Chapter I: The Immortal Handful1 (3)

Lord Methuen commanded, and expressed himself much gratified with the success of the operations, with the courage and coolness and method with which all his orders were carried out. Colonel Peakman, of Kimberley fame, who had already accomplished a quite unusual record of fighting, displayed an immense amount of talent in the field, and his corps, in every way worthy of him, cut off the enemy's retreat with remarkable skill. So much indeed, that the Boers complained of the slimness of the troops who, by apparently retiring hurriedly, drew them within range of the British volleys! Our troops were pitting themselves now against no unruly or uninitiated barbarians, for the hostile force was under the command of the notable Frenchman, Colonel de Villebois-Mareuil. This gallant officer was killed by shrapnel from the 4th Field Battery Royal Field Artillery before the display of the white flag by the Boers. He was accompanied by many of his compatriots, who were taken prisoners. The force indeed was mainly cosmopolitan, it being composed of Hollanders, Frenchmen, Germans, and Russians, three Boers only belonging to the commando. Not a man of the enemy escaped. Eight were killed, six wounded, and fifty-four polyglot prisoners, with sixty horses and their baggage, were brought into camp. Two guns were also captured.

The courage and dash of the Imperial Yeomanry was eulogised on all sides, even by the Colonials, who hitherto had been somewhat disposed to look down on their brother Volunteers from civilised and inexperienced England. The magnificent spirit which inspired one and all, the grit displayed by the wounded, and their self-abnegation were the subject of much comment. A Colonial trooper, writing home his applause, said: "Where all behaved so well it is almost invidious to mention any one in particular, but as an instance of the fine spirit which animated them, I would mention two whose names I have ascertained, Sergeant-Major Coles, of the Bucks Yeomanry, and Throgmorton, a trooper in the Oxfords. These two continued in action after being wounded, the former with a bullet through the shoulder, and the latter with a gunshot wound in the head, and sooner than crowd the ambulance they rode in afterwards, twelve miles in the darkness, through one of the worst thunder-storms it has been my lot to witness. What they must have suffered in the state they were in they alone know."

From all accounts the French colonel who fell was entirely confident of success. Before the engagements he sent an invitation to his compatriots to join his force. He thought he had discovered the flaws in the Boer armour, and was bent on giving the Federals an object lesson in how to defeat and scatter the British. He also issued a manifesto addressed to the French legions, the translation of which ran thus:--

"To the Legionaries, who have known me as their
comrade.--Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men,--I know
that you have not forgotten me, and we understand each other,
and therefore I appeal to you. There is here in front of the
Vaal a people whom it is desired to rob of its rights, its
properties, and its liberty in order to satisfy some
capitalists by its downfall. The blood that runs in the veins
of this people is in part French blood. France, therefore, owes
to it some striking manifestation of help. Ah, well! You are
the men whom a soldier's temperament, apart from all the great
obligations of nationality, has gathered under this people's
flag, and may that flag bring with it the best of fortune! To
me you are the finished type of a troop that attacks and knows
not retreat."

He also wrote to the Parisians:--

"The Dutch are splendid at defence, but they cannot follow up a
defeat and crush the enemy, which the French legionaries would
be able to do.... Come and I will receive you here; and I
promise you that very few days shall elapse before we will show
the world the mettle of which the French legionaries are made."

The display to unprejudiced onlookers was distinctly poor, however, and the example of strategy set by the gallant Gaul scarcely served to demonstrate astounding military genius.

The Colonel's plan of campaign was nevertheless most carefully made out, as a document which subsequently fell into Lord Methuen's hands served to show. Very dramatic sounds the orders for the movements on April 4, as translated by the correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_:--

"To-night the detachment of the raid will attack Boshof and
follow its route, under the favour of a surprise and the
prevailing darkness. For this purpose, the following
dispositions will be observed: The column will set off at four
o'clock in the afternoon, with the detachment of Boers under
Field-Cornet Daniell, in such a manner as just to reach Boshof
by night. At a certain point the detachment will divide, and
will reach their respective places of assembly to the east and
west of the town. Boshof is situated in a plain, and is flanked
by certain kopjes, of which the importance and distance from
the town are reported as follows: to the north, two naked
kopjes, weakly guarded, and a good distance from the town.
Between them passes the Hoopstadt-Boshof road. To the east, on
the road to Kimberley, which it commands, one kopje, which is
not guarded by the enemy. Upon this the Boers will take up
their position. Finally, to the south-east of the town, and
exactly opposite to it, there is a kopje, where the English
have an outpost of fifty men. On the summit of this is formed a
small parapet of stones, about half the height of a man. This
will form part of the attack reserved for the detachment of the
raid.

