Chapter V: Conclusion (1)

I may sum up all I have said in a few words. If nothing were necessary but to restore the machinery of government in the States lately in rebellion in point of form, the movements made to that end by the people of the south might be considered satisfactory. But if it is required that the southern people should also accommodate themselves to the results of the war in point of spirit, those movements fall far short of what must be insisted upon.

The loyalty of the masses and most of the leaders of the southern people, consists in submission to necessity. There is, except in individual instances, an entire absence of that national spirit which forms the basis of true loyalty and patriotism.

The emancipation of the slaves is submitted to only in so far as chattel slavery in the old form could not be kept up. But although the freedman is no longer considered the property of the individual master, he is considered the slave of society, and all independent State legislation will share the tendency to make him such. The ordinances abolishing slavery passed by the conventions under the pressure of circumstances, will not be looked upon as barring the establishment of a new form of servitude.

Practical attempts on the part of the southern people to deprive the negro of his rights as a freeman may result in bloody collisions, and will certainly plunge southern society into restless fluctuations and anarchical confusion. Such evils can be prevented only by continuing the control of the national government in the States lately in rebellion until free labor is fully developed and firmly established, and the advantages and blessings of the new order of things have disclosed themselves. This desirable result will be hastened by a firm declaration on the part of the government, that national control in the south will not cease until such results are secured. Only in this way can that security be established in the south which will render numerous immigration possible, and such immigration would materially aid a favorable development of things.

The solution of the problem would be very much facilitated by enabling all the loyal and free-labor elements in the south to exercise a healthy influence upon legislation. It will hardly be possible to secure the freedman against oppressive class legislation and private persecution, unless he be endowed with a certain measure of political power.

As to the future peace and harmony of the Union, it is of the highest importance that the people lately in rebellion be not permitted to build up another "peculiar institution" whose spirit is in conflict with the fundamental principles of our political system; for as long as they cherish interests peculiar to them in preference to those they have in common with the rest of the American people, their loyalty to the Union will always be uncertain.

I desire not to be understood as saying that there are no well-meaning men among those who were compromised in the rebellion. There are many, but neither their number nor their influence is strong enough to control the manifest tendency of the popular spirit. There are great reasons for hope that a determined policy on the part of the national government will produce innumerable and valuable conversions. This consideration counsels lenity as to persons, such as is demanded by the humane and enlightened spirit of our times, and vigor and firmness in the carrying out of principles, such as is demanded by the national sense of justice and the exigencies of our situation.

In submitting this report I desire to say that I have conscientiously endeavored to see things as they were, and to represent them as I saw them: I have been careful not to use stronger language than was warranted by the thoughts I intended to express. A comparison of the tenor of the annexed documents with that of my report, will convince you that I have studiously avoided overstatements. Certain legislative attempts at present made in the south, and especially in South Carolina, seem to be more than justifying the apprehensions I have expressed.

Conscious though I am of having used my best endeavors to draw, from what I saw and learned, correct general conclusions, yet I am far from placing too great a trust in my own judgment, when interests of such magnitude are at stake. I know that this report is incomplete, although as complete as an observation of a few months could enable me to make it. Additional facts might be elicited, calculated to throw new light upon the subject. Although I see no reason for believing that things have changed for the better since I left for the south, yet such may be the case. Admitting all these possibilities, I would entreat you to take no irretraceable step towards relieving the States lately in rebellion from all national control, until such favorable changes are clearly and unmistakably ascertained.

To that end, and by virtue of the permission you honored me with when sending me out to communicate to you freely and unreservedly my views as to measures of policy proper to be adopted, I would now respectfully suggest that you advise Congress to send one or more "investigating committees" into the southern States, to inquire for themselves into the actual condition of things, before final action is taken upon the readmission of such States to their representation in the legislative branch of the government, and the withdrawal of the national control from that section of the country.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CARL SCHURZ.

His Excellency ANDREW JOHNSON, _President of the United States_.

DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING THE REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL CARL SCHURZ.

No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

_Hilton Head, S.C., July_ 27, 1865.

Dear Sir: I have received your letter of the 17th instant, from Charleston, propounding to me three questions, as follows:

1st. Do you think that there are a number of _bona fide_ loyal persons in this State large enough to warrant the early establishment of civil government?

2d. Do you think that the white population of South Carolina, if restored to the possession of political power in this State, would carry out the spirit of the emancipation proclamation, and go to work in a _bona fide_ manner to organize free labor?

3d. What measures do you think necessary to insure such a result in this State?

The first of these questions I am forced to answer in the negative, provided that white persons only are referred to in the expression "_bona fide loyal persons_," and provided that "the early establishment of civil government" means the early withdrawal of the general control of affairs from the United States authorities.

