Chapter XVI: Appendix: The Story of Spion Kop

A great deal of consternation and not a little surprise was caused by the publication of the official account (_London Gazette_, April 16, 1900) of the evacuation of Spion Kop. In order to make intelligible the causes of the terrible fiasco it is necessary to quote for the benefit of those interested not only Lord Roberts's comments on the subject, but the statements of the officers concerned. Sir Redvers Buller, writing from Spearman's Hill, January 30, 1900, gave his version of the proceedings:--

"I have the honour to report that General Sir Charles Warren's
Division having arrived at Estcourt, less two battalions 10th
Brigade, which were left at the Cape, by the 7th January, it
moved to Frere on the 9th.

"The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the
9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many
of them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took
650 ox waggons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to
Springfield there were three places at which all the waggons
had to be double spanned, and some required three spans, some
idea may be formed of the difficulties; but these were all
successfully overcome by the willing labours of the troops.

"The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th in support of
the mounted troops, who had surprised and seized the important
position of Spearman's Hill, commanding Potgieter's Drift, on
the 11th.

"By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman's
Hill, and supply was well forward.

"On the 16th a reserve of seventeen days' supply having been
collected, General Sir Charles Warren, in command of the 2nd
Division, the 11th Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade
Division Royal Field Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps
troops, including the Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield
to Trichardt's Drift, which is about six miles west of
Potgieter's.

"I attach Sir Charles Warren's report of his operations.

"On the night of the 23rd General Warren attacked Spion Kop,
which operation he has made the subject of a special report. On
the morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been
abandoned in the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren's
force; the troops had been continuously engaged for a week, in
circumstances entailing considerable hardships; there had been
very heavy losses on Spion Kop. I consequently assumed the
command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy mule
transports on the 25th: this was completed by midday the 26th;
by double spanning, the loaded ox waggons got over the drift at
the rate of about eight per hour. The mule waggons went over
the pontoon bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and
the vehicles passed over by hand. For about seven hours of the
night the drift could not be used as it was dangerous in the
dark, but the use of the pontoon went on day and night. In
addition to machine guns, six batteries of Royal Field
Artillery and four howitzers, the following vehicles were
passed: ox waggons, 232; 10-span mule waggons, 98; 6-span, 107;
4 span, 52; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these the
ambulances were working backwards and forwards evacuating the
sick and wounded.

"By 2 P.M. the 26th all the ox waggons were over, and by 11.30
P.M. all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear
for the troops. By 4 A.M. the 27th all the troops were over,
and by 8 A.M. the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The
troops had all reached their new camps by 10 A.M. The marches
averaged for the mounted troops about seven miles, and for the
infantry and artillery an average of five miles.

"Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements
reflected great credit on the Staff of all degrees; but I must
especially mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the
Pontoon Troop, who were untiring. When all men were over, the
chesses of the pontoon bridge were so worn by the traffic that
I do not think they would have lasted another half-hour."

He concluded by saying:--

"Thus ended an expedition which I think ought to have
succeeded. We have suffered very heavy losses, and lost many
whom we can ill spare; but, on the other hand, we have
inflicted as great or greater losses upon the enemy than they
have upon us, and they are, by all accounts, thoroughly
disheartened; while our troops are, I am glad and proud to say,
in excellent fettle."

Sir Charles Warren's report addressed to the Chief of the Staff, ran thus:--

"On the 8th January field orders were published constituting
the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division a Corps Brigade, and
placing the 4th Brigade in the 5th Division. The 5th Division
thus constituted marched from Frere on the 10th instant,
arriving at Springfield on the 12th instant.

"On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to
command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt's
Drift to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed
forward, refusing my right (namely) Spion Kop, and bringing my
left forward to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. This
move was to commence as soon as supplies were all in, and the
10th Brigade (except two companies) removed from Springfield
Bridge to Spearman's Hill.

"I was provided with four days' rations with which I was to
cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and
join your column opposite Potgieter's.

"On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting
supplies, and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day, and
on the evening of the 16th January I left Springfield with a
force under my command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less
one Brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichardt's
Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of
the Tugela.

