, 202

Historical materialism, 32

Hitler, Adolf, 77, 202, 225

_Hitlerjugend_, 57

_Hitlermädel_, 57

Ho Chi-minh, 263

Holland, 13, 52, 68

Holy Roman Empire, 15

Homeland facilities, 204

Honesty as basis of U.S. policy, 282

Howitzers, 228

Huks (Hukbong Mapagpalaya Bayan), 259-260

Huns, 63

Hunter, Edward, 295

Hymn of Hate, 63

Identification of propaganda, 116

Identity cards, 209

Ideology, 8, 31, 79
and plans, 201

India, 264

Indian-Pakistani fighting, 255

Indochina, 185, 245

Indochinese war, 255

Indonesia, 47, 52, 185

Indonesia, fighting in, 255, 257-259

Indonesia, Republic of, 185

Information activities of State Department, 269

Information agencies, chart, 95

Information Control Commands, 270

Information Control Service, 189

Information, Department of, 64

Information and Education Section, 270

Inner Mongolia, 168, 185

Inquisition, 20

Insanity as a Communist technique, 295-296

Intelligence
Director of, 64
propanal in, 129
propaganda intelligence, 132, 197

Inter-Allied cooperation, 163

Interest, enemy, 48

Interim Intelligence Information Service, 184

International Information Service, 269

International propaganda, 46

International "realities," 245

_Internationale_, 104

Interpretation vs. truth, 117

Interrogation, 145
of prisoners, 147

Iron Curtain, 244

Irregular warfare, 287

Islam, 10

Isolationism, 140

Israel, 255

Italy, 68, 214
landings in, 239
surrender, 202

Jackson, C. D., 276

Jackson Report, 268, 275, 289

Jackson, William, 275

Jacobite broadcast, 18

Japan, 184
Board of Information, 184-185
black book, 208
black propaganda, 105
cultural propaganda, 206
Emperor, 49, 214
Foreign Office, 204
nostalgic white, 135
peso note, 23
PsyWar in World War II, 105
Sad Sack, 213, 216
surrender, 104

Japan's East Asia, 255

Jenks, Edward, 3

_Jisei_, 168

Johnson, Louis, 269

Johnston, Col. Dana W., 97

_Joho Kyoku_, 34, 184, 204

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 93, 194, 277

Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, 93

Josey, Alex, 264

Joyce, James, 119

Joyce, William. _See_ Haw Haw, Lord

Kachins, 224

Kafka, Franz, 119

Kaiserist propaganda, 66

Kaltenbach, Fred, 83

_Kempeitai_, 187

Kinsey reports, 291

Kiska, 214

Kjellen, Rudolf, 31

Koestler, Arthur, 79

Koop, Theodore, 53

Korea, 184

Korean conflict, 255, 263, 265-266, 269, 280, 286, 294, 301, 303
leaflet deliveries, 306-307
loudspeaker sections, 306
opsearch, 288
propaganda policies, 305
PsyWar in, 301
PsyWar officers, 305
radio operations, 306
radio propaganda, 289

Krum, 132

Kublai Khan, 14, 106

_Kultur_, 63

Kuomintang, 75, 186, 204

Kyes, Roger M., 276

Labor recruitment, 224

Lamb, Harold, 15

Laos, 262

Larson, Cedric, 103

Lasswell, Harold, 38, 97

Latin-America, 68

Lattimore, Owen, 15, 183

Laurel, José P., 157

Laval, Pierre, 157

Leadership, defamation of, 155

Leaflets
action leaflets, 231
anti-exhibit leaflet, 96
anti-radio leaflet, 86
artillery, delivery by, 307
B-29 raids, 168
on Berlin, 57
bombs, 307
bundles, 228
Bunker Hill leaflet, 21
civilian-action leaflets, 222
civilian-morale leaflet, 215
for civilians, 207
direct-reply leaflet, 120
dispensers, 265
distribution, 170, 171
dropping procedures, 192
field procedure, 228
French Communist leaflet, 121
ground-distributed leaflets, 86
informational leaflet, 142
loading, 172
map leaflets, 235
morale leaflets, 213
news leaflets, 216
packaged leaflets, 170
Philippine leaflet, 2
production, 190
radio-program leaflet, 82
rolling, 169
spot-news leaflets, 221
start-of-war leaflet, 198
surrender leaflets, 230, 236
surrender leaflet, AEF, 70
surrender leaflet, improved, 239
surrender form, radio, 83
surrender, tactical, leaflets, 235
troop-morale leaflet, 212
troop-morale leaflet, gray, 214
troop-morale leaflet, Nazi, 4
World War I leaflets, 68