To the second question, I answer that I do not think that the white inhabitants of South Carolina, if left to themselves, are yet prepared to carry out the spirit of the emancipation proclamation; neither do I think that they would organize free labor upon any plan that would be of advantage to both whites and blacks until the mutual distrust and prejudice now existing between the races are in a measure removed.

To the third question I answer, that, in order to secure the carrying out of the "spirit of the emancipation proclamation," and the organization of really free labor in good faith, it appears to me necessary that the military, or some other authority derived from the national government, should retain a supervisory control over the civil affairs in this State until the next season's crops are harvested and secured.

The reasons which have dictated my replies I shall notice quite briefly.

Loyalty in South Carolina--such loyalty as is secured by the taking of the amnesty oath and by the reception of Executive clemency--does not approach the standard of loyalty in the north. It is not the golden fruit of conviction, but the stern and unpromising result of necessity, arising from unsuccessful insurrection. The white population of the State accept the condition which has been imposed upon them, simply because there is no alternative.

They entered upon the war in the spring of 1861 and arrayed themselves on the side of treason with a unanimity of purpose and a malignity of feeling not equalled by that displayed in any other State.

The individual exceptions to this rule were too few in numbers and were possessed of too little power to be taken into account at all. Although the overt treason then inaugurated has been overcome by superior force, few will claim that it has been transformed into loyalty toward the national government. I am clearly of the opinion that it has not, and that time and experience will be necessary to effect such a change.

All intelligent whites admit that the "abolition of slavery" and the "impracticability of secession" are the plain and unmistakable verdicts of the war. Their convictions as yet go no further. Their preference for the "divine institution," and their intellectual belief in the right of a State to secede, are as much articles of faith in their creed at the present moment as they were on the day when the ordinance of secession was unanimously adopted. When the rebel armies ceased to exist, and there was no longer any force that could be invoked for waging war against the nation, the insurgents accepted that fact simply as proof of the impossibility of their establishing an independent government. This sentiment was almost immediately followed by a general desire to save as much property as possible from the general wreck. To this state of the public mind, which succeeded the surrender of the rebel armies with noteworthy rapidity, I am forced to attribute the prevailing willingness and desire of the people to "return" to their allegiance, and resume the avocations of peace.

I do not regard this condition of things as at all discouraging. It is, indeed, better than I expected to see or dared to hope for in so short a time. One good result of it is, that guerilla warfare, which was so very generally apprehended, has never been resorted to in this State. There was a sudden and general change from a state of war to a state of peace, and, with the exception of frequent individual conflicts, mostly between the whites and blacks, and often, it is true, resulting in loss of life, that peace has rarely been disturbed.

It is, however, a peace resulting from a cool and dispassionate appeal to reason, and not from any convictions of right or wrong; it has its origin in the head, and not in the heart. Impotency and policy gave it birth, and impotency, policy and hope keep it alive. It is not inspired by any higher motives than these, and higher motives could hardly be expected to follow immediately in the footsteps of armed insurrection. The hopes of the people are fixed, as a matter of course, upon the President. The whites hope and expect to recover the preponderating influence which they have lost by the war, and which has been temporarily replaced by the military authority throughout the State, and they receive with general satisfaction the appointment of Mr. Perry as provisional governor of the State, and regard it as a step toward their restoration to civil and political power. Even those men who have taken the lead during the war, not only in the heartiness and liberality of their support of the rebel cause, but also in the bitterness of their denunciation of the national government and the loyal people of the northern States, express themselves as entirely satisfied with the shape which events are taking.

The colored population, on the contrary, or that portion of it which moulds the feelings and directs the passions of the mass, look with growing suspicion upon this state of affairs, and entertain the most lively apprehensions with regard to their future welfare. They have no fears of being returned to slavery, having the most implicit faith in our assurance of its abolition for all time to come, but they think they see the power which has held the lash over them through many generations again being restored to their former masters, and they are impressed with a greater or less degree of alarm.