"On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela,
passed the infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills
immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two
brigades commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart. The
Commander-in-Chief was present during part of the day, and gave
some verbal directions to General Woodgate.

"The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and
went over the country as far as Acton Homes, and on the
following day (18th) had a successful action with a small party
of Boers, bringing in 31 prisoners.

"During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole
of the waggons belonging to the force were brought across the
Tugela, and the artillery were in position outside of Wright's
Farm.

"On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the
adjoining hills on the right, and the waggons were successfully
brought to Venter's Spruit.

"In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by
which we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and
the Staff, and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and
Commanding Royal Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the
two roads by which we could advance, the eastern one by Acton
Homes must be rejected, because time would not allow of it, and
with this all concurred. I then pointed out that the only
possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair
View would be by taking three or four days' food in our
haversacks, and sending all our waggons back across the Tugela,
but before we could do this we must capture the position in
front of us.

"On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and
six batteries of artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F.
Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a
series of outflanking movements, and by the end of the day,
after fighting for twelve hours, we were in possession of the
whole part of the hills, but found a strongly-intrenched line
on the comparatively flat country beyond us.

"On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our
left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two
batteries from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the
day, I found it impossible to proceed without howitzers, and
telegraphed for four from Potgieter's. These arrived early on
the morning of the 22nd, and the Commander-in-Chief, arriving
about the same time, directed me to place two of these
howitzers on the left, two having already been placed on the
right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief that it
would be impossible to get waggons through by the road leading
past Fair View, unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies
within about 2000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief
agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that
evening orders were drawn up giving the necessary instructions
to General Talbot Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing
to an absence of sufficient reconnaissance, he requested that
the attack might be put off for a day.

"On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the
attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel
aCourt, of the Headquarter Staff, was directed by the
Commander-in-Chief to accompany General Woodgate, who was
detailed to command the attacking column. The account of the
capture of Spion Kop is given in another report.

"On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief
arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct
command. The whole of the waggons of the 5th Division were got
down to the drift during the day, and were crossed over before
2 P.M. on the 26th January."

In regard to the Council of War, Sir Charles Warren amplified his previous statement:

"Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter's Laager, I
assembled all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal
Artillery and Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers,
together. I pointed out to them that, with the three and a
half (3-1/2) days' provisions allowed, it was impossible to
advance by the left road through Acton Homes. In this they
unanimously concurred. I showed them that the only possible
road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but I
expressed my conviction that this could not be done unless we
sent the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and
attempted to march through with our rations in our
haversacks--without impedimenta."

Sir Charles then added:--

"The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong
intrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was
present on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the
difficulties of marching along the road, accompanied by
waggons, without first taking Spion Kop.

"Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke
to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation
might be deferred for a day in order that he might make a
reconnaissance with the Officers Commanding battalions to be
sent there.

"On 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and
told me that there were two courses open--(1) to attack, (2) to
retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to
retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the
previous day.

"The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General
Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed
Lieutenant-Colonel aCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.

"The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the
Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion
of Thorneycroft's Horse, and half-company Royal Engineers,
supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the
Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by
Trichardt's Drift.

"The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful.
General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th,
reported that he had intrenched a position and hoped he was
secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see.
The position was rushed without casualties other than three men
wounded.

"Lieutenant-Colonel aCourt came down in the morning and stated
that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to
the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started
on his return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from
Colonel Crofton (Royal Lancaster). The message was, 'Reinforce
at once, or all lost. General dead.'

"He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately
ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take
command of the troops. He started at once, and was accompanied
by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.

"I replied to Colonel Crofton, 'I am sending two battalions,
and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must
hold on to the last. No surrender.'

"This occurred about 10 A.M.

"Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the
Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieutenant-Colonel
Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had
heliographed, 'With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I
place Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit,
with the local rank of Brigadier-General.'

"For some hours after this message I could get no information
from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their
apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.

"I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view
of the situation. At 1.20 P.M. I heliographed to ascertain
whether Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the
same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the
situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether
General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of
the situation. He stated that, unless the Artillery could
silence the enemy's guns, the men on the summit could not stand
another complete day's shelling, and that the situation was
extremely critical."

