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Chapter XVI: Appendix: The Mons Despatch

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_To the Secretary of State for War_

_September 7, 1914._

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report the proceedings of the Field Force
under my command up to the time of rendering this despatch.

1. The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by
rail was effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit
arrived at its destination in this country well within the
scheduled time.

The concentration was practically complete on the evening of
Friday, the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to
move the Force during Saturday, the 22nd, to positions I
considered most favourable from which to commence operations which
the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, requested me to
undertake in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the
campaign.

The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Conde
on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was
taken up as follows:--

From Conde to Mons inclusive was assigned to the 2nd Corps, and to
the right of the 2nd Corps from Mons the 1st Corps was posted. The
5th Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.

In the absence of my 3rd Army Corps I desired to keep the Cavalry
Division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer
flank, or move in support of any threatened part of the line. The
forward reconnaissance was entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir
Philip Chetwode with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, but I directed
General Allenby to send forward a few squadrons to assist in this
work.

During August 22 and 23 these advanced squadrons did some
excellent work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and
several encounters took place in which our troops showed to great
advantage.

2. At 6 a.m. on August 23 I assembled the Commanders of the 1st
and 2nd Corps and Cavalry Division at a point close to the
position, and explained the general situation of the Allies, and
what I understood to be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with
them at some length the immediate situation in front of us.

From information I received from French Headquarters I understood
that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's Army
Corps, with perhaps one Cavalry Division, were in front of my
position; and I was aware of no attempted outflanking movement by
the enemy. I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my
patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitring
operations. The observation of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear
out this estimate.

About 3 p.m. on Sunday, the 23rd, reports began coming in to the
effect that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line,
apparently in some strength, but that the right of the position
from Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened.

The Commander of the 1st Corps had pushed his flank back to some
high ground south of Bray, and the 5th Cavalry Brigade evacuated
Binche, moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied
Binche.

The right of the 3rd Division, under General Hamilton, was at
Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed
the Commander of the 2nd Corps to be careful not to keep the
troops on this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to
draw back the centre behind Mons. This was done before dark. In
the meantime, about 5 p.m., I received a most unexpected message
from General Joffre by telegraph, telling me that at least three
German Corps, viz., a reserve corps, the 4th Corps and the 9th
Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the 2nd Corps
was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournay.
He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and the
5th French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on
the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre
between Charleroi and Namur.

3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons
position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be
reconnoitred. This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on
the right and extended west to Jenlain, south-east of
Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to
hold, because standing crops and buildings made the siting of
trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire in many
important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good
artillery positions.

When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German
threatening on my front reached me, I endeavoured to confirm it by
aeroplane reconnaissance; and as a result of this I determined to
effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the
24th.

A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line
throughout the night, and at daybreak on the 24th the 2nd Division
from the neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration
as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of
both the 1st and 2nd Divisions, whilst the 1st Division took up a
supporting position in the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover
of this demonstration the 2nd Corps retired on the line
Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The 3rd Division on the right of the
Corps suffered considerable loss in this operation from the enemy,
who had retaken Mons.

The 2nd Corps halted on this line, where they partially entrenched
themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the 1st Corps gradually
to withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much
further loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 p.m.
Towards midday the enemy appeared to be directing his principal
effort against our left.

I had previously ordered General Allenby with the Cavalry to act
vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavour to take the
pressure off.

About 7.30 a.m. General Allenby received a message from Sir
Charles Fergusson, commanding 5th Division, saying that he was
very hard pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of
this message General Allenby drew in the Cavalry and endeavoured
to bring direct support to the 5th Division.

During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the 2nd
Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyse the
further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack
on his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was
held up by wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the 9th
Lancers and 18th Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of
the Brigade.

The 19th Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the Line of
Communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22nd
and 23rd. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a
position south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the 2nd
Corps.

With the assistance of the Cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was
enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having
two corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank,
he suffered great losses in doing so.

At nightfall the position was occupied by the 2nd Corps to the
west of Bavai, the 1st Corps to the right. The right was protected
by the Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the 19th Brigade in
position between Jenlain and Bry, and the Cavalry on the outer
flank.

4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except
such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the
determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank
assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place
and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring
to another position.

I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were
somewhat exhausted, and I knew that they had suffered heavy
losses. I hoped, therefore, that his pursuit would not be too
vigorous to prevent me effecting my object.

The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not
only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the
exhaustion of the troops.

The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to
a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were
ordered to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5.30 a.m.

