Chapter VI (9)

NOTE 19, p. 163.—The speech of Sir Robert Peel here referred to was a part of a memorable debate in June, 1850, on what is known as the “Don Pacifico Affair.” Don Pacifico was a Jew born at Gibraltar (and therefore an English subject), who settled in Athens. In a riot his house was assailed and its furniture destroyed. His claim was presented to the English officials, who at once demanded £500 damages for Don Pacifico. After some delays the English brought a man-of-war from Constantinople, blockaded the harbor of Athens, and declined to allow any vessel to depart till the claim was settled. The French and Russian governments were thrown into considerable excitement, and the French ambassador left the English court. A resolution of censure was introduced into the House of Lords, and was carried by a majority of thirty-seven. In the House of Commons, however, matters took a different turn. Mr. Roebuck introduced a resolution of general approval of the foreign policy of the government, intended, of course, to give the government a better chance to escape the downfall that seemed impending. Lord Palmerston, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, defended the government in a speech of extraordinary power, extending, as Mr. Gladstone said, “from the dusk of one day till the dawn of the next.” The opponents claimed that Don Pacifico should have sought redress in the Greek courts, while Palmerston claimed that the condition of the Greek courts was such as to make a judicial appeal simply a mockery. The debate extended over four nights, closing with the speech of Peel in opposition to the government. The resolution of approval was carried by a majority of forty-six. The Don Pacifico case was finally submitted to French commissioners, by whom the amount of damages was fixed. The speech of Peel was memorable for its pacific and judicial tone, as well as for the fact that it was delivered only a few hours before the accident from which he died on the 2d of July. See Peel’s “Speeches,” vol. iv.; Hansard’s “Debates” for 1850, and “Ann. Reg.,” xcii., 57–88; Phillimore, “Int. Law,” iii., 76.

NOTE 20, p. 167.—The important assertion here made can hardly be successfully disputed, though there are many who would be reluctant to admit its truth. The modern Tories, with Disraeli at their head, have held that the reform of 1832 tended still further to weaken the masses of the people. This position, fully elaborated and defended in Disraeli’s “Defence of the Constitution,” his “Life of Lord George Bentinck,” and his speech introducing the Reform Bill of 1867, is touched upon briefly also in the same orator’s speech on “Conservative Principles” given below. The question is elaborately considered in the first two chapters of Lecky’s “History of England.”

NOTE 21, p. 168.—This must be regarded as mere conjecture, though stated as a fact. Even the formidable alliances against Louis XIV. in the War of the Spanish Succession were not able to prevent the French king from keeping his heir upon the Spanish throne. If the Bourbons, in spite of the allied armies with Marlborough at their head, were able to hold their position, they would hardly have done less if England had not interfered. To say that a union of the crowns “would have been impossible in the nature of things,” is to presume that the line of succession must have been just what it was. But this, of course, could not have been foreseen. If a disturbance of the balance of power ever justifies war, it did so in the case of the War of the Spanish Succession.

NOTE 22, p. 168.—This statement is not quite correct. The English Plenipotentiaries at Vienna were Lord Castelreagh and Lord Wellington. Castelreagh died in 1822 and Wellington in 1852; whereas the alliance between the governments of England and France to prevent the aggressions of Russia did not occur till August, 1853. On the 12th of August Lord Aberdeen declared that the four great powers, England, France, Austria, and Prussia, were acting cordially together; but on the 20th of the same month Lord Clarendon announced that an offensive alliance had been formed between England and France. It was this alliance which made all further efforts in behalf of peace hopeless. It was the opinion not only of Cobden and Bright, but also of Disraeli and of the Tories generally, that the act which made the war inevitable was the abandonment of Austria and Prussia and the formation of this alliance with France. Such is also the opinion of Mr. Kinglake. See Hansard’s “Debates,” cxxix., 1424, 1768, and 1826; also Kinglake’s “Crimean War,” _passim_.

NOTE 23, p. 169.—The so-called doctrine of the “balance of power,” whatever may be said against it, has been generally held by Europe ever since it was so energetically advocated by Henry IV., of France, at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The doctrine may be said to exercise the functions of a general European police to prevent any inequitable disturbance of territorial limits. It is difficult to see what but that doctrine could have prevented France under Napoleon from getting and holding two thirds of Europe; what would have prevented Russia long since from destroying Turkey; indeed what would prevent the strongest power from ultimately absorbing the whole. It did not prevent the destruction of Poland, partly because there was a general conviction that Poland was hardly worth saving, and partly because the partitioning powers were so strong as to make interference at least a very costly operation. These facts are enough to show that there is a very important other side to Mr. Bright’s attractive doctrine of non-interference. The question is not simply whether Europe has been made better, but also whether she has not been prevented from being made worse.

NOTE 24, p. 171.—The orator might also have said that the English people have very largely given up all _desire_ that the national debt should be paid off. It affords a convenient investment, which restrains an undue inclination to speculation and affords a steady and certain income to vast numbers of the people. Its payment would create a disturbance which no English minister would venture to advocate.

