Chapter XVII: The Events of February and March 1902

TRANSVAAL (EAST)

General B. Hamilton's three months' effective efforts resulted in the departure of Botha, and the complete clearance of the enemy from the district. It was now impossible to locate bodies of Boers in any part of that region. Rumour said that Botha had betaken himself to Vryheid to seek rest and change of scene for himself and his hunted horde. So, on his track went the British sleuth-hounds. The movement began on the 25th, and early in March they located their man in the neighbourhood of Vryheid.

Meanwhile General Plumer, Colonel Pulteney, and Colonel Wing, in the angle formed by the upper waters of the Vaal River and the Standerton-Volksrust Railway, gleaned remnants from Botha's sheaf of Boers, Plumer's Queenslanders bringing in twelve, and Wing's men eight. General Gilbert Hamilton, during his operations east of Springs, was sharply attacked on the 18th of February, and a lamentable incident occurred. Boers, estimated to number 500, had been hanging around Klippan (twenty miles S.E. of Springs), seeking an opportunity to take vengeance. A portion of the Scots Greys, detached to one flank, was cut off, surrounded, and partially captured. They made a gallant fight for it, during which Major Feilden and Captain Ussher were mortally wounded, while Lieutenant Rhodes and two men were killed, and six men wounded. The Boers lost eight killed, and Commandant Van Niekerk was shot in the knee.

After this sorry affair General Gilbert Hamilton was joined by the 28th Mounted Infantry, and from Springs he proceeded to hunt down the commando which had caused the trouble.

To make up for the mishap two successes were reported during the operations of General Fetherstonhaugh north of the Delagoa line. On the 20th February Colonel Park's column with 300 National Scouts, after a tedious night march, swooped down on two laagers at Nooitgedacht and Grootrievlei. Among the prisoners taken--164 in all--were Field-Cornets Du Toit, G. Joubert, H. de Jager, Lieutenant A. J. Vilgoen. Hinton and Trichardt, two pernicious guerillas, succeeded in escaping. But there was a goodly haul of horses, waggons, mules, cattle, &c.

Colonel E. Williams' men on the southern slopes of the Bothaberg secured some more prisoners, and on the 21st they surprised a laager at Buffelskloof and captured twenty more.

Drawing by H. W. Koekkoek]

A co-operative movement was now organised for the purpose of making a descent on Langkloof (near the junction of the Olifant and Wilge Rivers), where the Boer Government was shortly expected to arrive, but owing to the nature of the rocky and intersected country, the arrangements were impeded. The said Government, by the time the troops surrounded the place, had got some hours' start and were well on their way to Pietersburg. Colonel Park, who was unavoidably prevented from reaching his assigned position in time, proceeded to investigate the kloofs on the western side of Rhenoster Kop, and unearthed seventeen prisoners and many oxen, horses, and vehicles.

TRANSVAAL (WEST)

Operations continued in February as before, save that Colonel Von Donop at Wolmaranstad had succeeded temporarily to the command of Lord Methuen's mobile troops. On the 23rd an empty convoy of over one hundred waggons was despatched to refill at Klerksdorp and bring back supplies to Wolmaranstad. The escort was composed of 5th Imperial Yeomanry, three companies 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, two guns and a pom-pom, under Colonel W. C. Anderson (Imperial Yeomanry). Till the 25th all went well. Then, before dawn, as the convoy was moving from its bivouac ground ten miles south-east of Klerksdorp, a furious attack was made on the advance guard from the darkness of dense bush on the left. Flashes and forks of flame only showed where the enemy plied his rifles, but on this point the guns and pom-pom at once opened fire. The waggons of the convoy, which had stampeded back to the old camping-ground in the midst of the first shock of attack, were again closed up as rapidly as possible from the rear. A second and a third attack upon the rearguard were boldly and indeed brilliantly repulsed. Then Colonel Anderson, fearing the increased pressure on his rearguard, ordered the convoy to proceed towards Klerksdorp, instructing his transport officer to try and trot the waggons clear of the fire. He then made noble efforts to extricate his force, supporting the hard pressed rearguard, as it struggled to cover the retirement, with his guns and such troops as could be collected from the front. But without avail. The enemy under Delarey and Kemp, old and accomplished hands, kept the advantage. They had had the first word in the darkness; they were superior in numbers; they pressed triumphantly forward and caught the convoy where they had expected to catch it--in crossing the Jagd Spruit. The difficulty of the operation, the terror and stampede of natives and beasts in the hail of bullets that fell on them, contributed to the disaster. The convoy was lost. The escort, gallant and stubborn, was overpowered; 5 officers and 53 men fell, 6 officers and 123 men were wounded. The remainder, with the exception of 3 officers and 106 men, who reached Klerksdorp, were captured. They were subsequently released. Though the pursuit of the Boers was at once taken up, little could be done. The empty waggons were burnt, and the captors had dispersed as rapidly as they had assembled.

