Chapter VIII: The Protection of the President (2)

It is the conclusion of the Commission that, even in the absence of Secret Service criteria which specifically required the referral of such a case as Oswald’s to the Secret Service, a more alert and carefully considered treatment of the Oswald case by the Bureau might have brought about such a referral. Had such a review been undertaken by the FBI, there might conceivably have been additional investigation of the Oswald case between November 5 and November 22. Agent Hosty testified that several matters brought to his attention in late October and early November, including the visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, required further attention. Under proper procedures knowledge of the pending Presidential visit might have prompted Hosty to have made more vigorous efforts to locate Oswald’s roominghouse address in Dallas and to interview him regarding these unresolved matters.

The formal FBI instructions to its agents outlining the information to be referred to the Secret Service were too narrow at the time of the assassination. While the Secret Service bears the principal responsibility for this failure, the FBI instructions did not reflect fully the Secret Service’s need for information regarding potential threats. The handbook referred thus to “the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President.”[C8-148] It is clear from Hosty’s testimony that this was construed, at least by him, as requiring evidence of a plan or conspiracy to injure the President.[C8-149] Efforts made by the Bureau since the assassination, on the other hand, reflect keen awareness of the necessity of communicating a much wider range of intelligence information to the Service.[C8-150]

Most important, notwithstanding that both agencies have professed to the Commission that the liaison between them was close and fully sufficient,[C8-151] the Commission does not believe that the liaison between the FBI and the Secret Service prior to the assassination was as effective as it should have been. The FBI Manual of Instructions provided:

Liaison With Other Government Agencies

To insure adequate and effective liaison arrangements, each
SAC should specifically designate an Agent (or Agents) to be
responsible for developing and maintaining liaison with other
Federal Agencies. This liaison should take into consideration
FBI-agency community of interests, location of agency
headquarters, and the responsiveness of agency representatives.
In each instance, liaison contacts should be developed to
include a close friendly relationship, mutual understanding
of FBI and agency jurisdictions, and an indicated willingness
by the agency representative to coordinate activities and to
discuss problems of mutual interest. Each field office should
determine those Federal agencies which are represented locally
and with which liaison should be conducted.[C8-152]

The testimony reveals that liaison responsibilities in connection with the President’s visit were discussed twice officially by the special agent in charge of the FBI office in Dallas. As discussed in chapter II, some limited information was made available to the Secret Service.[C8-153] But there was no fully adequate liaison between the two agencies. Indeed, the Commission believes that the liaison between all Federal agencies responsible for Presidential protection should be improved.

Other Protective Measures and Aspects of Secret Service Performance

The President’s trip to Dallas called into play many standard operating procedures of the Secret Service in addition to its preventive intelligence operations. Examination of these procedures shows that in most respects they were well conceived and ably executed by the personnel of the Service. Against the background of the critical events of November 22, however, certain shortcomings and lapses from the high standards which the Commission believes should prevail in the field of Presidential protection are evident.

_Advance preparations._--The advance preparations in Dallas by Agent Winston G. Lawson of the White House detail have been described in chapter II. With the assistance of Agent in Charge Sorrels of the Dallas field office of the Secret Service, Lawson was responsible for working out a great many arrangements for the President’s trip. The Service prefers to have two agents perform advance preparations. In the case of Dallas, because President Kennedy had scheduled visits to five Texas cities and had also scheduled visits to other parts of the country immediately before the Texas trip, there were not enough men available to permit two agents to be assigned to all the advance work. Consequently, Agent Lawson did the advance work alone from November 13 to November 18, when he was joined by Agent David B. Grant, who had just completed advance work on the President’s trip to Tampa.

The Commission concludes that the most significant advance arrangements for the President’s trip were soundly planned. In particular, the Commission believes that the motorcade route selected by Agent Lawson, upon the advice of Agent in Charge Sorrels and with the concurrence of the Dallas police, was entirely appropriate, in view of the known desires of the President. There were far safer routes via freeways directly to the Trade Mart, but these routes would not have been in accordance with the White House staff instructions given the Secret Service for a desirable motorcade route.[C8-154] Much of Lawson’s time was taken with establishing adequate security over the motorcade route and at the two places where the President would stop, Love Field and the Trade Mart. The Commission concludes that the arrangements worked out at the Trade Mart by these Secret Service agents with the cooperation of the Dallas police and other local law enforcement agents, were carefully executed. Since the President was to be at the Trade Mart longer than at any other location in Dallas and in view of the security hazards presented by the building, the Secret Service correctly gave particular attention in the advance preparations to those arrangements. The Commission also regards the security arrangements worked out by Lawson and Sorrels at Love Field as entirely adequate.