NOTE 25, p. 172.—This statement is undoubtedly true; and yet it can hardly be denied that the course taken by England in the Napoleonic wars added very greatly to the importance of England as a power. A little later, Mr. Bright objects to the policy pursued, because “it is impossible that we can gain one single atom of advantage for this country.” His opponents would claim that England has gained immense advantages from the very influence she has acquired, and as shown by the very examples given by the orator. They would probably also say that no other class gained so much as the manufacturers, the very class to which Mr. Bright belonged.

NOTE 26, p. 174.—The wit of this passage consists in its use of the expression “out-door relief.” In England the poor laws provide for two kinds of relief—that afforded in the work-houses and that afforded to the poor in their own homes. The latter is popularly known as “out-door relief.”

NOTE 27, p. 175.—When the claim of Denmark to the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein came forward, in consequence of the death of the last ducal peer, England decided that she had no right to interfere, though the claims of Denmark were earnestly pressed by the Crown Princess of England, a daughter of the Danish king. The question was finally taken up by Prussia, in opposition to the claims of Denmark, in a manner that aroused the hostility of Austria, and brought on the war of 1866 between Austria and Prussia.

NOTE 28, p. 176.—In 1830 the governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia entered into a treaty, establishing and guaranteeing the constitutional monarchy of Greece. This was in effect acknowledging the independence of Greece from Turkey, and guaranteeing to defend that independence. Mr. Bright could hardly mean to be understood as objecting to such a guarantee. A loan, furnished by the Rothschilds, of £2,343,750 was also guaranteed by the three powers, each being responsible for one third. As the Greek Government did not pay, the guarantors were held responsible; and in 1866 the amount that had been paid by England was £1,060,385. This, of course, was held as a claim against Greece. In 1866 a convention of the powers agreed that the Greek Government should pay £12,000 a year till all is liquidated.—Martin’s “Statesman’s Year-Book for 1873,” p. 285.

NOTE 29, p. 176.—“Animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire as a security for the peace of Europe,” is the avowal of the object of the treaty of July 15, 1840, entered into at London by all the powers except France. The occasion of it was the revolt of Egypt under Mehemet Ali.—Phillimore, “Int. Law,” i., 86.

NOTE 30, p. 177.—As indicated in NOTE 22, the diplomatic act which precipitated the Crimean War was the offensive alliance of England and France against Russia. The cause of this alliance was the attitude of Prussia, which at that time was very weak, and was under the powerful influence of Russia. After the practical withdrawal of Prussia from her treaty obligations to protect Turkey, Austria decided not to venture upon war without the coöperation of Prussia, unless her own Danubian principalities should be threatened. The withdrawal of Russia from the mouth of the Danube, and the transfer of the seat of war to the Crimea, left Austria free to decline to act with England and France. Some of the diplomatic correspondence was spirited, though perhaps it is going too far to call it either “offensive” or “insolent.”

NOTE 31, p. 177.—It is an established principle of international usage that no nation is obliged to accept or retain a foreign minister that is offensive to it, and any nation has a right to request the recall of a minister who is for any reason offensive to it. In 1789 Jefferson requested the French Government to recall Count de Moustier because he was “politically and morally offensive.”—Trescott’s “Am. Dip. Hist.,” 34. America requested the recall of Genet, and France in turn requested the recall of Morris, in 1794, for political reasons.—Hildreth, 2d series, i., 477. America also requested the recall of Poussin in 1849.—“Ammaire,” xl., 665. In 1872 the Russian minister Catacazy engaged in writing political articles for the _New York Herald_ offensive to the government, and his recall was requested. In 1809 the English Government was requested to recall Minister Jackson from Washington, “for questioning the word of the Government.” The case alluded to by Mr. Bright was doubtless that of Sir John Crampton, whose recall was requested in 1856, because he was found to be enlisting troops in the United States for the Crimean War.—“Am. Reg. for 1856,” 277; “Ex. Docs. Thirty-fourth Congress,” 107. In all these cases the request was acceded to without delay. According to Phillimore, ii., 149: “It is in the discretion of the receiving state to refuse the reception of a certain diplomatic agent.”

NOTE 32, p. 177.—This is a very immoderate statement, certainly not justified by the facts. Everybody conceded that “Don Pacifico” had a claim that was not “false.” The only question in dispute was whether the claim ought not to have been first presented to the Greek courts. See Note 19.

NOTE 33, p. 177.—In 1856 the conduct of the King of Naples toward political offenders was so tyrannical as to be a scandal to all Christendom. The governments of England and France addressed a remonstrance to the government of Naples “upon the general maladministration of justice in that country, and upon the danger thereby accruing to the Italian peninsula especially, and generally to the peace of Europe.” As the remonstrance was rejected by the King of Naples, England and France showed their condemnation of the internal policy of the Neapolitan Government by withdrawing their ambassadors, as under the law of nations they had a perfect right to do. See Phillimore, ii., 148, and iii. Preface, ix.