Later on in the evening arrangements were made to send two (Naval) 12-pounders, and the Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, to the summit, together with half-company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two reliefs of 600 men each), to strengthen the intrenchments and provide shell cover for the men. The 17th Company, Royal Engineers--it must be noted--proceeded at the same time as General Woodgate's force, and were employed until daylight upon the intrenchments, then upon road-making and water supply.

Sand-bags were sent up early on the 24th instant, but they were too late. Colonel Sim and his party, while ascending, met Colonel Thorneycroft descending the hill. The position was evacuated. Sir Charles Warren concluded thus:--

"I wish to bring to notice that I heard from all but one
expression of the admirable conduct and bravery shown by
officers and men suffering under a withering artillery fire on
the summit of the slopes, and also of those who, with so much
endurance, persisted in carrying up water and food and
ammunition to the troops during the day.

"During the day a Staff Officer of the Headquarter Staff was
present on the summit, and reported direct to the
Commander-in-Chief.

"At sunset I considered that the position could be held next
day, provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter
provided. Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled,
as already mentioned.

"In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to
report in person as to the situation, the evacuation took place
under orders, given upon his own responsibility, by
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. This occurred in the face of the
vigorous protests of General Coke's Brigade-Major, the Officer
commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and others.

"It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether
there should be an investigation into the question of the
unauthorised evacuation of Spion Kop."

General Buller, in forwarding to the Secretary of State for War Sir Charles Warren's report, made the following observations:--

"Sir C. Warren is hardly correct in saying that he was only
allowed three and a half days' provisions. I had told him that
transport for three and a half days would be sufficient burden
to him, but that I would keep him filled up as he wanted it.
That he was aware of this is shown by the following telegram
which he sent on the day in question. It is the only report I
had from Sir C. Warren:--

(Sent 7.54 P.M. Received 8.15 P.M.)

'Left Flank, 19th January.

'To the Chief of the Staff--

'I find there are only two roads by which we could
possibly get from Trichardt's Drift to Potgeiter's, on
the north of the Tugela, one by Acton Homes, the other
by Fair View and Rosalie; the first I reject as too
long, the second is a very difficult road for a large
number of waggons, unless the enemy is thoroughly
cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some
special arrangements which will involve my stay at
Venter's Laager for two or three days. I will send in
for further supplies and report progress. WARREN.'

"The reply to this was that three days' supply was being sent.

"I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him
that I had no further report and no intimation of the special
arrangements foreshadowed by this telegram of the 19th, that
for four days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell
and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous
hill, that the position admitted of no second line, and the
supports were massed close behind the firing line in
indefensible formations, and that a panic or sudden charge
might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any
moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be
prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw
his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance
from his left. He said that he had the night before ordered
General Coke to assault Spion Kop, but the latter had objected
to undertaking a night attack on a position the road to which
he had not reconnoitred, and added that he intended to assault
Spion Kop that night.

"I suggested that as General Coke was still lame from the
effects of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who had two
sound legs, was better adapted for mountain climbing.

"As no heliograph could, on account of the fire, be kept on the
east side of Spion Kop, messages for Sir C. Warren were
received by our signallers at Spearman and telegraphed to Sir
C. Warren; thus I saw them before he did, as I was at the
signal station. The telegram Sir C. Warren quotes did not give
me confidence in its sender, and at the moment I could see that
our men on the top had given way and that efforts were being
made to rally them. I telegraphed to Sir C. Warren: 'Unless you
put some really good hard fighting man in command on the top
you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.'

"The statement that a staff officer reported direct to me
during the day is a mistake. Colonel aCourt was sent down by
General Woodgate almost as soon as he gained the summit.

"I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If
at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly
in hand, intrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the
dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole
place brought under regular military command, and careful
arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the
scattered fighting line, the hills would have been held, I am
sure.

"But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have
been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one
succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that
guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of
organisation and system that acted most unfavourably on the
defence.

