Chapter XXI: Appendix: H to Part Iii—korea
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA AND PROPOSED MILITARY AID
_Military Situation_
In September, 1945, United States Army Forces, pursuant to instructions contained in General Order Number 1 of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, occupied Korea south of the 38° North parallel and accepted the surrender of Japanese troops south of that line. This arbitrary line of demarcation between the United States and Soviet Union occupation areas rapidly became a complete barrier to free movement between agricultural South Korea and the more industrialized North Korea. Numerous disputes and incidents, mostly political or economic, continue to take place even after two years of occupation.
The Commander in Chief, Far East, has delegated military responsibility and authority for occupation of South Korea to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the XXIV Corps. This Corps of two divisions totals 41,000 United States troops and constitutes the American Occupational Force in Korea.
There are no South Korean Armed Forces to augment these American occupational troops. There are, however, three authorized Korean uniformed elements or quasi-military forces: the National Police with a strength of 28,000, the Constabulary with 16,000, and the Korean Coast Guard with 3,000. These forces may be expected to remain loyal to the United States Military Government in the event of emergency. The National Police Force is the agency for enforcing law and order in Korea and is organized into district and subdistrict headquarters with police stations in principal towns and villages.
* * * * *
The Constabulary is similar in purpose to the National Guard of the United States in that it is used to back up the police in event of major disorders. At present, the Constabulary is also being utilized to augment American guards on United States Army installations. It is armed with captured Japanese rifles and small arms, and its efficiency is low by American standards.
North of the 38° North parallel, the estimated Soviet troop strength in Korea is approximately 45,000. These forces are organized into two major units, the 40th Rifle Division and the 19th Mechanized Division, plus complementary air, naval, and service support. There is evidence of further Soviet withdrawal now underway. An accurate figure denoting the Soviet-trained and equipped North Korean People’s (Communist) Army in its overall structure has not yet been obtained but the figure of 125,000 troops has been generally accepted. These forces assist Soviets in control of the border, maintain liaison with Chinese Communists in Manchuria, and constitute a potential military threat to South Korea.
Current political and economic unrest in Southern Korea is aggravated by Communistic terrorism, and by Communist-inspired riots and revolutionary activities in the occupied area. Such disorders impose additional military burdens on the police, the constabulary, and the American Occupation Forces. In addition, there is a possibility, however remote, of a Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea by troops of the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army. Recent reports from Manchuria indicate that sizable elements of Korean troops are operating with Chinese Communists, possibly to acquire battle conditioning. Furthermore there is evidence that Soviet officers and equipment are being used to groom the Korean Army.
Although it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets or their North Korean satellites would invade South Korea in the near future, infiltration of Communists and of large numbers of the North Korean Army, in connection with large-scale Communist-inspired or abetted riots or revolts in the South, is always a dangerous threat. Should this occur, the forces available should be adequate for maintaining order under any circumstances except for an outright Soviet directed or controlled invasion.
_Strategic Importance_
The political, social, economic, and military situations in South Korea are inextricably mingled. A Soviet-dominated Korea would constitute a serious political and psychological threat to Manchuria, North China, the Ryukyus, and Japan, and hence to United States strategic interests in the Far East. It is therefore in the best interest of the United States to ensure the permanent military neutralization of Korea. Neutralization can only be assured by its occupation until its future independence as a buffer state is assured.
So long as Soviet troops remain in occupation of North Korea, the United States must maintain troops in South Korea or admit before the world an “ideological retreat.” The military standing of the United States would decline accordingly; not only throughout the Far East, but throughout the world. Withdrawal of United States Occupation Forces from Korea would result in a growing unrest among the Japanese people because of their uncertainty regarding future United States policy in the Far East, and their consequent fears of expanding Soviet influence. This might well increase occupational requirements for Japan.
Except as indicated above, and the fact that its occupation denies a potential enemy the use of warm-water ports and the opportunity to establish strong air and naval bases in the peninsula, the United States has little military interest in maintaining troops or bases in Korea. In the event of major hostilities in the Far East, present forces in Korea would most likely be a military liability as they could not be maintained there within our present military capabilities.
There are three possible courses of action with reference to United States Occupation Forces in Korea:
They may be withdrawn immediately, which would abandon South Korea to the Soviet Union through pressures which could be exerted by the North Korea People’s (Communist) Army and is therefore an unacceptable course from the strategic viewpoint.
They may remain in occupation indefinitely, which course would be unacceptable to the American public after Soviet withdrawal, and would subject United States to international censure.
They may be withdrawn concurrently with Soviet occupation forces.
Soviet forces in Northern Korea will not be withdrawn until the North Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops. One of these Soviet objectives will undoubtedly be to obtain control of South Korea by utilization of Communist Korean armed forces as a means of pressure after withdrawal of United States forces, as was done in the cases of Poland, Outer Mongolia, Yugoslavia, and Albania.
There appears to be a strong possibility that Soviet Russia will withdraw its occupational forces when such conditions are favorable and thus induce our own withdrawal.
