Chapter VII: Part 7
The condition of the family, however, made it impossible for him to complete the course of studies at the University; and accordingly, at fourteen, he was placed as a midshipman in the navy. Here he remained four years, during which time he visited different parts of the globe, including the Indies and the English colonies in North America. At the end of his term he determined, like the elder Pitt, to enter the army; and, taking the whole of his small patrimony for the purpose, he bought an ensign’s commission in the Royals or First Regiment of Foot. Here he remained from the time he was eighteen till he was twenty-five. At twenty he was married to a lady of respectability, though without fortune. But this step, which, with most persons, would have been the sure precursor of poverty and obscurity, turned out in the case of Erskine to be a means of inspiration and assistance. His mind was balanced, and his vivacity was reduced to earnestness. As the regiment was in garrison, he had abundant leisure, and he applied himself in the society of his wife to the systematic study of the masterpieces of English literature. The best parts of Milton and Shakespeare he acquired such mastery of that he continued to know them by heart throughout life. It is evident that his attainments were beginning to attract attention; for, in April of 1772, Boswell speaks of him as dining with Johnson, and characterizes him as “a young officer in the regimentals of the Scotch Royals, who talked with a vivacity, fluency, and precision which attracted particular attention.”
It was not until two years after this time that we find Erskine interested in the proceedings of the courts. He subsequently declared that, while a witness of judicial proceedings, it often occurred to him in the course of the argument on both sides how much more clearly and forcibly he could have presented the points and urged them on the minds of the jury. It was this consciousness that led him one day, while dining with Lord Mansfield, to ask: “Is it impossible for me to become a lawyer?” The answer of the Lord Chancellor did not utterly discourage him; and he became a student of Lincoln’s Inn at the age of twenty-five. In order to abridge his term of study, he determined to take a degree at one of the universities, as, being a nobleman’s son, he was entitled to do on examination and without residence. In fulfilment of this design, he became a member of Trinity College, at Cambridge, in 1776, while he was prosecuting his legal studies in London, and still holding his commission in the army as a means of support. In July of 1778, when in his twenty-ninth year, he was called to the bar.
A singular combination of circumstances almost immediately brought him forward into great prominence. He had been retained as junior counsel with four eminent advocates for the defence of one Captain Bailie, who had disclosed certain important corruptions of the government officials in charge of Greenwich Hospital. Bailie was prosecuted for libel, and the influence of the government was so great, that the four older counsellors advised him to accept of a compromise by withdrawing the charges and paying the costs. From this opinion Erskine alone dissented. Bailie accepted the advice of the young advocate with enthusiasm, and thus threw upon him the chief responsibility of conducting the cause. The result was one of the most extraordinary triumphs in the history of forensic advocacy. Erskine’s power revealed itself, not only in the remarkable learning and skill which he showed in the general management of the cause, but in the clearness with which he stated the difficult points at issue, and the overpowering eloquence with which he urged his positions on the court and the jury. It was his first cause. He entered Westminster Hall in extreme poverty; before he left it he had received thirty retainers from attorneys who had been present at the trial. Demand for his services continued rapidly to increase, till within a few years his income from his profession amounted to 12,000 pounds a year.
It was but natural that so great success at the bar should carry Erskine, at an early day, into the House of Commons. In 1783 we find him on the benches of the House as a supporter of the newly formed Coalition of North and Fox. His fame as an orator had become so great, that the Coalition hoped and the Opposition feared much from his eloquence. But he disappointed his friends, and showed as soon as he took the floor, that his manner was suited to the courts and not to the legislature. Croly, in his “Life of George IV.,” relates that great expectations were raised when it was announced that Erskine was to make his maiden speech. Pitt evidently intended to reply, and sat, pen in hand to take notes of his formidable opponent’s arguments. He wrote, however, but a few words. As Erskine proceeded, his attention relaxed; and finally, with a contemptuous expression, he stabbed his pen through the paper and threw them both on the floor. “Erskine,” says Croly, “never recovered from this expression of disdain; his voice faltered, he struggled through the remainder of his speech and sank into his seat dispirited, and shorn of his fame.” It was not until late in life, that he was able to recover the equanimity lost on that night in the House of Commons. But, although after some years, he made several eloquent parliamentary speeches, all his legislative efforts were far surpassed by the brilliancy of his speeches in Westminster Hall.
From 1783 till 1806 Erskine adhered to the liberal political doctrines advocated by Fox. His influence in Parliament, however, was not great, and his principal energies were expended in the courts; when, in 1806, Grenville and Fox came into power, Erskine received the highest award to which an English attorney can aspire. But, he had not long to enjoy his new honors as Lord Chancellor, for Pitt soon came once more into power. The usages of the legal profession in England did not allow Erskine to return to the bar, and therefore the remaining years of his life were unimportant, and not without disappointment. The great advocate died November 17, 1823, in the seventy-fourth year of his age.