"It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the
greatest gallantry throughout the day, and really saved the
situation. Preparations for the second day's defence should
have been organised during the day and have been commenced at
nightfall.

"As this was not done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a
wise discretion.

"Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy
admitted to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and
though we were not successful in retaining the position, the
losses inflicted on the enemy and the attack generally have had
a marked effect upon them.

"I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the
gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops, the endurance
shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and
Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the
efforts of the 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles and 3rd Battalion
King's Royal Rifles were equally good, and the Royal Lancasters
fought gallantly."

The Commander-in-Chief, writing to the Secretary of State for War, thus criticised both operations and operators:--

"The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the
despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the
accompanying documents themselves that the original intention
was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichardt's Drift, and
thence by following the road past Fair View and Acton Homes, to
gain the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in
front of Potgieter's Drift being too strong to be taken by
direct attack. The whole force, less one brigade, was placed
under the orders of Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he
had crossed the Tugela, seems to have consulted his General and
principal Staff Officers, and to have come to the conclusion
that the flanking movement which Sir Redvers Buller had
mentioned in his secret instructions was impracticable on
account of the insufficiency of supplies. He accordingly
decided to advance by the more direct road leading north-east
and branching off from a point east of Three Tree Hill. The
selection of this road necessitated the capture and retention
of Spion Kop, but whether it would have been equally necessary
to occupy Spion Kop, had the line of advance indicated by Sir
Redvers Buller been followed, is not stated in the
correspondence. As Sir Charles Warren considered it impossible
to make the wide flanking movement which was recommended, if
not actually prescribed, in his secret instructions, he should
at once have acquainted Sir Redvers Buller with the course of
action which he proposed to adopt. There is nothing to show
whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair to Sir Charles
Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears throughout
to have been aware of what was happening. On several occasions
he was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave advice
to his subordinate Commander, and on the day after the
withdrawal from Spion Kop he resumed the chief command."

The abandonment of Spion Kop was condemned by Lord Roberts in the following terms:--

"As regards the withdrawal of the troops from the Spion Kop
position, which, though occupied almost without opposition in
the early morning of the 24th January, had to be held
throughout the day under an extremely heavy fire, and the
retention of which had become essential to the relief of
Ladysmith, I regret that I am unable to concur with Sir
Redvers Buller in thinking that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft
exercised a wise discretion in ordering the troops to retire.
Even admitting that due preparations may not have been made for
strengthening the position during the night, reorganising the
defence and bringing up artillery--in regard to which Sir
Charles Warren's report does not altogether bear out Sir
Redvers Buller's contention--admitting also that the senior
officers on the summit of the hill might have been more
promptly informed of the measures taken by Sir Charles Warren
to support and reinforce them, I am of opinion that
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's assumption of responsibility and
authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy's
fire, if it did not cease altogether, could not have been
formidable, and though lamp signalling was not possible at the
time owing to the supply of oil having failed, it would not
have taken more than two or three hours at most for
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger with
Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren, and to receive a
reply. Major-General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop at
9.30 P.M. for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles
Warren, and up to that hour the idea of a withdrawal had not
been entertained. Yet almost immediately after Major-General
Coke's departure Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order,
without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole
plan of operations and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which
had already been made to carry it into effect."

In spite of this somewhat severe criticism, however, Lord Roberts went on to say:--

"On the other hand, it is only right to state that
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very
gallant manner throughout the day, and it was doubtless due, in
a great measure, to his exertions and example that the troops
continued to hold the summit of the hill until directed to
retire."

The action of Captain Phillips he warmly praised:--

"The conduct of Captain Phillips, Brigade-Major of the 10th
Brigade, on the occasion in question, is deserving of high
commendation. He did his best to rectify the mistake which was
being made, but it was too late. Signalling communication was
not re-established until 2.30 A.M. on the 25th January, and by
that time the Naval guns could not have reached the summit of
the hill before daybreak. Major-General Coke did not return,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft had gone away. Moreover,
most of the troops had begun to leave the hill, and the working
parties, with the half-company of Royal Engineers, had also
withdrawn."