Two Cavalry Brigades, with the Divisional Cavalry of the 2nd
Corps, covered the movement of the 2nd Corps. The remainder of the
Cavalry Division, with the 19th Brigade, the whole under the
command of General Allenby, covered the west flank.

The 4th Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday,
the 23rd, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a
Brigade of Artillery with Divisional Staff were available for
service.

I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his
right south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau
Road south of La Chaprie. In this position the Division rendered
great help to the effective retirement of the 2nd and 1st Corps to
the new position.

Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le
Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th,
been partially prepared and entrenched, I had grave doubts--owing
to the information I received as to the accumulating strength of
the enemy against me--as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.

Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my
right, my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western
corps (II) to envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted
condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to
continue the retreat till I could put some substantial obstacle,
such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy,
and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganisation.
Orders were, therefore, sent to the Corps Commanders to continue
their retreat as soon as they possibly could towards the general
line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.

The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the
retirement.

Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the 1st Corps
continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the
eastern border of the Forêt De Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies
about 10 o'clock. I had intended that the Corps should come
further west so as to fill up the gap between Le Cateau and
Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further
in without rest.

The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9.30
p.m. a report was received that the 4th Guards Brigade in
Landrecies was heavily attacked by troops of the 9th German Army
Corps who were coming through the forest on the north of the town.
This brigade fought most gallantly and caused the enemy to suffer
tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets
of the town. This loss has been estimated from reliable sources at
from 700 to 1,000. At the same time information reached me from
Sir Douglas Haig that his 1st Division was also heavily engaged
south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent messages to the
Commander of the two French Reserve Divisions on my right to come
up to the assistance of the 1st Corps, which they eventually did.
Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner
in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his Corps from an
exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night,
they were able at dawn to resume their march south towards
Wassigny on Guise.

By about 6 p.m. the 2nd Corps had got into position with their
right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighbourhood of Caudry, and
the line of defence was continued thence by the 4th Division
towards Seranvillers, the left being thrown back.

During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the Cavalry became a good
deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General
Allenby had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south
of Cambrai.

The 4th Division was placed under the orders of the General
Officer Commanding the 2nd Army Corps.

On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting of three
divisions, under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of
Avesnes. On my way back from Bavai, which was my "Poste de
Commandement" during the fighting of the 23rd and 24th, I visited
General Sordêt, and earnestly requested his co-operation and
support. He promised to obtain sanction from his Army Commander to
act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too tired to
move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable
assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable
for the reasons given to afford me any support on the most
critical day of all, viz., the 26th.

At daybreak on August 26 it became apparent that the enemy was
throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position
occupied by the 2nd Corps and the 4th Division.

At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position
against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he
judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as
ordered) in face of such an attack.

I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to break off the
action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was
impossible for me to send him any support, the 1st Corps being at
the moment incapable of movement.

The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on
our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message
to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of
my left flank; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found
himself unable to intervene in any way.

There had been no time to entrench the position properly, but the
troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which
confronted them.

The Artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made
a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to
be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was
given to commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement was covered with
the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the Artillery,
which had itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the
Cavalry in the further retreat from the position assisted
materially in the final completion of this most difficult and
dangerous operation.

Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage
in an energetic pursuit.

I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the
British troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of
the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace
Smith-Dorrien.

I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the
Army under my command on the morning of the 26th August could
never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and
unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present
to personally conduct the operation.

The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and
through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the
line Noyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of
the enemy's pursuit.

On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordêt and the
French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially assisting
my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on
Cambrai.

General D'Amade also, with the 61st and 62nd French Reserve
Divisions, moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras on the
enemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the
British Forces.

This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced
at Mons on Sunday afternoon, August 23, and which really
constituted a four days' battle.

At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present
despatch.

I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British Forces
have suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in
view of the fact that the British Army--only two days after a
concentration by rail--was called upon to withstand a vigorous
attack of five German Army Corps.

It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced
by the two General Officers commanding Army Corps; the
self-sacrificing and devoted exertions of their Staffs; the
direction of the troops by Divisional Brigade and Regimental
Leaders; the command of the smaller units by their officers; and
the magnificent fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned
officers and men.

I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the
admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David
Henderson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond
all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and
accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the
conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and
foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have
remained undaunted throughout.

Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in
destroying five of the enemy's machines.

I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable
assistance I received from the General and Personal Staffs at
Headquarters during this trying period.

Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General
Staff; Major-General Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and
all under them have worked day and night unceasingly with the
utmost skill, self-sacrifice and devotion; and the same
acknowledgment is due by me to Brigadier-General Hon. W. Lambton,
my Military Secretary, and the Personal Staff.