Erskine was not only the greatest of English advocates, but he is entitled to the still higher distinction of having given so clear an exposition of some of the most subtle principles at the basis of human liberty, as to cause them to be generally recognized and accepted. It was his lot to be much more frequently employed in defence, than in prosecution, and many of his arguments in behalf of his clients are marvels of clear and enlightened exposition of those fundamental rights on which English liberty is established. His speeches in behalf of Gordon, Hadfield, Hardy, and Tooke, constitute, as a whole, the clearest exposition ever made of the law of treason. Of the speech in defence of Gordon, Lord Campbell goes so far as to say: “Here I find not only great acuteness, powerful reasoning, enthusiastic zeal, and burning eloquence, but the most masterly view ever given of the English law of high treason, the foundation of all our liberties.” The plea in behalf of Stockdale, commonly considered the finest of Erskine’s speeches, is perhaps a still more felicitous exposition of the principles involved in the law of libel. Of his speech on the rights of juries, Campbell says that it displayed “beyond all comparison the most perfect union of argument and eloquence ever exhibited in Westminster Hall.” His address in behalf of Paine, if somewhat less successful than the great efforts just alluded to, was still a remarkable presentation of the principles of free speech. But the most noteworthy characteristic of Erskine was that notwithstanding the depth and ingenuity and learning of his arguments, his whole presentation was so illumined by the glow of his genius, that his address was always listened to with the greatest popular interest. His speech in behalf of Hardy was seven hours in length, but the crowd of eager auditors not only heard him to the end, but “burst out into irrepressible acclamations which spread through the vast multitude outside and were repeated to a great distance around.”
It need scarcely be added that for students of English law, Erskine is the most important of all the English orators.
LORD ERSKINE.
ON THE LIMITATIONS OF FREE SPEECH, DELIVERED IN 1797 ON THE TRIAL OF WILLIAMS FOR THE PUBLICATION OF PAINE’S “AGE OF REASON.”
Nearly all of Erskine’s speeches were several hours in length and so
logically constructed as not to admit of abridgment or excision. The
more elaborate of them, therefore, are not adapted to the purposes
of this collection. It happens, however, that one of the briefest of
his forensic addresses was the one on which he himself looked with
most satisfaction. Of the speech delivered on the prosecution of
Williams he is reported to have said: “I would rather that all my
other speeches were committed to the flames, or in any manner buried
in oblivion, than that a single page of it should be lost.” Erskine’s
“Speeches,” Am. ed., vol. i., p. 571.
It is an interesting fact that the same great advocate who gave all
his powers to the defence of Paine for publishing the “Rights of
Man,” was equally earnest in the prosecution of Williams for the
publication of the same author’s “Age of Reason.” But the explanation
is easy. In the former work the author criticised, in what Erskine
regarded as a legitimate way, the character and methods of the
English Government; in the latter he assailed what the advocate
regarded as the very foundations of all government and all justice.
The difference between the two is pointed out in the following
speech with a skill that will give the reader a good example of the
orator’s method.
GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY:
The charge of blasphemy, which is put upon the record against the publisher of this publication, is not an accusation of the servants of the crown, but comes before you sanctioned by the oaths of a grand jury of the country. It stood for trial upon a former day; but it happening, as it frequently does, without any imputation upon the gentlemen named in the panel, that a sufficient number did not appear to constitute a full special jury, I thought it my duty to withdraw the cause from trial, till I could have the opportunity of addressing myself to you who were originally appointed to try it.
I pursued this course from no jealousy of the common juries appointed by the laws for the ordinary service of the court, since my whole life has been one continued experience of their virtues; but because I thought it of great importance that those who were to decide upon a cause so very momentous to the public, should have the highest possible qualifications for the decision; that they should not only be men capable from their educations of forming an enlightened judgment, but that their situations should be such as to bring them within the full view of their country, to which, in character and in estimation, they were in their own turns to be responsible.
Not having the honor, gentlemen, to be sworn for the king as one of his counsel, it has fallen much oftener to my lot to defend indictments for libels than to assist in the prosecution of them; but I feel no embarrassment from that recollection. I shall not be bound to-day to express a sentiment or to utter an expression inconsistent with those invaluable principles for which I have uniformly contended in the defence of others. Nothing that I have ever said, either professionally or personally, for the liberty of the press, do I mean to-day to contradict or counteract. On the contrary, I desire to preface the very short discourse I have to make to you, with reminding you that it is your most solemn duty to take care that it suffers no injury in your hands. A free and unlicensed press, in the just and legal sense of the expression, has led to all the blessings, both of religion and government, which Great Britain or any part of the world at this moment enjoys, and it is calculated to advance mankind to still higher degrees of civilization and happiness. But this freedom, like every other, must be limited to be enjoyed, and, like every human advantage, may be defeated by its abuse.
Gentlemen, the defendant stands indicted for having published this book, which I have only read from the obligations of professional duty, and which I rose from the reading of with astonishment and disgust. Standing here with all the privileges belonging to the highest counsel for the crown, I shall be entitled to reply to any defence that shall be made for the publication. I shall wait with patience till I hear it.
