Chapter M: Black, (1)

_Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A._

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Surgeon Horace Wardner, recalled and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. Have you heard our examination of the wounded in this hospital from Fort Pillow?

Answer. I have.

Question. Did you have any conversation with them when they were first brought to the hospital?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did the statements they made to you then correspond with their statements to us?

Answer. They did.

Question. Do the nature and character of their injuries sustain their statements in regard to their injuries?

Answer. The character of the injuries of these men corroborates their statements in regard to the treatment they received from the rebels.

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MOUND CITY, ILLINOIS, _April 23, 1864_.

Captain Alexander M. Pennock, United States navy, sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank and position in the navy?

Answer. I am a captain in the United States navy; fleet captain of the Mississippi squadron, and commandant of the station of Cairo and Mound City.

Question. How long have you been in the naval service?

Answer. Since the first of April, 1828.

Question. Will you please state what services have been rendered by the naval forces here in checking and preventing the recent movements of the rebel Forrest and his command in this vicinity?

Answer. Two gunboats were at Paducah at the time the attack was made upon that place; they rendered efficient service there. On receiving information that Paducah had been attacked, or that there was a probability of its being attacked, I immediately went to Cairo from Mound City, with Captain Shirk, of the navy, and conferred with General Brayman and General Veatch. A regiment was sent by General Veatch up to Paducah. An armed despatch boat was also sent up, with Captain Shirk on board, and Captain Odlin, assistant adjutant general on General Brayman's staff, to ascertain the facts, and render such assistance as might be needed. I was informed by both Captain Shirk and Captain Odlin that the gunboats there, and the fort, had expended a great deal of ammunition and were getting short of it. Ammunition both for the army and navy was immediately sent up; a division of gunboats from the Cumberland river, Captain Fitch commanding, came down after the fight and re-enforced Captain Shirk at Paducah.

Information having reached me that the rebels were crossing over into Illinois in small squads, four gunboats were stationed by the two above-named naval officers between Paducah and Mound City, to prevent their crossing, and orders were given them to destroy all ferries and skiffs, in fact all means of communication across the Ohio river.

A gunboat had been stationed at Columbus, Kentucky. Hearing that the surrender of that place had been demanded, I despatched Captain Fitch with two of the Cumberland river boats, and another gunboat which was here for repairs, to Columbus, with orders if all was quiet there to go down the river a far as Hickman. I instructed him that the Mississippi river must be kept clear at all hazards. After having given this order, which was in writing, the captain of a steamboat came to me and informed me that Fort Pillow had been attacked, and that the captain of the gunboat stationed there sent word that he had expended nearly all his ammunition. I directed Captain Fitch, if he could be spared from Columbus, to go down to Fort Pillow with his three boats, and I immediately had placed on board a despatch boat the ammunition required for the gunboat then at Fort Pillow. And boats have since been cruising up and down the Ohio river, and the Mississippi river as far as Fort Pillow, for the purpose of giving convoy and keeping the river open. On the arrival of Captain Fitch near Fort Pillow, he found the enemy in force on this side of the fort, behind wood piles on the bank of the river; they were burning wood and barges there. They were shelled and driven off. Captain Fitch also prevented a detachment of rebels from crossing over to an island, where a number of transports and other boats had been detained, which the rebels desired to capture or destroy. He convoyed that fleet as far as Fort Pillow, clear of danger. Afterwards three boats were sent down to Hickman, for the purpose of giving protection to such Union men as desired to leave and bring away their goods, and if possible to capture any rebels that might be in the place. A detachment of marines accompanied this expedition. The town was surrounded twice, once by day and once by night; the guerillas had been in there and escaped. The people of Hickman were warned that if even a musket shot was again fired at a transport or other boat the place would be at once destroyed. These boats have been moving constantly day and night, and despatch boats have been furnished by the navy to convey despatches for General Sherman and General Brayman, up the Tennessee river, or wherever they might require. I would add that when Captain Fitch returned from Fort Pillow he brought away with him refugees, women and children, who had been left there, and ten wounded soldiers who had been there for two days.

Question. What, in your opinion, would be the competent military and naval force to protect the public property at Cairo and Mound City?

Answer. Two gunboats and 2,000 men.

Question. State briefly your reason for believing so large a force is required for that purpose.

Answer. For the reason that we have public property extending along the river for seven miles, and we should be ready for any emergency.

Question. What amount of property would be destroyed here, should the enemy get possession long enough to destroy it?

Answer. It is difficult to estimate its value accurately. We have here a a large number of guns, and all the ammunition and other supplies for the Mississippi fleet, consisting of at least 100 vessels.

Question. What effect would the destruction or capture of this property have upon operations here in the west?