The Commission believes, however, that the Secret Service has inadequately defined the responsibilities of its advance agents, who have been given broad discretion to determine what matters require attention in making advance preparations and to decide what action to take. Agent Lawson was not given written instructions concerning the Dallas trip or advice about any peculiar problems which it might involve; all instructions from higher authority were communicated to him orally. He did not have a checklist of the tasks he was expected to accomplish, either by his own efforts or with the cooperation of local authorities.[C8-155] The only systematic supervision of the activities of the advance agent has been that provided by a requirement that he file interim and final reports on each advance assignment. The interim report must be in the hands of the agent supervising the protective group traveling with the President long enough before his departure to apprise him of any particular problems encountered and the responsive action taken.[C8-156] Agent Lawson’s interim report was received by Agent Kellerman on November 20, the day before departure on the Texas trip.[C8-157]

The Secret Service has advised the Commission that no unusual precautions were taken for the Dallas trip, and that “the precautions taken for the President’s trip were the usual safeguards employed on trips of this kind in the United States during the previous year.”[C8-158] Special Agent in Charge Sorrels testified that the advance preparations followed on this occasion were “pretty much the same” as those followed in 1936 during a trip to Dallas by President Roosevelt, which was Sorrels’ first important assignment in connection with Presidential work.[C8-159]

In view of the constant change in the nature of threats to the President and the diversity of the dangers which may arise in the various cities within the United States, the Commission believes that standard procedures in use for many years and applied in all parts of the country may not be sufficient. There is, for example, no Secret Service arrangement for evaluating before a trip particular difficulties that might be anticipated, which would bring to bear the judgment and experience of members of the White House detail other than the advance agent. Constant reevaluation of procedures, with attention to special problems and the development of instructions specific to particular trips, would be a desirable innovation.

_Liaison with local law enforcement authorities._--In the description of the important aspects of the advance preparations, there have been references to the numerous discussions between Secret Service representatives and the Dallas Police Department. The wholehearted support of these local authorities was indispensable to the Service in carrying out its duties. The Service had 28 agents participating in the Dallas visit.[C8-160] Agent Lawson’s advance planning called for the deployment of almost 600 members of the Dallas Police Department, Fire Department, County Sheriff’s Department, and the Texas Department of Public Safety.[C8-161] Despite this dependence on local authorities, which would be substantially the same on a visit by the President to any large city, the Secret Service did not at the time of the assassination have any established procedure governing its relationships with them.[C8-162] It had no prepared checklist of matters to be covered with local police on such visits to metropolitan areas and no written description of the role the local police were expected to perform. Discussions with the Dallas authorities and requests made of them were entirely informal.

The Commission believes that a more formal statement of assigned responsibilities, supplemented in each case to reflect the peculiar conditions of each Presidential trip, is essential. This would help to eliminate varying interpretations of Secret Service instructions by different local law enforcement representatives. For example, while the Secret Service representatives in Dallas asked the police to station guards at each overpass to keep “unauthorized personnel” off, this term was not defined. At some overpasses all persons were excluded, while on the overpass overlooking the assassination scene railroad and yard terminal workmen were permitted to remain under police supervision, as discussed in chapter III.[C8-163] Assistant Chief Batchelor of the Dallas police noted the absence of any formal statement by the Secret Service of specific work assigned to the police and suggested the desirability of such a statement.[C8-164] Agent Lawson agreed that such a procedure would assist him and other agents in fulfilling their responsibilities as advance agents.[C8-165]

_Check of buildings along route of motorcade._--Agent Lawson did not arrange for a prior inspection of buildings along the motorcade route, either by police or by custodians of the buildings, since it was not the usual practice of the Secret Service to do so.[C8-166] The Chief of the Service has provided the Commission a detailed explanation of this policy:

Except for inauguration or other parades involving foreign
dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington, it has
not been the practice of the Secret Service to make surveys
or checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential
motorcade. For the inauguration and certain other parades in
Washington where the traditional route is known to the public
long in advance of the event, buildings along the route can be
checked by teams of law enforcement officers, and armed guards
are posted along the route as appropriate. But on out-of-town
trips where the route is decided on and made public only a few
days in advance, buildings are not checked either by Secret
Service agents or by any other law enforcement officers at the
request of the Secret Service. With the number of men available
to the Secret Service and the time available, surveys of
hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical.

In Dallas the route selected necessarily involved passing
through the principal downtown section between tall buildings.
While certain streets thought to be too narrow could be
avoided and other choices made, it was not practical to select
a route where the President could not be seen from roofs or
windows of buildings. At the two places in Dallas where the
President would remain for a period of time, Love Field and
the Trade Mart, arrangements were made for building and roof
security by posting police officers where appropriate. Similar
arrangements for a motorcade of ten miles, including many
blocks of tall commercial buildings is not practical. Nor is it
practical to prevent people from entering such buildings, or
to limit access in every building to those employed or having
business there. Even if it were possible with a vastly larger
force of security officers to do so, many observers have felt
that such a procedure would not be consistent with the nature
and purpose of the motorcade to let the people see their
President and to welcome him to their city.

In accordance with its regular procedures, no survey or other
check was made by the Secret Service, or by any other law
enforcement agency at its request, of the Texas School Book
Depository Building or those employed there prior to the time
the President was shot.[C8-167]

This justification of the Secret Service’s standing policy is not persuasive. The danger from a concealed sniper on the Dallas trip was of concern to those who had considered the problem. President Kennedy himself had mentioned it that morning,[C8-168] as had Agent Sorrels when he and Agent Lawson were fixing the motorcade route.[C8-169] Admittedly, protective measures cannot ordinarily be taken with regard to all buildings along a motorcade route. Levels of risk can be determined, however, as has been confirmed by building surveys made since the assassination for the Department of the Treasury.[C8-170] An attempt to cover only the most obvious points of possible ambush along the route in Dallas might well have included the Texas School Book Depository Building.

