Chapter XIX: Appendix

THE "GREEN PAMPHLET"

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WAR COURSE

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Strategical Terms and Definitions used in Lectures on Naval History

BY

JULIAN S. CORBETT, ESQ., L.L.M.

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NAVAL STRATEGY

Naval strategy does not exist as a separate branch of knowledge. It is only a section of a division of the art of war.

The study for officers is the art of war, specialising in Naval Strategy.

The true method of procedure then is to get hold of a general theory of war, and so ascertain the exact relations of Naval Strategy to the whole.

War is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of foreign politics which begins when force is introduced to attain our ends.

OBJECTS.

We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or immediate.

Immediate objects (also called "Primary") are the ends of particular operations or movements. But it must be remembered that every primary object has also its ulterior object; that is, every operation must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. Classified by the object it is Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.

This also means that every operation of an army or fleet must be regarded in a double light, _i.e._, it must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general progress of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.

Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has for its province the plan of the war, and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces.

NOTE.--Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also to deal with the
whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship.
It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled
together; they are instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view
constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which
depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and
financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is
maintained). The friction of these two considerations is inherent in
war, and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. It is
usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every
strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question
of grand strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa.
For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of
view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice
versa. To decide a question of grand strategy without consideration of
its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither
strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This interaction has to
be accepted by commanding officers as part of the inevitable "friction
of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the
Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, for
fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.

Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with--

(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces
of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order
to secure the object of the particular operation.
(2) The directing of the force assigned for the operation.

Minor Strategy may be of three kinds:--

(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet
only.
(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army
only.
(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army
and navy together.

NOTE.--It will be seen that what is usually called Naval Strategy or
Fleet Strategy, is only a sub-division of a division of strategy, and
that, therefore, strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of
naval operations only.

NOTE.--Naval Strategy, being only a part of General Strategy, is
subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less
degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision
independently of the central government, or headquarters; they should,
therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any
line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is
strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.

EXAMPLE.--Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven
Years War.

NATURE OF OBJECT

The solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view.

All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative.

A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for ourselves.

A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent his gaining something.

Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.

Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.

EXAMPLE.--When Togo attacked Rojesvensky his primary object was
offensive, _i.e._, to capture or destroy the Russian Fleet. His
ulterior object was to maintain the defensive function which had been
assigned to the Japanese Fleet.

NOTES.--This is a good example of true defensive; that is, Togo's
operations, though drastically offensive in action, were all strictly
within the strategical defensive sphere assigned to him.

The Offensive, being positive in its aim is naturally the more effective form of war (_i.e._, it leads more directly to a final decision), and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power.

The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is naturally the stronger form of war; _i.e._, it requires less force, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power.

NOTE.--The general truth of this proposition is not affected by
apparent exceptions where the contrary appears to be true.

_The Offensive must not be confused with the Initiative._ It is
possible to seize the Initiative, under certain conditions, by taking a
defensive position from which the enemy is bound to dislodge us or
abandon the operation.

In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive,
it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or
concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal
in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy.

The advantages of the Offensive are well known.

Its disadvantages are:--

(1) That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its
communications.
(2) That it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground.
(3) That it continually increases the difficulty of retreat.

The advantages of Defence are chiefly:--

(1) Proximity to base.
(2) Familiar ground.
(3) Facility for arranging surprise by counter attack.

NOTE.--In modern Naval warfare these advantages--that is, the
advantages of fighting on your own ground--are specially high as giving
greater facility for the use of mine and torpedo.

The disadvantages are mainly moral or when the enemy's objective or
line of operations cannot be ascertained, but this disadvantage can be
neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSIVE.

True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.

NOTE.--When the Dutch burnt our ships at Chatham, we were not acting on
the defensive, we had laid them up and were doing nothing at all.

The strength and the essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke.

A well designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack.

A general defensive policy may consist of a series of minor offensive operations.

The maxim is: If you are not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive till you become so--

(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise;

(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or securing allies.

Except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the defensive alone we can never acquire anything, we can only prevent the enemy acquiring. But where we are too weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation.

As a cover or support for the offensive, the defensive will enable us to intensify the attack; for by assuming the defensive in one or more minor theatres of operation we can reduce our forces in those theatres to a minimum, and concentrate to a maximum for the offensive in the most important theatre.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS USED WITH A DEFENSIVE INTENTION

(A) Counter attacks.
(B) Diversions.