Answer. It would paralyze the fleet.

Question. For how long a time?

Answer. For the entire season, besides giving the enemy means to act more on the offensive--means enough to last them for a campaign.

Question. Is it also true that all the army supplies for the western department pass through here?

Answer. To the best of my knowledge it is.

Question. What force have you here at Mound City now?

Answer. I have two gunboats, 85 marines, 100 mechanics, who have been armed and drilled, one company of the invalid corps, and a detachment of convalescents from the hospital. Any other forces that may be here are merely temporary.

Question. What force have you at Cairo?

Answer. Seventy-odd marines. But those we have only to protect the wharf boat and the inspection boat, which have on board provisions, ship chandlery, &c. Admiral Porter has ordered me to move them up to this point whenever I can do so without detriment to the public service. I understand that there is a permanent garrison at Cairo of between 300 and 400 men. When General Brayman was compelled to re-enforce Columbus, he was compelled to take away from there all except about 150 men.

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Captain James W. Shirk, United States navy, sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the navy, and where are you stationed at this time?

Answer. I am a lieutenant commander, and commandant of the United States gunboat Tuscumbia, and the 7th district of the Mississippi squadron, which extends from the headwaters of the Tennessee river to Cairo.

Question. How long have you been in service in the west?

Answer. I have been attached to this squadron since the 6th of September, 1862.

Question. You are acquainted with the immense amount of public property at Mound City and Cairo?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you consider that there is a permanent force here, both naval and military, large enough for its protection?

Answer. I do not consider that there has been force enough here heretofore.

Question. What, in your judgment, would be a force sufficient to render that protection and security which the place ought to have?

Answer. I should think it would take a couple of gunboats, and at least two full regiments. The great danger to be apprehended here is from fire.

Question. Will you now state what services the navy has rendered in the late raids in this region of country?

Answer. I will state in regard to my own division. I returned to Paducah, from a trip up the Tennessee river, on the 25th of March, at noon. I immediately called upon Colonel Hicks, the commandant of that post, as was my custom, to hear what news he had. He informed me that the rebels had taken Union City the day before, and that he expected an attack there that night. As I had just come down from the southern part of Tennessee, and had heard nothing of Forrest there, and as I had been told so many times before without cause that the rebels were threatening to attack Paducah, I did not put much confidence in the report; at the same time, I did not wish to leave the place unprotected by gunboats, and I accordingly left the Peosta and the Pawpaw at that place, while I came down to Cairo to communicate with Captain Pennock and the authorities here, in order to find out whether or not there was any truth in the report. I left Paducah about one o'clock and arrived here about dark. Shortly after I arrived here the telegraphic operator at Metropolis telegraphed down that Paducah was in flames. Captain Pennock and I went down to Cairo to see Generals Brayman and Veatch. General Veatch ordered a regiment of his troops up to Paducah to re-enforce Colonel Hicks, and I immediately started up in the despatch boat Volunteer with Captain Odlin, General Brayman's assistant adjutant general. On our way up we destroyed several ferryboats and skiffs, in order to prevent the rebels crossing the river. We arrived at Paducah about daylight on the 26th of March. The enemy was in force about two miles and a half from town. It was reported to me by my subordinate officers that the enemy had attacked the place about three o'clock in the evening of the day before; that the fort had been bravely defended and preserved by the gallantry of Colonel Hicks and his small garrison, assisted very materially by the two gunboats which I had left there; that Forrest had occupied the town; that about ten o'clock that night he had been driven out by the fire of the Peosta, she having gone up and shelled the town for that purpose. I placed myself in communication with Colonel Hicks on the morning of the 26th, and found that he was short of ammunition, as were also the gunboats. I immediately telegraphed to Captain Pennock to send up a full supply of ammunition for the two gunboats, and 30,000 rounds of Enfield cartridges for Colonel Hicks. The supplies were sent up by him immediately, and reached us that evening. In the afternoon, about three o'clock, Colonel Hicks sent me a message that the enemy were forming in line of battle at the head of Jersey street, and requested me to open upon them with shell. I fired shell in that direction, and about four o'clock the enemy left in the direction of Mayfield. The captains of the Peosta and the Pawpaw both informed me that the day before the rebels took advantage of the presence of women there, behind whom they covered themselves, and fired at the officers and men on the gunboats. The women came running down towards the fort, and the rebels got behind them and fired at our people on the boats.

Question. And the boats could not fire upon the rebels without killing the women?