Indeed, if I were to anticipate the defence which I hear and read of, it would be defaming by anticipation the learned counsel who is to make it; since, if I am to collect it from a formal notice given to the prosecutors in the course of the proceedings, I have to expect that, instead of a defence conducted according to the rules and principles of English law, the foundation of all our laws, and the sanctions of all justice, are to be struck at and insulted. What gives the court its jurisdiction? What but the oath which his lordship, as well as yourselves, has sworn upon the gospel to fulfil? Yet in the King’s Court, where his Majesty is himself also sworn to administer the justice of England—in the King’s Court—who receives his high authority under a solemn oath to maintain the Christian religion, as it is promulgated by God in the Holy Scriptures, I am nevertheless called upon as counsel for the prosecution to “produce a certain book described in the indictment to be the Holy Bible.” No man deserves to be upon the rolls, who has dared as an attorney to put his name to such a notice. It is an insult to the authority and dignity of the court of which he is an officer; since it calls in question the very foundations of its jurisdiction. If this is to be the spirit and temper of the defence; if, as I collect from that array of books which are spread upon the benches behind me, this publication is to be vindicated by an attack of all the truths which the Christian religion promulgates to mankind, let it be remembered that such an argument was neither suggested nor justified by any thing said by me on the part of the prosecution.
In this stage of the proceedings, I shall call for reverence to the Sacred Scriptures, not from their merits, unbounded as they are, but from their authority in a Christian country; not from the obligations of conscience, but from the rules of law. For my own part, gentlemen, I have been ever deeply devoted to the truths of Christianity; and my firm belief in the Holy Gospel is by no means owing to the prejudices of education, though I was religiously educated by the best of parents, but has arisen from the fullest and most continued reflections of my riper years and understanding. It forms at this moment the great consolation of a life, which, as a shadow passeth away; and without it, I should consider my long course of health and prosperity, too long perhaps and too uninterrupted to be good for any man, only as the dust which the wind scatters, and rather as a snare than as a blessing.
Much, however, as I wish to support the authority of Scripture from a reasonable consideration of it, I shall repress that subject for the present. But if the defence, as I have suspected, shall bring them at all into argument or question, I must then fulfil a duty which I owe not only to the court, as counsel for the prosecution, but to the public, and to the world, to state what I feel and know concerning the evidences of that religion, which is denied without being examined, and reviled without being understood.
I am well aware that by the communications of a free press, all the errors of mankind, from age to age, have been dissipated and dispelled; and I recollect that the world, under the banners of reformed Christianity, has struggled through persecution to the noble eminence on which it stands at this moment, shedding the blessings of humanity and science upon the nations of the earth.
It may be asked, then, by what means the reformation would have been effected, if the books of the reformers had been suppressed, and the errors of now exploded superstitions had been supported by the terrors of an unreformed state? or how, upon such principles, any reformation, civil or religious, can in future be effected? The solution is easy: let us examine what are the genuine principles of the liberty of the press, as they regard writings upon general subjects, unconnected with the personal reputations of private men, which are wholly foreign to the present inquiry. They are full of simplicity, and are brought as near perfection, by the law of England, as perhaps is attainable by any of the frail institutions of mankind.
Although every community must establish supreme authorities, founded upon fixed principles, and must give high powers to magistrates to administer laws for the preservation of government, and for the security of those who are to be protected by it; yet as infallibility and perfection belong neither to human individuals nor to human establishments, it ought to be the policy of all free nations, as it is most peculiarly the principle of our own, to permit the most unbounded freedom of discussion, even to the detection of errors in the constitution of the very government itself; so as that common decorum is observed, which every state must exact from its subjects and which imposes no restraint upon any intellectual composition, fairly, honestly, and decently addressed to the consciences and understandings of men. Upon this principle I have an unquestionable right, a right which the best subjects have exercised, to examine the principles and structure of the constitution, and by fair, manly reasoning, to question the practice of its administrators. I have a right to consider and to point out errors in the one or in the other; and not merely to reason upon their existence, but to consider the means of their reformation.
By such free, well-intentioned, modest, and dignified communication of sentiments and opinions, all nations have been gradually improved, and milder laws and purer religions have been established. The same principles which vindicate civil controversies, honestly directed, extend their protection to the sharpest contentions on the subject of religious faiths. This rational and legal course of improvement was recognized and ratified by Lord Kenyon as the law of England, in the late trial at Guildhall, where he looked back with gratitude to the labors of the reformers, as the fountains of our religious emancipation, and of the civil blessings that followed in their train. The English constitution, indeed, does not stop short in the toleration of religious opinions, but liberally extends it to practice. It permits every man, even publicly, to worship God according to his own conscience, though in marked dissent from the national establishment, so as he professes the general faith, which is the sanction of all our moral duties, and the only pledge of our submission to the system which constitutes the state.
Is not this freedom of controversy and freedom of worship sufficient for all the purposes of human happiness and improvement? Can it be necessary for either, that the law should hold out indemnity to those who wholly abjure and revile the government of their country, or the religion on which it rests for its foundation? I expect to hear in answer to what I am now saying, much that will offend me. My learned friend, from the difficulties of his situation, which I know from experience how to feel for very sincerely, may be driven to advance propositions which it may be my duty with much freedom to reply to; and the law will sanction that freedom. But will not the ends of justice be completely answered by my exercise of that right, in terms that are decent, and calculated to expose its defects? Or will my argument suffer, or will public justice be impeded, because neither private honor and justice nor public decorum would endure my telling my very learned friend, because I differ from him in opinion, that he is a fool, a liar, and a scoundrel, in the face of the court? This is just the distinction between a book of free legal controversy, and the book which I am arraigning before you. Every man has a right to investigate, with decency, controversial points of the Christian religion; but no man consistently with a law which only exists under its sanctions has a right to deny its very existence, and to pour forth such shocking and insulting invectives as the lowest establishments in the gradation of civil authority ought not to be subjected to, and which soon would be borne down by insolence and disobedience, if they were.