Instead of such advance precautions, the Secret Service depended in part on the efforts of local law enforcement personnel stationed along the route. In addition, Secret Service agents riding in the motorcade were trained to scan buildings as part of their general observation of the crowd of spectators.[C8-171] These substitute measures were of limited value. Agent Lawson was unable to state whether he had actually instructed the Dallas police to scan windows of buildings lining the motorcade route, although it was his usual practice to do so.[C8-172] If such instructions were in fact given, they were not effectively carried out. Television films taken of parts of the motorcade by a Dallas television station show the foot patrolmen facing the passing motorcade, and not the adjacent crowds and buildings, as the procession passed.[C8-173]

Three officers from the Dallas Police Department were assigned to the intersection of Elm and Houston during the morning of November 22 prior to the motorcade.[C8-174] All received their instructions early in the morning from Capt. P. W. Lawrence of the traffic division.[C8-175] According to Captain Lawrence:

I then told the officers that their primary duty was traffic
and crowd control and that they should be alert for any persons
who might attempt to throw anything and although it was not a
violation of the law to carry a placard, that they were not to
tolerate any actions such as the Stevenson incident and arrest
any person who might attempt to throw anything or try to get
at the President and his party; paying particular attention to
the crowd for any unusual activity. I stressed the fact that
this was our President and he should be shown every respect
due his position and that it was our duty to see that this was
done.[C8-176]

Captain Lawrence was not instructed to have his men watch buildings along the motorcade route and did not mention the observation of buildings to them.[C8-177] The three officers confirm that their primary concern was crowd and traffic control, and that they had no opportunity to scan the windows of the Depository or any other building in the vicinity of Elm and Houston when the motorcade was passing. They had, however, occasionally observed the windows of buildings in the area before the motorcade arrived, in accordance with their own understanding of their function.[C8-178]

As the motorcade approached Elm Street there were several Secret Service agents in it who shared the responsibility of scanning the windows of nearby buildings. Agent Sorrels, riding in the lead car, did observe the Texas School Book Depository Building as he passed by, at least for a sufficient number of seconds to gain a “general impression” of the lack of any unusual activity.[C8-179] He was handicapped, however, by the fact that he was riding in a closed car whose roof at times obscured his view.[C8-180] Lawson, also in the lead car, did not scan any buildings since an important part of his job was to look backward at the Presidents car.[C8-181] Lawson stated that he “was looking back a good deal of the time, watching his car, watching the sides, watching the crowds, giving advice or asking advice from the Chief and also looking ahead to the known hazards like overpasses, underpasses, railroads, et cetera.”[C8-182] Agent Roy H. Kellerman, riding in the front seat of the Presidential car, stated that he scanned the Depository Building, but not sufficiently to be alerted by anything in the windows or on the roof.[C8-183] The agents in the followup car also were expected to scan adjacent buildings. However, the Commission does not believe that agents stationed in a car behind the Presidential car, who must concentrate primarily on the possibility of threats from crowds along the route, provide a significant safeguard against dangers in nearby buildings.

_Conduct of Secret Service agents in Fort Worth on November 22._--In the early morning hours on November 22, 1963, in Fort Worth, there occurred a breach of discipline by some members of the Secret Service who were officially traveling with the President. After the President had retired at his hotel, nine agents who were off duty went to the nearby Fort Worth Press Club at midnight or slightly thereafter, expecting to obtain food; they had had little opportunity to eat during the day.[C8-184] No food was available at the Press Club. All of the agents stayed for a drink of beer, or in several cases, a mixed drink. According to their affidavits, the drinking in no case amounted to more than three glasses of beer or 1½ mixed drinks, and others who were present say that no agent was inebriated or acted improperly. The statements of the agents involved are supported by statements of members of the Fort Worth press who accompanied or observed them and by a Secret Service investigation.[C8-185]

According to their statements, the agents remained at the Press Club for periods varying from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, and the last agent left the Press Club by 2 a.m.[C8-186] Two of the nine agents returned to their rooms. The seven others proceeded to an establishment called the Cellar Coffee House, described by some as a beatnik place and by its manager as “a unique show place with continuous light entertainment all night [serving] only coffee, fruit juices and no hard liquors or beer.” [C8-187] There is no indication that any of the agents who visited the Cellar Coffee House had any intoxicating drink at that establishment.[C8-188] Most of the agents were there from about 1:30 or 1:45 a.m. to about 2:45 or 3 a.m.; one agent was there from 2 until 5 a.m.[C8-189]

The lobby of the hotel and the areas adjacent to the quarters of the President were guarded during the night by members of the midnight to 8 a.m. shift of the White House detail. These agents were each relieved for a half hour break during the night.[C8-190] Three members of this shift separately took this opportunity to visit the Cellar Coffee House.[C8-191] Only one stayed as long as a half hour, and none had any beverage there.[C8-192] Chief Rowley testified that agents on duty in such a situation usually stay within the building during their relief, but that their visits to the Cellar were “neither consistent nor inconsistent” with their duty.[C8-193]