Answer. No, sir. And the rebels also took advantage of a flag of truce, while it was flying, to enter the town and plant their batteries there, and to get into brick houses on the levee, from which to fire on the gunboats, while the flag of truce was flying at the fort. I returned that night at midnight to Cairo, and assisted Captain Pennock as much as I could in making preparations to take care of the public property, as I knew that some few stragglers had crossed the Ohio above, and we were fearful they would come down and burn the public property here. Again, on the 12th of this month, I was at Paducah. The rebels were reported in force all around the town. I telegraphed to Captain Pennock, giving him that information, and also that in my opinion Colonel Hicks ought to be re-enforced. Another regiment was immediately sent up by General Brayman, and Lieutenant Commander Fitch, commanding the 8th district of the Mississippi squadron, by direction of Captain Pennock, sent four of his gunboats to report to me for duty. I made disposition of four gunboats, each with ten marines on board, to patrol between Paducah and Mound City. The enemy hovered around us until about noon of the 14th, when they made a dash upon the town, sending in a flag of truce to Colonel Hicks, giving him one hour to remove the women and children from the town. I immediately ordered all the transports to the Illinois shore, and took the women and children over there. When the hour was up I was informed that the rebels were in Jersey, a suburb of the town, and Colonel Hicks wished me to go up there and shell them. I did so, with two gunboats, carrying long-range rifled guns, firing about 120 rounds of shell, which fell in among them. The rebels retired, and encamped from three to six miles out of town that night. When the flag of truce was sent in to the fort, squads of rebel cavalry came into town and stole all the government horses there, and also a great many belonging to private citizens.

Question. Under the flag of truce?

Answer. Yes, sir; as the flag of truce came in and went to the fort they came into the town.

Question. Is not that a direct and utter violation of the rules of warfare?

Answer. It is a direct violation of the flag of truce. I have had three or four boats up the Tennessee river all the time. There are three up there now, one having come out the day before yesterday. There were two to have started this morning at daylight, and I received a despatch this forenoon, saying that the enemy were reported to be crossing the Tennessee river at Birmingham and above, in force, from the west to the east side. I immediately telegraphed to Paducah and had two heavy gunboats go up to ascertain the truth of the report. I do not credit the story, but I have done all I possibly could do, with the limited number of boats at my command.

Question. How long have you been in the navy?

Answer. Fifteen years.

Question. You are acquainted with the administration of Captain Pennock, of the navy, here?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What do you say of it?

Answer. I do not think any one could have done more than Captain Pennock has done, with the means at his command.

Question. Why is it that we do not hear more of the transactions of the gunboats out here, while we hear so much of what the army does?

Answer. One reason is that there is a general order by Admiral Porter, prohibiting any newspaper reporter from going on board any vessel in the Mississippi squadron.

Question. Is there a cordial understanding and co-operation between the navy here and the military forces under General Brayman?

Answer. I think there is to a very great degree. I never saw more cordiality existing between officers of the different services. I would like to say further, that during this late raid I convoyed General Veatch's division up the Tennessee river. It was ordered up there by General Sherman to land at or near Savannah, and go out to Purdy and the Hatchie, in that way intending to catch Forrest. I afterwards sent up another despatch of the same purport, from General Sherman to General Veatch, which reached him at the landing near Purdy. I sent up a third despatch to him, which was brought here by General Corse from General Sherman. That despatch never reached General Veatch for the reason that he had come back from Purdy, gone on up the Tennessee and disembarked his troops at Waterloo, Alabama, and was out of reach of my gunboats.

Captain Smith, commanding the Peosta, broke up a rebel recruiting office at Brooklyn, Illinois, a week ago last Sunday. The recruiting office was on board a trading vessel. He destroyed the boat, but saved seven new rebel uniforms that were on it. He could not discover the recruiting agent there, there being so many secesh sympathizers around there.

Question. In your opinion, has General Brayman acted with vigilance and activity, and done all he could with the forces intrusted to him, during these raids?

Answer. So far as I know, he has done all he could do.

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CAIRO, ILLINOIS, _April 24, 1864_.

Major General Steven A. Hurlbut, sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers, commanding the 16th army corps.

Question. Where have you been stationed?

Answer. I have been stationed at Memphis for the last sixteen months.

Question. How long have you been stationed along the river?

Answer. Ever since the battle of Shiloh. I have commanded at Bolivar and Jackson, Tennessee, until about the 20th of November, 1862, when I was ordered to Memphis.

Question. Now, with regard to this raid of Forrest, was that raid made in your department?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Please give us, in your own way, a brief account of that raid.

