Chapter I: Footnote 13

Compare Liepmann, “Über Ideenflucht,” Halle 1904; also Jung,
“Diagnost. Assoc. Stud.,” p. 103: “Denken als Unterordnung unter eine
herrschende Vorstellung”; compare Ebbinghaus, “Kultur der Gegenwart,”
p. 221. Külpe (“Gr. d. Psychologie,” p. 464) expresses himself in a
similar manner: “In thinking it is a question of an anticipatory
apperception which sometimes governs a greater, sometimes a smaller
circle of individual reproductions, and is differentiated from
accidental motives of reproduction only by the consequence with which
all things outside this circle are held back or repressed.”

Footnote 14:

In his “Psychologia empirica meth. scientif. pertract.,” etc., 1732,
p. 23, Christian Wolff says simply and precisely: “Cogitatio est actus
animae quo sibi rerumque aliarum extra se conscia est.”

Footnote 15:

The moment of adaptation is emphasized especially by William James in
his definition of reasoning: “Let us make this ability to deal with
novel data the technical differentia of reasoning. This will
sufficiently mark it out from common associative thinking, and will
immediately enable us to say just what peculiarity it contains.”

Footnote 16:

“Thoughts are shadows of our experiences, always darker, emptier,
simpler than these,” says Nietzsche. Lotze (“Logik,” p. 552) expresses
himself in regard to this as follows: “Thought, left to the logical
laws of its movement, encounters once more at the end of its regularly
traversed course the things suppressed or hidden.”

Footnote 17:

Compare the remarks of Baldwin following in text. The eccentric
philosopher Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88) even places intelligence and
speech as identical (see Hamann’s writings, pub. by Roth, Berlin
1821). With Nietzsche intelligence fares even worse as “speech
metaphysics” (Sprachmetaphysik). Friedrich Mauthner goes the furthest
in this conception (“Sprache und Psychologie,” 1901). For him there
exists absolutely no thought without speech, and speaking is thinking.
His idea of the “fetish of the word” governing in science is worthy of
notice.

Footnote 18:

Compare Kleinpaul: “Das Leben der Sprache,” 3 Bände. Leipzig 1893.

Footnote 19:

“Jardin d’Épicure,” p. 80.

Footnote 20:

Speech is generated by the intellect and in turn generates intellect.

Footnote 21:

It is difficult to calculate how great is the seductive influence of
the primitive word-meaning upon a thought. “Anything which has even
been in consciousness remains as an affective moment in the
unconscious,” says Hermann Paul (“Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte,”
4th ed., 1909, p. 25). The old word-meanings have an after-effect,
chiefly imperceptible, “within the dark chamber of the unconscious in
the Soul” (Paul). J. G. Hamann, mentioned above, expresses himself
unequivocably: “Metaphysics reduces all catchwords and all figures of
speech of our empirical knowledge to empty hieroglyphics and types of
ideal relations.” It is said that Kant learned some things from
Hamann.

Footnote 22:

“Grundriss der Psychologie,” p. 365.

Footnote 23:

“Lehrbuch der Psychologie,” X, 26.

Footnote 24:

James Mark Baldwin: “Thought and Things, or Genetic Logic.”

Footnote 25:

In this connection I must refer to an experiment which Eberschweiler
(_Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie_, 1908) has made at my
request, which discloses the remarkable fact that in an association
experiment the intra-psychic association is influenced by phonetic
considerations (“Untersuchungen über den Einfluss der sprachlichen
Komponente auf die Assoziation,” _Allgemeine Zeitschrift für
Psychiatrie_, 1908).

Footnote 26:

So at least this form of thought appears to Consciousness. Freud says
in this connection (“The Interpretation of Dreams,” tr. by Brill, p.
418): “It is demonstrably incorrect to state that we abandon ourselves
to an aimless course of ideas when we relinquish our reflections, and
allow the unwilled ideas to emerge. It can be shown that we are able
to reject only those end-presentations known to us, and that
immediately upon the cessation of these unknown or, as we inaccurately
say, unconscious end-presentations come into play which now determine
the course of the unwilled ideas—a thought without end-presentation
cannot be produced through any influence we can exert on our own
psychic life.”