NOTE 34, p. 177.—In 1856 Lord Dalhousie, Governor-General of India, annexed the kingdom of Oude under the following circumstances: The East India Company had bound themselves by treaty “to defend the sovereigns of Oude against foreign and domestic enemies, on condition that _the State should be governed in such a manner as to render the lives and property of its population safe_.” Lord Dalhousie found on investigation that “while the Company performed their part of the contract, the King of Oude so governed his dominions as to make his rule a curse to his own people, and to all neighboring territories.” McCarthy (“Hist. of Our Own Time,” Eng. ed., iii., 61), though an extreme Liberal in his sympathies, speaks of Lord Dalhousie’s act as “not only justifiable, but actually inevitable.” The act was only one of many causes of the Sepoy rebellion. The language of the orator seems altogether extravagant and unwarranted.

NOTE 35, p. 178.—The “Opium War” of 1839, and the “Lorcha Arrow War” of 1856, are now generally and justly condemned. But to say that “no man with a spark of morality in his composition,” or “who cares any thing for the opinion of his fellow-countrymen,” “has dared to justify that war,” is scarcely less than an absurd and amusing exaggeration. The election of 1856 turned expressly on the justification of Lord Palmerston in the “Lorcha Arrow War,” and it was Bright’s opposition to the war which caused his defeat at Birmingham, and obliged him to take a seat for Manchester. The causes of both of these wars are given with admirable spirit in McCarthy’s “History of Our Own Time,” chapters viii. and ix. Cobden also lost his seat for opposition to the war.

NOTE 36, p. 179.—At the conclusion of the Chinese War in 1858 there were some who desired a foothold in Japan. Lord Elgin went to the Japanese capital and succeeded in negotiating a treaty of “peace, friendship, and commerce,” the first concluded by Japan with any Western power. This treaty, signed Aug. 26, 1858, and ratified July 11, 1859, is given in “Am. Reg.,” ci., 216, 268.

NOTE 37, p. 182.—This statement is very difficult to understand. The exports of British produce have varied not very greatly during the past twenty years. In 1873 the exports amounted to £255,164,603. This amount declined with considerable regularity till 1879, when it was £191,531,756. It then began to increase, and in 1883 reached £241,461,162. Martin, “Statesman’s Year-Book, for 1884,” 264. It seems impossible to reconcile these figures with Mr. Bright’s statements, unless he means _profit_ instead of “trade.”

NOTE 38, p. 182.—The facts do not justify this statement. At the time of the Peace of Paris, in September, 1815, the national debt of Great Britain was £900,436,845. In March of 1855 it had been diminished to £808,518,448, £91,918,397 having been paid off. The two years of the Crimean War increased the debt by £30,399,995. But since March, 1857, the decrease has been £82,541,924, leaving the debt March 31, 1883, £756,376,519, a diminution of £144,060,326 since 1815. By a law of 1875 provision was made for the gradual extinction of the debt by means of a sinking fund to be annually provided for in the budget. In 1883 a bill passed providing still further for a series of terminable annuities, by which, in the next twenty years, £173,000,000 will be paid.—Martin, “Statesman’s Year-Book, for 1884,” 230.

NOTE 39, p. 186.—This is not quite accurately stated. At the time of the _coup d’état_ Lord Palmerston was Minister of Foreign Affairs. He did indeed in a conversation with Count Walewski, the French Ambassador at London, express his approval of the course of the French Government, but so far from speaking “ostensibly for the cabinet, for the sovereign, and the English nation,” he offered simply his private opinion. The English Government formally determined upon a course of the strictest neutrality; and when it was found that Palmerston’s approval had been sent by Walewski to France, the message was not only disavowed, but Palmerston was summarily dismissed. See McCarthy, ii., chap. xxii., 148–154, Eng. ed. The _coup d’état_ was in December, 1851; but there was no alliance till August of 1853, long after the people of France had given their sanction to the empire.

NOTE 40, p. 192.—This hardly accords with what the orator said a few moments ago of India—“a vast country which we do not know how to govern.” The East India Company’s power was broken by the Sepoy rebellion, and the government was transferred to the crown in 1858. The government of Canada was made substantially what it now is, on the recommendation of Lord Durham, in 1839.

NOTE 41, p. 195.—The aggregate number of paupers has changed but slightly during the last twenty years. In 1874 the total number in England and Wales was 829,281; in 1883, 799,296. But in Ireland the number has increased from 79,050 in 1874 to 115,684 in 1883. In Scotland the number has diminished from 111,996 in 1873, to 95,081 in 1882.—Martin, “Statesman’s Year-Book, for 1884,” 253, 257, 261.

NOTE 42, p. 223.—The daily political duties of the Queen are described somewhat in detail in Ewald’s “The Crown and its Advisers,” where the influence of the crown is held to be much greater than it has sometimes been supposed to be. In 1850 the question was very fully considered by the government, and the requirement of the Queen, that no important action should be taken that had not first received her consideration and sanction, was set forth in a “memorandum” written to the Prime-Minister. Because of a violation of the principles set forth in this memorandum, Lord Palmerston was dismissed in the following year. The details of the controversy, which ended in the more complete establishment of the constitutional principle, are given in McCarthy, “History of Our Own Time,” chap. xxii., Eng. ed., vol. ii., pp. 124–163.