Answer. Forrest first crossed the Memphis and Charleston railroad last December. I organized a force in Columbus, and moved it down and drove him out. General Sherman then ordered all the available troops in my command to be got together--leaving very small garrisons at the important points--for the Meridian expedition. I marched and crossed there, and marched back again. Two divisions of my command were then detailed to go up Red river, under General Banks. As an auxiliary to the infantry movement to Meridian, General W. S. Smith came to Memphis and took command of all my cavalry and another brigade which he brought over, all amounting to about seven thousand effective men, to move across the country, drive the enemy's force out, cut his way across to Columbus and Aberdeen, and to go down to the Mobile and Ohio railroad, and join us at Meridian. He failed to make that junction; was met by Forrest about West Point, and for some reason or other (I do not know what) retreated and fell back to Memphis. The effect of a retreat, at the rate at which they retreated, and the loss they met with, and the retreating before an inferior force, demoralized the cavalry very seriously. I returned to Memphis about the Three Points, marched, and found that Forrest was organizing a very considerable force, so far as I could find out, with the intention of moving up to West Tennessee. I had orders from the War Department to send home all the veteran regiments (cavalry especially) as rapidly as possible. I took an inventory of my force, and found that I had about six thousand cavalry to two thousand two hundred horses, which limited the efficiency of the cavalry. I furloughed and sent home the 3d Michigan, 2d Iowa, 3d, 6th, 7th, and 9th Illinois, and distributed their horses among the men that were left, so as to keep men enough always, and more, to mount with horses. Forrest moved up, and crossed the line of the Charleston and Memphis railroad, towards Jackson, Tennessee, and occupied it. General Grierson was directed by me to go out with his cavalry, feel him, attack him, and cripple him as much as possible. He went out, and reported that he was "a little too strong for him, and he could not touch him." My effective force at Memphis consisted of 2,200 cavalry, 2,100 white infantry, and 2,400 colored infantry. I had the choice to move out a force sufficiently strong to attack Forrest and leave Memphis open, with its immense amount of government stores, ordnance, hospitals, and everything of that nature. I became satisfied that if I moved out 4,000 men, (which was the lowest I considered safe to send out,) and they should move out 50 or 60 miles into the country, the enemy, being all mounted, would turn that force and come in and occupy Memphis, which I considered would be a greater disaster than to allow Forrest to range in West Tennessee. I therefore did not send them out, but I kept the cavalry out as far as we could go, or dared go. It was not possible to divine precisely what Forrest's intentions were. My own opinion was, that it was his intention to organize a force, cross the Tennessee river, and operate upon General Sherman's line of communication. I was at Cairo at the time Union City was attacked. Four regiments and a battery of one of my divisions, which were ordered up the Tennessee river, were here also. I directed General Brayman to take them and throw them up to Columbus in rear of Forrest when he was at Paducah, but they were peremptorily ordered up the Tennessee river.

Question. Ordered up by General Sherman?

Answer. Yes, sir. The result was, that there was not force enough, in my opinion, in the command on the Mississippi river, from Paducah to Memphis, to operate upon Forrest with any prospect of success.

Question. What was the estimated strength of Forrest's forces?

Answer. Forrest's entire force, according to the best of my information, was between 8,000 and 9,000 men altogether. That includes this division of Buford's that operated up here. I have somewhere among my papers a list of all his brigades. I know nearly all of them. I have run against nearly all of them. He had five of the oldest regiments in the confederate service detailed expressly for this purpose as a nucleus of his organization. These were troops that had seen a great deal of service along the line below Memphis--Chalmers's brigade, Ely's brigade, Bell's brigade, and McCullough's. I cannot estimate Forrest's force at less than between 8,000 and 9,000 men. The cause of his raid, unquestionably, was the fact that so large an amount of troops which had been holding this region of country had been removed--a portion of them up the Tennessee river to Decatur, and a portion up the Red river--also the fact that he knew perfectly well, from his spies at Memphis, the condition of our cavalry. Memphis, from the nature of the ground there, is a place that requires not less than five thousand men to garrison the outer line. It is the worst place to cover that I ever saw. We have a fort there that was built that would take seven thousand men as a reasonable amount to line the parapets. We have immense stores there, for from Memphis not only the 16th and 17th army corps are supplied, but General Steele's army at Little Rock are supplied from there also. We have large hospitals there, scattered all over the city. We have an unsteady and unreliable population; and the daily interior guard duty, for the city proper, requires over 300 men. I considered then, and I consider now, that the removal of any force competent to make any serious impression upon Forrest would have imperilled Memphis; and I believe that was what General Forrest wanted done.

Question. How large a force did you retain there for the safety of that place?

Answer. I retained the infantry--four thousand men. I kept the cavalry out all the time as far as they could go.

Question. How came you to reoccupy Fort Pillow? Had it been abandoned?