Legion of St. George, 84

Leighton, Lt. Com. Alexander, 97

Leites, Nathan, 290

Lenin, Nikolai (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov), 71, 263

Lenin Old Guard, 205

Leninism, 71

Letters, prisoner, 232

Lewis, Wyndham, 77

Leyte campaign, 123, 169

Lhasa, 168

Liaison
field liaison, 226
mechanics of, 227

Liaison officers, PsyWar, 192, 226

Library of Congress, 137

Lienta University, 35

Limitations on American PsyWar, 278_ff_

Lippmann, Walter, 38, 103, 149

Listening, prevention of, 159

Literary personalities in propaganda, 290

Lo Kuan-chung, 8

"Localism," 295

Long, Huey, 38

Lorient, 227

Loudspeaker units, 237, 302-303

Loudspeakers
airborne, 307
emplacement, 307
vehicle-mounted, 239, 307

_Luftpost_, 220

Luxembourg, 168

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 157, 189, 257, 266, 301

MacDonald, Malcolm, 264

Mackall, Lt. Col. Samuel T., 7

MacLeish, Archibald, 279

Maginot Line, 213

Magsaysay, Ramón, 259

Mails, 206
civilian personal, 219

Malai, 185

Malaya, 185, 209, 262
Chinese in, 262_ff_
government of, 263
High Commissioner of, 264
war in, 255

Malayan Races Liberation Army, 262, 295

Malingerer's black, 125

Manchukuo, 185

Manchus in China, 20

Mannheim, Karl, 3

Mao Tse-tung, 252, 263

Marx, Karl, 263, 297

Marxism, 70-71

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 297

Materials, 194
basic materials, 195
enemy information materials, 122-123

McClure, Gen. Robert B., 266

McEvoy, Dennis, 208

Media, 56
limitations, 48, 55
prescription of, 27

Medical conditions, 36

Mediterranean Theater, 191

_Mein Kampf_, 65, 101

Merat, Edward K., 183

Merriam, Charles E., 186

Merrill's Marauders, 226

Mexican War, 23

Mexico, 68

Midianites, 3

Mikhailovich, Draja, 87, 89

Military goals, 199

Military Intelligence Division, 91

Military Intelligence Reserve, 301

Military Intelligence Service, 182

Military Propaganda School, 304

Military PsyWar since World War II, 299_ff_

Military Secretary, 189

Milton, George Fort, 21

Milton, John, 16

Ministry of Information, 64, 87

_Miranda_, 186

Mission, 125
sense of, 26

Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, 302

Mock, James R., 103

Mockery, 118

Money, 23, 209

Mongol secret weapons, 14

Monitor, submarine, 97

Monitoring, 111

Morale
analysis chart, 70
enemy situation, 127
general morale, 215
German morale, 220
index, 147
operations, 211
services, 34
wartime morale, 156

Morgan, Dr. George, 289

Mortars, 69, 228

Moscow, 71

Moscow-Peking Axis, 294

Moscow trials, 79

Motion pictures, 210
American, 90
propaganda movies, 68, 81

Motive, 155
attribution of, 155

Movie van, 175

Mutiny, 211

Mutual Security Administration, 273

Nagasaki, 106

National-level plans, 200

National Security Council, 269, 276

National Socialist German Workers' Party. _See_ Naziism

National War Aims Commission, 64

Nationalism and Communism, 295

Nationalists, Chinese, 75, 106

Naziism, 77
and Communism, 77
fifth column, 81

Nazi-Soviet struggle, 293-294

Netherlands and Indonesia, 257-259

"New British Broadcasting Company," 83

"New Democracy," 32

New York, radio facilities, 179

News
as intelligence, 135
bad news, 136
classified news, 136
commercial facilities, 136
good news, 136
palatability, 136
planted news, 84
pre-action news, 232
private facilities, 136
procurement of, 137
sources, 136

Newspapers, 220
air-format newspapers, 207
airborne newspapers, 13
in American Revolution, 21