NOTE 43, p. 224.—The ablest and most suggestive discussion of this important topic is to be found in Bagehot’s volume on “The English Constitution.” In the second chapter the author, with characteristic ability, traces “how the actions of a retired widow and an unemployed youth became of such importance” to the English people.

NOTE 44, p. 224.—Reference is here made to Sir Charles Dilke’s speech at Nottingham adverted to in the sketch of the orator.

NOTE 45, p. 226.—The salaries of English ministers are fixed not by Parliament but by the ministers themselves. This subject was considered at length in 1831, and again in 1834, when it was held in Parliament that the determination of salaries of executive officers is an executive and not a legislative function. The salaries, therefore, are fixed by the government, and are included in the budget presented to the Commons. The ministers, of course, act in full view of their responsibility; but the estimates for salaries have never, except in one instance, been modified. The salaries of ministers in England are generally £5,000, though that of the Lord Chancellor, who is at the head of the Department of Justice, is £10,000. The salary of the President of the United States was $25,000 until 1872, when it was fixed by Congress at $50,000. On the salaries of English officials, see Todd, “Parliamentary Government in England,” i., 396–420. Members of Parliament, as such, receive no salaries whatever.

NOTE 46, 231.—In Bagehot’s “English Constitution,” chap. iv., is a very brilliant and suggestive discussion of the several political as well as social functions of the House of Lords. In this chapter, p. 100, Eng. ed., is to be found a remarkable letter of Lord Wellington to Lord Derby on “managing” the House of Lords. Bagehot argues that a second or revising chamber, to perform its work well, must have “independence,” “leisure,” and “intelligence,” and that on the whole these qualities are found in large measure in the House of Lords. Though many of the lords are ignorant of political affairs, the ignorant ones generally are so good as to remain away from the House and leave matters in the hands of those who are not ignorant.

NOTE 47, p. 232.—The question of raising persons to a life peerage has often been considered in England. In 1856 Lord Wensleydale was summoned “for and during the term of his natural life,” in imitation of what had been done four hundred years before; but the measure awakened violent opposition on the part of the House of Lords, which held that the independence of the House was thereby imperilled. The House decided that although the crown had the right to create “life peers,” such peers had no right to sit and vote in the House of Peers. After this decision, Lord Wensleydale did not attempt to take his seat, until shortly afterward he was created an hereditary peer as Baron Parke.—Hansard clviii. 1457, 1469; Todd, i. 368. In this same year a committee of the House of Lords was appointed to further consider the question, and reported recommending a statute “to confer life peerages upon two persons who had served for five years as judges, and that they should sit with the Lord Chancellor, as Judges of Appeal.” A bill founded on this recommendation passed the Lords, but was thrown out by the Commons. The principle was revived, however, in the “Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876,” by which provision was made for the constant presence in the House of Lords of four “Lords of Appeal in Ordinary,” to rank as Barons. They are selected from those who have held “high judicial office” and their dignity “does not descend to their heirs.”—Amos’ “Fifty Years of the English Constitution.” 19.

NOTE 48, p. 233.—This suggestion probably had its origin in the organization of the Roman Senate, which was made up of persons appointed for life from those who had been elected to the higher offices in the state.

NOTE 49, p. 235.—The period referred to was that immediately after 1832. The reformed parliament was strongly Liberal, and several measures were proposed to alter the constitution of the House of Lords. The headlong rate of the reformers was checked by the accession of the opposite party in 1835; but O’Connell was still clamorous for reform of the Lords, and in May of 1836 he introduced a resolution to make the Upper House elective, but the motion was received with universal derision.—Martineau, “Hist. of the Peace,” iii. 552.

NOTE 50, p. 238.—After the Reform Bill of 1832 was passed it was soon evident that it would have to be supplemented. Again and again attempts were made to carry a measure that would extend the franchise on the same principles as those acted on in 1832. But the nobility and the middle classes appeared to have no further interest in reform. Meantime there were others who had thought of reform in a different method. As early as 1821 Lord Durham had proposed the establishment of electoral districts, essentially according to the custom in America. In 1859, when Derby and Disraeli were in power, Disraeli introduced a bill enlarging the suffrage and essentially modifying the methods of determining qualifications. But this, too, failed. Another reform bill was introduced by Palmerston’s government in 1860, and still another by Gladstone in 1866. But all were unsuccessful till Mr. Disraeli’s bill of 1867. This was founded on the principle that the franchise should depend on permanency of interest, rather than amount of tax paid.—McCarthy, iv., 94–117; Molesworth, iii., 303–347.