In order to intercept, if possible, the captured guns, and prevent Delarey from moving to the Marico district, Lord Methuen resumed the vigorous pursuit of him in which he had for sometime previously been engaged. To this end the column started from Vryburg on the 2nd of March. Colonel Kekewich was directed to send a column from Wolmaranstad towards Rooirantjesfontein, there to meet the column under Major Paris (R.M.A.), from Vryburg, while Colonel Rochefort was directed to cross the Vaal from Orange River Colony and drive Delarey towards the columns heading for Rooirantjesfontein.

Drawing by C. M. Sheldon]

The movement seemed excellently planned, and every precaution to avert surprise taken, but nevertheless Delarey and Kemp made an overwhelming and successful attack on Lord Methuen, with the result that this commander, who has worked with indefatigable zeal throughout the war, was dangerously wounded and taken prisoner. Since the details of this unfortunate affair have not yet been fully sifted, it is best to satisfy ourselves with reading Lord Methuen's own report of the events connected with the Tweebosch disaster:--

FROM LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LORD METHUEN TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

"KLERKSDORP, _13th March 1902_.

"SIR,--I have the honour to inform you that, with the object of
preventing the force under General Delarey from moving
northwards to the Marico district through the gap between
Lichtenburg and Mafeking, I sent orders to Colonel Kekewich,
C.B., at Wolmaranstad, to send a column towards
Rooirantjesfontein, where he would meet a column under Major
Paris, Royal Marine Artillery, from Vryburg.

I, at the same time, directed Colonel Rochefort to cross the
Vaal from Orange River Colony, and to move northwards by the
Bamboo Spruit, or the Harts River, and thus drive General
Delarey towards the columns which were heading for
Rooirantjesfontein.

2. Colonel Kekewich informed me, on the 2nd March, that he was
sending a column, consisting of 1600 mounted men, lightly
equipped; while Colonel Rochefort wired that the command would
contain about 1000 mounted men.

3. The column, under Major Paris, which I accompanied,
consisted of the following units:--5th Battalion Imperial
Yeomanry, 184 men, under Captain Jennings; Cape Police
(including Special Police), 233 men, under Major Berangé;
Cullinan's Horse, 64 men, under Captain Cullinan; British South
African Police, 24 men, attached to Cullinan's Horse; 4th
Battery, Royal Field Artillery, one section, under Lieutenant
Venning, D.S.O.; one pom-pom 'GG' Section, under Captain
Geoghegan, Royal Field Artillery. These units did not belong to
Major Paris's column, but were an addition, placed under his
command.

Major Paris's column before the fresh units were placed under
his command at Vryburg:--86th Company Imperial Yeomanry, 110
men; Diamond Fields Horse, 92 men; Dennison's Scouts, 58 men,
under Captain Browne; Ashburner's Light Horse, 126 men, under
Captain Ashburner; 38th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, one
section, under Lieutenant Nesham; one pom-pom, 'D' Field
Artillery; 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 200 men,
under Captain Montagu; 1st Battalion Royal North Lancashire
Regiment, 100 men, under Lieutenant Paul. The infantry were
attached to the columns at Vryburg.