_Military Aid to Korea_
The Military Government in Korea, which is currently being turned over to American and Korean civilians, is the only government in South Korea. The immediate and primary objectives of the American Military Commander in Korea are to maintain law and order in the face of subversive uprisings in the American zone, to care for and safeguard American noncombatants and property, and to operate a military government which looks toward the future political independence of Korea together with its economic and social rehabilitation. In view of these objectives, the immediate purpose of any American military aid to Korea should be to facilitate their realization.
The long-term purpose of military aid to Korea should be to enable South Korea, and later all Korea, to engage in a holding operation against the progressive expansion of militaristic Communism. Minimum military aid to Southern Korea therefore should envisage the support of the uniformed elements of Korean military and quasi-military forces through the furnishing of United States equipment including carbines and some light machine guns as well as furnishing vehicles, telephone and radio communications, etc., and training advice.
Consideration was given by the Mission to the organization, training, and equipping of a strong Korean military force along the lines of the former Philippine Scouts. This force should be under the control of the United States Military Commander, initially should be officered throughout by Americans, but with a program for replacement and understudy by Korean officers, and should be of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the north. Such a force will become truly effective only if the United States Commander in Korea is given clear-cut authority to establish and control it.
Because of its occupation by two nations of radically differing ideologies and policies, and the corresponding separation into two parts economically, there is little that Korea, even as a liberated nation, can do to improve its situation. South Korea lacks the experience and industrial potential to create or support its own armed forces.
An American organized and equipped Korean military force would serve to counteract in large measure the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army when the American and the Soviet forces are withdrawn from Korea. It might possibly preclude the forceful establishment of a Communist Government, and thus contribute to a situation favorable for the establishment of a free and independent Korea.
_Conclusions_
United States-Soviet Union troop strengths in South and North Korea are approximately equal but the Soviets, assisted by a Soviet-controlled, equipped, and trained North Korean People’s (Communist) Army of 125,000 men, and geographically supported by a contiguous Soviet Siberia, are in an infinitely stronger military position.
There is considerable unrest in South Korea but forces available to General Hodge are adequate to cope with it and to maintain order, though completely inadequate, even with maximum assistance from General MacArthur, to meet Soviet-controlled invasion of North Korean forces.
A United States withdrawal which permitted the Soviet Union to dominate Korea would result in a serious political and psychological threat to China, including Manchuria, and Japan.
The United States has a strong strategic interest in insuring permanent military neutralization of Korea and its denial as a base to the Soviet Union.
The Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces just as soon as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created will be strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops.
_Recommendations_
It is recommended that:
United States withdrawal from Korea be based upon agreements with the Soviet Union to effect proportional withdrawals, with as many guarantees as possible to safeguard Korean freedom and independence.
Military aid be furnished to South Korea which would support the achievement of such adequate safeguards and which would envisage:
Continuing to furnish arms and equipment to Korean National
Police and Korean Coast Guard.
The creation of an American-officered Korean Scout Force to replace the present Constabulary of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the North.
Continued interim occupation by United States Army forces in Korea.
Advice in training of technical specialists and tactical units.
_Bibliography_
A
_Alexander of Macedon_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday, Doran Co., Garden City, N. Y. 1946.
_American Mercury Magazine_, March, 1951.
_Asia at the Crossroads_, by E. Alexander Powell, Century Co., N. Y., 1922.
C
_Caesar and Christ_, by Will Durant, Simon & Schuster, N. Y., 1944.
_Challenge of the East, The_, by George E. Eddy, Farrar, N. Y., 1931.
_China of Chiang Kai-shek_, a political study, by Paul M. A. Linebarger, World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass., 1941.
_China Shall Rise Again_, by Mei-ling Soong Chiang, Harper and Bros., N. Y., and London, 1940.
_China in the Sun_, by Randall Gould, Doubleday and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1946.
_Chinese Civilization_, by Marcel Granet, Alfred Knopf, N. Y., 1930.
_Chinese, Their History and Culture, The_, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, The MacMillan Co., N. Y., 1934.
_City of the Czars, The_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1948.
_Civilization on Trial_, Essays, by Arnold J. Toynbee, N. Y., Oxford University Press, 1948.
_Conquest of Civilization, The_, by James H. Breasted, Harper Bros., N. Y., 1938.
Current Magazines and Newspapers.
D
_Discovery of Freedom, The_, by Rose Wilder Lane, The John Day Co., N. Y., 1943.
_Dawn of Conscience, The_, by James Henry Breasted, N. Y., London, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1933.
E
_Early Empires of Central Asia, The_, by William Montgomery McGovern, Chapel Hill, 1939.
_Economics and the Public Welfare_, by Benjamin McAlister Anderson, Literary Guild of America, N. Y., 1938.
_Economics in One Easy Lesson_, by Henry Hazlitt, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1946.
_Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, The_, by Anatole Leroy Beaulieu, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, N. Y., 1893.