NOTE 51, p. 248.—On the question here raised, there is a great variety of opinion, but the best authorities will accept the statement of the orator as substantially correct. The most careful consideration of the question has been presented in “Six Centuries of Work and Wages,” by Professor Thorold Rogers, who has devoted many years to the subject, and is unquestionably the highest living authority. On p. 522 (Am. ed.) he says: “Through nearly three centuries the condition of the English laborer was that of plenty and hope; from perfectly intelligible causes it sunk within a century to so low a level as to make the workman practically helpless, and the lowest point was reached just about the outbreak of the great war between King and Parliament. From this time it gradually improved, till in the first half of the eighteenth century, though still far below the level of the fifteenth, it achieved comparative plenty. Then it began to sink again, and the workmen experienced the direst misery during the great continental war. Latterly, almost within our own memory and knowledge, it has experienced a slow and partial improvement, the causes of which are to be found in the liberation of industry from protective laws, in the adoption of certain principles which restrained employment in some directions, and, most of all, in the concession to laborers of the right, so long denied, of forming labor partnerships.”

NOTE 52, p. 257.—The rate of increase in the population of Great Britain is such that there need be no especial alarm. In 1879, according to the official statistics, the number of births in Great Britain and Ireland in excess of the deaths was 436,780, while in France it was only 96,647. To every 10,000 inhabitants in Great Britain the annual addition is 101, while in France it is only 96. In Germany it is 115; in the United States (largely through immigration, of course) it is 260. The number of births per 1,000 in France is annually 26; in Switzerland, 30; in Denmark, 31; in Belgium, 32; in England, 35; in Austria, 38; in Saxony, 40; and in Russia, 50.—Raoul Frary, “Le National Peril”; also “Bradstreet’s” for Oct. 27, 1883, on “Vital Statistics,” 259.

NOTE 53, p. 257.—The question most prominently before the English people at the time of the fall of Disraeli’s government in December of 1868 was the bill for disestablishing the Irish Church. This was the real issue at the election in November, and is what Disraeli called the policy of “violence.” The local reference was doubtless to the fact that Mr. Gladstone and Lord Hartington were both defeated in Lancashire as candidates for the House of Commons. Gladstone, however, accepted a seat for Greenwich.

NOTE 54, p. 258.—Lord Mayo, in consequence of his successful administration of the affairs of Ireland, was appointed by Disraeli’s Ministry Viceroy of India. He was assassinated early in 1872. His administration was such as to win the admiration of all discriminating men of all parties.

NOTE 55, p. 259.—When Mr. Gladstone came into power in 1868, one of his early measures was bill for the disendowment of the Irish State Church. The controversy over the measure was one of great earnestness, but it was finally carried and went into effect January 1, 1871. This was followed by the Irish Land Bill, which aimed to overthrow the doctrine of the landlord’s absolute and unlimited rights, and to recognize certain property of the tenant in the land. This doctrine was carried still further in the Irish Land Bill of 1882.—McCarthy, chap. lviii.

NOTE 56, p. 260.—This subject is well presented in McCarthy’s chap. lix., “Reformation in a Flood.” For a list of the most important of these measures, see the Introduction to Mr. Gladstone.

NOTE 57, p. 263.—The “Captain” was a six-gun turret-ship, which, with a crew of five hundred men, foundered at sea on the 7th of September, 1870. The court of enquiry found that the disaster was owing to faulty construction of the vessel, which had been built “in deference to public opinion, as expressed in Parliament and through other channels, and in opposition to the views and opinions of the Controller of the Navy.”—“Ann. Reg. for 1870,” 107, 119. The “Megara” was an iron screw troop-ship that was run aground in a sinking state at St. Paul’s, Ireland, June 19, 1871. The commissioners of enquiry into the causes of the disaster reported their “decided opinion that the state and condition of the ‘Megara’ was such that she ought never to have been selected for the voyage.” After giving the details that led to their conclusion, the commissioners said: “It is with reluctance and pain that we express unfavorable opinions with respect to the conduct of officers and the management of a great department.”—“Ann. Reg. for 1881,” 96, and for 1882, 257, 260.

NOTE 58, p. 263.—This had been suggested by Mr. Lowe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

NOTE 59, p. 266.—Mr. Cobden was of the same opinion. In 1854 he said: “I look back with regret on the vote which changed Lord Derby’s government; I regret the result of that motion, for it has cost the country a hundred millions of treasure and between thirty and forty thousand good lives.”—Morley’s “Life of Cobden,” Eng. ed., ii., 151.

NOTE 60, p. 267.—During the Civil War Mr. Gladstone as well as Lord Russell had inclined to favor the Southern cause by a recognition of the Southern States. To this Mr. Disraeli and Lord Stanley (the present Lord Derby) were strenuously opposed. During Mr. Disraeli’s first administration Lord Stanley was Secretary of State for Foreign affairs.