Answer. No, sir. When I moved to Meridian, the 52d Indiana regiment which had been there was withdrawn, and made a part of the expedition, and the 13th Tennessee cavalry, which was recruiting, was moved down there as a recruiting point. I afterwards re-enforced it by sending up Major Booth with four companies of colored heavy artillery and six guns, and a section of light artillery, making in all about 600 men.

Question. Do I understand you to say that the post had never been entirely abandoned?

Answer. No, sir. When the 52d Indiana was taken away it was temporarily abandoned until the 13th Tennessee came down to hold it as a recruiting point. I considered Fort Pillow as a place which ought to be held with a small garrison, and I think so yet, and any navy officer or river man will tell you that the situation of the channel there requires it.

Question. I am not questioning that at all. I merely inquired as to the fact.

Answer. I sent Major Booth there because I had great confidence in him as a soldier. He was an old soldier who had served in the regular army, and I considered him the best man I had for that purpose. I received a report from him "that he could hold that post against any force for forty-eight hours," which was all I expected him to do, and if he had not been killed I think he would have held it. I have no doubt that his death was the immediate cause of the capture of the place.

Question. Just in this connexion, please to state why you deemed it important to keep up a garrison at that place.

Answer. The steamboat channel at Fort Pillow runs right under the bluff, and brings every boat as it passes within musket-shot of the shore, and a couple of guns mounted up above there would stop most effectually the navigation of the river, and drive away any of the tin-clad gunboats we have, for a plunging fire would go right through them, and they could not get elevation enough to strike. The whole life of the army below, especially while these large movements were going on, depended upon an uninterrupted communication by the river, and the stopping that communication for two or three days might deprive us of necessary supplies just at the moment that they were required. These were my reasons for holding the place.

Question. What information have you in regard to the attack upon Fort Pillow; its capture, and the barbarities practiced there?

Answer. I am not positive about dates, but my recollection is that Fort Pillow was attacked on the 12th of April. Just about dusk of the 12th a boat came down to Memphis from Fort Pillow, bringing information that the place was attacked, but that Major Booth was perfectly confident of being able to hold out until he could be re-enforced. I immediately ordered a regiment to be got ready, with four days' rations and an extra supply of ammunition; took the steamer "Glendale," dropped her down to Fort Pickering, and the regiment was in the very act of going on board when another boat came down with the information that the fort was captured. The order to move up the regiment was countermanded, for there was no use in sending it then. There were at Fort Pillow two 10-pound Parrotts, two 6-pounder field guns, and two 12-pounder howitzers, and about 600 men. I cannot tell precisely the number of the 13th Tennessee cavalry, for it was a recruiting regiment, and filling off and on. If the men had been left in the position in which they had been placed by Major Booth, and from which position he had already repelled an assault of the enemy, I think they would have been able to have held the fort until re-enforced. I believe that the ground there is so strong that 600 men with that artillery ought to have held it; but the command devolved upon a very good gentleman, but a very young officer, entirely inexperienced in these matters. The enemy rushed on the fort from two or three directions, and confused him, I think, and broke him and carried it. The information which I have from all sources, official and otherwise, is that--whether by permission of their officers, or contrary to their permission, I cannot say--a butchery took place there that is unexampled in the record of civilized warfare. We always expect, in case of a place carried by assault, that some extravagance of passion will occur; but this seems to have been continued after resistance had ceased, when there was nothing to keep up the hot blood, and to have been of a nature brutal to an extent that is scarcely credible, and I have embodied in my official report to General McPherson (my present superior officer) my opinion that the black troops will hereafter be uncontrolable, unless the government take some prompt and energetic action upon the subject. I know very well that my colored regiments at Memphis, officers and men, will never give quarter.

Question. They never ought to.

Answer. They never will. They have sworn it; and I have some very good colored regiments there.

Question. What do you say of the fighting qualities of the colored troops?

Answer. That depends altogether upon their officers. If they are properly officered, they are just as good troops as anybody has. I have two or three regiments at Memphis that I am willing to put anywhere that I would put any soldiers which I have ever seen, with the same amount of experience.

Question. Did you learn anything of the particulars of those atrocities that were committed there at Fort Pillow?

Answer. I learned the particulars from the reports of the officers.

Question. Did you learn anything about any flags of truce being taken advantage of?

Answer. They always do that; that is a matter of habit with them.

Question. And they took advantage of them in this case, as you learn?

Answer. Yes, sir; and they did it at Paducah, and they tried it at Columbus.

Question. Did you hear anything about their setting fire to hospitals, while the wounded were in there?

Answer. I learn from what I consider unquestionable authority, that bodies were found which had been wounded by musket shots, and then their eyes bayoneted out; men wounded in a similar way, with their bowels cut open; and I have heard many other instances of equal barbarity.

