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Chapter XIII: Part VII: Proceedings of Annual Meeting 287 (9)

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It was almost universally the evils attending child labor that evoked the first acts of regulation. But although abuses were very serious, legal remedies were most timidly applied. Even with the example of the successful issue of the English laws the New England legislatures contented themselves with the passage of most inadequate measures, measures that could hardly have been looked upon as anything more than unenforcible threats. We realize how complete a change of attitude toward this “intermeddling legislation” has been brought about during the course of the past sixty years when we compare a few of these old laws with those to-day in force. Contrast, for example, the detailed and exacting requirements of the present law concerning child labor in Massachusetts with the older Vermont statute, which is quite typical of the earlier order and “merely requires the selectmen of towns to inquire into the treatment of minors employed in manufacturing establishments; and if a minor’s education, morals, etc., are unreasonably neglected, or he is treated with improper severity or compelled to labor unreasonable hours, they may, if he has no parent or guardian, discharge him from such employment and bind him out as apprentice with the minor’s consent.” (Vt. 2518.)[31]

Early measures were certainly neither severe in the regulation imposed nor exact in defining the parties held to be responsible. They generally involved a question of volition, making “willful” transgression alone punishable, and thus unenforcible in the letter, were given into the hands of town officials who had neither the power nor the effective desire to investigate or to bring suit.

Such enactments stood for little more than a public recognition of abuses which they in no wise checked, but the increasing menace of the situation, the threat, not to be scorned, of a future sickly and illiterate labor population, forced the passage of more adequate measures and the resort to a better mechanism of enforcement than that of town officials and the general police. In such reforms Massachusetts took the lead, enacted and repealed several contradictory statutes, and finally by the slow process of continued amendment evolved the present really enforcible law.

We feel in studying the halting stages of this development not only that there was a pardonable ignorance of ways and means in attacking a new problem, but also the influence of a more or less skeptical public opinion concerning this policy of interference which reflected itself in hedging clauses that weakened and sometimes vitiated what would otherwise have been good measures.

In spite of many drawbacks to advance, however, there was no retrograde motion, but a continued development of strictness and detail in exactions, of clearer definition and placement of responsibility and of more adequate provision for inspection. As these laws gradually demonstrated their practical usefulness and convinced the public of benefit instead of harm, the former attitude of timidity gave place to a decided peremptoriness, the former indiscriminate _omnibus ad quos hae litteræ pervenerint_ to placed responsibility.

Meantime the way was opened for more wide-reaching regulations concerning hours of labor, workroom conditions, etc., and a broader conception of the province of such legislation and of that which might be considered proper subject of legal interference. Whereas the first attempts to protect even little children from conditions that imperiled their health and life were bitterly opposed in England upon grounds of national policy, to-day we find statutes that regulate not only child labor, hours of labor, factory constructions and the use of machinery, but also others that stipulate times and manner of wage payment, and forbid fines in dealings with adult male employees. And this has come to pass in America where “freedom of contract” is the constitutional right of every individual citizen.

Our laws have indeed very steadily progressed from measures of simple protection to detailed regulation of conditions, and even to the securing of special benefits to labor.

This broader application of the legal remedy has been accompanied also by marked territorial extension, following the growth and spread of manufactures. Other states have felt the necessity of adopting a labor code and have naturally, in a general way, followed the forms of New England and New York. They range, however, through all stages of incompleteness. A curious phenomenon constantly appears in this imitative legislation. When a state legislature passes a new labor law, or revises an old one, it does not necessarily adopt the latest form nor that which has proved to work most satisfactorily in another state, nor yet a combination of choice clippings from several. A state legislature is generally perfectly content with a law that is about as poor as the average and looks forward most placidly to the inevitable train of amendments that must follow in its wake. By this I do not mean to criticise in the least the enactment of less strict regulations as a lower age limit or longer hours of labor, which may be proper under given local conditions, but alone the continued repetition of blunders and faults of construction that have elsewhere proved their character and their power to nullify the intent of the law. Fortunately experience proves in the end an effective, if dear, teacher and one of the lessons that it ultimately drives home is that even a state legislature cannot legislate the laws of nature out of the world arena. As Jevons said, “The state is the least of the powers that govern us.” But as the physician through his knowledge of medicine and physiology, and by his diagnosis of the symptoms of disease, is able to pit law against law, and to restore health where he found abnormal conditions; so the statesman who understands the social order and the tendencies of economic forces is often able to control their action. In either case, a knowledge of the active agencies is absolutely necessary to the solution of the problem. The recent organization of bureaus of labor statistics is certainly significant in this connection. To-day, when a question of labor legislation is presented, there is, in many states, such a qualified advisory body to whom the whole matter may be referred for investigation and study, and whose regular duty it is to inquire into and report upon labor and industrial conditions within the state. This indicates a growing appreciation of the necessity of accurate information and of the exercise of due care in passing acts of regulation.