(A) _Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of defence."

(B) _Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive operations.

Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.

It is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that justifies the breach of the law of concentration which they involve.

This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities are most highly developed in combined expeditions.

NOTE.--_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric
attacks_. _Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a
positive object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy;
whereas diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at
preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Being in the
category of the weaker form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made
in greater force than diversions.

EXAMPLES.--_Diversion._--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force,
about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instructions, "a
diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the
army employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was
negative--preventative--defensive.

2. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against New Orleans in 1815.
Intended force 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of
embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important
and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of
peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was positive--to
acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) and Belleisle
(eccentric attack) in the Seven Years War.

Note 2.--This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined
expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists.

Raids = Diversions.
Incursions = Eccentric attacks.
Invasions = True direct offence.

Compare these with Sir John Ardagh's classification (Report of Royal
Commission on Reserve Forces, 1904):--

"Raids," not exceeding 10,000 men.
"Small expeditions," not exceeding 50,000 men.
"Dangerous invasion," not exceeding 150,000 men.

NATURE OF ULTERIOR OBJECT

From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_.

(1) War with _limited object_ ("limited war") is where we merely seek
to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions, or
interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the
liberation of Cuba.

(2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where we seek to overthrow the
enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must
agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War.

NOTE.--Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as
the immediate (primary or secondary) objects which lead up to them;
_e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the
immediate objects may be defensive, and _vice versa_.

EXAMPLE 1.--Japanese position in the late war. Ulterior object of the
war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive).
Function or ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was
defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack
and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).

EXAMPLE 2.--In the Spanish-American War the ulterior object of the war
was (for the Americans) to eject the Spanish Government from Cuba. This
was offensive. The ulterior object of the fleet was to prevent the
Spaniards sending reinforcements or interfering with the intended
American invasion. This was defensive. The primary object of the fleet
was to bring the Spanish Fleet to action. This was offensive.

SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS

Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object (_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or unlimited), strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of the war."

This depends upon:--
(1) The theatre of the war.
(2) The means at our disposal.

1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "all the territory upon which the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an island power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer definition: "geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of the war and the subordinate objects that lead up to them."

A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."

2. _Theatre of Operations_.--Is generally used of the operations of one belligerent only.

An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.

A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory we seek to take possession of or to defend.

A truer definition is, "the area, whether of sea or land or both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the particular operation."

Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.

Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or movements may be offensive.

OBJECTIVE

An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is directed." Thus where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually be the _objective_.

LINES OF OPERATION

A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."

Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said to hold the interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a position is called an interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior Position" are the converse of these.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

This expression is used of three different things:--

(1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point
which the operating force has reached.

(2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in
one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to
each other's support.

(3) _Lines of retreat_, which are lines of supply reversed, _i.e._,
leading back to the base.

These three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and communication," which we had in use at the end of the eighteenth century.

Ashore, lines of passage and communication are roads, railways, waterways, &c.

At sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to be supplied.

In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on communications, but probably it does so even more than Land Strategy, as will appear from a consideration of maritime communications, and the extent to which they are the main preoccupation of Naval operations.

MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet may have to operate are:--

(1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond
to the communications of armies operating ashore). These tend to
increase in importance strategically with the increasing hunger of
modern fleets (for coal, ammunition, &c).

(2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea
base, that is communication between the advanced and the main base.

(3) Trade Routes, that is the communications upon which depend the
national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the
"lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of
belligerents' possessions.

N.B.--Such "lines of passage and communication" are the preoccupation of Naval Strategy; that is to say, problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and communication" and this is probably the best method of solving them.

NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND COMMUNICATION

By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the operations of the Fleet. Such operations must always have for their object "passage and communication"; that is, the Fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those of the enemy.

PROOF I.--_Deductive_.--We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. What does this mean? It is something quite different from the Military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb's theory of "conquest of water territory," therefore, involves a false analogy, and is not safe as the basis of a strategical system. What then is the value of the sea in the political system of the world? Its value is as a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned.

COROLLARY.--The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of
territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime
war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century,
but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior
object of particular operations.

PROOF II.--_Inductive_, from history or past experience.--History shows that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold.

1. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the war).

EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the
Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and
Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the
alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.

In the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to
demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining
Louis XIV than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the
second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the
Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.

2. The protection or destruction of commerce.

3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.

NOTE.--The above is the best working "Definition of Naval Strategy," as emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of major strategy.