Thus the "irrepressible conflict," the antagonism of interest, thought, and sentiment between the races is perpetuated. The immediate resumption by the whites of the civil and political power of the State would have a tendency to augment this evil. At the present time all differences between the whites and blacks, but more especially those growing out of agreements for compensated labor, are promptly and willingly referred to the nearest military authority for adjustment; the whites well knowing that simple justice will be administered, and the blacks inspired by the belief that we are their friends. This plan works smoothly and satisfactorily. Many of the labor contracts upon the largest plantations have been made with special reference to the planting and harvesting of the next year's crops; others expire with the present year. The immediate restoration of the civil power by removing military restraint from those planters who are not entirely sincere in their allegiance, and have not made their pledges and especially their labor contracts in good faith, and by withdrawing from the blacks that source of protection to which alone they look for justice with any degree of confidence, would, by engendering new suspicions, and new prejudices between the races, work disadvantageously to both in a pecuniary sense, while the successful solution of the important question of free black labor would be embarrassed, deferred, and possibly defeated, inasmuch as it would be placed thereby in the hands of men who are avowedly suspicious of the negro, and have no confidence in his fitness for freedom, or his willingness to work; who regard the abolition of slavery as a great sectional calamity, and who, under the semblance and even the protection of the law, and without violating the letter of the emancipation proclamation, would have it in their power to impose burdens upon the negro race scarcely less irksome than those from which it has theoretically escaped. Indeed, the ordinary vagrancy and apprenticeship laws now in force in some of the New England States (slightly modified perhaps) could be so administered and enforced upon the blacks in South Carolina as to keep them in practical slavery. They could, while bearing the name of freeman, be legally subjected to all the oppressive features of serfdom, peonage, and feudalism combined, without possessing the right to claim, much less the power to exact, any of the prerogatives and amenities belonging to either of those systems of human bondage. All this could be done without violating the letter of the emancipation proclamation; no argument is necessary to prove that it would be a total submission of its spirit. Even upon the presumption that the whites, when again clothed with civil authority, would be influenced by a sincere desire to enforce the emancipation proclamation, and organize free labor upon a wise and just basis, it would seem injudicious to intrust them with unlimited power, which might be wielded to the injury of both races until the prejudices and animosities which generated the rebellion and gave it life and vigor have had time to subside. Few men have any clear conception of what the general good at the present time requires in the way of State legislation. A thousand vague theories are floating upon the public mind.

The evils which we would have to fear from an immediate re-establishment of civil government would be not only hasty and ignorant but excessive legislation. While there may be wide differences of opinion as to which is the greater of these two evils _per se_, I am free to express my belief that one or the other of them would be very likely to follow the immediate restoration of civil government, and that it would be not only injudicious in itself but productive of prospective harm, to whites as well as blacks, to place the former in a position where a community of feeling, the promptings of traditional teachings, and the instincts of self-interest and self-preservation, would so strongly tempt them to make a choice. I believe that a respectable majority of the most intelligent whites would cordially aid any policy calculated, in their opinion, to secure the greatest good of the greatest number, blacks included, but I do not regard them as yet in a condition to exercise an unbiassed judgment in this matter. Inasmuch as very few of them are yet ready to admit the practicability of ameliorating the condition of the black race to any considerable extent, they would not be likely at the present time to devise a wise system of free black labor. Neither would they be zealous and hopeful co-laborers in such a system if desired by others.

I have spoken of the contract system which has been inaugurated by the military authorities throughout the State as working smoothly and satisfactorily. This statement should, of course, be taken with some limitation. It was inaugurated as an expedient under the pressure of stringent necessity at a time when labor was in a greatly disorganized state, and there was manifest danger that the crops, already planted, would be lost for want of cultivation. Many of the negroes, but more especially the able-bodied ones and those possessing no strong family ties, had, under the novel impulses of freedom, left the plantation where they had been laboring through the planting season, and flocked to the nearest military post, becoming a useless and expensive burden upon our hands. Very many plantations, under extensive cultivation, were entirely abandoned. At places remote from military posts, and that had never been visited by our troops, this exodus did not take place so extensively or to a degree threatening a very general loss of crops. The negroes were retained partly through ignorance or uncertainty of their rights and partly through fear of their former masters and the severe discipline unlawfully enforced by them.

Under the assurance that they were free, that they would be protected in the enjoyment of their freedom and the fruits of their labor, but would not be supported in idleness by the government so long as labor could be procured, the flow of negroes into the towns and military posts was stopped, and most of them already accumulated there were induced to return to the plantations and resume work under contracts to be approved and enforced by the military authorities. Both planters and negroes very generally, and apparently quite willingly, fell into this plan as the best that could be improvised. Although there have been many instances of violation of contracts, (more frequently, I think, by the black than by the white,) and although the plan possesses many defects, and is not calculated to develop all the advantages and benefits of a wise free-labor system. I am not prepared to recommend any material modification of it, or anything to replace it, at least for several months to come.

For reasons already suggested I believe that the restoration of civil power that would take the control of this question out of the hands of the United States authorities (whether exercised through the military authorities or through the Freedmen's Bureau) would, instead of removing existing evils, be almost certain to augment them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q.A. GILLMORE, _Major General_.

General CARL SCHURZ, _Charleston, S.C._

No. 4.

Charleston, South Carolina, _July_ 25, 1865.

General: Since handing you my letter of yesterday I have read a speech reported to have been delivered in Greenville, South Carolina, on the 3d instant.

I have judged of Mr. Perry by reports of others, but as I now have an opportunity from his own lips of knowing his opinions, I must request that you will cross out that portion of my letter referring to him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN P. HATCH, _Brevet Major General, Commanding_.

Major General CARL SCHURZ.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DISTRICT OF CHARLESTON,

_Charleston, South Carolina, July_ 24, 1865.

