Chapter II: Part 2

8.) Throughout this period of three years of struggle _Russia compelled the enemy to spend on the Russian front such a stupendous amount of force, reserves and munitions_ as to hasten the inevitable fall of the enemy, and _this immensely facilitated the delivery of the final, decisive blows by the Allies_.

9.) Russia, incessantly drawing upon herself the forces of the enemy, did not give him the opportunity for one minute from the very beginning of the War to gather sufficient force for a decisive blow on the main, decisive front--in France. The role of Russia, therefore, was clearly apparent in the fact that she deprived Germany throughout the War of the possibility to win and rendered futile every effort of the enemy in this respect.

10.) Corresponding with the most important role that Russia played in the War are her enormous sacrifices in men, material and treasure. Her losses in men, amounting to 12,000,000, exceed several times the casualties of any of the Allies; are almost equal to the losses of all the Allies combined; exceed several times the total number of men mobilized by any one of the Allies....

11.) Russia's role in the recent war was so important and extraordinary that _without Russia the very idea of a struggle with German militarism would have been impossible_. Germany would have been able to crush any combination of the European Powers if Russia had not participated in such combination. Were it not for Russia, Germany would now dominate not only Europe, but probably the rest of the world as well.

12.) Russia's great role in the World War is so much the greater since she fought under extraordinary circumstances, lacking so indispensable an asset as a great network of railways, with a backward technique, industry, etc. In the hard first years of the War the Russian Armies, as we have seen, in extraordinary circumstances and frequently without arms and munitions, did everything possible, and, together with failures, had also their successes.

Ludendorf was able to achieve success on the Russian front only when the Germans outnumbered their adversaries by at least three to two. At Tannenberg the Germans had twice as many and, at certain stages, even three times as many men as the Russians. Against Rennenkampf Ludendorf had three men to every two of his enemy, and probably even as many as two to one, as Rennenkampf had suffered severe losses during the preceding days.

It is equally true that the Russians were able to defeat the Germans whenever they had even a small superiority of force. Near Warsaw the Russians had less than five men to every four Germans and they succeeded in defeating the latter and throwing them clear across all Poland.

It may seem strange that the Germans should have managed to have numerical superiority over the Russians all the time. Regrettable as it may be, it is nevertheless true, for the strength of an army is determined not by the number of its men, but by the number of bayonets (infantry), sabres (cavalry) and guns (artillery). The Russian Army consisted of millions, but bayonets and guns it had only for one-tenth of its number. In 1915 some Russian divisions numbered, instead of 20,000 bayonets, only a mere thousand, owing to disastrous losses. The only employment of infantry during those days was as a screen for the artillery, while the latter was quite useless for fighting purposes because it had no ammunition whatever. Under such conditions many of our corps often did not exceed the strength of a single regiment and some armies numbered no more effectives than a single division. We had plenty of men, but no arms and ammunition. Therefore, the Germans frequently surpassed us not in men, but in bayonets and guns.

The tragedy of the Russian situation lay in the cruel fact that Russia, while only one-tenth of her Armies were armed, was facing Germany and Austria, who were armed from head to foot. Not Ludendorf and not his ordinary military skill were the causes of Russia's failures in the first year of the War, but that simple and terrible truth which Brusilov once expressed in the following words: "_The Russians had no shells with which to blast their way across barbed-wire entanglements before an attack; so it became necessary for them to break down the wires with the bodies of Russian soldiers, and to form a bridge across these dead bodies for the next attacking column._"

We have concluded our sketch of Russia's participation in the World War with 1917. But 1918 also has its story: in that year Russia was denied a voice at the conference on that peace in the name of which Russia had offered up so many sacrifices and made such efforts.

We have seen how important and essential a part Russia played in the overthrow of German militarism. Russia's tremendous role confirms once more the elementary truth that in the future also Russia will inevitably be a colossal factor of political and military equilibrium in Europe. Whatever does happen to Russia, however they may dismember her living body, the immense Russian nation, with 125 million souls of pure Russian blood alone, will always remain that heavy military weight which inevitably lowers that particular scale upon which it descends.