F
_Fight for the Republic of China, The_, by B. L. Putnam Weale, Dodd, Mead and Co., N. Y., 1917.
G
_Genghis Khan_, by Harold Lamb, Robert M. McBride and Co., N. Y., 1927.
_Great Globe Itself, The_, by William C. Bullitt, Charles Scribner’s Sons, N. Y., 1946.
H
_History of Civilization_, by James Henry Breasted, Ginn & Co., N. Y. and Boston, 1937.
_History of Russia, A_, by Bernard Pares, Alfred A. Knopf, N. Y., 1926.
_History of the Russian Empire Under Peter the Great_, by Voltaire, Vol. XVIII, St. Hubert Guild, N. Y., 1901.
_History of the Russian Revolution_, by Leon Trotsky, Vols. I, II, III, Simon and Schuster, N. Y., 1932.
I
_Inside Asia_, by John Gunther, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1942.
_Intelligence Digest_—A Review of World Affairs.
_International Relations of the Chinese Empire, The_, by Hosea Ballou Morse, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., Vols. I, II, III, 1918.
_I Speak for the Chinese_, by Carl Crow, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1937.
_Ivan the Terrible, Czar of Russia_, by George Backer, Random House, N. Y., 1950.
J
_Journey to China, A_, by Arnold J. Toynbee, London, Constable and Co., Ltd., 1931.
L
_Life Magazine_, The June 14, issue.
_Lost Peace in China_, by George Moorad, E. P. Dutton, N. Y., 1949.
M
_Man of Independence, The_, by Jonathan Daniels, Lippincott & Co., N. Y., 1940.
_March of the Barbarians_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1940.
_March of Muscovy, The_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1948.
_Marco Polo, the Venetian_, Everyman’s Library, Edited by Ernest Rhys, 1907.
O
_Old Civilizations of the New World_, by Hyatt Verrill, Bobbs-Merrill Co., N. Y., 1929.
P
_Pageant of Chinese History, The_, by Elizabeth Seeger, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1934.
Pamphlets, Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, N. Y.
_Practical Program for America, A_, Edited by Henry Hazlett, Harcourt Brace and Co., N. Y., 1932.
R
_Resistance and Reconstruction_, by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1943.
_Riding the Tiger_, by Harry Carr, Houghton Mifflin Co., N. Y., and Boston, 1934.
_Russia and the Peace_, by Bernard Pares, The MacMillan Co., N. Y., 1944.
_Russian Enigma, The_, by William Henry Chamberlin, Charles Scribner’s Sons, N. Y., 1943.
_Russia and the Russians_, by Edward Crankshaw, Viking Press, N. Y., 1948.
S
_Siberia_, by Emil Lengyel, Random House, N. Y., 1942.
_Soong Sisters, The_, by Emily Hahn, Doubleday, Doran and Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1942.
_Speaking Frankly_, by James F. Byrnes, Harper Bros., N. Y., 1947.
_Stalin, A Critical Survey of Bolshevism_, by Boris Souvarine, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1939.
_Stalin’s Russia and the Crisis in Socialism_, by Max Eastman, W. W. Norton and Co., N. Y., 1940.
_Study in History, A_, by Arnold J. Toynbee, Abridgement of Vols. I-VI, by D. C. Somervell, N. Y., G. Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1946.
T
_Tamerlane, the Earth Shaker_, by Harold Lamb, Robert M. McBride and Co., N. Y., 1928.
_Tinder Box of Asia, The_, by George E. Sokolsky, Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1932.
_Together_, by Katherine Tupper Marshall, Tupper & Love, Inc., N. Y., Atlanta, 1946.
_Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire, The_, by Hosea Ballou Morse, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1908.
W
_War in the East_, by Charles A’Court Repington, John Murray, London, 1905.
_We’re in This with Russia_, by Wallace Carroll, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1942.
_Index_
A
Acheson, 19, 26, 118.
_American Mercury_, 23.
Atwood, Harry E., 134.
Anti-Imperialist League, 67
Aristotle, 144.
Attila, the Hun, 73, 74.
Attlee, Prime Minister, 146.
B
“Ballentine Beer Patches,” 16.
“Big Noses,” 117.
Bleucher, General, 59.
Borodin, Michael, 59.
Bourtai, 76.
(See _also_ Genghis Khan, favorite wife of)
Browder, Earl, 50, 53, 59, 60.
Byrnes, Secretary of State, 19, 24.
C
Cairo Conference, 108.
Canton, Russians in, 113, 120, 121.
Chang Kuo Sin, 117, 119.
Checfoo, 9.
Cheng Tien-shi, Dr., 129, 130.
Chennault, Claire L., 119.
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106;
building of model village by, 106, (See _also_ Soong, Sisters).
Chiang Kai-shek, 7, 8, 27, 59, 62, 67, 85, 92, 93, 103-116,
contributions of, to the U. S., 103;
“Golden Decade” of, 104;
mistakes of, 10;
tragedy of, 103-116.