NOTE 61, p. 268.—This statement is not quite justified by the facts. At the conclusion of the Civil War, intense feeling of indignation pervaded the United States against Great Britain, for three reasons: first, for a premature recognition of the belligerency of the Southern States; secondly, for the direct aid and supplies furnished the Southern States in British ports; and thirdly, for allowing the fitting out of cruisers in British ports to prey upon Northern commerce. The people of the United States held that Great Britain through her government had disregarded the obligations of neutrality imposed upon her by the law of nations. The United States Government remonstrated with the British Government, demanding reparation for past wrong, and cessation from a continuance of the wrong. But so long as Lord John Russell was in power (through whose negligence or misjudgment the wrong had been done) no progress was made toward a settlement. The Derby-Disraeli government succeeded that of Russell in 1866, with Lord Stanley as Minister of Foreign Affairs. About the end of 1866 Lord Stanley, through Sir Frederick Bruce, offered to submit the Alabama Claims to arbitration. To this Mr. Seward assented “on condition that the whole controversy between the two governments should be deferred.” Lord Stanley asked for information as to what was meant by the expression “the whole controversy,” but the answer was not free from ambiguity, and was supposed to refer to damages for “premature recognition of the Confederacy.” As Lord Stanley had refused to submit this subject to arbitration, negotiations were broken off. The matter rested till March 6, 1868, when it was brought up in the House of Commons, and was fully debated. This was followed by a debate March 20th in the House of Lords, both in excellent spirit. It was in the following November that negotiations were again opened with a view to submitting the differences to arbitration. A preliminary agreement was reached and signed November 10th, by Lord Stanley and Mr. Johnson, the American minister. It was not, however, acceptable to Mr. Seward, who telegraphed November 26th: “Claims Convention unless amended is useless.” In a long despatch of the same date sent by mail the objections were duly pointed out, the most important of which were in regard to Article IV. of the Protocol, and were stated in these words: “While the Convention provides that the United States claims and the British claims shall be settled and determined by a majority of the Commissioners, this Article IV. _requires entire unanimity of the Commissioners for a derision upon any of the Alabama Claims_.” Other objections were given, but this was the most important one why, as Mr. Seward said, “the United States are obliged to disallow this Article IV.” On November 28th Mr. Johnson had an interview with Lord Stanley, when the latter said he had received a despatch from the British minister at Washington, which stated “that it was understood that all the cabinet disapprove of it.” On the 5th of December Mr. Johnson wrote to Mr. Seward that he just had an interview with Lord Stanley, who “expressed no willingness to change the mode of appointing the arbitrator who is to decide the question of the liability of this government for the Alabama Claims.” In the same letter Mr. Johnson announced the resignation of the Disraeli government, and the necessity of postponing all further negotiations. On the whole subject see “Diplomatic Correspondence,” 3d Sess., 40th Cong., vol. i., pp. 361–391. Soon after the Gladstone-Clarendon government came into power the subject was again taken up, and a Protocol was agreed upon between Mr. Johnson and Lord Clarendon, providing that “_all claims_ should be submitted to arbitration.” This treaty was submitted to the Senate of the United States, and April 19, 1869, was rejected with but one dissenting voice. The grounds of objection were that the Alabama Claims were so obscured by minor matters that they would not receive due attention. The Johnson-Clarendon treaty is given in the “Diplomatic Correspondence” and in “Ann. Reg. for 1869,” p. 282. The subject was not again renewed till the outbreak of the Franco-German War, in regard to which see note 63.

NOTE 62, p. 270.—At the conclusion of the Crimean War the great powers in the Treaty of Paris agreed to impose and enforce the neutrality of the Black Sea. The waters and the ports were “perpetually interdicted to the flag of war of either of the powers possessing its coasts,” excepting certain small armed vessels to act as a sort of maritime police. As was not unnatural, Russia chafed under this interdiction. The Franco-German War broke out in July of 1870. In October of that year, when France and Germany were so occupied as scarcely to be able to protest, Prince Gortschakoff addressed a circular despatch to the European powers, stating that Russia no longer recognized the obligations of the Treaty of 1856. This despatch called forth a courteous but firm reply from Lord Granville, in which the obligatory nature of the treaty was insisted upon. It was feared that Prussia had secretly assented to the claims now put forward by Russia, in compensation for grants made to Prussia on the Baltic. Accordingly Mr. Odo Russell was sent to the German head-quarters at Versailles to ascertain the attitude of the Prussian Government. Count Bismarck assured the English ambassador that Prussia had given no sanction to the step, and proposed that the whole question should be submitted to a conference of the powers, to be held at London. This proposal of Prussia was assented to by England and Russia, and the conference took place in January of 1871. The result was the neutralization of the Black Sea was abrogated. The prediction of Beaconsfield, that “the entire command of the Black Sea will soon be in the possession of Russia,” has been amply justified by subsequent history.—“Ann. Reg., 1870,” 109; 1871, 3–17.