It is true, Germany is now crushed and enfeebled. But we know that victorious countries are now suffering not less, and some of them even more, from the consequences of the most stupendous world conflict.

Years will pass, and possibly but a few years, and again the world will recuperate. We have no reason to expect that the active German people will lag behind the rest in this work of reestablishing normal conditions of life and labor.

The Treaty of Versailles has not solved a good many problems, and among them also those that were the cause of the World War. Notwithstanding all partitioning, Germany still retains up to 60 million souls, but France only a little more than 40 million. The population of Germany has always been growing, while that of France, if it has not decreased, has not increased. _After all, Germany has and will have a numerical superiority over France of one and a half times._

France, well aware of that, tries to maintain an alliance with England, and reckons upon the aid of America. But the statesmen of the West realize how insufficient all this is, for they still remember well that first critical month of the War when France was all alone and saved herself only through extraordinary efforts.

Until the United States arrives on the scene! Why, that inevitably means months and months of waiting. Until the British Army is mobilized and transported! Why, we know how difficult and tedious are the conditions of embarkation and landing of troops, artillery, transport columns, munitions, etc. We know that the 150,000 soldiers of the British Army alone required, in August, 1914, more than three weeks for disembarkation. And where? In three ports where everything was equipped for disembarkation purposes, where ideal conditions prevailed such as were hard to find in any other ports.

Thus France, in the event of a new conflict with her old foe, will again find herself for quite some time left all alone to face the numerically superior enemy. Where will Russia be then?

No Poland, no combination of any group of small States will be able to take the place of Russia, for that would be a mere 15-20 millions; it will be not Russia, but only one-seventh, a sixth, or fifth part of that which Russia gave during the past War. These weak nations will only become additional trophies to the enemy, just as Roumania, Serbia and Belgium became his easy prey in the past War.

Where will Russia be then? Not the present-day Russia bleeding to death in its struggle against Bolshevism, but the future, once more powerful, Russia?...

Bolshevism, an abnormal phenomenon, is bound to come to an end--somewhat earlier, or somewhat later. No matter how much may be cut off from Russia, she will always remain an immense, great, rich, and therefore powerful, country. Too much will depend upon what this coming Russia may have to say, for any sensible statesman to refuse to reckon with that eventuality.

This question the statesmen of the West must ask of themselves clearly and plainly--not those statesmen who think no further than the following day and of the success of their fight against their political opponents--but those wise leaders of the nations who really have at heart the interests of their own countries, as well as of the entire civilized world. "Ostrich politics" may least of all be applied in dealing with that tremendous military and political factor which covers one-sixth of the land surface of the globe and is called Russia.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See diagrams on pp. 15 and 18.

[2] See Appendixes No. I and II, in which an analysis of this part of Ludendorf's Memoirs is given.

[3] See Appendixes "Ludendorf--Samsonov" and "Ludendorf--Rennenkampf" at the end of the pamphlet.

[4] How preposterous is this figure of 1,200,000 men, supposed to have been transferred by the Russians from Galicia to Warsaw, to oppose Ludendorf, may be seen from the fact that only 3 railway lines run from Galicia to Warsaw. It is not difficult to demonstrate that it is impossible to carry 1,200,000 men on 3 railway lines within 2 weeks (the offensive of the Germans against Warsaw began in the first days of October, and the retreat began two weeks later, i. e., when the Russian troops were transferred from Galicia to Warsaw).

One army corps requires 140-150 trains. The best road in Russia can at most carry 52 trains in 24 hours in one direction. Hence, to entrain a corps would require 3 days. Consequently the most that could be entrained within 15 days would be 5 corps to each railway line. Thus, all 3 roads combined might have been able to carry up to 15 corps, but actually, of course, they carried less than that. But even if we allow the computation of 15 corps to stand, we have but 500-600 thousand men, and not 1,200,000 as Mr. Ludendorf unhesitatingly allots.