The same principle pervades the whole system of the law, not merely in its abstract theory, but in its daily and most applauded practice. The intercourse between the sexes, which, properly regulated, not only continues, but humanizes and adorns our natures, is the foundation of all the thousand romances, plays, and novels, which are in the hands of everybody. Some of them lead to the confirmation of every virtuous principle; others, though with the same profession, address the imagination in a manner to lead the passions into dangerous excesses; but though the law does not nicely discriminate the various shades which distinguish such works from one another, so as to suffer many to pass, through its liberal spirit, that upon principle ought to be suppressed, would it or does it tolerate, or does any decent man contend that it ought to pass by unpunished, libels of the most shameless obscenity, manifestly pointed to debauch innocence and to blast and poison the morals of the rising generation? This is only another illustration to demonstrate the obvious distinction between the work of an author who fairly exercises the powers of his mind in investigating the religion or government of any country, and him who attacks the rational existence of every religion or government, and brands with absurdity and folly the state which sanctions, and the obedient tools who cherish, the delusion. But this publication appears to me to be as cruel and mischievous in its effects, as it is manifestly illegal in its principles; because it strikes at the best—sometimes, alas!—the only refuge and consolation amidst the distresses and afflictions of the world. The poor and humble, whom it affects to pity, may be stabbed to the heart by it. They have more occasion for firm hopes beyond the grave than the rich and prosperous who have other comforts to render life delightful. I can conceive a distressed but virtuous man, surrounded by his children looking up to him for bread when he has none to give them; sinking under the last day’s labor, and unequal to the next, yet still, supported by confidence in the hour when all tears shall be wiped from the eyes of affliction, bearing the burden laid upon him by a mysterious Providence which he adores, and anticipating with exultation the revealed promises of his Creator, when he shall be greater than the greatest, and happier than the happiest of mankind. What a change in such a mind might be wrought by such a merciless publication? Gentlemen, whether these remarks are the overcharged declamations of an accusing counsel, or the just reflections of a man anxious for the public happiness, which is best secured by the morals of a nation, will be soon settled by an appeal to the passages in the work, that are selected by the indictment for your consideration and judgment. You are at liberty to connect them with every context and sequel, and to bestow upon them the mildest interpretations. [Here Mr. Erskine read and commented upon several of the selected passages, and then proceeded as follows:]
Gentlemen, it would be useless and disgusting to enumerate the other passages within the scope of the indictment. How any man can rationally vindicate the publication of such a book, in a country where the Christian religion is the very foundation of the law of the land, I am totally at a loss to conceive, and have no ideas for the discussion of. How is a tribunal whose whole jurisdiction is founded upon the solemn belief and practice of what is here denied as falsehood, and reprobated as impiety, to deal with such an anomalous defence? Upon what principle is it even offered to the court, whose authority is contemned and mocked at? If the religion proposed to be called in question, is not previously adopted in belief and solemnly acted upon, what authority has the court to pass any judgment at all of acquittal or condemnation? Why am I now or upon any other occasion to submit to his lordship’s authority? Why am I now or at any time to address twelve of my equals, as I am now addressing you, with reverence and submission? Under what sanction are the witnesses to give their evidence, without which there can be no trial? Under what obligations can I call upon you, the jury representing your country, to administer justice? Surely upon no other than that you are sworn to administer it, under the oaths you have taken. The whole judicial fabric, from the king’s sovereign authority to the lowest office of magistracy, has no other foundation. The whole is built, both in form and substance, upon the same oath of every one of its ministers to do justice, as God shall help them hereafter. What God? And what hereafter? That God, undoubtedly, who has commanded kings to rule, and judges to decree justice; who has said to witnesses, not only by the voice of nature but in revealed commandments, “Thou shalt not bear false testimony against thy neighbor”; and who has enforced obedience to them by the revelation of the unutterable blessings which shall attend their observance, and the awful punishments which shall await upon their transgression.