General: In answer to your question as to the disposition of the people being such as to justify their speedy return to the control of political power, I would say no.

Many portions of the State have not yet been visited by our troops, and in other parts not long enough occupied to encourage the formation of a new party, disposed to throw off the old party rulers, who, after thirty years preaching sedition, succeeded in carrying their point and forcing the people into rebellion.

Were elections to be held now, the old leaders already organized would carry everything by the force of their organization. I would say delay action, pardon only such as the governor can recommend, and let him only recommend such as he feels confident will support the views of the government. Men who supported nullification in thirty-two, and have upheld the doctrine of States' rights since, should not be pardoned; they cannot learn new ways. I have read with care the published proceedings of every public meeting held in this State, and have observed that not one single resolution has yet been passed in which the absolute freedom of the colored man was recognized, or the doctrine of the right of secession disavowed. Why is this? Because the old leaders have managed the meetings, and they cannot see that a new order of things exists. They still hope to obtain control of the State, and then to pass laws with reference to the colored people which shall virtually re-establish slavery; and although they look upon secession as at present hopeless, a future war may enable them to again raise the standard.

You ask what signs do they show of a disposition to educate the blacks for the new position they are to occupy? This is a question that has so far been but little discussed. No education, except as to their religious duties, was formerly allowed, and this only to make them contented in their position of servitude. Whilst thoroughly instructed in the injunction, "servants obey your masters," adultery was not only winked at, but, unfortunately, in too many cases practically recommended. A few gentlemen have said to me that they were willing to have the blacks taught to read and write, but little interest appears to be felt on the subject.

With reference to the benefit to be derived by the general government by delaying the formation for the present of a State government, I will be brief. It will discourage the old leaders who are anxious to seize immediately the reins of power. It will, by allowing time for discussion, give the people an opportunity to become acquainted with subjects they have heretofore trusted to their leaders. Wherever our troops go, discussion follows, and it would be best that the people should not commit themselves to a line of policy, they have not had time to examine and decide upon coolly. It will give the young men ambitious of rising opportunity for organizing on a new platform a party which, assisted by the government, can quiet forever the questions which have made the State of South Carolina a thorn in the side of the Union. These young men, many of whom have served in the army, take a practical view of their present condition that the old stay-at-homes cannot be brought to understand. Give them time and support and they will do the work required of them. Their long absence has made it necessary to become acquainted with the people; but they will be listened to as men who have honestly fought in a cause which has failed, and will be respected for as honestly coming out in support of the now only reasonable chance of a peaceful government for the future.

Where our troops have been the longest time stationed we have the most friends; and were the people thoroughly convinced that the government (until they have shown a disposition to unite heartily in its support) is determined not to give them a State government, the change would go on much more rapidly.

The selection of Governor Perry was most fortunate. I know of no other man in South Carolina who could have filled the position.

I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. P. HATCH, _Brevet Major General Commanding_.

General CARL SCHURZ.

No. 5.

Charleston, S.C., _July_ 24, 1865.

General: In compliance with your verbal request, made at our interview this a.m., to express to you my opinions and impressions regarding the status of the people of South Carolina, and of such others of the insurrectionary States with whom I have come in contact, respecting a return to their allegiance to the federal government, and a willingness on their part to sustain and support the same in its efforts to restore and accomplish the actual union of the States, and also their probable adhesion to the several acts and proclamations which have been enacted and promulgated by the legislative and executive branches of the government, I beg to reply, that, as an officer of one of the departments, I have been enabled by constant intercourse with large numbers of this people to form an approximate estimate of the nature of their loyalty, and also to gain a knowledge of the prejudices which remain with them towards the forces, military and political, which have prevailed against them after the struggle of the last four years, and established the integrity and power of the republic.

Whatever may be said upon the abstract question of voluntary or forcible State secession, the defeat of the insurrectionary forces has been so perfect and complete, that the most defiant have already avowed their allegiance to the national government. The first experience of the insurgents is a complete submission, followed by a promise to abstain from all further acts of rebellion--in fact, the nucleus of their loyalty is necessity, while perhaps some with still a sentiment of loyalty in their hearts for the old flag turn back, like the prodigal, with tearful eyes, wasted means, and exhausted energies.

At the present time there can be but few loyal men in the State of South Carolina who, through evil and good report, have withstood the wiles of secession. South Carolina has been sown broadcast for the last thirty years with every conceivable form of literature which taught her children the divine right of State sovereignty, carrying with it all its accompanying evils. The sovereign State of South Carolina in her imperial majesty looked down upon the republic itself, and only through a grand condescension, remained to supervise and balance the power which, when not controlling, she had sworn to destroy. The works of Calhoun were the necessary companion of every man of culture and education. They were by no means confined to the libraries of the economist and politician. When the national troops pillaged the houses and deserted buildings of Charleston, the streets were strewn with the pamphlets, sermons and essays of politicians, clergymen, and belles-lettres scholars, all promulgating, according to the ability and tastes of their several authors, the rights of the sovereign State. No public occasion passed by which did not witness an assertion of these rights, and the gauntlet of defiance was ever upon the ground.