[5] According to figures submitted in 1916 by the army committee of the German Reichstag, the German army lost during the first 12 months of the War 604 thousand killed, 1,556,000 wounded, and 317 thousand prisoners. This shows that the number of wounded is 2½ times the number of killed.

[6] According to the statistics of the "Copenhagen Society," the French Army lost 1,350,000 in killed, the British--700,000, the Italian--330,000, and each of the remaining Allies--100,000 and less.

Appendix No. I

Ludendorf--Samsonov

1.) A careful perusal of Ludendorf's memoirs brings out the fact that during the first Russian invasion of Eastern Prussia there participated on the German side: the 1st, 17th, 20th and 1st Reserve Corps, the 3rd Reserve Division, the 6th Landwehr Brigade, Goltz's Division, the garrisons of the Vistula fortresses,--Thorn, Kulm and Graudenitz, and a brigade of cavalry. The German forces consisted, therefore, not of two corps numbering 80,000 men but of more than 240,000, not counting the masses of landsturm, which fact Ludendorf carefully conceals.

2.) The Russians, on the other hand, advanced into East Prussia not fully mobilized, as this battle took place twenty-seven days after the War was declared, and the Russian mobilization was only completed three--four weeks later. Samsonov had no six army corps under his command, but only 4 corps: the 1st, the 6th, the 13th and the 15th, and, figuring even at 40,000 men per army corps, this force could not have exceeded 160,000 men.

3.) It can be seen, therefore, that in this battle over 240,000 Germans were opposing 160,000 Russians at most. However, as a matter of positive fact, the attack of the 240,000 Germans was directed against two Russian corps only, the 1st and the 6th, i. e., at only approximately 80,000 men.

4.) A force of Germans, three times as strong, overpowered two Russian corps. During that attack Samsonov and a part of his staff were killed. That, and the disruption of liaison, was the reason reinforcements were not sent up from the other corps and the Germans succeeded in invading the Russian rear (see map No. 1).

5.) The remainder of Samsonov's army, about 80,000 men, became surrounded by 240,000 Germans, and, left without leadership, in the midst of an extremely critical and dangerous operation, on unfamiliar territory, it was shattered. _Only under such an unfortunate combination of circumstances could a threefold strong German force win the battle in a tactical sense. But, from the strategic point of view, the Germans lost in this stage of their campaign, as this battle diverted a number of German corps from France and served a purpose of the greatest importance._

It may be observed from the map that the 1st Corps was attacked by two German corps, one division and the Vistula garrisons, i. e., about 120,000 Germans attacked 40,000 Russians. The 6th Corps at Biskofsburg was put in a similar situation. Under pressure from a threefold stronger German force, the 1st and 6th Corps retreated. Thereupon the Germans fell under Neiderborg and Passenheim upon the rear of Samsonov's remaining troops, the 13th and 15th Corps. These corps were consequently surrounded by this threefold stronger force and were defeated after a heroic fight of three days.]

6.) It must be added that the entire population of East Prussia was armed, and scouting was very difficult. The Russians knew nothing about the enemy, while the latter was fully informed by the inhabitants concerning the Russians and knew every step these were making. That is why the German attack came as a surprise.

7.) The assertion that Rennenkampf had 400,000 men and intentionally did not come to Samsonov's aid is a downright misstatement. This can be seen from the fact that the battle, which was begun on August 27, was lost in 18 hours, on the morning of August 28, and Rennenkampf, who with small forces was within three days' marching distance from Samsonov--40 miles--could not have arrived in time, particularly when we consider that he had to overcome on his way fortifications and barbed-wire defenses manned by landsturm and by cavalry.

8.) Ludendorf's assertion that Rennenkampf's force consisted of 24 divisions, almost 400,000 men, is an obvious falsehood. A single army is never made up of more than six army corps, for facility and expediency in commanding, and this is a basic rule in military organizations. Ludendorf knows this very well, but it appears that he consciously misstated the truth in this case as well.