Footnote 27:

“Grundriss der Psychologie,” p. 464.

Footnote 28:

Behind this assertion stand, first of all, experiences taken from the
field of the normal. The undirected thinking is very far removed from
“meditation,” and especially so as far as readiness of speech is
concerned. In psychological experiments I have frequently found that
the subjects of the investigation—I speak only of cultivated and
intelligent people, whom I have allowed to indulge in reveries,
apparently unintentionally and without previous instruction—have
exhibited affect-expressions which can be registered experimentally.
But the basic thought of these, even with the best of intentions, they
could express only incompletely or even not at all. One meets with an
abundance of similar experiences in association experiments and
psychoanalysis—indeed, there is hardly an unconscious complex which
has not at some time existed as a phantasy in consciousness.

However, more instructive are the experiences from the domain of
psychopathology. But those arising in the field of the hysterias and
neuroses, which are characterized by an overwhelming transference
tendency, are rarer than the experiences in the territory of the
introversion type of neuroses and psychoses, which constitute by far
the greater number of the mental derangements, at least the collected
Schizophrenic group of Bleuler. As has already been indicated by the
term “introversion,” which I briefly introduced in my study,
“Konflikte der kindlichen Seele,” pp. 6 and 10, these neuroses lead to
an overpowering autoerotism (Freud). And here we meet with this
unutterable purely phantastic thinking, which moves in inexpressible
symbols and feelings. One gets a slight impression of this when one
seeks to examine the paltry and confused expressions of these people.
As I have frequently observed, it costs these patients endless trouble
and effort to put their phantasies into common human speech. A highly
intelligent patient, who interpreted such a phantasy piece by piece,
often said to me, “I know absolutely with what it is concerned, I see
and feel everything, but it is quite impossible for me to find the
words to express it.” The poetic and religious introversion gives rise
to similar experiences; for example, Paul, in the Epistle to the
Romans viii:26—“For we know not what we should pray for as we ought:
but the Spirit itself maketh intercession with groanings which cannot
be uttered.”

Footnote 29:

Similarly, James remarks, “The great difference, in fact, between that
simple kind of rational thinking which consists in the concrete
objects of past experience merely suggesting each other, and reason
distinctively so called, is this, that whilst the empirical thinking
is only reproductive, reasoning is productive.”

Footnote 30:

Compare the impressive description of Petrarch’s ascent of Mt.
Ventoux, by Jacob Burckhardt (“Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien,”
1869, p. 235):

“One now awaits a description of the view, but in vain, not because
the poet is indifferent to it, but, on the contrary, because the
impression affects him all too strongly. His entire past life, with
all its follies, passes before him; he recalls that it is ten years
ago to-day that he, as a young man, left Bologna, and he turns a
yearning glance toward Italy. He opens a book—‘Confessions of St.
Augustine,’ his companion at that time—and his eye falls upon this
passage in the tenth chapter: ‘and the people went there and admired
the high mountains, the wide wastes of the sea and the mighty downward
rushing streams, and the ocean and the courses of the stars, and
forgot themselves.’ His brother, to whom he reads these words, cannot
comprehend why, at this point, he closes the book and is silent.”

Footnote 31:

Wundt gives a striking description of the scholastic method in his
“Philosophische Studien,” XIII, p. 345. The method consists “first in
this, that one realizes the chief aim of scientific investigation is
the discovery of a comprehensive scheme, firmly established, and
capable of being applied in a uniform manner to the most varied
problems; secondly, in that one lays an excessive value upon certain
general ideas, and, consequently, upon the word-symbols designating
these ideas, wherefore an analysis of word-meanings comes, in extreme
cases, to be an empty subtlety and splitting of hairs, instead of an
investigation of the real facts from which the ideas are abstracted.”