NOTE 63, p. 271.—The Washington Treaty of June 17, 1871, provided for referring five important questions in dispute to a Committee of Arbitration, consisting of one member appointed by the Queen of England, one by the President of the United States, one by the King of Italy, one by the President of the Swiss Confederation, and one by the Emperor of Brazil. The sixth article of the treaty provided that the Arbitrators should be guided in their decision of the “Alabama Claims” by “three rules” which were given in the article, and which virtually acknowledged the responsibility of England for allowing the “Alabama” to be fitted up in a British port, and allowing her to escape. The adoption of these “three rules” unquestionably gave the United States great advantage and made, it nearly certain that the case would be adjudicated in their favor. But the opposition in England steadily held that the “three rules” that were made the basis of the arbitration were not justified by the requirements of international law. This view has since been held by many prominent publicists, American as well as European. The rules are of at least questionable advantage, and have not been assented to by any other powers than England and the United States. The result of the arbitration, which was held at Geneva in 1871 and 1872, was to award “the sum of $15,500,000 in gold as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States for the satisfaction of all claims referred to the consideration of the tribunal.” The treaty and the award are printed at length in Cushing’s “Treaty of Washington,” pp. 257–280. What made England willing to adopt the “three rules” for the sake of speedily reaching a final settlement, was the condition of affairs in Europe. In case England had become involved in war, her commerce would have been at the mercy of American privateers. But the treaty and the award were very unpopular in England. Mr. McCarthy (iv., 347) says: “What most of the English people saw was that England had been compelled, in homely phrase, to ‘knuckle down’ to America.” This unpopularity of the measure and the good use made of it by Lord Beaconsfield had not a little to do with bringing on the downfall of Gladstone’s government.

NOTE 64, p. 272.—Reference is here made to the so-called “indirect claims” which the United States Government insisted on having considered by the Arbitrators, but which the English as strenuously refused to submit. The claim was in substance that the “Alabama” and other cruisers had not only directly destroyed much of our commerce, but had indirectly prolonged the war, and that for this prolongation the United States should be paid. Though this doctrine was presented in the so-called “American Case,” which, as Beaconsfield amusingly says, was translated into all languages and sent into all European courts, it was not formally objected to until the Arbitrators met at Geneva. The question there seemed likely to bring arbitration abruptly to an end. But finally the Arbitrators, in an informal manner, declared that “in case the indirect claims _should_ come before them, they should be obliged to reject them,” whereupon the Americans said that all they insisted on was a _decision_, not necessarily a decision in their favor. The difficult question thus happily disposed of, other matters were settled with substantial unanimity.

NOTE 65, p. 275.—It is not difficult to understand the great influence of passages like this in stirring the national feeling of Great Britain. Lord Beaconsfield knew how to move the British heart as no other modern statesman except Palmerston has done.

NOTE 66, p. 288.—In 1879 the people of England were confronted with problems which a long succession of good harvests had caused them to forget. The failure of four successive crops had brought about unexampled distress. The cry for protection was revived, and in the spring of 1879 was brought in various forms before Parliament. Lord Beaconsfield, the Prime-Minister, in a succession of quite remarkable speeches, took the ground that “the country had settled the question in another generation,” and that the distress was not to be relieved by a return to the former policy. Among other interesting things shown by the Prime-Minister, was the fact that the loss to the nation from bad harvests had been in four years not less than about 80,000,000 pounds sterling.—Beaconsfield’s “Speeches,” i., 327.

NOTE 67, p. 289.—Mr. Gladstone’s praise of Mr. Playfair’s qualifications was not extravagant. Playfair first became eminent as a chemist, having been a successful student under Liebig at Giessen, and subsequently Professor of Chemistry in the Royal Institution at Manchester and in the University of Edinburgh. In 1844 he was appointed chairman of a commission to examine into the sanitary condition of English towns, and in 1851 was sent by the government into the manufacturing districts to prepare a classification of the various objects of industry. At the World’s Exposition he was placed in charge of the department of jurors, and so well did he perform his work that at the next World’s Exposition, in 1862, he was entrusted with the selection of the jurors, some six hundred in number, to be drawn from the most eminent men of all countries. In 1874 he prepared the elaborate scheme for the reorganization of the English civil service, a work which he was well fitted to perform by reason of his labors in 1873–4 as Postmaster-General. During his visit to the United States he delivered an important address in Boston on the civil service in England as compared with that in the United States.

NOTE 68, p. 293.—The development of Manitoba has quite justified the predictions of Beaconsfield, which Mr. Gladstone seemed to make light of.

NOTE 69, p. 297.—In the second Mid-Lothian speech, Mr. Gladstone had spoken at length on the tenure of land and the land laws. Among other statements, he said concerning the law of entail and settlement: “I believe that you view that law with disapproval, as being itself one of the most serious restraints upon the effective prosecution of the agriculture of the country. Gentlemen, I need not dwell upon that matter. I heartily agree with you on the point at issue. I am for the alteration of that law. I disapprove of it on economic grounds. I disapprove of it on social and moral grounds. I disapprove of the relation which it creates between father and son. I disapprove of the manner in which it makes provision for the interests of children to be born. Was there ever in the history of legislation a stranger expedient? * * * The law of England is wiser than the Almighty; it improves upon Divine Providence.”—Gladstone, “Speeches in Scotland,” 83.

NOTE 70, p. 306.—In the preceding April, Lord Bateman had moved in Parliament “That, this House fully recognizing the benefits which would result to the community if a system of free trade were universally adopted, it is expedient, in all future commercial negotiations with other countries, to advocate a policy of reciprocity between all inter-trading nations.” The policy was opposed by Lord Beaconsfield, because, as he said, he was convinced it was “a proposition which can lead to no public benefit.” Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the course of the summer appeared to favor it.