9.) In reality Rennenkampf's army consisted of eight divisions or four army corps,--the 2nd, the 3rd, the 4th and the 20th, and of six cavalry divisions. Altogether his force consisted of about 160,000 men. The bulk of his infantry could not have reached the front at that time, as it was necessary to organize the rear and to coordinate the railway movement in Prussia, as the Russian rail gauge is much wider than that adopted by the German railway system. Rennenkampf's front, therefore, was occupied largely by cavalry, supported only in section by weak detachments of infantry.

10.) Rennenkampf could not have aided Samsonov even if he had known his situation, because he was already at a distance of 90 miles from his own railway lines, and Ludendorf himself admits that it is not possible to operate safely further than 80 miles from one's railroads. Rennenkampf's army, therefore, without provisions and ammunition, had to wait until its rear was made secure and was unable to move further.

Appendix No. II.

Ludendorf--Rennenkampf

His second battle--with Rennenkampf--Ludendorf describes with a similar distortion of facts. On this occasion he goes so far as to assert that Rennenkampf had not 400,000 men but 600,000, and he states at the same time that Rennenkampf was a traitor because he retreated too soon. As we have already seen, Rennenkampf had only about 160,000 men, and he was reinforced by one more corps, the 22nd,--about 40,000 additional men; therefore his army could not have exceeded 200,000 men. Ludendorf places his own army at 300,000 men, much less, of course, than his actual strength, but even at that rate he attacked 200,000 Russians with 300,000 German troops, outnumbering his adversary one and a half times.

That accounts for the ease with which Ludendorf was able to throw 200,000 men into the frontal attack and still was able to send up 100,000 men to get into Rennenkampf's rear (see map No. 2). Rennenkampf's troops were kept engaged for seven days in repulsing Ludendorf's attacks upon their front, and he had no troops left with which to parry the attack on his rear. When the Germans invaded the Russian rear and were threatening to cut off the Russian main line of retreat, the Vershbolovo-Kovno Railroad, Rennenkampf was compelled to retreat so as not to be cut off. In fact, had Rennenkampf not retreated at that time, he would have committed the same act of treason that Marshal Bazaine was guilty of in 1870, when he, under similar circumstances, did not consent to escape from the steadily closing-up iron ring of Germans and was finally captured with his entire army. Rennenkampf gave orders to retreat only when the Germans were firing at the city of Gumbinnen and at his rear railway lines. This was not too soon by any means, but may have been rather a little late.

Rennenkampf had 4 corps,--less than 160,000 men. He was attacked frontally also by 4 corps which engaged all his effectives. Meanwhile two German corps (the 17th and the 1st) that remained free began invading his rear (these corps are indicated in black). When these two corps approached Gumbinnen, they found themselves in a position to cut Rennenkampf off from his only road, the Insterburg-Kovno railway. Rennenkampf had no men to oppose these troops with, as all his units were fighting at the front line of Welau-Ingenburg. Rennenkampf was therefore compelled to retreat in order not to be cut off.]

The 22nd Corps did not even succeed in getting near Rennenkampf, and was halted by the Germans fifty miles away from the field of battle. Rennenkampf had, therefore, not 200,000 men to Germany's 300,000, but only 160,000,--about one-half. The cause of the defeat of Rennenkampf was that that military operation had been calculated for the combined armies of Samsonov and Rennenkampf, and was a risky undertaking at that. When Rennenkampf was left alone, this operation was as a matter of course doomed to defeat, and it required the tenacity of Rennenkampf to have offered the obstinate resistance that he did in this battle.

* * * * * *

Transcriber's note:

Obvious punctuation errors were corrected.

Inconsistent hyphenation wss made consistent.

Ludendorff consistently spelled Ludendorf but has not been corrected.

p. 10: Apparent missing line in: "brought about the final defeat of the Germans in this [newline] sonov."

pp. 45-6: Several misspellings of Rennenkampf corrected.

p. 46: He was atacked frontally -> He was attacked frontally.