It is the loyalty of such a people that we have to consider. As a people the South Carolinians are brave and generous in certain directions. In their cities there is great culture, and many of the citizens are persons of refinement, education and taste. The educated classes are well versed in the history of our country, and many have an intimate knowledge of the varied story of political parties. But from the lowest to the highest classes of the white population there is an instinctive dread of the negro and an utter abhorrence of any doctrine which argues an ultimate improvement of his condition beyond that of the merest chattel laborer.

The first proposition made by the southerner on all occasions of discussion is, that the emancipation proclamation of the President was a grievous error from every point of view; that in the settlement of the various questions arising from the insurrection, the national government assumes a responsibility which belongs to the several States, and now that the supremacy of the general government is established, and the prospect of a resuscitation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, or simple assertion of the legislative and executive powers of the separate States, a lingering hope yet remains with many, that although African slavery is abolished, the States may yet so legislate as to place the negro in a state of actual peonage and submission to the will of the employer. Therefore, we have combined with a forced and tardy loyalty a lingering hope that such State legislation can be resorted to as will restore the former slave to, as nearly as possible, the condition of involuntary servitude. And the question naturally arises, how long must we wait for a higher and purer expression of fealty to the Union, and for a more intelligent and just appreciation of the question of free colored, labor which the results of the contest have forced upon us?

I am satisfied, that while no efforts must be spared to instil into the minds of the freedmen the necessity of patient labor and endeavor, and a practical knowledge of the responsibilities of their new condition, by a judicious system of education, the white southerner is really the most interesting pupil, and we must all feel a solicitude for his enlightenment.

The principles of liberty have been working for a number of years in our republic, and have secured various great political results. Latterly they have worked with wonderful and rapid effect, and it has ever been by aid of all the forces of education and enlightened commerce between man and man that the progress of true freedom has been hastened and made secure. When the southern planter sees it demonstrated beyond a doubt that the free labor of the black man, properly remunerated, conduces to his pecuniary interests, at that moment he will accept the situation, and not before, unless it is forced upon him; therefore, it is the white southerner that must be educated into a realization of his responsibility in the settlement of these questions, and by a systematic and judicious education of the freedman a citizen will gradually be developed; and the two classes, finding their interests mutual, will soon settle the now vexed question of suffrage. I am firmly of opinion that the government cannot afford to relax its hold upon these States until a loyal press, representing the views of the government, shall disseminate its sentiments broadcast all over this southern land; and when all the avenues and channels of communication shall have been opened, and the policy of the government shall be more easily ascertained and promulgated, and the States, or the citizens thereof in sufficient numbers, shall have avowed by word and act their acceptance of the new order of things, we may then safely consider the expediency of surrendering to each State legislature the duty of framing its necessary constitution and code, and all other adjuncts of civil government. If the form of our government were monarchical, we might be more sanguine of the success of any proposed measure of amnesty, because of the immediate power of the government to suppress summarily any disorder arising from too great leniency; but to delegate to the States themselves the quelling of the tumult which they have themselves raised, is, to say the least, a doubtful experiment. Many thinking Carolinians have said that they preferred that the government should first itself demonstrate the system of free labor, to such an extent that the planter would gladly avail himself of the system and carry it on to its completion.

The presence of a strong military force is still needed in the State of South Carolina to maintain order, and to see that the national laws are respected, as well as to enforce such municipal regulations as the occasion demands. For such service, officers of sound, practical sense should be chosen--men whose appreciation of strict justice both to employer and employee would compensate even for a lack of mere skilful military knowledge; men without the mean prejudices which are the bane of some who wear the insignia of the national service.

I believe that affairs in South Carolina are yet in a very crude state; that outrages are being practiced upon the negro which the military arm should prevent. Doubtless many stories are fabricated or exaggerated, but a calm and candid citizen of Charleston has said: "Is it wonderful that this should be so; that men whose slaves have come at their call, but now demur, hesitate, and perhaps refuse labor or demand certain wages therefor--that such men, smarting under their losses and defeats, should vent their spite upon a race slipping from their power and asserting their newly acquired rights? Is abuse not a natural result?" But time, enlightenment, and the strenuous efforts of the government can prevent much of this.

I am, therefore, convinced that the education of the white and black must go hand in hand together until the system of free labor is so absolutely demonstrated that the interest of the employer will be found in the intelligence, the well-being, and the comfort of the employed. I believe that the great sources of benevolence at the north should still flood this southern land with its bounty--that the national government should encourage each State to receive all the implements of labor, education and comfort which a generous people can bestow, not merely for the benefit of the black freedman, but for the disenthralled white who has grovelled in the darkness of a past age, and who has been, perhaps, the innocent oppressor of a people he may yet serve, and with them enter into the enjoyment of a more glorious freedom than either have ever conceived.