Chinese Communist Party, 45;
Central Committee of, 32;
Central People’s Government, 45;
Personalities, 45-68;
young intelligentsia of, 57.
Chinese New Year, 87.
Chingwangtao, 7.
Chou En-lai, 8, 13, 28, 42, 56-61, 125;
family of, 59;
wife of, 60, 126;
“Executioner,” 59.
Chungking, 45, 105, 106;
destruction of, by Japanese, 106;
model village in, 106.
Churchill, 26, 33, 108.
Chu Teh, 13, 38, 40, 50-56;
as a movie “fan,” 40;
family of, 51;
hunting prowess of, 40;
wives of, 51, 54.
Comintern, 49.
Communism, the “lure” of, 1;
forebears of, 70-81.
Communist, flag; propaganda, 82-93;
(See _also_ Propaganda, Communist)
Confucius, 50, 115.
Courcy, Kenneth de, 145.
“Cumshaw,” 36.
D
Dairen, 9.
Daniels, Jonathan, 25.
Drugs, “actedon,” 90;
“mescaline,” 90;
use of, 90, 91;
on Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, 91;
(See _also_ Hypnotism, use of)
on Michael Shipkov, 91;
on Robert A. Vogeler, 91, 92;
(See _also_ Hypnotism, use of).
Democracy, as a principle, 133.
E
England, 139.
Estabrooks, Dr. G. H., 91;
(See _also_ Hypnotism, use of).
Eurasia, 7.
F
Fifth Column, conception of, 72.
Finland, 132.
Foundation for Economic Education, 136.
Formosa, 112, 115, 118;
invasion of, 118-120.
France, 132.
Free love, 125.
G
Gallen, 59.
Genghis Khan, 17, 22, 53, 68, 70, 74-78, 79, 81, 96, 99, 100, 105,
106, 108, 109;
favorite wife of, 76;
“Scourge of God,” 74;
superstitions of, 77;
Yassa of, 1, 78.
Generalissimo, 7, 10, 17, 28, 33, 45.
H
Hankow, 115.
Hatem, Dr., 63, 64;
family of, 63, 64. (See _also_ Ma Hia-teh).
Hiss, 26.
Hirohito, 131.
Hitler, 46, 131, 136.
Hong Kong, 108, 124, 128, 129;
treatment of British in, 129.
Hoover administration, 135, 136.
Hoover, J. Edgar, 137.
Huns, 70, 73.
Hutton, Betty, 40.
Hurley, Ambassador, 10, 41, 45, 109.
Hypnotism, use of, 91, 92;
(See _also_ Estabrooks, Dr. G. H.);
on Cardinal Mindszenty, 91, 92;
on Robert Vogeler, 91, 92;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of);
on Van der Lubbe, 92;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of).
I
International News Service, 18.
International Hospital, 30, 37.
(See _also_ Yenan).
J
Japanese, peace terms offered, 108, 115.
Jefferson, Thomas, 142.
Jenner, William E., 20, 22.
Jessup, 26.
Joffe, Adolph, 104.
Judd, Walter H., 17.
K
Kalgan Pass, 9.
Kung, H. H., Madame, 64.
(See _also_ Soong, Sisters).
Kung, H. H., Dr., 104.
Kwangsi Province, 113.
L
Lamb, Harold, 22.
Lattimore, 26.
Lehey, William D., 25.
Lesser concessions, theory of, 135.
Li Li San, 61, 96;
wife of, 61.
_Life Magazine_, 115.
Lin Piao, 62.
Li Tsun-jen, General, 113.
“Long March,” the, 47, 48, 54, 121.
Lu Hsun Art Academy, 34, 64.
M
MacArthur, General Douglas, 22, 23, 25, 107.
Madison, James, 134.
Ma Hai-teh, 63, 64.
(See _also_ Hatem, Dr.).
Malinovsky, Marshall, 61.
Mao Tse-tung, 13, 14, 15, 29, 33, 45-50, 54, 57, 61, 62, 63, 68, 76,
92, 102, 121, 125;
daughter of, 30;
son of, 46;
wives of, 48;
heroine of “Long March,” 48, 49;
Lang Ping, 48, 49;
Myth, 49;
propaganda speech by, 92, 93.
Manchuria, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 61, 94-102;
as granary of Asia, 94;
occupation of, by Japanese, 94;
stripping of, by Communists, 96.
Manchus, 94, 104.
Marriage, New Democracy, 125-126.
Marshall, General George C., 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 24,
28, 56;
at a Chinese opera, 14;
at a Communist banquet, 14;
in conference with Mao, 15;
preference for Mao, 16;
visit of, to Yenan, 12, 14, 15.
McNeil, Hector, 130.
Michener, James, 115.
Mindszenty, Joseph Cardinal, 91;
(See _also_ Drugs, use; Hypnotism, use of).
Ming Bing, 13.
Min Yuan Park, 87.
Missionaries, Catholic, 34;
Protestants, 35.
Mongol, 38, 70, 72, 73, 74, 81, 100, 101.