_Enforcement by Inspection._

The problem of enforcement of these laws has proved even more serious than that of their enactment. Labor laws, however good, cannot enforce themselves. It may appear to be for the laborer’s own interest to report violations and seek the legal remedy, but the indisputable fact is that he does not do it. Moreover, not only is the individual laborer often not in a position to do so safely, but even the labor union shrinks from the task. The whole history of the movement for the regulation of labor shows the absolute necessity of efficient inspection, a fact which has unfortunately been most clearly demonstrated in the general lack of such inspection. In nothing do the states differ more widely than in their provision for inspection. There are such specifically differentiated departments as that of Massachusetts or New York; there are such combinations as that of Connecticut, where a single inspector with two or three assistants enforces the factory, workshop and bake-shop acts, while the Board of Education is charged with the child labor laws; and there is dependence alone upon the general police force.

Inspection always lags too far behind legislation and has given some ground of credit to the often-repeated criticism that this labor legislation is not in fact intended seriously, but has been entered upon the statute books rather to still the clamor of agitators for reform than to effect any real change in conditions. It is certain at least that the serious effectiveness of these laws develops in exact proportion with the inspecting power,—with the organization, number and qualification of inspectors. If the charge of insincerity, however, had been true, we might expect to find that the better the laws became, the stronger the pressure that would be brought against the development of costly inspection. The legal remedy being given, is it not the privilege of the individual to avail himself of it, rather than the duty of the state to force it upon him? On the contrary, however, the history of inspection runs parallel and in the same direction with that of the legislation just reviewed. The same economic and social forces that were the _raison d’être_ of these laws have quite as distinctly and steadily, though more slowly, created the supplementary machinery of enforcement. The unreliable and haphazard inspection of town officials has passed entirely, superseded by the inspector whose sole duty is inspection, in which duty he is aided by assistants immediately under his own command, or by members of other departments of government. The tendency towards the development of _distinct_ inspection departments is quite unmistakable though the exact form of their future organization is less easily predicted. There are two toward which present forms lean, one exemplified in Massachusetts, the other in New York.

In Massachusetts the inspectors are organized as a division of police, under the chief of police as chief inspector, exactly as the detective division, for instance. That of New York is a separate and distinct body under a chief appointed by the governor to hold that single office.

The question is therefore raised as to whether organic connection with the police department or separate and distinct autonomy is the more practical and advantageous form. It is conceded that Massachusetts has developed the most efficient corps of inspectors in this country, but this cannot at present be taken as conclusive proof of policy, because Massachusetts was earlier in the field, and because opposing obstacles were hardly so serious as those met in New York. Further, such connection with the police department in Massachusetts seems to have been largely due to local conditions and to have grown out of measures dictated by immediate convenience at the time of the passage of the early child labor laws, rather than a deliberately chosen system of administration. A clipping from the history of the department will make this clear.

“At first the unreliable mechanism of truant officers and local town or city officials was solely depended upon for inspection. Then, under new child labor statutes, a single deputy was in each case detailed by the police department to aid enforcement (1866, c. 273; 1867, c. 285). The law of 1877 (c. 214), increasing the duties of factory inspection by regulations looking to the safety of employees, provided that members of the State Detective Department should act as inspectors of factories and public buildings, to report and prosecute violations of this act as well as of other measures relative to the employment of women and minors.... In 1879 (c. 305), the governor was authorized to appoint two regular inspectors from the police department....

“Better administration was finally secured in 1888 (c. 113), by separating the detective and inspecting forces.... With the enactment of stringent steam-boiler inspection laws, a new department of boiler inspectors ... was created.”

While in some ways this affiliation with the police has been helpful, there are also drawbacks in the combination under one head of work in fields that are so large and so distinctly marked off from one another not only in object, but most essentially in methods of work. It would seem that a due co-operation between district departments could be made to afford all of the advantages of the closer relationship, while it would insure the whole time and energy of the chief to a task that is quite enough to occupy his entire attention. Indeed, with the increasing number and detail of regulations, the many technicalities that arise in the application of labor laws and the rapid growth of the factory system of industry, another specialist will soon be demanded to fill such an office. The necessary increase in numbers alone must make the police connection awkward.

In framing many of these laws, for example the factory acts, much has necessarily been left to the discretion of inspectors in the decision of what is “adequate” provision. Especially where appliances not contemplated in the ordinary law are offered, very careful judgment is called for. Such powers cannot be entrusted to untrained and inexperienced persons, however well intentioned, nor is the training of police duty any sufficient preparation. It would not be considered appropriate to appoint a policeman inspector of stationary steam boilers or examiner of engineers, yet under present factory laws, technical knowledge of industrial processes, machinery, etc., is sometimes equally demanded. In Massachusetts the original method of detailing police as inspectors when occasion demanded, or even permanently installing them in these positions, has been abandoned for the stricter and more adequate tests of civil service examinations open to all applicants. And again her example indicates a general trend.

The tendency in inspection already is, and in the future must be more markedly, toward the growth of a distinct and specialized department, in which the chief and his assistants are trained for their work. Such a department, while it would not stand in the relationship which some at present hold to the police, would come into closer touch with other departments, as the Board of Education and Bureau of Labor.