Nicolai, Col. Walther, 64

Nimitz, Adm. Chester W., 187

XIX Corps, 239

Normalcy, effects, 73

Normandy, 239

North Africa, 47, 202

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 254

North Burma, 213, 226

North Korea, 263
Communist army of, 295

Northrop, F. S. C., 290

Norway, 13

Nostalgic black, 133

Nostalgic white, 134

Novelty materials, 207

_Oberkommando der Wehrmacht_, 82

Obscene black, 141

Oestrous black, 137

Oestrous gray, 138

Offensive propaganda, 46

Office of Censorship, 53

Office of Chief of PsyWar, 266, 304

Office of Facts and Figures, 91

Office of Intelligence, Information, and Cultural Affairs, 184

Office of Inter-American Affairs, 184

Office of Strategic Services, 93, 273, 297
in SWPA, 98

Office of War Information, 93, 269, 271, 297
organization, 178
outposts, 179
quarrels with OSS, 94

Okinawa, 239, 263

Operations, clandestine, 192

Operations Coordination Board, 275_ff_
functions and members, 276

Operations Division, GS, 94

Operations Research, 287ff

Operators
needs, 194
qualifications of, 99

Opinion
analysis, 110, 141
enemy opinion, 26
enemy opinion profile, 145
generalized opinion, 143
opinion groups, 143
sampling, 141

Order of battle, 192

Outer Mongolia, 168

Outpost Service Bureau, 182

Overclassification, 268

Overseas offices, 97

Overseas Operations Branch, 179

Overt act, 211

Overt propaganda, 44

Paine, Thomas, 23

Palestine, 38

Palmerston, Lord (Henry John Temple, 3d
Viscount), 297

Pamphlets, 208

Panmunjom, 261

Parachute News. See Rakkasan

Pareto, Vilfredo, 13

Parsons, Talcott, 3

Passierschein, 6

Pavlovian psychology, 26, 296

Pearl Harbor, 42

Peasant revolts, 20

Peck, Graham, 189

Percentage analyses, 145

Pershing's headquarters, 67-68

Persians, 8

Personnel limitations, 48

Persuasion, 25

Phase planning, 202

Philippines, 137, 185
Communist war in, 255

Philosophy in propaganda development, 289

Photo exhibit, 176

Pictures, prisoners, 238

PK units, 223

Plain-clothes troops, 164

Planning, 194
enemy plans and situations, 126
failure of West, 264
general plans, 199
in research and development, 287_ff_
pre-belligerent planning, 197

Point Four administration, 273

Poland, 13

Policy meetings, 97

Political Adviser, 187

Political background, 43

Political goals, 199

Political limitations, 48

Political officers, 159

Political warfare, 47
in Indochina, 260

Political Warfare Executive, 87

Politics, home-front, 49

Polly planes, 239

Polo, Marco, 14

Postal propaganda, 206

Poster propaganda, 111, 176

Pre-belligerent stages, 80

President's Committee on International Information Activities, 276

Press analysis, 112

Presses, military, 169

Price, Byron, 53

Printing, 111, 230

Prisoners of war, 36
propaganda value, 105

Private use of PsyWar techniques, 296-297

Problems, future tactical, 229

Projection in propaganda, 292

Promises, 52

Propaganda
analysis, 110, 128
analysis procedure, 126
choice in, 162
commitment, 50
conditions for effectiveness, 280
defensive propaganda, 46, 101
divisive propaganda, 46
history of, 3
organizations, national, 174
propaganda addict, 78
propaganda against propaganda, 100
purposefulness in, 40
re-use of, 102
in seven small wars, 265

Propaganda Branch, 182

Propaganda Man, 153, 200, 205-206

Propaganda Platoon, 303

Propaganda Section, AEF, 67

_Propagandakompanie_, 223

Propagandists as spokesmen, 281

Propanal. See Propaganda analysis

Proust, Marcel, 119

Prussia, 15

Psychological research in PsyWar, 292

Psychological Strategy Board, 271, 274, 276, 289

Psychological warfare
American agencies, 175
definitions, 37, 276-277
defensive, 216
in Intelligence (G2), 304
limitations, 48, 266
in Military Government, 302
Nazi PsyWar, 41
new establishment in Army, 266
organization for, 168
personnel, 99
in Plans and Operations (G3), 304
policy, dissension over, 270
tactical planning, 164
training, 304_ff_

Psychological Warfare Board, 304

Psychological Warfare Branch, 93, 187

Psychological Warfare Center, 304

Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, 187

Psychological Warfare Facility, 177

Psychological Warfare School, 304

Psychological Warfare Section, 301, 304-305

Psychological Warfare Staff in FEC, 304

Psychologist, role of, 26

Psychology, 25
new developments, 285
relation to propaganda, 291

Psychology Section, AEF, 67

Public Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for, 269-270

Public Affairs Officer, 272

_Public Opinion Quarterly_, 110

Public relations, 33

Publications Platoon, 303

Pushtu, 37

Quakers, 17

Quality as opposed to quantity in PsyWar, 307

Quantification, 291

Quasi-private operations, 273_ff_

Quisling, Vidkun, 32, 157

Quislings, 88, 157

Quotations, falsified, 84

Radek, Karl, 79

Radio
American operations, 91
jamming, 159
materials, 113
short-wave, 203
standard wave relay, 203
support, 227
suppression, 114
tactical radio, 192
wired radio, 113

Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, 301-302

Radio Free Asia, 273_ff_

Radio Free Europe, 273_ff_

Radio in the American Sector, 270

Radio Luxembourg, 56

Radio Malaya, 264

Radio Saipan, 45, 203

Radio Tokyo, 113

Radio war, 81

Raids, B-29, 237

_Rakkasan News_, 168, 220

RAND Corporation, 297

Ration cards, 209

_Reader's Digest_, 90

Readiness, national, 251

Rearrangements in U.S. Government, 269

Recognition and delay, 244_ff_

Recruiting of Anti-Communist forces, 265

Red Army, 113

Red scare, 72

Reformation, Wars of the, 10

Religious black, 124

Reproduction Company, 302

Requirements, guidance, 195

Research and Analysis Branch, 90

Reserve groups, use in PsyWar, 304

Responsibility of propagandists, 135

Reston, James, 273

Results of PsyWar, 307

Revision of U.S. laws, 298

Revolution and Development of International Relations Project, 297

Revolution as opposed to living, 277

Revolutionary propaganda, 46

"Rockefeller Office," 91

Rockets, 21

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 168, 175, 225

Roper, Elmo, 290

Rowe, David, 111

Royall, Kenneth C., 269

"Rum, Romanism and Rebellion," 49

Rumors, Mongol, 15

Russian Army of Liberation, 88

Russian combat propaganda, 105, 165

Russian Revolution, 71

Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, 273

Ryukyus. _See_ Okinawa

Sabine, G. H., 3

Saipan, 98

Salesmanship, 32

Samuel, Czar, 132

San Francisco, 203
OWI in, 55
radio facilities, 179

_San Kuo_, 8

Sargeant, Howland, 271

Saumaise, Claude de, 16

Scandinavia, 68

Schenke, Wolf, 81

Secret weapons, 129

Security
excessive security, 54
security liaison, 55
limitations, 48, 53
security officers, 53
procedures, 54
supervision, 55
unit security, 54

Selling, Lowell S., 27

Sex propaganda, 137

SHAEF, 176, 187, 212

Shans, 224

Shantung guerrillas, 204

Shells
artillery, 228
chemical warfare, 228
leaflet shells, 228
smoke shells, 228

Sherwood, Robert, 93, 178

Shonan, 8

Siam, 47, 186

_Sicherheitsdienst_, 85

Singapore, 8

Small wars, seven, 255

Smearing, 157

Smith, Bruce Lannes, 38

Smith, Nicol, 182

Smith, Walter Bedell, 274, 276

Social groups, 143

Social sciences in PsyWar, 290

Socialists, Russian, 70

Solbert, Gen. Oscar N., 94

Source, 44, 122

South-East Asia, 186

Southwest Pacific, 187, 213

Soviet-German front, 214

Soviet propaganda, 1941-45, 51
development of techniques, 294

Soviet PsyWar, 104

Soviet Union, 80
policies, 282

Spain, 31, 68, 280

Spanish Empire, 20

Special Study Group, 91

Specificity in propaganda, 147

"Stab in the back," 65

Staff functions, 191

Stalin, Joseph, 51

Stanford University, 297

Stanley, Lt. Col. John B., 97

STASM, formula, 43-44, 120

Stassen, Harold E., 276

State Department, 184

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 175

Statistical propanal, 131

Stein, Gertrude, 119

_Sterber, Der_, 214

Stewart, James, 189

Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., 189

Stoddard, Lothrop, 186

_Strafe_, 63

Strategic operations in international information, 268

Strategic plans, 201

Strategic propaganda, 45

Strategic propaganda unit, 301

Streibert, Theodore C., 276

Strengths of U.S. propaganda, 279_ff_

Subject, 124

Submarine operations, 186

Subversive material, black, 121

Subversive operations, 88, 209

Subversive operations units, 173

Sultan, Gen. Daniel I., 189

Sung Dynasty, 15

Sun-Tzu, 28

Sunyatsenism, 75

Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, 189, 270

Surprise attacks, 129

Surrender, 211
goal of PsyWar, 288-289
procedure, 230
surrender passes, 7
psychology of, 212