Mongolia, 9.
Mossadegh, Mohammed, 146.
Moses, 70, 133.
Mud caves, of Yenan, 29, 44.
Mukden, 95, 99.
N
Nanking, 16, 56, 58.
Nan Yuan, 8.
Nationalist, 9, 11;
(See _also_ Chiang Kai-shek, tragedy of).
“New Democracy,” 82;
marriage under the, 125-126.
New Life Movement, 61, 106.
Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 107.
O
Open Door Policy, 9.
Opera, Chinese, 14;
Shanghai, 68.
P
Peace terms, Japanese, 108.
Pei Yuan, 8.
Peking, 7, 8, 57, 87, 122;
capture of, 87, 122;
famine in, 122.
Personalities, Communist, 45-69.
Plato, 50
Politburo, 15.
Port Arthur, 9.
“Prisoners of War School,” 32;
(See _also_ Yenan).
Propaganda, Communist, 82-93;
against Americans, 85;
basic purpose of, 82;
distortion of terms in, 82, 83;
Democracy, 82;
Freedom, 82, 83;
Security, 83;
Truth, 83;
for children, 84, 85;
newspapers as, 86;
opera as, 89;
posters as, 84;
slogans as, 84;
speeches as, 86;
by Mao Tse-tung, 12, 93;
titles as reward, 87;
types of, two, 83.
Q
Quislings, 100.
Quo Vadis, 131-148.
R
Red Curtain, Behind the, 117-130.
Republic, discussion of, 133, 134.
Rosenberg, Anna, 27.
Roosevelt, 21, 26, 33, 108, 135.
“Rosamond,” 65.
Russell, Dean, 143.
Russia, war potential, 138, 139.
Russian advisors, 117.
S
Samarkand, Battle of, 100.
Sanzo Nosako, 33.
Shanghai, fall of, 119, 120, 124;
Mayor of, 119;
Russians in, 120;
treatment of Americans in, 127.
Shensi Province, 29.
Shipkov, Michael, 91;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of).
Soong, Charlie, 65;
family, 65, 104;
Sisters, 64, 104.
“Stakhanovitism,” 80.
Stalin, 3, 28, 49, 50, 131.
State Department, 7, 9, 27, 42.
Stuart, J. Leighton, Ambassador, 24, 56.
Sun Fo, 66.
Sun Yat-sen, Madame, 31, 45, 64-69;
(See _also_ Soong, Sisters).
Sun Yat-sen, 47, 103;
revolution of, 51.
T
Tamerlane, 53, 78.
Tang Shan, 8.
Tartars, 63, 70, 78.
Tientsin, 7, 87, 88.
Tipping, prohibition against, 36;
“cumshaw,” 36.
Trans-Siberian Railway, 97.
Trohan, Walter, 23, 25.
Trotsky, 2.
Truce teams, 16.
Truman, President, 7, 10, 15, 19, 22, 108, 111.
U
United States, 7, 8, 16, 117.
Urals, 96, 97.
V
Vogeler, Robert A., 91;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of; Hypnotism, use of).
V-J Day, 95, 97.
_Voice of America_, 118.
W
Wallace, Henry, 131.
Wedemeyer, Lieutenant General Albert C., 9, 24, 111, 114, 118, 142.
Wei Tao-ming, Madame, 68, 69.
Wesleyan College, 65.
Wife swapping, 125.
Worton, Major General William Arthur, 7, 8.
Y
Yalta, 10, 12, 13, 22.
Yangtse River, 60, 105.
“Yassa,” 1, 78.
Yeaton, Colonel Ivan D., 31.
Yenan, 12, 15, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 48, 57, 64;
International Hospital in, 30;
Market place in, 35;
“Prisoner of War School,” 32.
Yenching University, 24, 56, 57.
Z
Zukov, 62.
About the Author...
Mary Lamar Knight, famed foreign correspondent and lecturer, graduated into the ranks of foreign correspondents while she was on a two-month “tour” of Europe in 1930. The tour lasted for five full years with only brief vacations and assignments at home. At that time Miss Knight was the only woman employed on a full-time basis in the Paris Bureau of the United Press Associations. In this capacity she covered the European continent as a feature writer in the varied fields of women’s fashions, crime and politics.
She reported on the outstanding fashions of the Parisian designers as they paraded their creations into pages of history; she was the first woman since the days of the French Revolution to witness the guillotining of a famous convict in Paris; she interviewed royalty of many nationalities; and, most important of all, she saw and studied the beginnings of World War II: the propaganda build-up, the international deceit and intrigue, the in-human characters of the men who promoted the war and prepared the nations of Europe for their own destruction.