Each of the agents who visited the Press Club or the Cellar Coffee House (apart from the three members of the midnight shift) had duty assignments beginning no later than 8 a.m. that morning. President Kennedy was scheduled to speak across the street from his hotel in Fort Worth at 8:30 a.m.,[C8-194] and then at a breakfast, after which the entourage would proceed to Dallas. In Dallas, one of the nine agents was assigned to assist in security measures at Love Field, and four had protective assignments at the Trade Mart. The remaining four had key responsibilities as members of the complement of the followup car in the motorcade. Three of these agents occupied positions on the running boards of the car, and the fourth was seated in the car.[C8-195]

The supervisor of each of the off-duty agents who visited the Press Club or the Cellar Coffee House advised, in the course of the Secret Service investigation of these events, that each agent reported for duty on time, with full possession of his mental and physical capabilities and entirely ready for the performance of his assigned duties.[C8-196] Chief Rowley testified that, as a result of the investigation he ordered, he was satisfied that each of the agents performed his duties in an entirely satisfactory manner, and that their conduct the night before did not impede their actions on duty or in the slightest way prevent them from taking any action that might have averted the tragedy.[C8-197] However, Chief Rowley did not condone the action of the off-duty agents, particularly since it violated a regulation of the Secret Service, which provides:

_Liquor, use of._--a. Employees are strictly enjoined to
refrain from the use of intoxicating liquor during the hours
they are officially employed at their post of duty, or when
they may reasonably expect that they may be called upon to
perform an official duty. During entire periods of travel
status, the special agent is officially employed and should not
use liquor, until the completion of all of his official duties
for the day, after which time a very moderate use of liquor
will not be considered a violation. However, all members of the
White House Detail and special agents cooperating with them on
Presidential and similar protective assignments are considered
to be subject to call for official duty at any time while in
travel status. Therefore, the use of intoxicating liquor of any
kind, including beer and wine, by members of the White House
Detail and special agents cooperating with them, or by special
agents on similar assignments, while they are in a travel
status, is prohibited.[C8-198]

The regulations provide further that “violation or slight disregard” of these provisions “will be cause for removal from the Service.”[C8-199]

Chief Rowley testified that under ordinary circumstances he would have taken disciplinary action against those agents who had been drinking in clear violation of the regulation. However, he felt that any disciplinary action might have given rise to an inference that the violation of the regulation had contributed to the tragic events of November 22. Since he was convinced that this was not the case, he believed that it would be unfair to the agents and their families to take explicit disciplinary measures. He felt that each agent recognized the seriousness of the infraction and that there was no danger of a repetition.[C8-200]

The Commission recognizes that the responsibilities of members of the White House detail of the Secret Service are arduous. They work long, hard hours, under very great strain, and must travel frequently. It might seem harsh to circumscribe their opportunities for relaxation. Yet their role of protecting the President is so important to the well-being of the country that it is reasonable to expect them to meet very high standards of personal conduct, so that nothing can interfere with their bringing to their task the finest qualities and maximum resources of mind and body. This is the salutary goal to which the Secret Service regulation is directed, when it absolutely forbids drinking by any agent accompanying the President on a trip. Nor is this goal served when agents remain out until early morning hours, and lose the opportunity to get a reasonable amount of sleep. It is conceivable that those men who had little sleep, and who had consumed alcoholic beverages, even in limited quantities, might have been more alert in the Dallas motorcade if they had retired promptly in Fort Worth. However, there is no evidence that these men failed to take any action in Dallas within their power that would have averted the tragedy. As will be seen, the instantaneous and heroic response to the assassination of some of the agents concerned was in the finest tradition of Government service.

_The motorcade in Dallas._--Rigorous security precautions had been arranged at Love Field with the local law enforcement authorities by Agents Sorrels and Lawson. These precautions included reserving a ceremonial area for the Presidential party, stationing police on the rooftops of all buildings overlooking the reception area, and detailing police in civilian clothes to be scattered throughout the sizable crowd.[C8-201] When President and Mrs. Kennedy shook hands with members of the public along the fences surrounding the reception area, they were closely guarded by Secret Service agents who responded to the unplanned event with dispatch.[C8-202]

As described in chapter II, the President directed that his car stop on two occasions during the motorcade so that he could greet members of the public.[C8-203] At these stops, agents from the Presidential follow-up car stood between the President and the public, and on one occasion Agent Kellerman left the front seat of the President’s car to take a similar position. The Commission regards such impromptu stops as presenting an unnecessary danger, but finds that the Secret Service agents did all that could have been done to take protective measures.

_The Presidential limousine._--The limousine used by President Kennedy in Dallas was a convertible with a detachable, rigid plastic “bubble” top which was neither bulletproof nor bullet resistant.[C8-204] The last Presidential vehicle with any protection against small-arms fire left the White House in 1953. It was not then replaced because the state of the art did not permit the development of a bulletproof top of sufficiently light weight to permit its removal on those occasions when the President wished to ride in an open car. The Secret Service believed that it was very doubtful that any President would ride regularly in a vehicle with a fixed top, even though transparent.[C8-205] Since the assassination, the Secret Service, with the assistance of other Federal agencies and of private industry, has developed a vehicle for the better protection of the President.[C8-206]

_Access to passenger compartment of Presidential car._--On occasion the Secret Service has been permitted to have an agent riding in the passenger compartment with the President. Presidents have made it clear, however, that they did not favor this or any other arrangement which interferes with the privacy of the President and his guests. The Secret Service has therefore suggested this practice only on extraordinary occasions.[C8-207] Without attempting to prescribe or recommend specific measures which should be employed for the future protection of Presidents, the Commission does believe that there are aspects of the protective measures employed in the motorcade at Dallas which deserve special comment.

