Chapter XXIII

The position of the army in front of Chattanooga was not as strong as we supposed, and the enemy succeeded in reopening their communications and obtaining supplies. There was no longer any expectation that we should be able to starve them out, and it was determined to make a diversion in another direction. The plan was to detach Longstreet, who should pass down the Sweet Water Valley and capture Burnside’s forces which were in the neighborhood of Knoxville. Before going away, I was exceedingly anxious to complete the equipment of our corps, but Bragg’s Chief of Ordnance, Colonel Oladowski, was inordinately fond of red tape, and I should have been in bad plight but for a quantity of Enfield rifles I had prudently brought from Virginia with me. Oladowski could outcurse any man in the army I ever met, except Jubal Early and M. W. Gary. It was one of his boasts that he had “evacuate Murphreysboro with zee whole army and lose only one grindstone.” It disgusted him, too, that Colonel Manning should have been wounded. He said to me: “My friend! what for Colonel Manning he go into zee fight?” I told him it was the custom of our Ordnance officers to do so. “I tell you sar,” said Oladowski, “he not go into zee fight for love zee country. I know! I know! he go into zee fight to get promotion and zee little furlough. Vell! vell! vell! I wish I was in h--ll ten year before dis war begin!”

I learned afterwards that Oladowski was the Ordnance Sergeant at the Baton Rouge Arsenal at the time the war began, and, of course, not a man of education or position. He was a good-hearted fellow, but I fear that after the disastrous defeat of Bragg’s army at the battle of Missionary Ridge, after Longstreet’s departure, he could not well have congratulated himself on having lost “only one grindstone.”

Early in November we left Chattanooga, and marched by the Sweet Water Valley and Loudon to Knoxville. One of General Longstreet’s most serious faults as a military commander was shown at this time. To his knowledge we were to cut loose from our communications, with no certainty that we should soon be able to re-establish them. It would indeed be easy enough to live upon the country, but we could not hope to find in the fields or the corn-cribs either small-arm or artillery ammunition. Nevertheless, he gave me no notice whatever that any extended movement was to be made, nor did he warn me that I must be prepared to supply the army with ammunition for the campaign. Not one word was said to me by him on the subject. I had an inkling, however, of what was going on, and obtained ample supplies. Had I not done so, we should have been in an awkward predicament by the time that we reached Knoxville. Had anything been lacking, it is certain that the blame would have been placed on me. It is evident that it was Longstreet’s duty, as a prudent commander, to confer with the chiefs of the several staff departments, ascertain from them what was the condition of their supplies, and inform them what was likely to be required. If he had not such confidence in them as would permit him to give them the necessary information, he should have removed them and put in their places officers whom he could trust. It is certain that he could have given the requisite instructions without divulging the details of the movement.

At Loudon we found that the enemy had destroyed the bridge across the Tennessee River and had smashed some locomotives and cars which had been left there. The process was very simple. The trains were made up, and when there was a full head of steam the throttles of the locomotives were opened, and they were allowed to whirl along the track until they reached the parapet of the bridge, whence they bounded into the river below.

Crossing the river on an unstable pontoon bridge, we found ourselves within striking distance of Burnside’s Corps at Lenoir Station. For two days there was sharp fighting with the enemy’s rear guard. Then our opportunity came. McLaws was ordered to press on to Campbell’s Station, while Hood’s Division, under Jenkins, took the road which follows the line of the railroad to Lenoir Station. Jenkins made a vigorous advance, and Burnside found it impracticable to move all his artillery and wagons. Some hundred of the latter, loaded with subsistence stores, ammunition and implements, were disabled and abandoned. The cannon powder lay on the ground four or five inches deep. It was a pleasant place where to smoke a quiet pipe, and several of my men indulged themselves in that way to my great discomfort. The expectation was that McLaws would reach the intersecting road in time to cut off Burnside, but McLaws was behind time, as usual, and we did not bag our game. General Sam Jones has just published an account of the Knoxville campaign, and I give here what he says about the failure to intercept Burnside:

The march on the 16th was a race for position, but a slow one,
because of the condition of the roads. McLaws was ordered to
march as rapidly as possible to the intersection of the road on
which he was marching with that which Jenkins was following, in
the hope of reaching it before the Federals. General Longstreet
was eager to force his adversary to accept battle, and General
Burnside just as eager to avoid it until he could reach
Knoxville.