_Uniform Labor Legislation._

The influence of state boundary lines upon the course of legislation in this country is an interesting question, and one upon which entirely diverse opinions are held. Some go so far as to claim that there never can be really successful legislation so long as such boundaries hold; that if a good labor law is passed in one state and enforced there, the benefit that may result to the few operatives is balanced by the restriction which it puts upon the producer and the consequent discrimination against capital in that state as compared with its neighbors. Capital therefore seeks investment in those sister states instead of in the law-trammeled one, thus reacting against the interests of the labor market there; while states that so profit in their freedom are the more loath to give over their advantage by enacting similar measures. Thus legislation in one state becomes at once detrimental to its own industrial interests, and a check upon legislation elsewhere. Loud protests of this tenor were heard, for example, in Massachusetts a few years ago, when at a time of business depression the cotton mills suffered from the competition of Southern rivals. A somewhat extended study of the situation at that crisis, however, failed to show that these detrimental consequences had followed in actual life, or that the stress felt by the mills could have been removed by a suspension of the laws complained of.

On the other hand, when we begin to reckon with the difficulties that must be encountered in any attempt to legislate upon labor conditions in this country treated as a whole (even disregarding entirely the present constitutional impediment), we find arguments showing that local self-government has probably furthered the development of labor legislation. In the first place, it is much more difficult to persuade a body with such wide jurisdiction to pass what must often be experimental measures and may endanger national interests. Suppose, however, that this legislation was undertaken, it would be well-nigh impossible to frame a measure that would apply with justice throughout and in communities where industrial occupations differ entirely in kind, or, if of like order, range through many stages of development. It would mean that such legislation must conform to a very low margin of production in order to avoid injury to states where conditions are backward, and that would leave unregulated much that has clearly shown need of regulation in states where there is higher organization of industry. Would it not, in fact, be absolutely necessary to mark out territorial divisions that might not of course follow state boundaries, but would not in the end differ essentially from them in character? Again, such divisions mapped, what an impossible labor is put upon the central body if it would legislate wisely for the several sections! Would it not be necessary at least to appoint some advisory body to study the local needs of each section and to report recommending appropriate measures? In the end, what would we have in the least better than the present system?

Within a single state the labor interest is united, the pros and cons of the situation can be more easily investigated, effects more easily watched and even more accurately predicted. Jevons might indeed have considered it a well-fitted laboratory for his scientific experimentation in legislation. The success of a local experiment acts often as an incentive to labor elsewhere to demand like privileges, and as against the argument of an insignificant tax upon production, the political power of the labor party has very generally won the day. The second state feels itself at no greater disadvantage than that which took the initiative in the movement, and may easily take the precaution of passing restrictions that are a trifle under those of its neighbor.

This discussion, however, leaves us still face to face with a confusion of local regulations, among which there is total lack of any uniformity. The situation has for some time attracted public comment, and there is a growing desire for uniformity especially in the protection of child labor and in the curtailment of the hours of labor, which are the regulations that particularly affect the interests of capitalists. Quixotic attempts to force an amendment of the Constitution, and to secure the passage of a national eight-hourday law, have been chronicled in the movement, which nevertheless, with more moderate aims, has steadily gathered strength. At last, under the Industrial Commission of 1898, the problem of uniform legislation has been clearly recognized and carefully studied, “in order,” the act reads, “to harmonize conflicting interests and to be equitable to the laborer, the employer, the producer and the consumer” (Sec. 3). Empowered to report with recommendations either directly to Congress or to the several state legislatures, the Commission addressed itself in this “matter of domestic law” to the state legislatures. The report submitted is of such interest and importance that I quote in full its recommendations so far as they apply to factory labor:

“Perhaps the subject of greatest public interest to-day is that of the regulation of the hours of labor permitted in industrial occupations, and especially in factories.... Obviously Congress has no power, without a constitutional amendment, to legislate upon this subject. The Commission are of the opinion that a uniform law upon this subject may wisely be recommended for adoption by all the states. We believe that such legislation cannot, under the federal and state constitutions, be recommended as to persons, male or female, above the age of twenty-one, except, of course, in some special industries, where employment for too many hours becomes positively a menace to the health, safety, or well-being of the community; but minors, not yet clothed with all the rights of citizens, are peculiarly the subject of state protection, and still more so, young children.

“The Commission are of the opinion, therefore, that a simple statute ought to be enacted by all the states, to regulate the length of the working day for young persons in factories (meaning by ‘young persons’ those between the age of majority and fourteen); and in view of the entire absence of protection now accorded by the laws of many states to children of tender years, we think that employment in any capacity or for any time, under the age of fourteen, should be prohibited. The question of shops and mercantile establishments generally appears even more subject to local conditions than that of factories; therefore the Commission see no need for even recommending to the states any uniform legislation upon this subject. But child labor should be universally protected by educational restrictions, providing in substance that no child may be employed in either factories, shops, or in stores in large cities, who cannot read and write, and except during vacation, unless he has attended school for at least twelve weeks in each year.”[32]

These are certainly conservative recommendations and illustrate again the difficulty of finding any common ground of action even in the fundamental requirements of health and education. The exception made with reference to shops and mercantile establishments upon the ground of local differences in conditions is interesting. So much evidence has been brought of abuse of child labor in the mercantile houses of many large cities, especially in respect to these two matters of overwork through long hours and of interference with common-school education (above recognized) that several states have voluntarily extended provisions of the factory laws concerning minors to cover such establishments. These conditions appear to reproduce themselves with remarkable similarity in various locations, and it is not altogether clear what local conditions could intervene to make the universal application of the measure proposed for factories undesirable.