The Presidential vehicle in use in Dallas, described in chapter II, had no special design or equipment which would have permitted the Secret Service agent riding in the driver’s compartment to move into the passenger section without hindrance or delay. Had the vehicle been so designed it is possible that an agent riding in the front seat could have reached the President in time to protect him from the second and fatal shot to hit the President. However, such access to the President was interfered with both by the metal bar some 15 inches above the back of the front seat and by the passengers in the jump seats. In contrast, the Vice Presidential vehicle, although not specially designed for that purpose, had no passenger in a jump seat between Agent Youngblood and Vice President Johnson to interfere with Agent Youngblood’s ability to take a protective position in the passenger compartment before the third shot was fired.[C8-208]

The assassination suggests that it would have been of prime importance in the protection of the President if the Presidential car permitted immediate access to the President by a Secret Service agent at the first sign of danger. At that time the agents on the running boards of the followup car were expected to perform such a function. However, these agents could not reach the President’s car when it was traveling at an appreciable rate of speed. Even if the car is traveling more slowly, the delay involved in reaching the President may be crucial. It is clear that at the time of the shots in Dallas, Agent Clinton J. Hill leaped to the President’s rescue as quickly as humanly possible. Even so, analysis of the motion picture films taken by amateur photographer Zapruder reveals that Hill first placed his hand on the Presidential car at frame 343, 30 frames and therefore approximately 1.6 seconds after the President was shot in the head.[C8-209] About 3.7 seconds after the President received this wound, Hill had both feet on the car and was climbing aboard to assist President and Mrs. Kennedy.[C8-210]

_Planning for motorcade contingencies._--In response to inquiry by the Commission regarding the instructions to agents in a motorcade of emergency procedures to be taken in a contingency such as that which actually occurred, the Secret Service responded:

The Secret Service has consistently followed two general
principles in emergencies involving the President. All agents
are so instructed. The first duty of the agents in the
motorcade is to attempt to cover the President as closely
as possible and practicable and to shield him by attempting
to place themselves between the President and any source of
danger. Secondly, agents are instructed to remove the President
as quickly as possible from known or impending danger.
Agents are instructed that it is not their responsibility to
investigate or evaluate a present danger, but to consider any
untoward circumstances as serious and to afford the President
maximum protection at all times. No responsibility rests
upon those agents near the President for the identification
or arrest of any assassin or an attacker. Their primary
responsibility is to stay with and protect the President.

Beyond these two principles the Secret Service believes a
detailed contingency or emergency plan is not feasible because
the variations possible preclude effective planning. A number
of steps are taken, however, to permit appropriate steps to
be taken in an emergency. For instance, the lead car always
is manned by Secret Service agents familiar with the area and
with local law enforcement officials; the radio net in use in
motorcades is elaborate and permits a number of different means
of communication with various local points. A doctor is in the
motorcade.[C8-211]

This basic approach to the problem of planning for emergencies is sound. Any effort to prepare detailed contingency plans might well have the undesirable effect of inhibiting quick and imaginative responses. If the advance preparation is thorough, and the protective devices and techniques employed are sound, those in command should be able to direct the response appropriate to the emergency.

The Commission finds that the Secret Service agents in the motorcade who were immediately responsible for the President’s safety reacted promptly at the time the shots were fired. Their actions demonstrate that the President and the Nation can expect courage and devotion to duty from the agents of the Secret Service.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission’s review of the provisions for Presidential protection at the time of President Kennedy’s trip to Dallas demonstrates the need for substantial improvements. Since the assassination, the Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury have properly taken the initiative in reexamining major aspects of Presidential protection. Many changes have already been made and others are contemplated, some of them in response to the Commission’s questions and informal suggestions.

Assassination a Federal Crime

There was no Federal criminal jurisdiction over the assassination of President Kennedy. Had there been reason to believe that the assassination was the result of a conspiracy, Federal jurisdiction could have been asserted; it has long been a Federal crime to conspire to injure any Federal officer, on account of, or while he is engaged in, the lawful discharge of the duties of his office.[C8-212] Murder of the President has never been covered by Federal law, however, so that once it became reasonably clear that the killing was the act of a single person, the State of Texas had exclusive jurisdiction.