During her varied career, Miss Knight, who is the daughter of the late Dr. Lucian Lamar and Edith Nelson Knight, of Atlanta, Georgia, has worked as a nurse at Bellevue Hospital, New York, to report on a bitter campaign to regulate working conditions for doctors and nurses; she was assigned to the New York Women’s House of Detention to pose as a prostitute, going to jail with Lucky Luciano’s “girls” and latter covered his vice trial in the courtroom; at one time she was assigned the role of a taxi-dance girl, and at another time to join the chorus line of the world-famous “Rockettes” at the lavish Music Hall theater; she was the first woman reporter allowed to invade the training camps of Joe Louis and Max Schmeling prior to their title fight which she covered at ringside. In 1935, the author embarked for China on a Norwegian freighter.
Remaining in China for two years she travelled to most of the principal cities in China, Korea and Manchuria. At the borders of Mongolia she witnessed the beginnings of her RED BLIGHT of today. The Communists were then in the process of developing the tactics, the brutality, the deceit and the methods which they have so far so successfully employed against their homeland and the neighboring countries of Tibet and Korea. In China, 1935-36, Mary Lamar Knight had a 15-year advance in preview of the tragic days that are now immediately ahead for all civilized nations. She returned to China again in 1946, independently covering the Pauley and the Marshall Missions. She met and became personally acquainted with most of the men who dominate today’s great human conflict—Marshall, Wedemeyer, Ambassador Hurley, Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang, Chou En-lai and many others. Herein she was able to objectively view the entire American-Chinese crisis, make a personal analysis of the appalling international situation and draw the conclusions which she presents in RED BLIGHT.
In recent months Miss Knight has spent her time in bringing this vitally enlightening book up-to-the-minute and appearing before many outstanding political, civic and patriotic clubs and organizations as a featured speaker on Communism and its avowed principles of ruling or ruining the earth.
Among Miss Knight’s published works are: _On My Own_, an autobiography, (MacMillan, 1938); _Spies versus Censors_ (Reader’s Digest, May, 1946) and _Red Realm in China_ (Reader’s Digest, February, 1947). The author was the only woman contributor to _We Cover the World_, the first symposium of foreign correspondents (Prentice-Hall).
The author is available for personal appearances and speaking engagements. (Fees are variable.)
A Note on KOREA ...
_By Mary Lamar Knight_
Books already have been written about the Korean situation. Although it is one spoke in the great Asiatic wheel, Korea is very important, but China still remains in the hub of the wheel. One of the greatest tragedies of this whole chain of events is that General Douglas MacArthur had the difficult—the impossible—task of trying to rescue the Korean chestnut from the fire—a fire which might not have ignited had his counsel and advice, along with that of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer and others, been heeded in the first place.
The Communist-inspired invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Communists was a trial balloon let loose by the Soviet and Chinese Communists to determine how far the United States and the United Nations would go before buying an all-out Asiatic war. It was a trick from the start, to draw U. S. and UN forces foremost into the area from which the U. S. had withdrawn in 1949. Once committed, and once having dispatched American—and a trickle of UN soldiers into South Korea, the chances were that they could be kept there indefinitely. We were permitted, early in the conflict, to cross the arbitrary 38th parallel, and to proceed at great difficulty and even greater loss of life, to the borders of Manchuria. Then, in typical Communist fashion, they struck back in the evening, almost, of our declaration of all but total victory. One need only to glance at a map of Korea to realize that the Communists, Soviet and Chinese, are in a position to pour millions of men into North Korea, dressed as Koreans or otherwise, at their will. How could we hope to do anything of a permanent nature in unifying Korea against the Communists? The Korean patriot Kim Koo, shortly before his assassination and replying to a question put to him by Representative Walter Judd said: “It doesn’t make any difference what you (the U. S.) do now. There just isn’t any way to get Korea so that she can be independent and secure and self-sustaining, until you solve the Communist problem across the border in Manchuria.” We solved that problem by giving that prize to the Soviets. It was Russia’s price for entering the war, the last six days of it, as an ally, even though it was rather generally known that Japan was ready to surrender.
For every life that may have been spared by the signing of the questionable Yalta agreement, thousands of American and Korean GI’s, and Korean civilians are now dead, dying and maimed. This little Florida-shaped country of Korea, cut up by outsiders, is a tragic example of failure to think beyond military objectives. We cannot defend Korea from Russian attack without an all-out war. We can only prolong the agony. If it was right for us to leave Korea in 1949, can we, honestly, justify our re-entry there in 1950—at the price we have paid?
There yet remain other fates to be decided—Formosa, the Philippines and numerous islands of the Pacific, whether we occupy them or not. Have we not already proven that, “It is fantastic to imagine that we can convert our enemies into our friends by treating our friends as if they were our enemies”?
But to understand the overall picture, one must begin with a knowledge of the background that has made China and the United States the estranged bed-fellow nations which they have become. The historic removal of Douglas MacArthur from all of his commands in the Far East, by President Truman at 1 a. m. on April 11, 1951, will have far-reaching effects. Due to this move, disaster looms before us larger than ever, especially for the United States and Great Britain. Nearly a month before the news of the impending MacArthur dismissal by the President “leaked” to the American press, headlines had appeared in Danish newspapers saying: “British Say ‘MacArthur Must go’.”