The distance from Lenoir to Campbell’s Station is about eleven
miles. Jenkins’ instructions were to press the enemy vigorously
and do his utmost to bring him to bay. The advance and rear
guards were several times hotly engaged, the latter halting only
long enough to cover the retreat and then following. About 11
o’clock Jenkins’ division reached the junction of the two roads
about a mile from Campbell’s Station. McLaws’ Division had not
arrived, and the Federals had passed it.

General McLaws’ orders were to move rapidly to Campbell’s Station
and endeavor to reach that point before the Federals. His march
during this day, the 16th, was as rapid as the condition of the
roads would permit, and not materially retarded by the troops
that General Hartranft had sent forward for the purpose, a
small body of Colonel Hart’s cavalry keeping back the enemy’s
skirmisher’s with but slight loss. By the time McLaws reached
the vicinity of Campbell’s Station the Federals had been so
closely pressed by Hood’s Division as to be obliged to face about
and form line of battle, which they did about a mile from the
station. When McLaws arrived he was ordered to deploy three of
his brigades in front of the enemy and to put his other brigade
(Humphrey’s) upon a ridge on his left, to threaten the enemy’s
right, but not to show his division beyond the woods skirting the
plain towards Campbell’s Station. Colonel Alexander placed his
artillery in position and General Jenkins ordered three of his
brigades, McLaws’ and Anderson’s, supported by Benning’s, around
the enemy’s left flank, the movement being concealed by a wooded
ridge, with instructions to attack vigorously. McLaws was to
attack in front when he should hear Jenkins’ guns.

This flank movement, which did not escape the vigilance of the
Federals, caused them to fall back, a rather difficult and
hazardous move to make in the face or an enemy. McLaws’ Division
advanced promptly and brought them to a stand in their second and
stronger position, about a mile further towards Knoxville. The
ground over which McLaws’ and Anderson’s Brigades had to move
to strike the enemy’s left and rear was very rough; over steep
hills covered with a thick growth of scrub oak, which necessarily
delayed them, while they were exposed to the fire of the enemy’s
artillery. Before McLaws’, Benning’s and Anderson’s Brigades
reached the left of the enemy’s position that position had been
abandoned for the second and stronger one.

General Longstreet earnestly desired a general engagement and
did his utmost to compel his adversary to accept it before
reaching Knoxville, rightly judging, it would seem, that to do so
offered the best prospect for the success of his expedition. The
opportunity was offered at Campbell’s Station. General Burnside
was forced to halt there and form line of battle to cover his
trains, which obstructed the road by which he was retreating.
He held his position there six or seven hours, but before the
Confederates could be placed in position night came on so dark
and rainy that the attack could not be made. Ably seconded by his
officers and the steadiness of his troops he skilfully extricated
his command from a perilous position.

“If,” says General Longstreet, “General Jenkins could have made
his attack during this movement (the withdrawal from the first
to the second position) or if he could have made it after the
enemy had taken his second position, we must have destroyed
this force, recovered East Tennessee, and in all probability
captured the greater part of the enemy’s forces.” When such an
opportunity is lost in a campaign blame is generally attached to
some one or more commanders; and this was not an exception to
the general rule. But when the weather and the condition of the
roads is considered it is not surprising that their movements
were not as rapid as could have been wished. The weather was most
unfavorable; frequent rains, especially on the 13th and 14th,
had rendered the steep and rugged roads almost impassable for
artillery and wagons.