But it seems this is an age of reason, and the time and the person are at last arrived that are to dissipate the errors which have overspread the past generations of ignorance. The believers in Christianity are many, but it belongs to the few that are wise to correct their credulity. Belief is an act of reason, and superior reason may, therefore, dictate to the weak. In running the mind over the long list of sincere and devout Christians, I can not help lamenting that Newton had not lived to this day, to have had his shallowness filled up with this new flood of light. But the subject is too awful for irony, I will speak plainly and directly. Newton was a Christian; Newton, whose mind burst forth from the fetters fastened by nature upon our finite conceptions; Newton, whose science was truth, and the foundations of whose knowledge of it was philosophy; not those visionary and arrogant presumptions which too often usurp its name, but philosophy resting upon the basis of mathematics, which, like figures, can not lie; Newton, who carried the line and rule to the uttermost barriers of creation, and explored the principles by which all created matter exists and is held together. But this extraordinary man, in the mighty reach of his mind, overlooked, perhaps, the errors which a minuter investigation of the created things on this earth might have taught him. What shall then be said of Mr. Boyle, who looked into the organic structure of all matter, even to the inanimate substances which the foot treads upon? Such a man may be supposed to have been equally qualified with Mr. Paine to look up through nature to nature’s God; yet the result of all his contemplations was the most confirmed and devout belief in all which the other holds in contempt, as despicable and drivelling superstition. But this error might, perhaps, arise from a want of due attention to the foundations of human judgment, and the structure of that understanding which God has given us for the investigation of truth. Let that question be answered by Mr. Locke, who to the highest pitch of devotion and adoration was a Christian; Mr. Locke, whose office was to detect the errors of thinking, by going up to the very fountains of thought, and to direct into the proper track of reasoning the devious mind of man, by showing him its whole process, from the first perceptions of sense to the last conclusions of ratiocination; putting a rein upon false opinion, by practical rules for the conduct of human judgment.
But these men, it may be said, were only deep thinkers, and lived in their closets, unaccustomed to the traffic of the world, and to the laws which practically regulate mankind. Gentlemen, in the place where we now sit to administer the justice of this great country, the never-to-be-forgotten Sir Mathew Hale presided; whose faith in Christianity is an exalted commentary upon its truth and reason, and whose life was a glorious example of its fruits; whose justice, drawn, from the pure fountain of the Christian dispensation, will be, in all ages, a subject of the highest reverence and admiration. But it is said by the author, that the Christian fable is but the tale of the more ancient superstitions of the world, and may be easily detected by a proper understanding of the mythologies of the heathens. Did Milton understand those mythologies? Was he less versed than Mr. Paine in the superstitions of the world? No; they were the subject of his immortal song; and, though shut out from all recurrence to them, he poured them forth from the stores of a memory rich with all that man ever knew, and laid them in their order as the illustration of real and exalted faith, the unquestionable source of that fervid genius which has cast a kind of shade upon most of the other works of man:
“He pass’d the flaming bounds of place and time:
The living throne, the sapphire blaze,
Where angels tremble while they gaze,
He saw, but blasted with excess of light,
Closed his eyes in endless night.”
But it was the light of the body only that was extinguished: “The celestial light shone inward, and enabled him to justify the ways of God to man.” The result of his thinking was, nevertheless, not quite the same as the author’s before us. The mysterious incarnation of our blessed Saviour, which this work blasphemes in words so wholly unfit for the mouth of a Christian, or for the ear of a court of justice, that I dare not, and will not, give them utterance. Milton made the grand conclusion of his “Paradise Lost,” the rest from his finished labors, and the ultimate hope, expectation, and glory of the world.
“A virgin is his mother, but his sire,
The power of the Most High; he shall ascend
The throne hereditary, and bound his reign
With earth’s wide bounds, his glory with the heavens.”
The immortal poet having thus put into the mouth of the angel the prophecy of man’s redemption, follows it with that solemn and beautiful admonition, addressed in the poem to our great first parent, but intended as an address to his posterity through all generations:
“This having learn’d, thou hast attain’d the sum
Of wisdom; hope no higher, though all the stars
Thou knew’st by name, and all th’ ethereal powers,
All secrets of the deep, all nature’s works,
Or works of God in heaven, air, earth, or sea,
And all the riches of this world enjoy’dst,
And all the rule, one empire; only add
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add faith,
Add virtue, patience, temperance, add love,
By name to come call’d charity, the soul
Of all the rest; then wilt thou not be loth
To leave this paradise, but shalt possess
A paradise within thee, happier far.”
Thus, you find all that is great, or wise, or splendid, or illustrious, amongst created things; all the minds gifted beyond ordinary nature, if not inspired by its universal Author for the advancement and dignity of the world, though divided by distant ages, and by clashing opinions, yet joining as it were in one sublime chorus, to celebrate the truths of Christianity; laying upon its holy altars the never-fading offerings of their immortal wisdom.
Against all this concurring testimony, we find suddenly, from the author of this book, that the Bible teaches nothing but “lies, obscenity, cruelty, and injustice.” Had he ever read our Saviour’s sermon on the mount, in which the great principles of our faith and duty are summed up? Let us all but read and practise it, and lies, obscenity, cruelty, and injustice, and all human wickedness, will be banished from the world!
Gentlemen, there is but one consideration more, which I cannot possibly omit, because I confess it affects me very deeply. The author of this book has written largely on public liberty and government; and this last performance, which I am now prosecuting, has, on that account, been more widely circulated, and principally among those who attached themselves from principle to his former works. This circumstance renders a public attack upon all revealed religion from such a writer infinitely more dangerous. The religious and moral sense of the people of Great Britain is the great anchor which alone can hold the vessel of the state amidst the storms which agitate the world; and if the mass of the people were debauched from the principles of religion, the true basis of that humanity, charity, and benevolence, which have been so long the national characteristic, instead of mixing myself, as I sometimes have done, in political reformations, I would retire to the uttermost corners of the earth, to avoid their agitation; and would bear, not only the imperfections and abuses complained of in our own wise establishment, but even the worst government that ever existed in the world, rather than go to the work of reformation with a multitude set free from all the charities of Christianity, who had no other sense of God’s existence, than was to be collected from Mr. Paine’s observations of nature, which the mass of mankind have no leisure to contemplate, which promises no future rewards to animate the good in the glorious pursuit of human happiness, nor punishments to deter the wicked from destroying it even in its birth. The people of England are a religious people, and, with the blessing of God, so far as it is in my power, I will lend my aid to keep them so.