It is anomalous that Congress has legislated in other ways touching upon the safety of the Chief Executive or other Federal officers, without making an attack on the President a crime. Threatening harm to the President is a Federal offense,[C8-213] as is advocacy of the overthrow of the Government by the assassination of any of its officers.[C8-214] The murder of Federal judges, U.S. attorneys and marshals, and a number of other specifically designated Federal law enforcement officers is a Federal crime.[C8-215] Equally anomalous are statutory provisions which specifically authorize the Secret Service to protect the President, without authorizing it to arrest anyone who harms him. The same provisions authorize the Service to arrest without warrant persons committing certain offenses, including counterfeiting and certain frauds involving Federal checks or securities.[C8-216] The Commission agrees with the Secret Service[C8-217] that it should be authorized to make arrests without warrant for all offenses within its jurisdiction, as are FBI agents and Federal marshals.[C8-218]

There have been a number of efforts to make assassination a Federal crime, particularly after the assassination of President McKinley and the attempt on the life of President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt.[C8-219] In 1902 bills passed both Houses of Congress but failed of enactment when the Senate refused to accept the conference report.[C8-220] A number of bills were introduced immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy.[C8-221]

The Commission recommends to the Congress that it adopt legislation which would:

Punish the murder or manslaughter of, attempt or conspiracy to
murder, kidnaping of and assault upon

the President, Vice President, or other officer next in
the order of succession to the Office of President, the
President-elect and the Vice-President-elect,

whether or not the act is committed while the victim is in
the performance of his official duties or on account of such
performance.

Such a statute would cover the President and Vice President or, in the absence of a Vice President, the person next in order of succession. During the period between election and inauguration, the President-elect and Vice-President-elect would also be covered. Restricting the coverage in this way would avoid unnecessary controversy over the inclusion or exclusion of other officials who are in the order of succession or who hold important governmental posts. In addition, the restriction would probably eliminate a need for the requirement which has been urged as necessary for the exercise of Federal power, that the hostile act occur while the victim is engaged in or because of the performance of official duties.[C8-222] The governmental consequences of assassination of one of the specified officials give the United States ample power to act for its own protection.[C8-223] The activities of the victim at the time an assassination occurs and the motive for the assassination bear no relationship to the injury to the United States which follows from the act. This point was ably made in the 1902 debate by Senator George F. Hoar, the sponsor of the Senate bill:

* * * what this bill means to punish is the crime of
interruption of the Government of the United States and the
destruction of its security by striking down the life of the
person who is actually in the exercise of the executive power,
or of such persons as have been constitutionally and lawfully
provided to succeed thereto in case of a vacancy. It is
important to this country that the interruption shall not take
place for an hour * * *[C8-224]

Enactment of this statute would mean that the investigation of any of the acts covered and of the possibility of a further attempt would be conducted by Federal law enforcement officials, in particular, the FBI with the assistance of the Secret Service.[C8-225] At present, Federal agencies participate only upon the sufferance of the local authorities. While the police work of the Dallas authorities in the early identification and apprehension of Oswald was both efficient and prompt, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who strongly supports such legislation, testified that the absence of clear Federal jurisdiction over the assassination of President Kennedy led to embarrassment and confusion in the subsequent investigation by Federal and local authorities.[C8-226] In addition, the proposed legislation will insure that any suspects who are arrested will be Federal prisoners, subject to Federal protection from vigilante justice and other threats.[C8-227]

Committee of Cabinet Officers

As our Government has become more complex, agencies other than the Secret Service have become involved in phases of the overall problem of protecting our national leaders. The FBI is the major domestic investigating agency of the United States, while the CIA has the primary responsibility for collecting intelligence overseas to supplement information acquired by the Department of State. The Secret Service must rely in large part upon the investigating capacity and experience of these and other agencies for much of its information regarding possible dangers to the President. The Commission believes that it is necessary to improve the cooperation among these agencies and to emphasize that the task of Presidential protection is one of broad national concern.

The Commission suggests that consideration might be given to assigning to a Cabinet-level committee or the National Security Council (which is responsible for advising the President respecting the coordination of departmental policies relating to the national security)[C8-228] the responsibility to review and oversee the protective activities of the Secret Service and the other Federal agencies that assist in safeguarding the President. The Committee should include the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, and, if the Council is used, arrangements should be made for the attendance of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General at any meetings which are concerned with Presidential protection.[C8-229] The Council already includes, in addition to the President and Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and has a competent staff.

The foremost assignment of the Committee would be to insure that the maximum resources of the Federal Government are fully engaged in the job of protecting the President, by defining responsibilities clearly and overseeing their execution. Major needs of personnel or other resources might be met more easily on its recommendation than they have been in the past.

The Committee would be able to provide guidance in defining the general nature of domestic and foreign dangers to Presidential security. As improvements are recommended for the advance detection of potential threats to the President, it could act as a final review board. The expert assistance and resources which it could draw upon would be particularly desirable in this complex and sensitive area.

This arrangement would provide a continuing high-level contact for agencies that may wish to consult respecting particular protective measures. For various reasons the Secret Service has functioned largely as an informal part of the White House staff, with the result that it has been unable, as a practical matter, to exercise sufficient influence over the security precautions which surround Presidential activities. A Cabinet-level committee which is actively concerned with these problems would be able to discuss these matters more effectively with the President.