"The Hoopstadt and Kimberley roads cross in the interior of the
town.

"The plan of attack will be carried out under the following
conditions: At eleven o'clock in the evening, the Boers under
Field-Cornet Daniell will be in position on the Kopje C, and
the telegraph wire on the Kimberley road will be cut by them.
At the same time, the raiding party will assemble behind the
Kopje E, situated two kilometres from the town. The horses and
the Scotch cart will there await the final operations, as well
as the native servants, if there are any. One man will be left
behind with each team of six horses. Commandant Saeremburg and
Lieutenant de Breda will, before the departure, choose these
men, the importance of whose mission will be readily
understood, since upon their vigilance will depend the safety
of the expedition in the event of retreat. The group left
behind will be under the orders of Nicollet. The men will
remain standing at the head of the horses, which will be
saddled and bridled, the cart boys at the head of the mules,
all ready harnessed.

"At half-past eleven, the attacking party will march in three
échelons, twenty mètres apart, the centre in the van. The
centre échelon, under the special direction of the General,
will be formed by the French platoon. The centre échelon,
commanded by Commandant Saeremburg, will consist of one-half of
the Dutch, and the left, under Lieutenant Bock, of the other
half. Furthermore, the men who have been in the habit of
messing together in groups will appoint a leader, from whom
they will on no account separate nor get out of touch. When
these groups do not exist, or exceed ten in number, the leaders
of the party will break them up and form parties of six or
eight, and appoint a head of the group. The General will see
these heads of groups at three o'clock in his camp, to give
them instructions further than can be detailed here.

"In the approaching march the commandants will give their
orders in a low voice, and the men will be ranged in line, so
that they can see the heads of groups and lie down instantly.
It is of importance, also, to watch the investigations of the
search-light, if the English have one at Boshof, which has not
yet been ascertained. The moment the ray is turned towards the
échelon, the leader will make his group lie down, and the march
will not be resumed until the light is turned away. At the rise
of Kopje D, a halt will be made behind the cemetery, and the
Saeremburg échelon will carry the kopje by assault and will
occupy it. From there it will hold ... the two kraals Z Z,
where the English encamped in the market-place in Boshof itself
could make the first attempt at resistance. In no case, for an
easily understood reason, will it fire upon the town. Firing,
moreover, can only be carried out by volleys discharged by word
of command given by the head of each group.

"Continuing their march, the two other échelons will pass a
well behind the kraals, and will attack the English camp
outside the town. In this effect, the French échelon, after
firing two volleys, will advance at the charge, with the cry,
'Transvaal and Free State!' and will thus complete the panic.
As there are no bayonets, the rifles will be kept loaded and
carried under the arms at the position of the charge. After
having crossed the camp from the east to the south, the rout
will be accomplished by firing. Lieutenant Bock's échelon will
remain under the orders of the General, as a reserve, should
the Boers placed on the Kimberley road on the Kopje C have to
deal with the fugitives. He could also render assistance, if
the enemy issuing from Boshof should endeavour to turn the
attack. He would then be informed of this eventuality by
Field-Cornet Coleman, who will cover the left of the attack in
such a manner as to observe all that may be menaced. For this
purpose, the Afrikanders will conform to the general movement
of the march of approach, and retire as soon as the attack
begins on the west of the English camp to a distance suitable
for observation.

"To facilitate recognition the brim of the hats will be covered
with a white handkerchief.

"The meagreness of our information does not permit of even an
approximate estimate of the English force. The forces in Boshof
seem, however, to be between 300 and 400 men. Whatever happens,
the assailants should remember that their moral superiority is
overwhelming, and even in the event of retreat, they can
easily, covered by the darkness, regain their horses and retire
from Boshof without risk."