In such operations as I have described the work of the
Quartermaster-General is of an extremely onerous nature.
Major-General Sir William Robertson has met what appeared to be
almost insuperable difficulties with his characteristic energy,
skill and determination; and it is largely owing to his exertions
that the hardships and sufferings of the troops--inseparable from
such operations--were not much greater.

Major-General Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant-General, has also
been confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in
connection with disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of
casualty lists. He has been indefatigable in his exertions to meet
the difficult situations which arose.

I have not yet been able to complete the list of officers whose
names I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for services
rendered during the period under review; and, as I understand it
is of importance that this despatch should no longer be delayed, I
propose to forward this list, separately, as soon as I can.

I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
(Signed) J.D.P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief,
British Forces in the Field.

INDEX

Abu Klea, battle of, 17.

Asquith, H.H., 103.

Baden-Powell, Lieut.-General Sir Robert, 26.

Barrow, Col. Percy, 12, 18, 19, 23.

Beresford, Lord Charles:
Knocked senseless, 15.

Bernhardi, General von, 33, 127.

Bewicke Copley, General--Admiration of French, 24.

Bloemfontein, 75, 85, 86.

Botha, General, 56.

Buller, Sir Redvers:
Relief for the Expedition, 18.
Desperate measure, A, 19.
Checking the enemy's advance, 20.
Tribute to French, 21.
His knowledge of French's value, 34.
Oppressed by misgivings, 53.
Preparing to relieve Ladysmith, 54.
Disaster at Colenso, 56.

Butcher Major E.E.A.: Ingenious solution of a difficulty, 62, 63.

Carleton, Colonel, 46, 47, 48, 49.

Cavalry:
Test against camels, 12.
Distinguishing themselves, 14.
Buller's belief in, 21.
Enemy's respect for, 22.
Cavalry regiments in India, 25.
French's, Sir, J., idea of the function of, 26.
Opinion of the late Sir Robert Russell, 27.
British cavalry reform, 28.
Worrying the enemy at Colesberg, 55.
Race for De Kiel's Drift, The, 70.
Popular idea of cavalry, 106.
Use and abuse of, 108.
Lesson of the Boer War, 109.
French's, Sir J., confidence in, 114.
Mounted arm in modern warfare, The, 115.

Chisholme, Colonel Scott, 36, 38.

Colenso, 50, 56.

Colesberg, 33, 55, 59, 62, 64, 84, 127, 134.

Cromer, Lord, 11.

Cronje, General, 56, 68, 69, 73, 73, 79, 80, 81, 82.

Curragh, The, 7, 104.

Delarey, General, 65, 83, 84.

Despard, Mrs., 2, 136.

De Wet, General, 65, 83, 84, 129.

Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan, 99.

"Dumpies," The, 5.

Eccles, Miss, 2.

Elandslaagte, 40, 41, 52, 135.

Ewart, Sir J.S., 101, 103.

Fisher, Colonel, 59.

French, General Sir John:
Boyhood, 3.
War game, The, 3.
8th Hussars, Gazetted to the, 5.
Naval career, Early, 4.
Sportsman, As a, 6, 7.
Nickname, His, 6.
Strategy, Interest in, 8.
Marriage, 8.
Egypt, Ordered to, 9.
Scouting in the desert, 14, 15.
Wood, Sir E., First meeting with, 20.
Mentioned in Dispatches, 21.
Promotion, 23.
Reorganisation of cavalry regiments in India, 25.
An enforced retirement, 25.
Function of cavalry, His idea of the, 26.
Effect of his cavalry theory, 27.
Appointment at the War Office, 28.
Temperament, His, 29.
Notable success, A, 30.
Promotion to Major-General, 31.
Public ignorance of his work, 33.
Sketch by Major Arthur Griffiths, 34.
Arrival at Ladysmith, 35.
Result of a cavalry charge, 36.
Difficult enterprise, A, 37.
His opportunity, 38.
His first victory, 39.
Impression of him on the battlefield, An, 40.
Secret of his ability, 41.
Won a reputation among the Boers, 43.
An American journalist's description, 44.
Out-manoeuvring the Boers, 49.
Leaving Ladysmith, 50.
Confounding the critics, 53.
Object at Colesberg, 54.
Cavalry attack, A, 55.
Cheering Christmas greeting, A, 57.
Cavalry tactics, His, 58.
Brilliant venture, A, 59.
Disaster to the Suffolks, The, 60.
His remarkable caution, 64.
Problem--modern warfare, mastered, A, 65.
Ability for doing the right thing, 66.
Promise to relieve Kimberley, 67.
Greatness of the undertaking, 68, 69.
Congratulated by Lords Roberts and Kitchener, 71.
Boers routed, 73.
French _v._ The Impossible, 76.
Kimberley relieved, 78.
Cutting off Cronje's retreat, 80.
Escape of De Wet, 84.
Narrow escape from death, 82.
Sitting for his portrait, 86.
Command of the forces in Eastern Transvaal, 89.
Imitating the Boers, 91.
Releasing Schoeman from jail, 92.
Command of the operations in Cape Colony, 93.
His modesty, 94.
"Shirt-sleeved General, The," 95.
Artilleryman's tribute, An, 96.
Return from South Africa, 97.
Appointed Inspector-General of the forces, 98.
His love of efficiency, 99.
Appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 99.
Gough incident, The, 100, 101.
His resignation, 103.
Student and an innovator, 107.
Objection to extremist views, 110.
His value in the present crisis, 118.
Man as he is, The, 123.
Worship of Napoleon, His, 124, 125.
Secret of his popularity, 126.
Literary ability, 130.
How he regards war, 133.