Responsibilities for Presidential Protection

The assignment of the responsibility of protecting the President to an agency of the Department of the Treasury was largely an historical accident.[C8-230] The Secret Service was organized as a division of the Department of the Treasury in 1865, to deal with counterfeiting. In 1894, while investigating a plot to assassinate President Cleveland, the Service assigned a small protective detail of agents to the White House. Secret Service men accompanied the President and his family to their vacation home in Massachusetts and special details protected him in Washington, on trips, and at special functions. These informal and part-time arrangements led to more systematic protection in 1902, after the assassination of President McKinley; the Secret Service, then the only Federal investigative agency, assumed full-time responsibility for the safety of the President. Since that time, the Secret Service has had and exercised responsibility for the physical protection of the President and also for the preventive investigation of potential threats against the President.

Although the Secret Service has had the primary responsibility for the protection of the President, the FBI, which was established within the Department of Justice in 1908, has had in recent years an increasingly important role to play. In the appropriations of the FBI there has recurred annually an item for the “protection of the person of the President of the United States,” which first appeared in the appropriation of the Department of Justice in 1910 under the heading “Miscellaneous Objects.”[C8-231] Although the FBI is not charged with the physical protection of the President, it does have an assignment, as do other Government agencies, in the field of preventive investigation in regard to the President’s security. As discussed above, the Bureau has attempted to meet its responsibilities in this field by spelling out in its Handbook the procedures which its agents are to follow in connection with information received “indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President” or other protected persons.

With two Federal agencies operating in the same general field of preventive investigation, questions inevitably arise as to the scope of each agency’s authority and responsibility. As the testimony of J. Edgar Hoover and other Bureau officials revealed, the FBI did not believe that its directive required the Bureau to notify the Secret Service of the substantial information about Lee Harvey Oswald which the FBI had accumulated before the President reached Dallas. On the other hand, the Secret Service had no knowledge whatever of Oswald, his background, or his employment at the Book Depository, and Robert I. Bouck, who was in charge of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service, believed that the accumulation of the facts known to the FBI should have constituted a sufficient basis to warn the Secret Service of the Oswald risk.

The Commission believes that both the FBI and the Secret Service have too narrowly construed their respective responsibilities. The Commission has the impression that too much emphasis is placed by both on the investigation of specific threats by individuals and not enough on dangers from other sources. In addition, the Commission has concluded that the Secret Service particularly tends to be the passive recipient of information regarding such threats and that its Protective Research Section is not adequately staffed or equipped to conduct the wider investigative work that is required today for the security of the President.

During the period the Commission was giving thought to this situation, the Commission received a number of proposals designed to improve current arrangements for protecting the President. These proposals included suggestions to locate exclusive responsibility for all phases of the work in one or another Government agency, to clarify the division of authority between the agencies involved, and to retain the existing system but expand both the scope and the operations of the existing agencies, particularly those of the Secret Service and the FBI.

It has been pointed out that the FBI, as our chief investigative agency, is properly manned and equipped to carry on extensive information gathering functions within the United States. It was also suggested that it would take a substantial period of time for the Secret Service to build up the experience and skills necessary to meet the problem. Consequently the suggestion has been made, on the one hand, that all preventive investigative functions relating to the security of the President should be transferred to the FBI, leaving with the Secret Service only the responsibility for the physical protection of the President, that is, the guarding function alone.

On the other hand, it is urged that all features of the protection of the President and his family should be committed to an elite and independent corps. It is also contended that the agents should be intimately associated with the life of the Presidential family in all its ramifications and alert to every danger that might befall it, and ready at any instant to hazard great danger to themselves in the performance of their tremendous responsibility. It is suggested that an organization shorn of its power to investigate all the possibilities of danger to the President and becoming merely the recipient of information gathered by others would become limited solely to acts of physical alertness and personal courage incident to its responsibilities. So circumscribed, it could not maintain the esprit de corps or the necessary alertness for this unique and challenging responsibility.

While in accordance with its mandate this Commission has necessarily examined into the functioning of the various Federal agencies concerned with the tragic trip of President Kennedy to Dallas and while it has arrived at certain conclusions in respect thereto, it seems clear that it was not within the Commission’s responsibility to make specific recommendations as to the long-range organization of the President’s protection, except as conclusions flowing directly from its examination of the President’s assassination can be drawn. The Commission was not asked to apply itself as did the Hoover Commission in 1949, for example, to a determination of the optimum organization of the President’s protection. It would have been necessary for the Commission to take considerable testimony, much of it extraneous to the facts of the assassination of President Kennedy, to put it in a position to reach final conclusions in this respect. There are always dangers of divided responsibility, duplication, and confusion of authority where more than one agency is operating in the same field; but on the other hand the protection of the President is in a real sense a Government-wide responsibility which must necessarily be assumed by the Department of State, the FBI, the CIA, and the military intelligence agencies as well as the Secret Service. Moreover, a number of imponderable questions have to be weighed if any change in the intimate association now established between the Secret Service and the President and his family is contemplated.

These considerations have induced the Commission to believe that the determination of whether or not there should be a relocation of responsibilities and functions should be left to the Executive and the Congress, perhaps upon recommendations based on further studies by the Cabinet-level committee recommended above or the National Security Council.