With sentiments of respect and esteem, I beg to remain, general, your obedient servant,

JOHN H. PILSBURY, _Deputy Supervising and Assistant Special Agent Treasury Department_.

Major General CARL SCHURZ, &c., &c., &c.

No. 6.

_VIEWS EXPRESSED BY MAJOR GENERAL STEEDMAN IN CONVERSATION WITH CARL SCHURZ_.

Augusta, Georgia, _August_ 7, 1864.

I have been in command of this department only a month, and can, therefore, not pretend to have as perfect a knowledge of the condition of affairs, and the sentiments of the people of Georgia, as I may have after longer experience. But observations so far made lead me to the following conclusions:

The people of this State, with only a few individual exceptions, are submissive but not loyal.

If intrusted with political power at this time they will in all probability use it as much as possible to escape from the legitimate results of the war. Their political principles, as well as their views on the slavery question, are the same as before the war, and all that can be expected of them is that they will submit to actual necessities from which there is no escape.

The State is quiet, in so far as there is no organised guerilla warfare. Conflicts between whites and blacks are not unfrequent, and in many instances result in bloodshed.

As to the labor question, I believe that the planters of this region have absolutely no conception of what free labor is. I consider them entirely incapable of legislating understandingly upon the subject at the present time.

The organization of labor in this State, especially in the interior, has so far, in most cases, been left to the planters and freedmen themselves, the organization of the Freedmen's Bureau being as yet quite imperfect. A great many contracts have been made between planters and freedmen, some of which were approved by the military authorities and some were not.

General Wilde, the principal agent of the Freedmen's Bureau in this State, is, in my opinion, entirely unfit for the discharge of the duties incumbent upon him. He displays much vigor where it is not wanted, and shows but very little judgment where it is wanted. Until the Freedmen's Bureau will be sufficiently organized in this State I deem it necessary to temporarily intrust the provost marshals, now being stationed all over the State, one to every four counties, with the discharge of its functions, especially as concerns the making of contracts and the adjustment of difficulties between whites and blacks.

I deem it impracticable to refer such difficulties for adjustment to such civil courts as can at present be organized in this State. It would be like leaving each party to decide the case for itself, and would undoubtedly at once result in a free fight. It will be so until the people of this State have a more accurate idea of the rights of the freedmen. The military power is, in my opinion, the only tribunal which, under existing circumstances, can decide difficulties between whites and blacks to the satisfaction of both parties and can make its decisions respected.

As for the restoration of civil power in this State, I apprehend it cannot be done without leading to the necessity of frequent interference on the part of the military until the sentiments of the people of Georgia have undergone a very great change.

This memorandum was read to General Steedman by me and he authorized me to submit it in this form to the President.

C. SCHURZ.

No. 7.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF COLUMBUS,

_Macon, Georgia, August_ 14, 1885.

General: There are no loyal people in Georgia, except the negroes; nor are there any considerable number who would under any circumstances offer armed resistance to the national authority. An officer, without arms or escort, could arrest any man in the State. But, while their submission is thus complete and universal, it is not a matter of choice, but a stern necessity which they deplore.

If allowed they will readily reorganize their State government and administer it upon correct principles, except in matters pertaining to their former slaves. On this subject they admit the abolition of the institution, and will so frame their constitution, hoping thereby to procure their recognition as a State government, when they will at once, by legislation, reduce the freedmen to a condition worse than slavery. Yet while they will not recognize the rights of their former slaves themselves, they will submit to its full recognition by the national government, which can do just as it pleases and no resistance will be offered. My own clear opinion is, it will have to do everything that may be necessary to secure real practical freedom to the former slaves.

The disturbances at present are chiefly due, I think, to the swarm of vagrants thrown upon society by the disbanding of the rebel armies and the emancipation of the slaves at a season of the year when it is difficult for those who seek to find employment.

After the 1st of January I apprehend no trouble, as the culture of the next crop will absorb all the labor of the country. In the interim a great deal of care and diligence will be required. Hence I recommend the importance of sending men of energy and business capacity to manage the affairs of the Freedmen's Bureau.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN T. CROXTON, _Brigadier General United States_.

General CARL SCHURZ.

No. 8.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

_New Orleans, June_ 20, 1865.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit for your consideration a copy of the correspondence between the governor of Louisiana and myself touching the relations between the State and the military authorities in this department.

The instructions upon this subject are, and probably designedly, indefinite. They indicate, however, the acceptance by the President of the constitution of the State, adopted in September, 1864, as the means of re-establishing civil government in the State and the recognition of the governor as his agent in accomplishing this work. The same principle gives validity to such of the State laws as are not in conflict with this constitution, or repealed by congressional legislation, or abrogated by the President's proclamation or orders issued during the rebellion.