Notwithstanding all moderation and the exceptions allowed, two of the commissioners still recorded themselves as considering it “unjust and impracticable to attempt any uniform laws regulating labor in all the states,” and a third concurring with these adds that, “the conditions to be dealt with will work themselves out better under local self-government than under any iron-clad rule adopted by or suggested from a central power.”[33]

The protestors are from the Southern states and their protest seems peculiarly pertinent at this time, when the prevailing conditions of child labor in these states are attracting so much attention. Not to digress into a discussion that would lead us too far afield, let it suffice to sum up the evident facts of the situation in a single paragraph.[34]

Whatever their previous condition of freedom, barbarism or poverty, there are to-day, in the cotton mills of the South, large numbers of little children, some under ten years of age, who can be and are employed sometimes eleven and more hours a day, sometimes eleven hours of the night. Indeed conditions parallel the times of Shaftesbury in England! Attempts to pass bills that can hardly be deemed extravagant in the protection demanded, and even compulsory education measures, have been opposed and frustrated. The reasons given for such resistance of legal interference may be summarized about as follows, at least in Alabama, which has been the field of a recent encounter: That the bill presented by the Alabama Child Labor Committee[35] is “outside interference” and “only the entering wedge”; that “Georgia (facing the more difficult task in) having double the number of spindles, should act first”; that against the expressed desires of mill officers, parents insist upon the employment of their children or “take their families to other mills where no objection is made” (and this the law would make impossible);[36] that the prodigiously early development of this particular class of Southern children together with “the length and heat of the day” which “are prime factors respecting the hours that may be appropriated to labor”[37] make it inadvisable to limit the hours of labor of children to ten out of a possible twenty-four, or to require that they should sleep and not work at night. We cannot say that the movement for uniform legislation or even for labor legislation “under local self-government” is unopposed.

The recommendations of the Commission also include the following:

“Further regulations, especially in the line of bringing states which now have no factory acts up to a higher standard, is earnestly recommended.

“In states which have many factories the well-known factory act of Massachusetts or New York, based upon the English act which served as a model to all such, is recommended for adoption.

“The sweat-shop law also, which is now practically identical in the important states of New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Ohio, is recommended for general adoption.

“A simple and liberal law regulating the payment of labor should be adopted in all the states, providing that laborers shall be paid, for all labor performed, in cash or cash orders, without discount, not in goods or due bills, and that no compulsion, direct or indirect, shall be used to make them purchase supplies at any particular store.”[38]

The report refers also to other statutes which reinforce certain common law doctrines, such as those concerning intimidation, strikes, boycotts and black-listing, to those protecting the political rights and legal rights in suit of labor and to the recognition accorded to trade unions in provisions for incorporation and protection of labels, making however no special recommendation concerning them to the states.[39]

We see, therefore, that beyond the elementary regulation of child labor and hours of labor for minors, the Commission would have the states establish a standard of good sanitation and of safe conditions in factories everywhere, and above this, especially suggests a scientific and well-tested law for adoption in states having large manufactures. The restriction of hours is always looked upon chiefly as a health measure, but it is certain that the general bodily vigor of the worker has been more markedly affected by modern improvements in ventilation, lighting and sanitation than by any of the shorter day statutes. Factory acts assist materially in forcing this advance and have received a due recognition of their usefulness. In recommending the universal passage of a sweat-shop act, the Commission endorses the old saying, that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. As a matter of fact, such laws have been passed, and in an incredibly short time (since 1892, when New York passed the first of this series), in those states in which the evil is important. Attempts to extirpate the evil in these states threaten to drive it into neighboring sections. Connecticut, for example, lying between Massachusetts and New York, in both of which quarters the anti-sweat-shop war is being vigorously pushed, has enacted a similar statute simply as a protective measure.

It is clear that the ultimate effect of uniform labor legislation will not be one law applying throughout the length and breadth of this great land, but rather a graded system. It will determine a minimum standard of regulations, a basal plane, of competition for American industry. Above this it will still be necessary for the local government in many places to impose stricter requirements where there is complexity of organization, but in that which is fundamentally essential to the common well-being of the community there will be one limit approved for all that may not be transgressed.

The suggestion made in the Industrial Commission’s report as to how this standard may be determined is especially well considered:

“In conclusion the Commission would recommend the establishment by all the states of labor bureaus or commissioners, who shall, besides their local duties as now defined, be charged with that of exchanging their statistics and reports, and of convening at least once in a year in national conference for general consultation, which national conference shall have power to submit directly to Congress its recommendations for such federal legislation as a majority of the state commissioners may deem advisable, and shall also submit to all the states, through the commissioners of each separate state, their recommendations for such uniform state statutes upon labor subjects as may seem wise and desirable.”[40]

If we rightly interpreted the action of local governments in establishing these bureaus of labor, as a step towards more scientific legislation in those states, surely this plan of a national conference of state commissioners of labor stands for a still more important extension of the scientific method in questions of labor legislation. It also illustrates a tendency that is becoming more and more evident, namely, the fuller reliance that is being placed upon “intelligence as a social regulator” and “publicity for controlling industry and commerce.” Make known the actual conditions that prevail, point out the appropriate remedy, and the weight of an informed public opinion will go far to force reform whether through an act of legislation or through the influence which may be exerted by consumers upon producers. Indeed the battle cry of the day is, “Give us but an enlightened public opinion and our fight is three-quarters won.”