Switzerland, 68

Symeon, 132

Tactical Information Detachment, 301, 303

Tactical propaganda, 45

Tactical propaganda unit, 301

"Target" leaflet, 256

Tartars, 15

Tatars, 14

Taylor, Edmond, 17, 41

Taylor, George, 182

Technical Cooperation Administration, 273

Technical Manual, 241

Teilhet, Darwin, 182

_Temps, Le_, 38

Tension
causes, 285
in decision-making, 284
in war, 284_ff_
research on, 284_ff_

Terrain of propaganda, 150

Terror, strategy of, 41

Teutoburger Wald, 239

Theater Psychological Warfare, 187

Theater Psychological Warfare Officer, 187

Thompson, Dorothy, 273

Thomson, Col. Charles A. H., 39

Tibet, 168

Time, 123

_Time-Life-Fortune_, 90

Timeliness, 140

Timing, 1

Tito. _See_ Broz-Tito

Toilet training, 154

Tokugawa shoguns, 17

Total war and constitutional law, 42

Totalitarian parties, 78

Toynbee, Arnold J., 78

Traitors, 59

Troop indoctrination, 224

Trotzky, Leon, 71

Truth, 116

Turkish PsyWar, 17

Ukraine, 13, 88, 293_ff_

"Unconditional surrender" doctrine, 47, 103, 305

Unconscious mind, 26

Undercover organizations, 173

Underground Railway, 297

Understanding of the enemy, 292-294

Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, 292-293

United Nations Command in Korea, 305

United Service Organizations, 224

United States Information Agency, 269
Director of, 269, 271

United States Information Service, 269, 276

Use of all government activities in PsyWar, 275

Uses of PsyWar, 299

Utley, Freda, 257

Vegetius, 28

Venezia-Giulia, 184

Victory and defeat, alternatives to, 252

Victory, psychological, 194

Viereck, George S., 66

Viet Minh, 295

Viet Minh vs. Viet Nam, 260_ff_

Viet Nam, 185, 262

Vladimirtsov, B., 15

Vlassov, Gen. Andrei A., 88, 157

Voice of America, 271

Voice of the United Nations Command, 306

Voices, ghost, 84

Voices, amplified, 237

_Volk_, 32

_Vorwärts_, 38

_Vozhd_, 11

Vyshinsky, Andrei, 79

Wallace, Henry A., 87

Wang An-shih, 7

Wang Ching-wei, 157

Wang Mang, 5

War
as chronic state, 283
concepts of, 1
definition, 28
between dissimilar states, 283-284
force short of war, 1
between similar states, 283

War College, 77

War Department participation, 182

War Propaganda Bureau, 64

Warburg, James P., 52

"Warfare psychologically waged," 40-41, 79

Wartime skills, use of in peace, 297

Washburn, Abbott, 275

Washington, George, 157

Washington-theater liaison, 182

Watts, Richard, Jr., 189

Weapons
leaflet-discharging, 228
Mongol secret weapons, 14

Weber, Max, 3

Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C., 257

West Germany, 282

White House assistant in charge of informational policies, 271

White propaganda, 44

Wieger, Leon, 7

William Jackson Report, 268, 275, 289

William of Orange, 18

Witchit Witchit Watakan, 186

Women, 207

Working-class revolution, 71

World revolution, 23

World War I, 62

_Yamato-damashii_, 32

Yenan, 106, 215

Yüan Shih-k'ai, 63

Zacharias, Adm. Ellis, 177, 204

Zilboorg, Gregory, 27

Zionist Organization, 38

ALSO BY PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER:

_The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen_
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937)

_Government in Republican China_
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938)

_The China of Chiang Kai-shek_
(Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941)

_A Syllabus of Psychological Warfare_
(Washington: War Department General Staff, 1946)

_Psychological Warfare in ROTC Senior Manual_
(Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1948)

_Far Eastern Governments and Politics_
(with Djang Chu and Ardath Burks;
New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1954)

Transcriber's notes:

In the context of "the unprofessional guttersnipe Hitler was ruining the wonderful German Army in amateurish campaigns" stood "raining" instead of "ruining".

In the index, the reference for the entry "Indonesia, fighting in," was changed from 257-258 to 257-259, and reference for the entry "Results of PsyWar," from 327 to 307.

Markup in diagrams was not rendered in the transcription where it did not carry any meaning and would have made reading difficult.

The list of other books by Paul M. A. Linebarger was moved from the beginning of the book to its end.

End of Project Gutenberg's Psychological Warfare, by Paul M. A. Linebarger