This leaves many questions undetermined, except so far as they are settled by the law of nations and the laws of war, so far as my authority extends. I will turn over all such questions to the State government; and in cases that do not come within the legitimate authority of a military commander, will report them for such action as his excellency the President, or the War Department, may think proper to adopt.

I have had a very free conference with the governor upon this subject, and I believe that he concurs with me that the course I have indicated in the correspondence with him is not only the legal but the only course that will avoid the appeals to the local courts by interested or designing men, which are now dividing those who profess to be working for the same object--the re-establishment of civil authority throughout the State.

Then, in addition, many questions, in which the interests of the government are directly involved, or in which the relations of the general government to the States, as affected by the rebellion, are left unsettled by any adequate legislation. I do not think it will be wise to commit any of these questions, either directly or indirectly, to the jurisdiction of the State or other local courts, and will not so commit them unless instructed to do so.

It is very possible that in the varied and complicated questions that will come up there may be differences of opinion between the governor and myself, but there shall be no discord of action, and I will give to his efforts the fullest support in my power.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir,

E.R.S. CANBY, _Major General Commanding_.

The SECRETARY OF WAR, _Washington, D.C._

Official copy:

R. DES ANGES, _Major, A.A.G._

STATE OF LOUISIANA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

_New Orleans, June_ 10, 1865.

General: There is a class of officers holding and exercising the duties of civil officers in this State who claim to hold their right to the same by virtue of deriving their appointment from military authority exercised either by General Shepley as military governor, or Michael Hahn, and in some cases by Major General Banks, commander of the department of the Gulf. These men resist my power to remove on the ground that I am not clothed with military power, although the offices they fill are strictly civil offices, and the power of appointing to the same to fill vacancies (which constructively exist until the office is filled according to law) is one of my prerogatives as civil governor. To dispossess these men by legal process involves delay and trouble. Many of the persons so holding office are obnoxious to the charges of official misconduct and of obstructing my efforts to re-establish civil government.

For the purpose, therefore, of settling the question, and relieving the civil government of the State from the obstructions to its progress caused by the opposition of these men, I would respectfully suggest to you, general, the expediency of your issuing an order revoking all appointments made by military or semi-military authority to civil offices in this State prior to the 4th of March, 1865, the date on which I assumed the duties of governor. I fix that date because it is only since that period the governor has been confined to strictly civil powers, and what military power has been exercised since in appointments to office has been from necessity and was unavoidable.

I throw out these suggestions, general, for your consideration. On my recent visit to the capital I had full and free conversation with President Johnson on the subject of reorganizing civil government in Louisiana, and while deprecating the interference of military power in civil government beyond the point of actual necessity, yet he fully appreciated the difficulties of my position, and assured me that I should be sustained by him in all necessary and legal measures to organize and uphold civil government.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, &c.,

J. MADISON WELLS, _Governor of Louisiana_.

Major General E.R.S. CANBY, _Commanding Department of the Gulf_.

Official copy:

R. DES ANGES, _Major, A.A.G._

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

_New Orleans, June_ 19, 1865.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 10th instant, asking me to revoke all appointments made by military or semi-military authority to civil offices in the State prior to the 4th of March, 1865.

I have given this subject the attention and serious consideration which its importance demands, and I find it complicated not only with the private and public interests of the people and State of Louisiana, but also with the direct interests of the government of the United States, or with the obligations imposed upon the government by the condition of the country or by the antecedent exercise of lawful military authority. To the extent that these considerations obtain they are controlling considerations, and I cannot find that I have any authority to delegate the duties devolved upon me by my official position, or to evade the responsibilities which it imposes. I venture the suggestion, also, that the evils complained of, and which are so apparent and painful to all who are interested in the restoration of civil authority, will scarcely be obtained by the course you recommend, but will, in my judgment, give rise to complications that will embarrass not only the State but the general government.

All officers who hold their offices by the tenure of military appointment are subject to military authority and control, and will not be permitted to interfere in any manner whatever with the exercise of functions that have been committed to you as governor of Louisiana. If they are obnoxious to the charge of misconduct in office, or of obstructing you in your efforts to re-establish civil government, they will, upon your recommendation, be removed. If, under the constitution and laws of the State, the power of appointment resides in the governor, my duty will be ended by vacating the appointment. If the office is elective, the military appointment will be cancelled so soon as the successor is elected and qualified. In the alternative cases the removal will be made, and successors recommended by you, and against whom there are no disqualifying charges, will be appointed.

This, in my judgment, is the only course which will remove all legal objections, or even legal quibbles.

I desire to divest myself as soon as possible of all questions of civil administration, and will separate, as soon and as far as I can, all such questions from those that are purely military in their character, and commit them to the care of the proper officers of the civil government.