Question. Did you hear, recently after that capture, of anybody being nailed to a building and burned?

Answer. I heard that Lieutenant Akerstrom was so treated.

Question. Did you learn that from a source that you could give credit to?

Answer. I had no reason to doubt it, with the exception of the identification of the body. The fact that somebody was so treated, I consider to be sufficiently proven; the identification I think is doubtful.

Question. Is there anything more you wish to state? If so, will you state it without further questioning?

Answer. I do not know that I can state anything more than my opinion in regard to certain things that might have been done. I do not know that it is worth while to do that. As I am under censure myself, at present I prefer not to.

Question. Will you give us a description of the situation of Fort Pillow?

Answer. It is a very difficult thing to describe. The original fortifications, as made by the rebels, were very much too large to be held by any force that we could spare. It was intended for a very large force; but there are two crowning heights--bold knobs--that stand up there, which command the entire region of approach, and which Major Booth was directed to occupy. He went up and examined the ground, and reported to me. A light work was thrown up upon one of them, and there was a portion of a work upon the other. The one to the south was not occupied during the fight; the one to the north of the ravine, which leads down to the landing, was occupied. That was the point which I considered should have been held; and I think yet it could have been, and would have been, if Major Booth had lived.

Question. Can you describe the position in which the men were placed by Major Booth?

Answer. Major Booth had his artillery upon this knoll, and held the slope of the hill with some rifle pits. From these rifle pits, as I am informed, he repulsed the enemy. The troops were afterwards drawn in by Major Bradford, into the fortification proper, and that was attacked on all sides. My opinion is that Major Bradford lost his head--got confused. The rush was too strong for him. The amount of the enemy's force that actually attacked there I do not know, but from all the testimony I could get, I should judge it to have been not less than 2,500 men.

Question. Who do you understand led the enemy's forces?

Answer. Forrest was there personally. I understand, however, that the main body of the force was Chalmers's command, who was also there. There was also a portion of Forrest's force there. Forrest will carry his men further than any other man I know of; he is desperate.

Question. Have we any force at Fort Pillow now?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you consider that a point which should be occupied by a force, in order to make the navigation of the river safe?

Answer. I do.

Question. What force do you deem should be placed there to hold it?

Answer. I think 500 steady troops, properly supplied with artillery, and properly covered with works, could hold the place until re-enforced--hold it, all that is necessary.

Question. Did you ever have any instructions or orders to evacuate Fort Pillow? or did you, at any time, ever propose to evacuate it?

Answer. I never had any orders to evacuate it. My orders from General Sherman were to hold certain points on the river. I never had any instructions with regard to Fort Pillow one way or the other that I recollect. I considered it necessary to hold it, and never intended to abandon it.

Question. Had it been held by us for some considerable time?

Answer. It had been held since we first occupied the river.

Question. Do not the same reasons exist for holding it now, that had existed during all that period?

Answer. The same. The reasons are geographical, and do not change.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Then I understand you to state that your instructions, in spirit, required you to hold it, and that it was necessary that it should be held?

Answer. My opinion is distinct that it should be held always, and there is nothing in my instructions that requires it to be abandoned. Some discretion, I suppose, belongs to an officer in charge of as much range as I have had to hold; and I certainly should not abandon that place, if I had troops to hold it.

By the chairman:

Question. Will you tell us what you know about the attack on Union City?

Answer. Colonel Hawkins, of the 7th Tennessee regiment, was at Union City as an advanced post. He had in round numbers about six hundred men. He was threatened by about fifteen hundred, I should think. They attacked him, and were repulsed. General Brayman moved from here with two thousand troops, and got down as far as the bridge, six miles from Union City, before Hawkins surrendered. They commenced the flag-of-truce operation on him, when they found they could do nothing else, threatening to open upon him with artillery, and to give no quarter. Contrary to the entreaties, prayers, and advice of all his officers and all his men, he did surrender his post, with a relieving force within six miles of him; and surrendered it, as I have no doubt, from pure cowardice.

Question. Was he aware of the re-enforcements approaching?

Answer. I think so, but I will not be positive. General Brayman can tell more about that than I can. I was at Columbus when General Brayman returned.

Question. Where is Colonel Hawkins now?

Answer. He is a prisoner. This is the second time he has surrendered to Forrest.

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Captain Thomas P. Gray, sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. For the last four months I have been holding the place of captain in the 7th Tennessee cavalry, but I have not been mustered in yet.

Question. Had you been in service before?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. For how long?

Answer. I enlisted in Illinois on the 24th of July, and was mustered into the United States service August 1, 1861.

Question. Were you at Union City when the late attack was made there?