Footnote 32:

The concluding passage in “Traumdeutung” was of prophetic
significance, and has been brilliantly established since then through
investigations of the psychoses. “In the psychoses these modes of
operation of the psychic mechanism, normally suppressed in the waking
state, again become operative, and then disclose their inability to
satisfy our needs in the outer world.” The importance of this position
is emphasized by the views of Pierre Janet, developed independently of
Freud, and which deserve to be mentioned here, because they add
confirmation from an entirely different side, namely, the biological.
Janet makes the distinction in this function of a firmly organized
“inferior” and “superior” part, conceived of as in a state of
continuous transformation.

“It is really on this superior part of the functions, on their
adaptation to present circumstances, that the neuroses depend. The
neuroses are the disturbances or the checks in the evolution of the
functions—the illnesses depending upon the morbid functioning of the
organism. These are characterized by an alteration in the superior
part of the functions, in their evolution and in their adaptation to
the present moment—to the present state of the exterior world and of
the individual, and also by the absence or deterioration of the old
parts of these same functions.

“In the place of these superior operations there are developed
physical, mental, and, above all, emotional disturbances. This is only
the tendency to replace the superior operations by an exaggeration of
certain inferior operations, and especially by gross visceral
disturbances” (“Les Névroses,” p. 383).

The old parts are, indeed, the inferior parts of the functions, and
these replace, in a purposeless fashion, the abortive attempts at
adaptation. Briefly speaking, the archaic replaces the recent function
which has failed. Similar views concerning the nature of neurotic
symptoms are expressed by Claparède as well (“Quelques mots sur la
définition de l’Hystérie,” _Arch. de Psychol._, I, VII, p. 169).

He understands the hysterogenic mechanism as a “Tendance à la
réversion”—as a sort of atavistic manner of reaction.

Footnote 33:

I am indebted to Dr. Abraham for the following interesting
communication: “A little girl of three and a half years had been
presented with a little brother, who became the object of the
well-known childish jealousy. Once she said to her mother, ‘You are
two mammas; you are my mamma, and your breast is little brother’s
mamma.’ She had just been looking on with great interest at the
process of nursing.” It is very characteristic of the archaic thinking
of the child for the breast to be designated as “mamma.”

Footnote 34:

Compare especially Freud’s thorough investigation of the child in his
“Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben,” 1912 _Jahrbuch_, Pt.
I. Also my study, “Konflikte der kindlichen Seele,” 1912 _Jahrbuch_,
Pt. II, p. 33.

Footnote 35:

“Human, All Too Human,” Vol. II, p. 27 and on.

Footnote 36:

“Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre,” Pt. II, p. 205.

Footnote 37:

“Der Künstler, Ansätze zu einer Sexualpsychologie,” 1907, p. 36.

Footnote 38:

Compare also Rank’s later book, “The Myth of the Birth of the Hero.”

Footnote 39:

“Wish Fulfilment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales,” 1908.

Footnote 40:

“Dreams and Myths.”

Footnote 41:

Compare with this “Konflikte der kindlichen Seele,” p. 6, foot.

Footnote 42:

Compare Abraham, “Dreams and Myths.” New York 1913. The wish for the
future is represented as already fulfilled in the past. Later, the
childish phantasy is again taken up regressively in order to
compensate for the disillusionment of actual life.

Footnote 43:

Rank: “The Myth of the Birth of the Hero.”

Footnote 44:

Naturally, it could not be said that because this was an institution
in antiquity, the same would recur in our phantasy, but rather that in
antiquity it was possible for the phantasy so generally present to
become an institution. This may be concluded from the peculiar
activity of the mind of antiquity.

Footnote 45:

The Dioscuri married the Leucippides by theft, an act which, according
to the ideas of higher antiquity, belonged to the necessary customs of
marriage (Preller: “Griechische Mythologie,” 1854, Pt. II, p. 68).

Footnote 46:

See S. Creuzer: “Symbolik und Mythologie,” 1811, Pt. III, p. 245.