The suggestion of regulating business relations through the pressure of public sentiment has been seized upon with almost too great avidity by some who would apply it as the immediate and sufficient solution of all labor difficulties and as an argument against the enactment of any statutory regulations whatever. Such a proposition appears, however, of doubtful value at present under the conditions of unenlightenment that unfortunately prevail, and it may be feared, does not proceed from the best friends of labor.

_Constitutionality._

Recurring to this fact of opposition, already earlier noted, it has been questioned whether this counter-movement does not offer a real menace to the future growth of the labor laws, and indeed to the continued existence of the present body of legislation. In a number of instances where labor laws have been brought to the test of a court decision they have been pronounced unconstitutional and annulled upon the ground that they “contravene freedom of contract,” are “class legislation” and so forth. This has been the fate of statutes regulating the hours of labor for women over twenty-one years of age in Nebraska, California and Illinois; of weekly payment laws in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri, West Virginia and Indiana; of anti-truck acts in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois and West Virginia; and of those prohibiting company stores or coercion of purchase in Pennsylvania, Illinois and Tennessee.

In Massachusetts, on the contrary, the regulation of hours was sustained “as a health or police regulation.” Also at the time when the bill for the extension of the act concerning weekly payments was before the legislature the justices returned as their opinion to the House of Representatives that such an act was within the constitutional power of the General Court to pass. It is also worthy of notice, that in spite of the decision by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in 1894,[41] a new law defining hours of labor for women was passed in 1899, and to-day applies not only in factories, but in restaurants and hotels as well. Again, in the report just reviewed, the commissioners have recommended the general enactment of an anti-truck and freedom of purchase act in spite of the decisions of Pennsylvania, Illinois and Tennessee courts.

Verdicts of unconstitutionality have therefore hardly affected more than the very border of the factory laws; the regulation of child labor, of workroom conditions, of hours of labor for minors, have never even been questioned. It hardly seems likely that any of these laws will ever be put to the court test at all. Both in England and in this country, they have proven generally beneficial to public interest, they have been pretty cheerfully accepted and obeyed; they have gained public approval; they have the political support of a large labor party. Perhaps the apparently adverse action of the courts ought rather to be looked upon as a healthfully conservative influence against possible evil results of hasty and ill-considered legislation or attempts to interpose legislation where the object could be better obtained by the effective organization of labor and should be left to the initiative of the unions.

Factory legislation has been inevitably necessitated by the action of economic and social forces, and may, in fact, be regarded as a natural phenomenon accompanying the growth of the factory system of manufacture. It has developed against the opposition of extreme doctrines of free contract, and having demonstrated itself in the facts of actual life has also created a new theory of the relation of the state to labor and industry.

“The state may determine the plane of competition; it may equalize the conditions of contract as between employer and employee; it may intervene to protect the standard of living of the workers. The only limits that theory places upon these lines of interference are considerations of the general good.”

In the historical development of factory laws, well-marked tendencies are traceable. The early attitude of timidity has given place to that of peremptory command. Progress has been steadily toward increased severity in the regulations imposed, increased exactness in detail and definition, towards distinctly placed responsibility and towards more adequate inspection.

The expansion of industry in this country has of course been accompanied by a like territorial extension of the labor laws. Accomplished through the independent action of the several state legislatures, the result has been an unfortunate confusion of unrelated and non-uniform measures. One of the recent and most important tendencies of this legislation is the movement for greater uniformity, made especially prominent by the attention given to it as a part of the study of the Industrial Commission. It indeed seems probable that these efforts will eventually issue in the determination of a minimum standard of labor legislation for the country as a whole, above which common basis the states will rise in grade according to the development of industrial organization and consequent increase of regulation demanded. This is necessarily a matter of voluntary conformity on the part of the separate state legislatures and therefore a fulfillment to be awaited with all patience.

VI. Juvenile Courts

PROBATION AND JUVENILE COURTS

By MRS. EMILY E. WILLIAMSON, ELIZABETH, N. J.
President New Jersey State Conference of Charities and Corrections

Perhaps the most practical movement in penal reform is probation, putting a stop as it does to the source from which crime is recruited. The principle involved in probation is prevention and, where properly applied, has resulted in a very large diminution of crime. Massachusetts reports a falling off of 75 per cent in juvenile crime, owing to probation. Juvenile and first offenders should never be dealt with as real criminals under the law except in special cases of depravity. Penological science lays down general rules for the treatment of juveniles and first offenders, absolutely prohibiting imprisonment except for those convicted of flagrant crimes, as it breaks down self-respect, placing a stigma on character that is never removed. Its deterrent power is destroyed with its relief from care and comfortable support and it hurts the physical, mental and moral health of the prisoner. The main object in the sentence of the convicted juvenile or first offender should be his rescue from a criminal life; therefore a complete investigation should be made of his character, home and environment before trial. In Massachusetts the probation act requires a probation officer to inquire into the nature of every criminal case brought before the court, and he may recommend that any person committed by the court be placed on probation. The question for the court, upon the information of the probation officer, is to decide whether it is safe for society to allow the prisoner to go at large. It has become an established fact among the people of Massachusetts, after several years of trial, that in the administration of justice the probation system has been wise and beneficial.