Some of these questions are complicated in their character, and involve not only private and public interests, but the faith of the national government; originating in the legal exercise of military authority, they can only be determined by the same authority.

There is another consideration, not directly but incidentally involved in the subject of your communication, to which I have the honor to invite your attention. The results of the past four years have worked many changes both as to institutions and individuals within the insurrectionary States, giving to some of the interests involved an absolutely national character, and in others leaving the relations between the general government and the States undetermined. So far as Congress has legislated upon these subjects, it has placed them under the direct control of the general government, and under the laws of nations and laws of war the same principle applies to the other subject. Until Congress has legislated upon this subject, or until Executive authority sanctions it, no questions of this character will be committed to the jurisdiction of the local courts.

I make these suggestions to you for the reason that I have already found a strong disposition in some sections of the country to forestall the action of the general government by bringing these subjects more or less directly under the control of the local courts; and I have neither the authority nor the disposition to establish precedents that may possibly embarrass the future action of the government.

I take this occasion to assure your excellency of my hearty co-operation in your efforts to re-establish civil government, and in any measures that may be undertaken for the benefit of the State or people of Louisiana.

I shall be happy at all times to confer with you upon any of these subjects, and to give you, whenever necessary, any assistance that you may require.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E.R.S. CANBY, _Major General, Commanding_.

His Excellency the GOVERNOR OF LOUISIANA, _New Orleans, La_.

Official copy:

R. DES ANGES, _Major, A.A.G._

STATE OF LOUISIANA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

_New Orleans, June_ 23, 1865.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 16th instant, in answer to mine of the 13th, relating to the expediency of your revoking the appointment of all civil officers in the State made by military or semi-military authority. I desire to state that your views and suggestions, as regards your duty and proper course of action in the premises, are entirely satisfactory to me. For the care you have bestowed on the subject, and the earnest disposition you evince to do all in your power to promote the interests of civil government in this unfortunate State, by co-operating with and sustaining me in all legitimate measures to that end, I beg to return you, not only my own thanks, but I feel authorized to speak for the great mass of our fellow-citizens, and to include them in the same category.

With high respect, I subscribe myself, your obedient servant,

J. MADISON WELLS, _Governor of Louisiana_.

Major General E.R.S. CANBY, _Commanding Department of the Gulf_.

Official copy:

R. DES ANGES, _Major, A.A.G._

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF LOUISIANA,

_New Orleans, September_ 8, 1865.

Sir: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to submit some remarks upon the civil government of Louisiana, and its relation to the military administration of this department. These relations are more anomalous and complicated, probably, than in any other insurrectionary State, and it will be useful in considering these questions to bear in mind the changes that have occurred since the occupation of this city by the Union forces. These are, briefly--

1. The military administration of the commander of the department of the Gulf, Major General Butler.

2. The military government, of which Brigadier General Shepley was the executive, by appointment of the President.

3. The provisional government, of which the Hon. M. Hahn was the executive, by appointment of the President, upon nomination by the people at an election held under military authority.

4. The constitutional government, organized under the constitution adopted by the convention in July, 1864, and ratified by the people at an election held in September of that year. Of this government the Hon. J.M. Wells is the present executive.

This government has not yet been recognized by Congress, and its relation to the military authority of the department has never been clearly defined. Being restrained by constitutional limitations, its powers are necessarily imperfect, and it is frequently necessary to supplant them by military authority. Many of the civil officers still hold their positions by the tenure of military appointments holding over until elections can be held under the constitution. These appointments may be vacated by the commander of the department, and, if under the constitution the power of appointment reside in the governor, be filled by him: if it does not, the appointment must be filled by the military commander. Very few removals and no appointments have been made by me during my command of the department; but the governor has been advised that all persons holding office by the tenure of military appointment were subject to military supervision and control, and would not be permitted to interfere in the duties committed to him by the President of restoring "civil authority in the State of Louisiana;" that upon his recommendation, and for _cause_, such officers would be removed; and if the power of appointment was not under the constitution vested in him, the appointment would be made by the department commander, if, upon his recommendation, there was no disqualifying exception.

The instructions to the military commanders, in relation to the previous governments, were general, and I believe explicit; but, as their application passed away with the existence of these governments, it is not necessary to refer to them here. Those that relate to the constitutional government are very brief, so far, at least, as they have reached me. In a confidential communication from his excellency to the late President, in which he deprecated, in strong terms, any military interferences, and expressed very freely his own views and wishes, he concluded by saying that "the military must be judge and master so long as the necessity for the military remains;" and, in my instructions from the War Department, of May 28, 1865, the Secretary of War says: "The President directs me to express his wish that the military authorities render all proper assistance to the civil authorities in control in the State of Louisiana, and not to interfere with its action further than it may be necessary for the peace and security of the department."