Answer. I was.

Question. Will you give us an account of what occurred there?

Answer. On the 23d of March last it was generally understood by the troops there that the rebels were advancing upon us; we supposed under General Forrest. That night two companies, I think, were ordered to keep their horses saddled. The first orders I received were about half-past four, the morning of the 24th. The adjutant of our regiment came to me and told me to have my horses saddled. In perhaps half an hour after that we were ordered into line, and I held my company in line for some time waiting for orders. As Colonel Hawkins came by I asked him if he wanted me to take my position at the breastworks, and he said he did. I then took my position at a place where I thought I was most needed, at some breastworks that my company had thrown up on the east side. At this time the rebels were firing on our pickets. I think there was no general charge until about half-past 5 or 6 o'clock. That charge was made by cavalry, on the south side. They did not charge a great way, and were easily repulsed. The same men then reassembled, dismounted, and charged on the fort. This time they came very close to the breastworks, but were again repulsed. After that our troops were very exultant, and ready to meet the rebels anywhere. The next charge was made on the northwest; that was easily repulsed. The last charge was made on the northeast, fronting my position; that was repulsed tolerably easily, but with more loss to the rebels than previously. Then there was sharpshooting for about an hour and a half, and we were all in good spirits. At the expiration of that hour and a half a flag of truce came in in my front. I sent word to Colonel Hawkins that there was a flag of truce coming. I went in person to meet the flag, and halted it about two hundred yards from the breastworks, and asked them what they desired. They said they wished to see the commander of the forces there. I told them I had notified him, and he would be there in a moment. At that time they ordered me under arrest, because I made myself easy looking around upon their position. I demanded their right to order me under arrest under a flag of truce, and told them I had as much right to look around as they had. They then ordered me to sit down. I told them that was played out; that I was not only there under the right of a flag of truce, but that I was there to give them their orders if they made any mismoves. They gave up then, as Colonel Hawkins was in sight. When the colonel came a document was handed him. I do not know anything about it; for, as soon as the colonel came near, I went back to the breastworks. The flag of truce then retired. As soon as I got back I made it my business to go around inside the breastworks to get a view of the rebel troops. They were there upon stumps and logs, and every place where they could see.

In about twenty minutes, I think it was, they came again with another flag of truce. I met them as before. This time a demand for surrender was handed to Colonel Hawkins. I remained there this time, and saw the communication. I could once give almost the exact language of it. At any rate, it was a demand for unconditional surrender, promising us the rights of prisoners of war if the surrender was made; if not, then we must take the consequences. After consulting with them for a little time Colonel Hawkins was allowed fifteen minutes to go to camp and back again. I remained there about fifteen minutes with the rebel truce bearers. During this time I could observe in every move and remark they made that they were beaten. Perhaps I should have said before, that when Colonel Hawkins was talking about the matter, I gave my opinion in regard to it. This was before the flag of truce came in at all. Colonel Hawkins came down to my corner of the breastworks. I told him that the rebels were beaten on their first programme, at any rate; that it was my opinion that they would either consolidate and make a charge on one side, or else they would leave the field, or else lie there and sharpshoot until they could get re-enforcements. I state this merely to show what our feelings were--that we were satisfied they were whipped, were beaten.

When the colonel came back from his second flag of truce I left them and went inside the breastworks. I was satisfied from appearances that the surrender would be made, and I hid a couple of revolvers and some other things I had; I did not know whether I should ever find them again or not. The troops considered that the surrender was made as soon as they saw a rebel officer coming back with the colonel, and every man tried to hide his stuff. Some broke their guns, and all were denouncing Colonel Hawkins as a coward, in surrendering them without cause. That is all I know of the matter up to the time of the surrender.

Question. Do you say it was the opinion of all the officers and men, so far as you know, that the surrender was wholly unnecessary?

Answer. Yes, sir; every man I ever heard say anything about it.

Question. To what cause do you attribute the surrender?

Answer. Some said that the colonel was half rebel, anyway; others said that he was a little cowardly, and surrendered to an imaginary foe--to a force that was not there. Those were the reasons that I have heard.

Question. What was your force there?

Answer. About 500 men.

Question. Did you have any colored troops?

Answer. None.

Question. What was the force of the enemy?

Answer. As near as I could judge--and I tried to estimate their number--they had about 800 after the surrender; I think they must have had a thousand at first.

Question. Could you have held that position against them?

Answer. I am satisfied we could have held it all day, unless our ammunition had given out.

Question. Had you any information in regard to any re-enforcements approaching to your relief?

Answer. For the last two hours we had expected to see them at any time.

Question. What reason had you to expect re-enforcements?