In view of these magnificent preliminaries, one may look without vanity at the celerity and completeness of the British operations which were rewarded with victory. The Frenchman's _programme_ makes a quaint contrast to the terse description of a quartermaster-sergeant of the Imperial Yeomanry, who thus sketched the events of the 5th of April:--

"We received orders to turn out as soon as possible; we were
soon all bustle, caught and saddled our horses, and off we went
post-haste. One of our patrols had been shot in the night by a
foraging party of Boers. We trotted off for about two hours,
and then caught them out-spanned at the bottom of a kopje. We
dismounted and got on some more kopjes close by and began
exchanging shots. Then we mounted again, and half of us went
round to their right and half to the left to cut off their
retreat; and our artillery, of which three guns had followed
us, began to shell them in front. When we had got well round
them we dismounted again and advanced to the attack, taking
cover. Then, after a few volleys, ran up about twenty yards;
then a few more volleys, and up again until we were within
about a hundred and fifty yards, when we made a rush for it
with fixed bayonets. About seventy yards from the top there was
a large wire fence. We had to clamber through, and then, when
we were about fifty yards away, they came out and surrendered.
There were thirteen of them killed, and we had fifty-four
prisoners, amongst them General de Villebois-Mareuil and four
or five more Frenchmen. They had a cart with them full of
ammunition and dynamite, so they were evidently on some foray
to blow some bridge or other up. They were stationed on two
kopjes. The one our own lot went against was on the right. Most
of their bullets fell short whilst we were advancing, and when
we made our final rush they went over us. About twenty of them
escaped before we reached them. It was about five o'clock when
the fight was over, and we commenced a twelve-mile march to
camp about 5.45. After going about two miles it came on dark,
and we had a very heavy thunder-storm all the way to camp,
which we reached about ten o'clock last night, wet to the
skin."

The blow so deftly and quickly struck at the marauding parties of the Boers was valuable from many points of view. It served to restore confidence in Lord Methuen's leadership--confidence which had been considerably shattered by the disaster of Majersfontein--and it helped to suppress a tendency to raiding in the west of Cape Colony. So complete a success could not but have a sobering effect on the rebels, and give them pause in their mad career of hostility.

On the 7th of April, at dawn, Lord Methuen marched ten miles on the Hoopstadt Road to Zwartkopjesfontein Farm without opposition. On the 8th he proceeded further, but finally, by Lord Roberts's orders, retraced his steps to Zwartkopjes. On the 10th, at daybreak, two flying columns started forth--General Douglas to south-east and east of the camp, Colonel Mahon (commanding Kimberley Mounted Corps) from Boshof towards Kimberley. Colonel Mahon's movements, on which the relief of Mafeking was depending, must be taken in detail later on. Lord Methuen operated in this district till the 17th of May, when he moved to Hoopstadt and brought his force within the zone of the main operations. On the 21st he proceeded to Kroonstadt.

In the Kimberley district the First Division had been rearranged as follows:--

Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen. 9th Brigade (Major-General C.
W. H. Douglas).--1st Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Loyal North
Lancashire, 2nd Northamptonshire, 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry.
20th Brigade (Major-General A. H. Paget).--Composed of Militia
Battalions, 4th, 20th, and 44th Field Batteries; 37th Howitzer
Battery. Brigade Imperial Yeomanry (Colonel Lord Chesham).--1st
Battalion, 3rd Battalion, 5th Battalion, 10th Battalion. Cape
Police, Diamond Fields Horse, Part Kimberley Light Horse,
Diamond Fields Artillery.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] From "The Handy Man, and other Verses" (Grant Richards).

[2] The Rev. J. Godfrey.

[3] Colonel the Hon. George Hugh Gough commenced his military career in 1871, when he took a commission as cornet in the 14th Hussars, of which he held the adjutancy for nearly four years until 1879, when he was promoted captain. In 1882 he obtained the brevet rank of major, and in 1885 he was promoted major and brevet lieutenant-colonel, and four years later he obtained his colonelcy. Colonel Gough passed through the Staff College in 1883, after serving as A.D.C. to the Lieutenant-General commanding the expeditionary force in Egypt in 1882. Among his staff appointments was that of private secretary to the Commander-in-chief (Lord Wolseley), which he attained in 1897, and again in 1898, after holding the post of assistant military secretary at the head-quarters of the army. Colonel Gough's war services included the Boer War of 1881, when he was aide-de-camp to the officer commanding the base and the lines of communication; the Egyptian campaign of 1882; and the Soudan Expedition of 1884-85. In the former his horse was killed under him at Tel-el-Kebir, and he was mentioned in despatches. He received the order of the Mejidieh (4th class), the bronze star, and the medal with clasp. In the Soudan Expedition, where he was in command of the Mounted Infantry, Colonel Gough was again mentioned in despatches, greatly distinguishing himself at the battle of Abu Klea, where he was wounded.