Pending any such determination, however, this Commission is convinced of the necessity of better coordination and direction of the activities of all existing agencies of Government which are in a position to, and do, furnish information and services related to the security of the President. The Commission feels the Secret Service and the FBI, as well as the State Department and the CIA when the President travels abroad, could improve their existing capacities and procedures so as to lessen the chances of assassination. Without, therefore, coming to final conclusions respecting the long-range organization of the President’s security, the Commission believes that the facts of the assassination of President Kennedy point to certain measures which, while assuming no radical relocation of responsibilities, can and should be recommended by this Commission in the interest of the more efficient protection of the President. These recommendations are reviewed below.

General Supervision of the Secret Service

The intimacy of the Secret Service’s relationship to the White House and the dissimilarity of its protective functions to most activities of the Department of the Treasury have made it difficult for the Treasury to maintain close and continuing supervision. The Commission believes that the recommended Cabinet-level committee will help to correct many of the major deficiencies of supervision disclosed by the Commission’s investigation. Other measures should be taken as well to improve the overall operation of the Secret Service.

Daily supervision of the operations of the Secret Service within the Department of the Treasury should be improved. The Chief of the Service now reports to the Secretary of the Treasury through an Assistant Secretary whose duties also include the direct supervision of the Bureau of the Mint and the Department’s Employment Policy Program, and who also represents the Secretary of the Treasury on various committees and groups.[C8-232] The incumbent has no technical qualifications in the area of Presidential protection.[C8-233] The Commission recommends that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant with the responsibility of supervising the Service. This special assistant should be required to have sufficient stature and experience in law enforcement, intelligence, or allied fields to be able to provide effective continuing supervision, and to keep the Secretary fully informed regarding all significant developments relating to Presidential protection.

This report has already pointed out several respects in which the Commission believes that the Secret Service has operated with insufficient planning or control. Actions by the Service since the assassination indicate its awareness of the necessity for substantial improvement in its administration. A formal and thorough description of the responsibilities of the advance agent is now in preparation by the Service.[C8-234] Work is going forward toward the preparation of formal understandings of the respective roles of the Secret Service and other agencies with which it collaborates or from which it derives assistance and support. The Commission urges that the Service continue this effort to overhaul and define its procedures. While manuals and memoranda are no guarantee of effective operations, no sizable organization can achieve efficiency without the careful analysis and demarcation of responsibility that is reflected in definite and comprehensive operating procedures.

The Commission also recommends that the Secret Service consciously set about the task of inculcating and maintaining the highest standard of excellence and esprit for all of its personnel. This involves tight and unswerving discipline as well as the promotion of an outstanding degree of dedication and loyalty to duty. The Commission emphasizes that it finds no causal connection between the assassination and the breach of regulations which occurred on the night of November 21 at Fort Worth. Nevertheless, such a breach, in which so many agents participated, is not consistent with the standards which the responsibilities of the Secret Service require it to meet.

Preventive Intelligence

In attempting to identify those individuals who might prove a danger to the President, the Secret Service has largely been the passive recipient of threatening communications to the President and reports from other agencies which independently evaluate their information for potential sources of danger. This was the consequence of the Service’s lack of an adequate investigative staff, its inability to process large amounts of data, and its failure to provide specific descriptions of the kind of information it sought.[C8-235]

The Secret Service has embarked upon a complete overhaul of its research activities.[C8-236] The staff of the Protective Research Section (PRS) has been augmented, and a Secret Service inspector has been put in charge of this operation. With the assistance of the President’s Office of Science and Technology, and of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, it has obtained the services of outside consultants, such as the Rand Corp., International Business Machines Corp., and a panel of psychiatric and psychological experts. It has received assistance also from data processing experts at the CIA and from a specialist in psychiatric prognostication at Walter Reed Hospital.[C8-237] As a result of these studies, the planning document submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Bureau of the Budget on August 31, 1964, makes several significant recommendations in this field.[C8-238] Based on the Commission’s investigation, the following minimum goals for improvements are indicated:

_Broader and more selective criteria._--Since the assassination, both the Secret Service and the FBI have recognized that the PRS files can no longer be limited largely to persons communicating actual threats to the President. On December 26, 1963, the FBI circulated additional instructions to all its agents, specifying criteria for information to be furnished to the Secret Service in addition to that covered by the former standard, which was the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President. The new instructions require FBI agents to report immediately information concerning:

Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists (a)
possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b)
who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or
employees of Federal, state or local government or officials
of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed
strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been
involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct
indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts
or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against
organized government.[C8-239]

Alan H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director of the FBI, testified that this revision was initiated by the FBI itself.[C8-240] The volume of references to the Secret Service has increased substantially since the new instructions went into effect; more than 5,000 names were referred to the Secret Service in the first 4 months of 1964.[C8-241] According to Chief Rowley, by mid-June 1964, the Secret Service had received from the FBI some 9,000 reports on members of the Communist Party.[C8-242] The FBI now transmits information on all defectors,[C8-243] a category which would, of course, have included Oswald.

Both Director Hoover and Belmont expressed to the Commission the great concern of the FBI, which is shared by the Secret Service, that referrals to the Secret Service under the new criteria might, if not properly handled, result in some degree of interference with the personal liberty of those involved.[C8-244] They emphasized the necessity that the information now being furnished be handled with judgment and care. The Commission shares this concern. The problem is aggravated by the necessity that the Service obtain the assistance of local law enforcement officials in evaluating the information which it receives and in taking preventive steps.