French, Lady, 8.

French, Commander J.T.W., 2.

Freyne, Lord de, 2.

Gatacre, General:
Boer invasion of Cape Colony, 54.
Reverse at Stormberg, 56.

Gordon, General, 11.

Griffiths, Major Arthur, 34.

Grimwood, Colonel, 47.

Gough, Brigadier-General, 101, 102.

Haig, Lieut.-General Sir Douglas, 26, 83, 119.

Hamilton, Sir Ian, 37.

Hussars, 19th, 1, 5, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22.

Joffre, General, 2, 119, 137.

Joubert, General, 49.

Khartoum:
Besieged, 11.
Effort to relieve, 12.
Fall of, 18.
Release of the Madhi's followers, 19.

Kitchener, Lord, 5, 9, 29, 66, 71, 74. 79, 93, 97, 122, 139.

Kimberley, 53, 54, 68, 75, 77, 78, 100, 101.

Kruger, President, 84.

Ladysmith, 35, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 69.

Lambton, Captain Hedworth, 48.

Laycock, Capt. J., 74.

Lombard's Cop, 49.

Luck, Sir George:
Opinion of cavalry regiments in India, 25.
Instituting cavalry reforms at home, 27.

Mahdi, The, 10, 11, 12, 15.

Mafeking, 53.

Magersfontein, 56, 75, 79.

Methuen, Lord, 53, 67, 75.

Milbanke, Sir John, 50.

Modder River, 69.

"Modern Marlborough, The," 120.

Moltke, Count von, 21.

_Morning Post, The_, 27.

Nile Expedition, 9.

Paget, General, 101.

Porter, Colonel, 56.

Pretoria, 88, 92.

Relieving Expedition, 18.

Rhodes, Cecil, 67, 68.

Roberts, Earl, 66, 67, 71, 83, 86, 87, 88, 93.

Seely, Colonel, 101, 102.

Selby-Lowndes, Richard William, 8.

Schoeman, General, 56, 58, 92.

Smith-Dorrien, General Sir Horace, 119.

Stead, W.T., 11.

Stewart, General Sir Herbert:
Testing the camels, 12.
Compelling the guides, 13.
Outnumbered by Dervishes, 15.
Hasty protection, 17.
Last words, His, 18.

Steyn, President, 84.

Stormberg, 56.

Talbot, General, 29, 30.

Warde, Colonel Charles E., 7.

Watson, Lieut.-Colonel A.J., 60, 61, 134.

Wauchope, Major-General, 54.

White, Sir George:
French's, Sir. J. colleague in South Africa, 25.
Peril at Ladysmith, His, 35.
Orders to French, His, 36.
Chivalrous reply, A, 38.
Attempt to distract the enemy, 41.
Difficult retreat, A, 42.
Two successful engagements, 45.
An optimistic plan, 46.
Seriousness of British position, 49.
Surrounded in Ladysmith, 53.

Wilford, Colonel, 42.

Wolseley, Lord:
Khartoum, Orders to relieve, 11.
Flying column, Dispatch of, 12.
Wood, Sir Evelyn, 4.
First meeting with French, 20.
Discovery of French's value, 24.

Yule, General:
Retreat from Dundee, 41.
His force saved, 42, 45.

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Typographical errors corrected in text:

Page 151: optimisitc replaced by optimistic
Page 73: pursut replaced by pursuit

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