Briefly the Commander-in-Chief deplored the chaotic state of affairs prior to the retirement. He said:--

"It is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren did not himself
visit Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he
did that the state of affairs there was very critical, and that
the loss of the position would involve the failure of the
operations. He was, consequently, obliged to summon
Major-General Coke to his headquarters in the evening, in order
that he might ascertain how matters were going on, and the
command on Spion Kop thus devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel
Thorneycroft; but Major-General Coke was not aware of this.
About midday, under instructions from Sir Redvers Buller, Sir
Charles Warren had directed Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft to
assume command on the summit of the hill, with the temporary
rank of Brigadier-General, but this order was not communicated
to Major-General Coke, who, until he left the position at 9.30
P.M., was under the impression that the command had devolved on
Colonel Hill, as senior officer, after Colonel Crofton had been
wounded. Omissions or mistakes of this nature may be trivial in
themselves, yet may exercise an important influence on the
course of events; and I think that Sir Redvers Buller is
justified in remarking that 'there was a want of organisation
and system which acted most unfavourably on the defence.'"

In conclusion, the principal actors in the drama were censured, while the troops engaged received well-merited praise:--

"The attempt to relieve Ladysmith, described in these
despatches, was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers
Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded. That it
failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the
ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy--probably
also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity
on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But whatever faults Sir
Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be
ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme
command to assert his authority and see that what he thought
best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless
assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer.

"The gratifying feature in these despatches is the admirable
behaviour of the troops throughout the operations."

LIST OF STAFF

The following Divisions reached South Africa at the end of 1899 and the beginning of 1900.

FIFTH DIVISION

Lieutenant-General--Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren, G.C.M.G.,
K.C.B., R.E.

Aides-de-Camp--Major R. M. B. F. Kelly, R.A.; Lieut. I. V.
Paton, Royal Scots Fusiliers.

Assistant Adjutant-General--Colonel A. W. Morris, _p.s.c._

Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-Generals--Bt.-Major T. Capper, East
Lancashire Regt., _p.s.c._; Bt.-Major H. N. Sargent, Army
Service Corps.

Assistant Provost-Marshal--Bt.-Major E. C. J. Williams, East
Kent Regt.

Principal Medical Officer--Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Allin, M.B.,
R.A.M.C.

Divisional Signalling Officer--Captain A. A. McHardy, R.A.

10TH BRIGADE

Major-General--Colonel (local Maj.-General) J. T. Coke.

Aide-de-Camp--Lieut. W. E. Kemble, R.A.

Brigade-Major--Captain H. G. C. Phillips, Welsh Regt., _p.s.c._

11TH BRIGADE

Major-General--Colonel (local Maj.-General) E. R. P. Woodgate,
K.C.M.G., C.B., _p.s.c._

Aide-de-Camp--Captain F. M. Carleton, D.S.O., Royal Lancashire
Regt.

Brigade-Major--Captain N. H. Vertue, East Kent Regt.

SIXTH DIVISION

Lieutenant-General--Major-General (local Lieut.-General) T.
Kelly-Kenny, C.B., _p.s.c._

Aides-de-Camp--Major H. I. W. Hamilton, D.S.O., Royal West
Surrey Regt., _p.s.c._; Captain W. H. Booth, East Kent Regt.

Assistant Adjutant-General--Colonel A. E. W. Goldsmid, _p.s.c._

Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-Generals--Major C. C. Monro, Royal
West Surrey Regt., _p.s.c._; Major J. E. Caunter, Lancashire
Fusiliers, _p.s.c._

Assistant Provost-Marshal--Major M. G. Wilkinson, King's Own
Scottish Borderers.

Principal Medical Officer--Lieut.-Colonel W. L. Gubbins, M.B.,
R.A.M.C.

Divisional Signalling Officer--Lieut. J. T. Burnett-Stuart,
Rifle Brigade.

12TH BRIGADE

Major-General--Colonel (local Maj.-General) R. A. P. Clements,
D.S.O., A.D.C.

Aide-de-Camp--Captain H. de C. Moody, South Wales Borderers.