The average reader, in all probability, sees only a difference of opinion in the policies of the political and military leadership on the conduct of World War III, but the facts go deeper than this. There appears to be a determination on the part of those who are playing international politics, to obtain and control world power. MacArthur, definitely, was the greatest single stumbling block in their path. To be in a position, militarily, to bomb enemy supply sources, and yet forbidden, by political directives from Washington, to do this, put greater handicaps on MacArthur than he was willing to take. With the MacArthur removal, Truman will bend every effort toward silencing all who remain opposed to his Acheson-approved manifesto.
On April 1, 1951, correspondent Kenneth de Courcy (_Intelligence Digest_—A Review of World Affairs) cabled from London:
“There is no longer even a definite objective in the Korean war.
Each nation or organization concerned in it seems to have a
different objective; while each high commander seems to have a
private idea of what would represent success or victory. If the
powers that be cannot agree even in Korea, it is hardly surprising
that they cannot devise an agreed strategy for the entire world.
Mr. Truman, who is becoming very tired, seems determined to await
decisive trends of public opinion. His private views and conclusions
are not likely to be pressed unless he is convinced that public
opinion is more than ready for them. In fact, American public
opinion is far ahead of its leadership. Mr. Truman however, has not
yet been convinced of this....
“The Kremlin reckons on a steadily progressive weakening of the
Atlantic group of powers. Meanwhile, it is intended to increase the
flow of warlike supplies and indirect help to Asiatic Communist
forces, rather than to the European satellites. Major developments
are timed to take place in Asia before the end of this year, which
by the middle of 1952, will give the USSR access to certain valuable
and essential raw materials which now have to be purchased from
outside the Soviet system.... The Kremlin thinks war with the West
will become inevitable ... but hopes to be able to postpone this war
until Burma and India have been brought within the Soviet sphere of
influence.”
To follow the MacArthur program has been called a “colossal gamble,” but what greater gamble can there be than sitting back and waiting for the enemy to come and destroy us? Was England able to stop Hitler by appeasement? Nor will the present British Labor Government be able to silence the Chinese Communists by promising them Formosa and a hand in the Japanese peace treaty if, indeed, the Japanese accept such a treaty.
Those who still believe that a “deal” can be made with Stalin or Communists anywhere, just do not know the history of Communism or of Communism’s forbears. MacArthur’s removal from the scene at this time is cause for jubilation among the radically inclined the world over, for this particular American hero was Stalin’s Enemy Number One.
Another great boon to the Chinese and Korean Reds is that Truman has virtually promised them that their Manchurian bases will not be bombed by us, unless of course, they step out of line and bomb us first. Thus, they can continue to kill and maim our boys without fear of too much retaliation on our part. We won two great victories on the battlefields of World Wars I and II, but we lost them both at conference tables. Political double-talk always gives the enemy a far greater victory than could be won on the battlefield.
The political moves made by the powers that be in Washington serve only to cancel out our military victories. On November 16, 1950, when Russia vetoed the Security Council’s resolution demanding that China clear out of Korea, she put the blame for the Korean war squarely in her own lap. But as long as Stalin and the Kremlin remain within the United Nations, this international body politic will remain hamstrung, for it will be used as an instrument to give aid and comfort to Communists everywhere in achieving military aggression against the Western Hemisphere. For Russia, as a member of the United Nations, with veto power, has sent no troops to Korea to fight the aggression. But why should she be exempt when others are not? A United Nations operating in opposite directions cannot be very united. With one side of the UN fighting aggression and another faction pushing it, defeat can be the only outcome. When the Korean war first burst into actual flame, and we discovered that Russia was openly, as well as secretly, supporting the North Koreans, why did we not then expel her from the UN and declare her an enemy of the peace? Had we had the courage to do so, the story would be different today. Now, with our hands tied behind our backs, we wait for the enemy to make the next move in the most tragic game of chess ever played with flesh and blood pawns.
It is difficult to understand why General MacArthur was prevented from arming some 400,000 unarmed South Koreans. On April 6, 1951, he stated that political decisions beyond his authority prevented him from doing this, but why were they deprived of fighting for their own land? And why were American fathers and sons to be butchered in battle to free those who would gladly fight for themselves, but for political interference? No short term good ever derived from a long term evil, nor can any amount of political expediency replace military emergency.
Terrible sabotage in this country is not unlikely. On April 7, 1951, J. Edgar Hoover stood before the Senate Committee and said: “A hard core of Communists trained in sabotage is ready to strike at vital industries ...” and he added that this would be one of the most effective weapons that Stalin could use against the United States.
Despite denials from the White House and State Department, we know that Russia has a solid network of spies and undercover agents operating in every department of our national life, operating to destroy us from within, circumventing the need for any long-range attack.
To those who stubbornly maintain that the blood of more than sixty thousand American boys killed or wounded in Korea, in addition to an almost equal number of what are called non-battle casualties, still constitutes merely a “police action,” I say in all reverence, may God forgive you. We are at war now. No amount of waiting or appeasement will put off World War III. We are in it up to our necks.