These functions may be discharged in two ways:--

(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed
(bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c).

(2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in
such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all
parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their
territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.

NOTE.--The power of the second method, by controlling communications,
is out of all proportion to the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first
can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second.
Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is
mainly a question of communications.

But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet must
discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time
to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and
military considerations may deflect normal operation of Naval
Strategy.)

EXAMPLE.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the
unshaken Toulon Fleet. Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

COMMAND OF THE SEA

Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have (a) adequate Naval positions; (b) an adequate Fleet to secure the command when war breaks out.

VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF COMMAND

1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.

(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.

This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send squadrons to sea.

NOTE.--Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do
absolutely nothing, but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the
undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war, or to
force our will upon him.

(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in one or more theatres of operation.

2. Both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.

(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining the object in view (_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first action.

(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition existed after Tsushima.

3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in three different states:--

(a) With us.
(b) With the enemy.
(c) In dispute.

If in dispute, it may be that:--

(1) We have preponderance.
(2) Our enemy has preponderance.
(3) Neither side preponderates.

COMMAND IN DISPUTE

The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.

The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._, till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.

It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with England.

The truth of this appears from the fact that _general command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations_.

In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. The weaker Power may take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere.

_Rule 1._ So long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating Power to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker.

_Rule 2._ In a state of dispute although the weaker Power may not be able to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own.

EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three
years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a
decision by defeating Conflans and De la Cloue; also in the Great War
up to Trafalgar.

SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE PRIMARY OBJECT?

When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._, leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.

Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it, because general command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have obtained a complete decision.

From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too loose an expression for strategical discussion. For practical purposes should be substituted "_control of passage and communication_."

The question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of operations will be, not "Have we the command of the sea?" but "Can we secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?"

METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL

1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions.

2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by:--

(a) A defensive action not necessarily entirely successful
(containing).

(b) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).

(c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force
available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).

BLOCKADE

Blockades are of two natures, according to the object review. The object may be:--

(d) Blockade.

i. _Close blockade_ to prevent the enemy putting to sea. The object
being usually to secure local or temporary control.

ii. _Observation blockade_, to force the enemy to put to sea _by
occupying the common lines of communications_ (_see_ below). In this
case you are seeking a decision as a step towards general control.

Both natures are operations upon the lines of passage and communication, but in case (1) the primary intention is defensive, to secure our own line; in case (2) the primary intention is offensive, to seize the enemy's line and compel him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it.

GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING BLOCKADES

In case (1) (defensive intention) blockade should be as close as is compatible with security from torpedo attack.

In case (2) (offensive intention) it should be as distant as is compatible with bringing enemy to action if he comes out.

Examples:--_Case_ (1): First stage of Togo's blockade of Port Arthur.
_Case_ (2): Nelson off Toulon.
_Confusion of the two_: Sampson's attempt to close Santiago
simultaneously with an attempt to force Cervera to sea.

THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

Since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole theory of blockade rest on the control of communications, neither can be fully apprehended without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications.

Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point.

At sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent tend to run approximately parallel, if, indeed, they are not identical.

Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines of communication would be identical.

This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.

_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly all our current maxims of Naval strategy can be traced to the pressure it exerts on Naval thought.

It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and confusion, which has arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications and operations against them in each case.

On land the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications at once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our own.

At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's.

Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded.

EXAMPLE.--This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our
getting a fleet off Brest before the French could sail.

Hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.

But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo's strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.

Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it.

Here again Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.

The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action."

The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.

EXAMPLE.--Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702
were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish
trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own
lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief
theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. 1703.--Chief
operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and
particularly of Portugal, and with same object in view, Rooke's
official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored
unless it threatened our communications.

RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from which France could
not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications.

But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable:--

(a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential
to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the
enemy's fleet.

(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt _to
control the common communications_.

(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex
(_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a
blow which solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir Palmes Fairborne's
solution of the problem in 1703 (_England in the Mediterranean_, Vol.
II., p. 234).

Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign.

This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of inevitable strategical law).

Compare Togo's strategy and that of the Americans in 1898.

Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about in this way, that is they have been the outcome on an effort to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet, _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.

Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.

FINAL NOTE

In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne in mind:--

(1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably
find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost.

(2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the
offensive, it is _prima facie_ better strategy to make the enemy come
to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground.

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WAR COURSE

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Notes on Strategy

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