NOTE 71, p. 315.—The first census of Great Britain was taken in 1801, when the population was found to be as follows: England, 8,331,434; Wales, 541,546; Scotland, 1,599,068; army and navy, 470,598; total in Great Britain, 10,942,646. The first census in Ireland was taken in 1813, but the returns were so imperfect as to be valueless. In 1821 Ireland had a population of 6,801,827.—Porter, “Progress of the Nation,” 8.

NOTE 72, p. 327.—The events alluded to in this and in following passages may be thus summarized. The war between Russia and Turkey terminated in the treaty of San Stefano, in the spring of 1878. Turkey had been overwhelmed by the war, and was now practically reduced to a cipher by the treaty. In the opinion of the English Government, Lord Beaconsfield being then in power, the interests of England in the eastern Mediterranean were imperilled by this aggrandizement of Russia. Russia was required by the British Government to submit the treaty of San Stefano to a European Congress. This Russia at first declined to do, whereupon the English Government at once moved an address requesting the Queen to call out the Reserves. This vigorous measure was at once followed by the still more decisive step of bringing up a division of the British army in India to the island of Malta. The right of the crown to employ Indian troops in European war was questioned, and gave rise to animated debate; but the measure was at least successful on diplomatic grounds. Russia at once lowered her pretensions, and arrangements were soon made for a General Congress at Berlin, in June of 1878, where the interests of Great Britain were represented by Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury. The result of the Congress was a modification of the treaty of San Stefano, by which the independence of Turkey was once more restored, and the dependent provinces were put on a substantial footing. The outcome was regarded as a great diplomatic triumph of Lord Beaconsfield. The agreement between Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff is treated more fully later in the speech.

NOTE 73, p. 332.—This statement, while substantially correct, is a little misleading. The provinces alluded to were all more or less dependent on Turkey, and England was at no time quite willing to adopt a military policy in their defence. Neither was any other government of Europe, excepting Russia, and Russia was willing simply because it opened the way for her own advance toward the south.

NOTE 74, p. 335.—In 1877, Lord Derby had resigned the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and had been succeeded by Lord Salisbury.

NOTE 75, p. 337.—The “needless and mischievous armaments” were the calling out of the Reserves, and the bringing to Malta of the Indian army. Mr. Gladstone’s adjectives can only mean that in his opinion the Berlin Treaty was not desirable, since without the military movements the treaty would have been impossible. The statement of the orator as to the agreement between Salisbury and Schouvaloff is not quite correct. There was no pretence to making a treaty or settling any question whatever, but simply an understanding as to what England demanded, and what she desired to submit to a Congress. After this conference, which Mr. Gladstone criticises with so much severity, Count Schouvaloff went to St. Petersburg, pausing at Berlin for an interview with Prince Bismarck. At St. Petersburg he appears to have convinced the Czar that nothing short of a submission of the question at issue to a General Congress would satisfy England. Soon after the Count’s return to London, the Prussian Government invited the powers to a Congress at Berlin; and Russia not only accepted the invitation, but agreed to submit to the powers, all the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. During the whole of these negotiations English public opinion was wrought up to the most intense excitement and anxiety. The course of the government was assailed and defended with the utmost vigor, everybody supposing, meanwhile, that peace or war between the two great nations hung upon the issue. In the “Ann. Reg. for 1878,” all the official papers are given, and on pp. 40–64 is to be found an abstract of the discussions in Parliament.

NOTE 76, p. 339.—The reader perhaps hardly needs to be reminded that the cases were not parallel. Russia had overwhelmed her weak foe, and now proposed to dismember her fallen enemy as a reward for her trouble. This was not only in clear violation of the principles set down by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, but also obnoxious to the traditional policy of Great Britain, as held by Pitt. But neither international obligation nor British usage offered any objection to a peaceful and voluntary treaty between England and Turkey, by which for a just consideration the one should cede a bit of territory to the other.

NOTE 77, p. 341.—On the 9th of November, 1879, Lord Beaconsfield, at the Lord Mayor’s banquet, had expounded his imperial policy, and in the course of his speech had used the words “_imperium et libertas_.” The speech attracted great attention as an authoritative exposition of the Prime-Minister’s views on domestic and foreign affairs.

NOTE 78, p. 344.—With this position Lord Beaconsfield would probably have heartily agreed. He might even have asked Mr. Gladstone, “Was it not to prevent just such aggrandizement as you condemn that we objected to the Treaty of San Stefano, and insisted upon a Congress?” More than that, he might have asked: “How do you reconcile your plea for the independence of the smaller states with your denunciation of the Congress of Berlin, brought about by ‘needless and mischievous armaments,’ by which alone the independence of Turkey could be saved?” To these questions Mr. Gladstone would probably have replied: “Yes; but you ought to have accomplished all this by preventing the war between Russia and Turkey in the beginning.” How Mr. Gladstone thought this might have been done and ought to have been done he pointed out in the first of the Mid-Lothian speeches, delivered at Edinburgh.

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences of inconsistent hyphenation have not been changed.