I have no objections to the most extended and free discussions upon doctrinal points of the Christian religion; and though the law of England does not permit it, I do not dread the reasonings of deists against the existence of Christianity itself, because, as was said by its divine author, if it be of God, it will stand. An intellectual book, however erroneous, addressed to the intellectual world upon so profound and complicated a subject, can never work the mischief which this indictment is calculated to repress. Such works will only incite the minds of men enlightened by study, to a closer investigation of a subject well worthy of their deepest and continued contemplation. The powers of the mind are given for human improvement in the progress of human existence. The changes produced by such reciprocations of lights and intelligencies are certain in their progression, and make their way imperceptibly, by the final and irresistible power of truth. If Christianity be founded in falsehood, let us become deists in this manner, and I am contented. But this book has no such object, and no such capacity; it presents no arguments to the wise and enlightened; on the contrary, it treats the faith and opinions of the wisest with the most shocking contempt, and stirs up men, without the advantages of learning, or sober thinking, to a total disbelief of every thing hitherto held sacred; and consequently to a rejection of all the laws and ordinances of the state, which stand only upon the assumption of their truth.
Gentlemen, I can not conclude without expressing the deepest regret at all attacks upon the Christian religion by authors who profess to promote the civil liberties of the world. For under what other auspices than Christianity have the lost and subverted liberties of mankind in former ages been reasserted? By what zeal, but the warm zeal of devout Christians, have English liberties been redeemed and consecrated? Under what other sanctions, even in our own days, have liberty and happiness been spreading to the uttermost corners of the earth? What work of civilization, what Commonwealth of greatness, has this bald religion of nature ever established? We see, on the contrary, the nations that have no other light than that of nature to direct them, sunk in barbarism, or slaves to arbitrary governments; whilst under the Christian dispensation, the great career of the world has been slowly but clearly advancing, lighter at every step from the encouraging prophecies of the gospel, and leading, I trust, in the end to universal and eternal happiness. Each generation of mankind can see but a few revolving links of this mighty and mysterious chain; but by doing our several duties in our allotted stations, we are sure that we are fulfilling the purposes of our existence. You, I trust, will fulfil yours this day.[36]
ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES.
NOTE 1, p. 24.—This is not quite a correct representation of Mr. Erskine’s declaration. He had not said that all discussion was rendered “impossible,” but that the treatment of the French minister by the English Government was “so harsh and irritating as to defeat all the objects of negotiation.” As a matter of fact, informal communications continued to pass between the two governments. But the agents of France were not accredited, and this fact threw upon England, in the judgment of the French, the responsibilities of the war. See “Parliamentary History,” xxxiv., 1289.
NOTE 2, p. 30.—By the Treaty of Westphalia, which in 1648 established the international relations of modern Europe, the river Scheldt was closed to general commerce out of consideration for Holland. It remained thus closed till 1792, when after the battle of Jemappes, in which the French defeated the Austrians and Prussians, a passage was forced by the French down to the sea. As England was the especial protector of Holland it was but natural that Pitt should protest against the act, not only as a national affront, but also as an expression of willingness on the part of France to set aside at her convenience the provisions of the great Treaty of Westphalia.
NOTE 3, p. 31.—The cause of this incorporating of Savoy was the famous meeting at Mantua in May of 1791. The Count d’Artois, brother of Louis XVI., the Emperor of Austria, the King of Spain, and the King of Sardinia, had secured an agreement from those monarchs to send 100,000 men to the borders of France in the hope that the French, terrified by the alliance and by such an army, would seek peace by submitting to the Bourbon king, and asking for mediation. Though the plan was rejected by Louis, it none the less showed the animus of the allies. The details may be seen in Mignet, 101, and in Alison, tenth ed., ii., 412. On the 27th of November, 1792, the National Convention annexed Savoy and erected it into a department of France in direct opposition to the Constitution of the Republic, which declared that there should be no extension of the territory.
NOTE 4, p. 32.—By the decree alluded to, the National Convention declared that they would “grant fraternity and assistance to all those peoples who wish to procure liberty.” They also charged their generals to give assistance to such peoples, and to defend all citizens that have suffered or are now suffering in the cause of liberty. Within ten days after the passage of this decree an English society sent delegates to Paris, who presented at the bar of the Convention a congratulatory address on “the glorious triumph of liberty on the 10th of August.” The President of the Convention replied in a grandiloquent speech, in which among other things he said: “The shades of Hampden and Sydney hover over your heads, and the moment without doubt approaches when the French will bring congratulations to the National Convention of Great Britain. Generous Republicans! your appearance among us prepares a subject for history!” By nonsense of this kind the French were constantly deceived in regard to the attitude of England.