Your First Step....
“The journey of a thousand miles begins with just one step ...” says a Chinese proverb.
Millions of Americans today know that we have to take that “one step” individually, if order is to be restored to the national house in which we live.
You have read in this volume of the many wrong steps in the wrong direction that have been taken by our national planners. These have resulted in the human turmoil, the domestic unrest, and in undeclared war against Communism. Our battlefield casualties have already passed the seventy thousand mark.
Every American must act NOW to preserve our Constitutional Way of Life. But before concerted political action can be taken the facts must be known. RED BLIGHT tells these facts!
Now _you_ can take _your_ first step in the right direction by helping to disseminate the truth about the RED BLIGHT that is engulfing the earth. You can do this by placing RED BLIGHT into the hands of as many people as possible.
RED BLIGHT is bound in two editions: Paper bound, $1.50 per copy; Cloth Bound, $2.50 per copy. Please use the coupon below for placing your order.
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Transcriber’s Notes
pg 10 Changed at no time had be to: he
pg 13 Changed spelling of Moa Tse-tung to: Mao
pg 15 Changed swayed to its ryhthmic to: rhythmic
pg 22 Changed methods of Genghis Kahn to: Khan
pg 23 Changed that these are dissillusioning to: disillusioning
pg 25 Changed Eighth Regiment at Fort Screvan to: Screven
pg 26 Added quote after: finest regiments in the Army.
pg 27 Changed May God forebid to: forbid
pg 31 Changed this last shipemnt to: shipment
pg 32 Changed proved to be a diobolical to: diabolical
pg 46 Changed Moa’s childhood was to: Mao’s
pg 50 Changed devotion to Confuscius to: Confucius
pg 52 Changed fire of vitrolic to: vitriolic
pg 56 Replaced comma with period at: foreign dignitaries with ease
pg 56 Changed did such a consumate to: consummate
pg 58 Changed more violent and vitrolic to: vitriolic
pg 58 Added double quote to end of sentence: return to China
from Europe?
pg 66 Changed publicity she so abhored to: abhorred
pg 67 Changed capitalization of world Anti-Imperialist to: World
pg 67 Changed capitalization of a cable to the anti-Imperialist
to: Anti
pg 67 Changed mind and persuasive personalitly to: personality
pg 72 Changed horsemen in the earily to: early
pg 73 Changed dirty and disheaveled to: disheveled
pg 86 Changed effort is wasted on superflous to: superfluous
pg 91 Changed warrant a demontration to: demonstration
pg 105 Changed capitalization of it had become obvious to: It
pg 135 Changed established in this county to: country
pg 138 Changed humiliation and degredation to: degradation
pg 141 Changed economically and phychologically to: psychologically
pg 142 Changed use our almost unprecendented to: unprecedented
pg 146 Changed dispatch datelined Teheran to: Tehran
pg 152 Changed Russian reentry to: re-entry
pg 153 Changed facilitate China’s post-war to: postwar
pg 154 Added comma after: Korea, the political
pg 155 Changed bound ideolologically to: ideologically
pg 163 Changed developments as portentious to: portentous
pg 164 Changed program of assistant to: assistance
pg 164 Changed eight years of war. to: war,
pg 166 Changed to preserve Korea to: Korea’s
pg 167 Removed comma from: first meeting March 8, 1946
pg 169 Changed continue as long is to: as
pg 169 Changed In the over-all administration to: overall
pg 174 Added space between words eastern and half
pg 177 Changed land for rise to: rice
pg 177 Changed chaotic hyperinflation to: hyper-inflation
pg 178 Removed period after: 1915-19 to 2.0
pg 178 Changed diet until indigeous to: indigenous
pg 179 Changed over 300 gram to: grams
pg 179 Changed salt an sugar to: and
pg 180 Changed long-staple Egyption to: Egyptian
pg 181 Changed in the time alloted to: allotted
pg 182 Removed duplicate word and their own own country
pg 184 Changed Army in its over-all to: overall
pg 186 Changed expansion of miltaristic to: militaristic
pg 189 Changed Charles Schribner’s to: Scribner’s
pg 191 Changed Education, Irrington-on Hudson to: Irvington
pg 193 Changed spelling of Aristole to Aristotle and changed page
number from 143 to 144
pg 193 Changed spelling of Centrol People’s Government to: Central
pg 193 Changed spelling of Crinese New Year to: Chinese
pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after: Drugs, use of, 90, 91
pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after:
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106
pg 194 Fixed page references under Hypnotism
pg 194 Replaced semi-colon with period after: International News
Service
pg 195 Changed spelling under Mindszenty of Hynotism to: Hypnotism
pg 196 Changed Sun Yet-sen to: Yat-sen
pg 196 Changed spelling of: Hynotism under Vogeler to: Hypnotism
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Red blightChapter XXI: Appendix: H to Part Iii—korea
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