The probation law enacted by the legislature of Illinois in 1899 declares the purpose of the law to be as follows: “This act shall be liberally construed to the purpose that its end may be carried out, to wit: that the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents; and in all cases where it can be properly done, the child be placed in an approved family home and become a member of the family by legal adoption or otherwise.” The Illinois juvenile court in its instructions to probation officers states that it will be the endeavor of the court to carry out both the letter and the spirit of the foregoing act, and to this end the court will have in mind the following considerations: _The Welfare and Interests of the Child._—To save the child from neglect and cruelty and from the danger of becoming a criminal or dependent. _The Welfare of the Community._—Lessening the burdens of taxation and loss of property through the ravages of the criminal class and by preventing pauperism and crime. _Temporary Care._—The law forbidding the keeping of any child in a jail or station-house, a place of detention is provided under the care of the court. Whenever practicable the child is to be left with his parents or with some suitable family. _Supervision After Action of the Court._—The probation officer is expected to keep a special oversight of the child by frequent visits at regular intervals and by reports from parents or custodians.

In Pennsylvania the law requires that the probation officer shall be notified when any juvenile offender is brought before the court, that he shall make such investigation as shall be directed by the court, be present to represent the interests of the child when the case is heard, furnish such information and assistance as the judge may require and take such charge of any child before or after trial as may be ordered.

Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota and New Jersey have state probation laws. San Francisco and Washington, D. C., have probation officers for the cities alone. New York has at last provided for probation and also for children’s courts, but the plans are not yet completed.

Voluntary probation officers in many cases in the large cities assist the paid officer, and in Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston and New York the child-saving societies of all denominations have placed officers—appointed by them for this purpose—at the disposal of the court. Their services have always been accepted. In New Jersey the State Board of Children’s Guardians greatly assists the county probation officers. Wise child-saving work can be done with this mutual co-operation.

In March, 1900, a bill prepared by Justice Franklin T. Fort, of the Supreme Court, was passed by the New Jersey legislature, providing for the appointment of probation officers and authorizing judges of the Courts of Quarter Sessions to appoint one probation officer and, with the consent of the board of county freeholders, as many other probation officers, not exceeding three, one of whom may be a woman, as the judge deems wise. The classes of offenders who may be probated, _i. e._, respecting age, etc., is left entirely to the discretion of the judge. Seven counties in New Jersey have probation officers—Hudson, Essex, Morris, Union, Middlesex, Mercer and Atlantic.

In February, 1902 at my request, I was appointed, by the court, probation officer for Union county, New Jersey, to serve without salary, the court granting fifty dollars a month for a clerk and allowing necessary expenses—in all not to exceed eight hundred dollars annually. The following are the descriptive blanks and rules prepared by me and allowed by the court. In addition, case cards are kept in which all records in detail are entered. A synopsis of each case is also entered in a history book which is easily referred to by an index kept on the Dewey plan. Each probationer is visited by the probation officer or her clerk once a month and in special cases oftener. The probationer reports regularly at the office, either in person or by letter, at such times as directed.

UNION COUNTY PROBATION OFFICER. RECORD.

No. Name Address Age Height Weight White or colored Color of eyes Hair Complexion Special marks Religion Church School Teacher Nationality Married or single Number of children, names and ages Occupation Employer’s name and address Father’s name and address Occupation

Mother’s name and address Occupation Other members of family Previous offense Present offense Date committed to Probation Officer Years expire Fine, $ Costs, $ Re-arrested Cause of Re-arrest REMARKS:

Ledger number

UNION COUNTY COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS.
RULES GOVERNING PROBATION.

THE PROBATIONER is required by the Court,

FIRST.—To furnish promptly, by letter or in person, such information
as the Probation Officer may require.

SECOND.—To mail on the first of each month a letter, stating his
present residence and occupation, place of employment and the name of
his employer; also the number of days employed during the previous
month, the place or places of employment and the names of his
employers. If the Probationer is of school age, the number of days of
school attendance must be given. The truth of these facts must be
certified by parent, employer, school teacher or some other person
satisfactory to the Probation Officer.

THIRD.—Evil companions and bad associations must be avoided. Strict
temperance must be observed. The Probationer must in every way conduct
himself as an upright and law-abiding citizen.

FOURTH.—To report promptly to the Probation Officer every change of
residence. To consult the Probation Officer before moving out of the
State of New Jersey or out of Union County.

FIFTH.—If the Probationer undertakes to pay fines or costs at stated
periods these payments must be prompt. If unable to meet the
obligation promptly he will send advance notice to the Probation
Officer.

The probation period is three years. If during this period of trial
the Probationer fails to observe strictly each of the above rules, he
is liable to be taken into custody at any time by the Probation
Officer to serve the full term of his suspended sentence. Liberty
depends entirely on the good conduct of the Probationer.