Brigade-Major--Captain R. S. Oxley, King's Royal Rifle Corps,
_p.s.c._

13TH BRIGADE

Major-General--Colonel (local Maj.-General) C. E. Knox.

Aide-de-Camp--Captain O. H. E. Marescaux, Shropshire Light
Infantry.

Brigade-Major--Captain R. W. Thompson, North Lancashire Regt.,
_p.s.c._

SEVENTH DIVISION

Lieutenant-General--Major-General (local Lieut.-General) C.
Tucker, C.B. Aides-de-Camp--

Assistant Adjutant-General--Colonel H. E. Belfield, _p.s.c._

Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-Generals--Brevet-Major H. G. Fitton,
D.S.O., Royal Berkshire Regt., _p.s.c._; Lieut.-Colonel H. G.
Rice, Army Service Corps.

Assistant Provost-Marshal--Brevet-Major F. Wintour, Royal West
Kent Regt., _p.s.c._

Principal Medical Officer--Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Gormley, M.D.,
R.A.M.C.

Divisional Signalling Officer--Captain J. R. K. Birch, Cheshire
Regt.

14TH BRIGADE

Major-General--Major-General Sir H. C. Chermside, G.C.M.G.,
C.B., R.E.

Aide-de-Camp--Captain E. FitzG. M. Wood, Devonshire Regt.

Brigade-Major--Captain W. M. Marter, 1st Dragoon Guards,
_p.s.c._

15TH BRIGADE

Major-General--Colonel (local Maj.-General) A. G. Wavell,
_p.s.c._

Brigade-Major--Captain L. R. Carleton, Essex Regt., _p.s.c._

END OF VOL. III.

Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.
Edinburgh & London

TRANSCRIBERS' NOTES

General : Corrections to punctuation have not been individually
documented
Page 5: "enroll" standardised to "enrol" after "forward in crowds to"
Page 15: "Divison" corrected to "Division" after "the Sixth"
Page 30: Variant spelling "via" not standardised as part of a
quotation
Page 31: "bombproof" standardised to "bomb-proof" after "burrowing
like rabbits, or in"
Page 55: "Jaysfontein" corrected to "Jasfontein" after "away from a
farm at"
Page 56: "Zoutspansdrift" corrected to "Zoutpansdrift" after "in the
direction of Kamak and"
Page 56: "Naauwport" corrected to "Naauwpoort" after "lot of those
around"
Page 58: "Naauwport" corrected to "Naauwpoort" after "The inhabitants
of"
Page 71: "bloodthirsty" standardised to "blood-thirsty" after "They
proved to be not"
Page 71: "farm-house" standardised to "farmhouse" after "bivouacked at
the"
Page 73: "horse-shoe" as in the original. Not standardised as this is
an adjectival usage
Page 77: "look-out" standardised to "lookout" after "They employed"
Page 78: "Koodoosberg" corrected to "Koodoesberg" after "troops from
Barkly and"
Page 85: "bloodstained" standardised to "blood-stained" after "the
eyes of those who,"
Page 86: "gantlet" as in the original
Page 92: "Divsion" corrected to "Division" after "Second"
Page 96: "POTGEITER'S" corrected to "POTGIETER'S" after "THE CROSSING
OF"
Page 99: "Carbineers" corrected to "Carabineers" after "one squadron
Natal"
Page 108: "roast" corrected to "roost" after "We shall be rulers of
the"
Page 123: "head-quarters" standardised to "headquarters" after "some
even reaching"
Page 134: "Blomfontein" corrected to "Bloemfontein" after "Steyn and
Kruger dated"
Page 148: "rough-riders" standardised to "roughriders" after "despatch
of 500 expert"
Page 174: "Naauwport" corrected to "Naauwpoort" after "thirty-seven
miles north of"
Page 179: "sandstorms" standardised to "sand-storms" after "These"
Page 182: "Ochtertang" corrected to "Achtertang" after "reconnoitring
towards"
Page 185: "unusally" corrected to "unusually" after "Boer movements
rendered"
Page 194: "Sandbags" standardised to "Sand-bags" before "were sent up
early"
Page 195: "Potgeiter's" as in the original. Left as part of a
quotation.

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