Answer. We had a communication that they knew our situation at Columbus, that they knew the rebels were advancing on us, and, of course, I thought they would send us re-enforcements.

Question. From what point did you expect re-enforcements?

Answer. From Columbus. I remarked to the men, as soon as the surrender was made, that I would be ten times more mad if I should hear afterwards that our re-enforcements were right close to us, which I expected was the case.

Question. What occurred after the surrender?

Answer. The men were marched on foot; the officers were allowed to ride their horses. They were marched two days--it was rainy and muddy weather--nearly east, towards Dresden. They had nothing to eat for two days, until eight o'clock the second night, and then we got some corn-bread and meat. The second day they turned from the Dresden road, towards Trenton, through the country, not in the regular road. On the evening of the third day we arrived at Trenton, Tennessee. There all our money, and I think all our watches, were taken--I know some of them were--and the pocket-knives were taken from the men: all done officially, one company at a time.

We laid over the fourth day at Trenton. On the fifth day at noon we marched toward Humboldt, and arrived there in the evening, just before dark. At seven o'clock, or nearly seven o'clock, I left them. My intention was to go to the commander at Memphis and get him to send a force out to make the rebels release our troops. Before I left the rebels, after I had concluded to leave them, I commenced getting up a plot to break the guards, and see if we could not redeem our name a little in that way and get off. It was working finely, but I met the opposition of the officers, because it was the general opinion that if we were caught, one in every ten would be killed. I abandoned that and escaped. I travelled on foot twenty-five hours without stopping, through the brush, dodging the rebels and guerillas. I was then directed by a negro to a farm where there were no whites, and where, he said, I could get a horse. When I got there I found I was so tired and sleepy that I dared not risk myself on a horse, and I secreted myself and rested there until early the next morning; I got a little refreshment there, too. I then got an old horse, with no saddle, and rode into Fort Pillow, just forty miles, in a little more than five hours. I reached there a little before noon, on the 30th of March.

The morning after I escaped from the rebels I wrote myself a parole, which screened me from a great many rebels whom I could not avoid. I was chased by two guerillas for some distance at this place, where I stopped over night, and got a horse. I knew two guerillas had been chasing me over ten miles. I told the negroes, as I laid down, that if any strangers came on the place, or any one inquiring for Yankees, to tell them that one had been there and pressed a horse and gone on. They did so; and more than that, they told the guerillas that I had been gone but a few minutes, and if they hurried they would catch me. They dashed on five miles further, and then gave up the chase and turned back. That is the way I avoided them.

After I got to Fort Pillow I got on a boat and went to Memphis, reaching there before daybreak on the morning of the 31st of March, and waked General Hurlbut up just about daybreak, and reported to him.

Question. Did you have much conversation with these rebels, or hear them express opinions of any kind, while you were with them?

Answer. I was talking almost continually with them. Somehow or other I got a little noted in the command, and a great many came to me to discuss matters about the war. They seemed to be confident that they were all right, and would succeed. I did not hear the command I was with say they intended to attack Fort Pillow; but while I was on my way from there to Fort Pillow, the report was current along the road that the rebels were going to attack it. But I reported to Major Booth, when I got to Fort Pillow, that I did not think there was any danger of an attack, because I thought I should have seen or heard something more to indicate it. I told him, however, that I thought it would be well to be on the lookout, though I did not think they would attack him. I heard the rebels say repeatedly that they intended to kill negro troops wherever they could find them; that they had heard that there were negro troops at Union City, and that they had intended to kill them if they had found any there. They also said they had understood there were negro troops at Paducah and Mayfield, and that they intended to kill them if they got them. And they said that they did not consider officers who commanded negro troops to be any better than the negroes themselves.

Question. With whom did you have this conversation?

Answer. With officers. I did not have any extensive conversation with any officer higher than captain. I talked with three or four captains, and perhaps twice that number of lieutenants.

Question. Did you see Colonel Hawkins, or have any conversation with him, after the surrender?

Answer. I did not. I felt so disgusted with him that I never spoke a word to him after the surrender.

* * * * *

Captain John W. Beattie, sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. To what regiment do you belong?

Answer. I am a captain in the 7th Tennessee cavalry.

Question. Were you at Union City when it was surrendered?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What was our force there?

Answer. Something near five hundred, altogether. There were some there that did not belong to our regiment.

Question. What was the force that attacked you?

Answer. From 1,500 to 1,800, as near as we could learn from the rebel officers while we were with them.

Question. What rebel officers were in command there?

Answer. The surrender was made to Colonel Duckworth; but I am not certain whether it was Duckworth or Faulkner who had the command.

Question. Will you state briefly the circumstances attending the attack and surrender of Union City?