Footnote 47:

Compare also the sodomitic phantasies in the “Metamorphoses” of
Apuleius. In Herculaneum, for example, corresponding sculptures have
been found.

Footnote 48:

Ferrero: “Les lois psychologiques du symbolisme.”

Footnote 49:

With the exception of the fact that the thoughts enter consciousness
already in a high state of complexity, as Wundt says.

Footnote 50:

Schelling: “Philosophie der Mythologie,” Werke, Pt. II, considers the
“preconscious” as the creative source, also H. Fichte (“Psychologie,”
I, p. 508) considers the preconscious region as the place of origin of
the real content of dreams.

Footnote 51:

Compare, in this connection, Flournoy: “Des Indes à la planète Mars.”
Also Jung: “Zur Psychologie und Pathologie sogenannter okkulter
Phänomene,” and “Über die Psychologie der Dementia praecox.” Excellent
examples are to be found in Schreber: “Denkwürdigkeiten eines
Nervenkranken.” Mutze, Leipzig.

Footnote 52:

“Jardin d’Épicure.”

Footnote 53:

The figure of Judas acquires a great psychological significance as the
priestly sacrificer of the Lamb of God, who, by this act, sacrifices
himself at the same time. (Self-destruction.) Compare Pt. II of this
work.

Footnote 54:

Compare with this the statements of Drews (“The Christ Myth”), which
are so violently combated by the blindness of our time. Clear-sighted
theologians, like Kalthoff (“Entstehung des Christentums,” 1904),
present as impersonal a judgment as Drews. Kalthoff says, “The sources
from which we derive our information concerning the origin of
Christianity are such that in the present state of historical research
no historian would undertake the task of writing the biography of an
historical Jesus.” Ibid., p. 10: “To see behind these stories the life
of a real historical personage, would not occur to any man, if it were
not for the influence of rationalistic theology.” Ibid., p. 9: “The
divine in Christ, always considered an inner attribute and one with
the human, leads in a straight line backward from the scholarly man of
God, through the Epistles and Gospels of the New Testament, to the
Apocalypse of Daniel, in which the theological imprint of the figure
of Christ has arisen. At every single point of this line Christ shows
superhuman traits; nowhere is He that which critical theology wished
to make Him, simply a natural man, an historic individual.”

Footnote 55:

Compare J. Burckhardt’s letter to Albert Brenner (pub. by Hans Brenner
in the Basle _Jahrbuch_, 1901): “I have absolutely nothing stored away
for the special interpretation of Faust. You are well provided with
commentaries of all sorts. Hark! let us at once take the whole foolish
pack back to the reading-room from whence they have come. What you are
destined to find in Faust, that you will find by intuition. Faust is
nothing else than pure and legitimate myth, a great primitive
conception, so to speak, in which everyone can divine in his own way
his own nature and destiny. Allow me to make a comparison: What would
the ancient Greeks have said had a commentator interposed himself
between them and the Oedipus legend? There was a chord of the Oedipus
legend in every Greek which longed to be touched directly and respond
in its own way. And thus it is with the German nation and Faust.”

Footnote 56:

I will not conceal the fact that for a time I was in doubt whether I
dare venture to reveal through analysis the intimate personality which
the author, with a certain unselfish scientific interest, has exposed
to public view. Yet it seemed to me that the writer would possess an
understanding deeper than any objections of my critics. There is
always some risk when one exposes one’s self to the world. The absence
of any personal relation with Miss Miller permits me free speech, and
also exempts me from those considerations due woman which are
prejudicial to conclusions. The person of the author is on that
account just as shadowy to me as are her phantasies; and, like
Odysseus, I have tried to let this phantom drink only enough blood to
enable it to speak, and in so doing betray some of the secrets of the
inner life.

I have not undertaken this analysis, for which the author owes me but
little thanks, for the pleasure of revealing private and intimate
matters, with the accompanying embarrassment of publicity, but because
I wished to show the secret of the individual as one common to all.