During the three months that I have held this office twenty-six cases have been probated to me by the judge of the county court and forty-six by the police justices of the county. The ages of the probationers and the character of the charges made against them are as follows:

───────┬───────┬──────┬──────┬─────────┬───────────┬────┬──────┬──────
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ Total │ │ │ │ │ │County│Police
│number.│White.│Black.│Catholic.│Protestant.│Jew.│Court.│Court.
───────┼───────┼──────┼──────┼─────────┼───────────┼────┼──────┼──────
Males │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
over │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
16 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
yrs. │ 31│ 25│ 6│ 12│ 18│ 1│ 14│ 17
Males │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
under│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
16 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
yrs. │ 28│ 28│ │ 20│ 6│ 2│ 6│ 22
Females│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
over │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
16 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
yrs. │ 6│ 4│ 2│ 3│ 3│ │ 2│ 4
Females│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
under│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
16 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
yrs. │ 7│ 6│ 1│ 6│ 1│ │ 1│ 2
───────┼───────┼──────┼──────┼─────────┼───────────┼────┼──────┼──────
│ 72│ 63│ 9│ 41│ 28│ 3│ 23│ 45
───────┴───────┴──────┴──────┴─────────┴───────────┴────┴──────┴──────

───────┬─────────────┬────────┬──────────┬────────┬─────────┬─────────
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ │Disorderly│ │Malicious│
│Embezzlement.│Larceny.│ conduct. │Assault.│mischief.│Mischief.
───────┼─────────────┼────────┼──────────┼────────┼─────────┼─────────
Males │ │ │ │ │ │
over │ │ │ │ │ │
16 │ │ │ │ │ │
yrs. │ 1│ 11│ 16│ 2│ 1│
Males │ │ │ │ │ │
under│ │ │ │ │ │
16 │ │ │ │ │ │
yrs. │ │ 7│ 9│ 1│ 5│ 1
Females│ │ │ │ │ │
over │ │ │ │ │ │
16 │ │ │ │ │ │
yrs. │ │ │ 4│ │ 2│
Females│ │ │ │ │ │
under│ │ │ │ │ │
16 │ │ │ │ │ │
yrs. │ │ 6│ 1│ │ │
───────┼─────────────┼────────┼──────────┼────────┼─────────┼─────────
│ 1│ 24│ 30│ 3│ 8│ 1
───────┴─────────────┴────────┴──────────┴────────┴─────────┴─────────

───────┬────────┬──────────┬─────────
│ │ │Probated
│ │ Previous │ without
│Truancy.│Offenders.│ trial.
───────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────
Males │ │ │
over │ │ │
16 │ │ │
yrs. │ │ 12│
Males │ │ │
under│ │ │
16 │ │ │
yrs. │ 5│ 13│
Females│ │ │
over │ │ │
16 │ │ │
yrs. │ │ 4│
Females│ │ │
under│ │ │
16 │ │ │
yrs. │ │ │ 4
───────┼────────┼──────────┼─────────
│ 5│ 29│ 4
───────┴────────┴──────────┴─────────

The secretary of the New Jersey State Charities Aid Association in his report says: “It is easier in Union than in most counties to learn whether such an officer is needed by the court, by the prisoner and by society, for the records of the Union County Jail are exceptionally complete. The Warden’s report contains statistics on two most important points—the ages of the prisoners and the number of the commitments. These two points are most important because the probation system presumes that all persons who are inexperienced in crime, whatever their actual age, can be better treated under supervision outside of jail than in idleness within jail.

“The New Jersey law was made broad enough to include both children of 7 years and adults of 83, except where safety demands the prisoner’s incarceration. From the Warden’s report it appears that 591 persons were sent to the county jail last year for terms averaging twenty-nine days. Of this number only 181, or 30 per cent, had served previous sentences. The great majority, 70 per cent, or 410, had never been previously committed. Among these first commitments are found persons of every age from 7 to 70 excepting 52, 56, 58, 62 and 69, while the years 71, 77 and 83 have one representative each. Take what age we will, public sentiment would approve another chance outside of jail, for every first offender, provided the dignity of the law and the welfare of society would be in no way jeopardized by suspending sentence. Our probation law provides for failures to reform outside of jail and gives to the probation officer and the court power to inflict the original but suspended sentence at any time within three years from the date of conviction. It is manifest that every successful case of probation nips in the bud a potential and probable career of crime.”

The oversight of adult first offenders by a probation officer is of immense value in reforming the offender and also results in a great saving of expense to the taxpayer. The first is the primary object and probably I cannot do better than cite some cases which are under my care: J. E., aged 22, a bright Irishman, not intoxicated, in a quarrel which took place in a saloon, interfered and used too much strength in separating the combatants; charged with malicious assault, court would have committed him to county jail for six months had there been no probation officer. Probation officer returned the man to his home, helped him to secure employment, visited his accuser and warned him not to molest J. E. Young man’s weekly calls to report have become friendly visits; he is always well dressed and is entirely self-respecting.

N. M.; American; aged 59; painter; married; offence—grand larceny; never arrested before; while drunk, stole mayor’s horse and buggy from hitching-post on main street; man not an habitual drunkard, character good, provided comfortable home for his family, always industrious and kind. Had there been no probation officer N. M. would have been sent to state prison. He is now doing well and reporting regularly.