NOTE 5, p. 35.—This was not the language of exaggeration. The decree of December 15, 1792, required the French generals wherever they marched, to proclaim “the abolition of all existing feudal and manorial rights, together with all imposts, contributions, and tithes”; to declare “the sovereignty of the people and the suppression of all existing authorities”; to convoke the people “for the establishment of a provisional government”; to place “all property of the prince and his adherents, and the property of all public bodies, both civil and religious, under the guardianship of the French Republic”; to provide, as soon as possible, “for the organization of a free and popular form of government.” This was literally a declaration of war against all governments then existing in Europe. The decree is given in the _Ann. Reg._, xxxiv., 155.
NOTE 6, p. 39.—The orator then proceeds to explain certain causes of misunderstanding which are of no general interest, and therefore are omitted. To this explanation he also attaches further proofs of the hostile purpose of France, and of the fact that England had no connection with Austria and Prussia at the time of their first attack. The passage seems to be an unnecessary elaboration of what has gone before, and therefore is also omitted.
NOTE 7, p. 41.—This province, which, from 1305 to 1377, was the residence of the popes, continued till the French Revolution to belong to the papal government. It was seized in 1790, and the next year was incorporated into France, where it has since remained.
NOTE 8, p. 41.—This is not quite accurate. The meeting at Mantua had been held, and the monarchs of Austria, Spain, and Sardinia had made the agreement already described above. That the army of 100,000 did not march against France, was not from any lack of purpose on their part, but from the irresolution of Louis XVI.
NOTE 9, p. 42.—In this statement, too, Pitt was not correct. The Declaration of Pilnitz did not leave “the internal state of France to be decided by the king restored to his liberty, _with the free consent of the states of the kingdom_;” but asked that the other powers would not refuse to employ jointly with their Majesties the most efficacious means, in proportion to their forces, to place the King of France “in a state to settle in the most perfect liberty the foundations of a monarchical government, _equally suitable to the rights of sovereigns_ and the welfare of the French.” They made no allusion to the “states of the kingdom”; but did indicate a purpose to settle the foundations of the government in accordance with the rights of sovereigns—that is to say, their own rights. Fox’s statement, given in the speech that follows, was far better. He said: “It was a declaration of an intention on the part of the great powers of Germany to interfere in the internal affairs of France, for the purpose of regulating the government against the opinion of the people.” The Declaration of Pilnitz was made by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, in consequence of their belief that “the situation of the King of France was a matter of common interest to all the European sovereigns.” The Declaration is given at length in Alison, 10th ed., ii., 415.
NOTE 10, p. 47.—Mr. Pitt then entered into a criticism of some expressions uttered by Erskine, not only in his speech, but also in a pamphlet on the subject of the war. The criticism brought out a reply and a rejoinder which are of little interest and are therefore omitted.
NOTE 11, p. 50.—Reference is here made to the fact that when in 1797 America demanded redress from France for her wanton attacks on American commerce, the officers of the French Government hinted that the payment of £50,000 by the Americans to the French officials would, perhaps, secure immunity. The letters proposing the payment of bribes, known as the “X. Y. Z. Correspondence,” were ordered published by Congress, in April of 1798. The English sent them everywhere throughout Europe to excite feeling against France. In America the indignation aroused by the suggestion of bribes gave rise to the cry: “Millions for defence, not a cent for tribute.”
NOTE 12, p. 51.—When Bonaparte landed in Egypt in December, 1798, he issued a proclamation in which, among other things, he exhorted the teachers in the mosques to assure the people he had come in fulfilment of prophecy: “Since the world has existed it has been written, that _after having destroyed the enemies of Islamism, and destroyed the cross_, I should come, etc.” This proclamation was published in the _Annual Register_, (xi., 265,) and not unnaturally made considerable sensation in England and in Europe.
NOTE 13, p. 52.—The French in Pondicherry sent emissaries throughout India to organize societies for the propagation of their doctrines. The members were bound by a series of oaths to do what they could for the destruction of all kings and sovereigns. Hyder Ali and his son, Tippoo Saib, were the agents and allies of the French in accomplishing this work. These designs of the French in India were brought to an end by the victories of Lord Cornwallis.—Green’s “English People,” Eng. ed., iv., 332.
NOTE 14, p. 65.—The treaty of Campo Formio was not negotiated by the accredited ministers of the Directory, but by Napoleon on his own responsibility. In explaining his haste, he gave as one of his reasons the necessity of being free to act directly against England. In one of his confidential letters he said: “It is indispensable for our government to destroy the English monarchy”; and again: “Let us concentrate all our activity on the marine and destroy England; that done, Europe is at our feet.”—Confidential letter to the Directory, Oct. 18, 1797. Alison, 10th ed., iv., 347.
NOTE 15, p. 94.—The orator in this connection then proceeds to give at some length his reasons for attempting negotiations in 1796–97. These, as having no direct bearing on the subject discussed, are omitted.
NOTE 16, p. 113.—For an explanation of what was done at Mantua, see Note 3, p. 31. On the Declaration of Pilnitz, see Note 9, p. 42.