Two boys, 9 and 12 years, arrested on charge of disorderly conduct (threw a fish-head at an old woman); belonged to the “gang;” had fairly good homes; did not attend school regularly; found upon investigation to be mischievous and truants only. Probation officer handed boys to truant officer, who immediately placed them in school. Boys report each week, come to office in Sunday clothes and evidently enjoy these visits. One lad has been employed on Saturdays, by probation officer’s clerk, doing odd jobs and is very proud of this evidence of favor. There has been a great improvement in the whole family owing to pressure through this little fellow.

In cases of non-support which are always tried before police justices, probation has proved of inestimable value. The following is an example: Mr. B. drank occasionally, earned eighteen dollars a week and failed to support his family; was arrested and handed to the probation officer. After a thorough investigation, including conditions in the home, the man was ordered to request his employer to hand Mrs. B. ten and one-half dollars every week—one and one-half dollars for each of the five children and three dollars for Mr. B.’s own board. Besides this the man was required to pay the house rent, eight dollars a month. After the first month, at the request of the wife, he was allowed to give her the money himself. Each week the man reports the payment. Had Mr. B. been sent to jail, he would have lost his self-respect and his situation, he would have become an expense to the taxpayer and his family dependent on the charity of the community.

Three little Polish girls, aged 9, 10 and 11 years, arrested and indicted by the Grand Jury for grand larceny; on investigation found parents, who could not speak English, were not implicated; homes above the average. Children had stolen ribbons, lace and other articles for personal adornment, saying some had been presents; others were hidden between two old mattresses in a garret; parents terribly frightened when discoveries were made. Upon arrest of children and after bail had been secured, I began to take supervision of them; examined each one separately at my office; sent for priest, and arranged for daily instructions by the Sisters—little girls had been regular attendants at school. Later, without trial, they were probated to me by the court for an indefinite period.

The police magistrates of Hudson and Union counties avail themselves of the services of the probation officers and it is in these courts that good preventive work can be done by seeing the accused as soon as a charge is made and by investigating the case before trial, and also, in many instances, preventing the charge being entered by talking the matter over and promising to see the accused. In Elizabeth, the largest city of Union county, arrests and commitments have fallen off 40 per cent since the work of the probation officer has become known.

Three Italians appeared at my office, one to complain of two boys and the others the fathers of the boys. These men had come to ask me to take charge of the little fellows, who were mischievous and annoyed the complainant. All three were satisfied with my decision.

A Jew, who was in the habit of making charges of disorderly conduct against mischievous boys, after a talk with me, promised to bring no more children before the court until I had investigated each case for him. He had not realized the serious harm inflicted upon the boys’ characters by their being brought into court. At the end of an hour he was fully convinced. The railway detectives also report cases to me before making charges and abide by my decisions.

There is great danger of perfunctory work on the part of the probation officer and very grave danger from the uneducated officer. Public opinion has still to be aroused; therefore the need of the best work along these lines. Where good work has been done, the public has recognized that the practice of inflicting short terms of imprisonment for minor offences is useless and harmful. The need of men and women of sound judgment and high character for this work is great, and in the development of the system it is hoped that many specialists will devote some time to the installation of the work and help to bring about the proper administration of the law.

Boston was the first city to set apart special hours for the trial of juvenile offenders, and the excellent way in which these trials are managed is an object lesson worth studying. Persons not connected with the trial are required to leave the court room, the officer who made the arrest tells his story, the complainant his, and the witnesses are examined. The child is called to the judge’s desk and tells his story in a quiet voice. Confidential relations are at once established between the child and the judge. The probation officer then makes his report upon the case, after which the judge announces his decision.

The same methods are employed in Chicago, Philadelphia and Minneapolis and will be in New York. In Chicago, a judge has been appointed who only tries children’s cases; in New York, a judge is to be chosen from time to time. The value of this way of conducting juvenile trials cannot be overestimated, as it robs the trial of all the sensational element. It also makes it easy for the various child-saving societies, such as the St. Vincent de Paul, Children’s Aid and Prevention of Cruelty to Children and for truant officers to co-operate with the court.

The following is a pen-picture of a trial held before the court in which I am probation officer: Court room crowded, twenty-two lawyers present; prosecutor reads the indictment. Boy eleven years old arrested for stealing brass worth eighty dollars, from railroad, and selling it to a junk man for twenty cents; had been bailed by kind neighbor, who delivered the boy. Court officer calls witnesses; boy brought; so small that his eyes are just on a line with the rail; boy weeping; prosecutor exclaims, and says boy should be in day-nursery; audience in back of room rises and presses forward to look at boy; lawyers inside of rail jump to their feet; court raps for order; boy realizes that he has become an object of pity and curiosity, cries louder and calls for his mother, who comes forward with a baby in her arms; judge and prosecutor confer, boy is handed over to probation officer to be produced to stand trial when called, virtually ending the matter.

THE JUVENILE COURT IN PHILADELPHIA

By JUDGE ABRAHAM M. BEITLER

Court of Common Pleas No. 1, Philadelphia

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