NOTE 17, p. 116.—See notes 4 and 5 above.
NOTE 18, p. 119.—Reference is here made to the Treaty of September 26, 1786. Mr. Fox argued this question at greater length in a letter to his Westminster constituents. Pitt maintained that England in 1800 was not bound by that treaty inasmuch as the French Government which had made the treaty had been destroyed by the Revolution. In reply Fox declared that if the Revolution had swept away the obligation to obey that treaty, it must have also swept away the obligation to obey all others. But Pitt had often acknowledged the binding force of obligations entered into before the Revolution. Hence the treaty of 1786 was still in force; and according to it the dismissal of M. Chauvelin was equivalent to a declaration of war.
NOTE 19, p. 121.—When the Duke of Brunswick invaded France in July of 1792 at the head of the Austrian and Prussian forces he published a manifesto which did every thing possible to put his masters in the wrong. The burden of the proclamation was that the French had usurped the reins of administration in France, had disturbed order, and had overturned the legitimate government. He declared that the allied armies were advancing “to put an end to anarchy in France, to arrest the attacks made on the altar and the throne, and to restore to the king the security and liberty he was deprived of.” The manifesto furthermore said that the “inhabitants of towns who dared to stand on the defensive would instantly be punished as rebels with the rigors of war, and their houses demolished and burned.” This proclamation not only showed that the principal object of the war was an interference with the domestic policy of France, but it greatly inflamed the animosities of the French against the foreign powers. See Mignet, “Fr. Rev.,” 143; v. Sybel, ii., 29.
NOTE 20, p. 128.—It is an interesting fact that in the early part of 1792 Louis XVI. sent to the King of England, through Chauvelin and Talleyrand, asking the English Government to intercede to prevent military action on the part of Austria and Prussia. Louis appears to have seen that war on the part of the German powers, though intended to restore Louis himself to his former influence and authority, could only result in evil. Louis said: “I consider the success of the alliance, in which I wish you to concur with as much zeal as I do, as of the highest importance; I consider it as necessary to the stability of the respective constitutions of our two kingdoms; and I will add that our union ought to command peace to Europe.” The proposal was rejected, and a few weeks later Louis made a second attempt. He now asked the King to interpose, and by his wisdom and influence, “avert, while there is yet time, the progress of the confederacy formed against France, and which threatens the peace, the liberties, and the happiness of Europe.” This proposition, too, was rejected July 8, 1792, and before the end of the month France was invaded by the allied armies under Brunswick.
NOTE 21, p. 134.—General Suwarroff, one of the most extraordinary men of his time, had begun his career in the days of Frederick the Great, and had contributed much to the fame of the Russians for bravery at the terrible battle of Kunnersdorf. Though now nearly seventy years of age he showed an energy that made his name a terror wherever he went. The campaign against Praga is described in Alison, 10th ed., iii., 517 _seq._ For his far more remarkable campaign in Italy, see vol. v., 45 _seq._
NOTE 22, p. 142.—The allusion here is to the Treaty of Campo Formio, signed Oct. 17, 1797, by which a large part of the Venetian territory was turned over to Austria in consideration of the annexation of Belgium and Lombardy to France. The machinations by which this transaction was brought about were among the most perfidious in the whole career of Napoleon. In regard to the alleged reason of giving up Venice Napoleon wrote to the Directory: “I have purposely devised this sort of rupture, _in case you may wish to obtain five or six millions from Venice_.” See Lanfrey’s “History of Napoleon,” 1, 100; and Adams’ “Democracy and Monarchy in France,” 162.
NOTE 23, p. 143.—The Emperor Paul I., father of Alexander I. and of Nicholas, was probably already insane at the time Fox was speaking. He had long shown a meddlesome disposition, and had interfered with the internal concerns of nearly all the countries on the Baltic as well as with those of Spain. Pitt on a former occasion had said of him: “There is no reason, no ground, to fear that this magnanimous prince will ever desert a cause in which he is so sincerely engaged.” But in spite of this prediction he did desert the allies and make peace with France. In view of these facts Fox’s ironical use of the word “magnanimous” was a peculiarly forcible hit.
NOTE 24, p. 151.—In this conjecture Fox was not far from the language subsequently used by Napoleon. He said: “I then had need of war; a treaty of peace which should have derogated from that of Campo Formio, and annulled the creations of Italy, would have withered every imagination.” He then went on to say that Pitt’s answer was what he desired, that “it could not have been more favorable,” and that “with such impassioned antagonists he would have no difficulty in reaching the highest destinies.”—“Memoirs,” i., 33.
NOTE 25, p. 151.—In a speech some months before, Pitt had defended his action in regard to Holland by saying that “_from his knowledge of human nature_” he knew that it must be successful. It proved a lamentable failure, hence the irony of Fox’s emphasis.
NOTE 26, p. 154.—Virgil (Æneid, xi., 313): “Valor has done its utmost; we have fought with the embodied force of all the realm.”
Pitt on a former occasion had said that the contest ought never to be abandoned till the people of England could adopt those words as their own.
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Representative British Orations Volume 2 (of 4)Chapter VII: Part 7
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