4. My written instructions to Major Paris were that I should
give him daily the direction of the march, and the time of
starting for the following day; in case of any fighting, that
he should look after the mounted brigade, and that I would
stand by the guns and infantry, and give him general
instructions.

The mounted troops were the best horsed force that I have yet
had under me, added to which the Cape Police, under Major
Berangé, held an exceptionally high reputation, as did also the
local corps. I remarked to Major Paris, on leaving Vryburg,
that I could not believe in the numbers given to me. He again
made inquiries, and satisfied himself that the numbers were
correct.

5. I informed Colonel Kekewich, by wire, that I should reach
Rooirantjesfontein on 7th March.

6. 2nd March.--The column under Major Paris left Vryburg at 5
A.M.; the Supply column consisting of 39 ox waggons, and the
baggage of 46 mule waggons; owing to heavy rains which had
fallen during the night the last waggon did not reach
O'Reiley's Pan, a distance of thirteen miles, till 5 P.M. I
therefore at once sent a message to Colonel Kekewich to inform
him that I should be one or perhaps two days late at
Rooirantjesfontein. I had previously informed him that the
position of the enemy had rendered it necessary for Major
Paris's column to bear more to the north-west towards
Polfontein (254).

7. 3rd March.--Owing to the animals being exhausted by the
previous day's trek, the column was only able to reach Grootpan
(Bestersfarm), a distance of six miles. During the march the
Police, forming the advance guard under Major Berangé, killed
three local rebel Boers, by name Steyn, Bester, and 'Janson.'

8. 4th March.--At Grootpan I heard that large droves of cattle
and Van Zyl's (rebel) commando had moved eastwards towards
Doornbult (197). That morning Major Paris's column marched to
Graspan, two miles beyond Mooiplatz (244 B), a distance of
thirteen miles, where there was plenty of water. As there had
been no rain in these parts it was very doubtful whether, if I
trekked by Klipdrift (188), as I had told Colonel Kekewich I
intended to do, I should find water at Vaalkop (183), or
Rietvlei (279).

9. 5th March.--I therefore moved to Boschpan (68) in the
morning, which I found all but dry, and in the afternoon to
Barberspan, a distance of twenty-one miles, where there was
plenty of water. Here I was informed that there had been rain
at Leeuwkuil (95), and that there certainly was water at
Leeuwkuil (23).

10. 6th March.--The column moved off at 5 A.M., the ox convoy
having moved at 4 A.M. The whole force reached Leeuwspruit
(232) about 7.30 A.M. Here I sent on a detachment of Cape
Police to Leeuwkuil (95) to make certain of the existence of
water.

There had been some sniping at the rearguard by about 100 of
Van Zyl's commando, and seeing some confusion, I went back
myself, sending at the same time for a section of the 38th
Battery.

I found the men forming the rear screen, which consisted of the
86th Company Imperial Yeomanry, very much out of hand and
lacking both fire discipline and knowledge of how to act. There
seemed to be a want of instructed officers and non-commissioned
officers. Van Zyl's commando being accurately shelled by the
section Royal Artillery, eventually retired and moved round our
right flank to Tweebosch (247), while the column halted at
Leeuwspruit (232).

On receiving information that there was no water at Leeuwkuil
(95), I decided to move to Tweebosch (247), where Van Zyl's
commando had taken up a good position in the bed of the Klein
Harts River.

Major Berangé with the Police, the section 4th Battery, and the
pom-pom 'GG' Section, were ordered to move straight on
Tweebosch (247), while Dennison's Scouts, supported by
Cullinan's Horse, were to move round the enemy's left flank.

The commando retired rapidly, the Police under Major Berangé
working with the greatest quickness.

Much praise is due to Major Berangé for the way in which he
handled his men.

Our casualties were one killed and two wounded.

As the day was hot, and it was then 11.30 A.M., I decided to
remain at Tweebosch (247).

11. 7th March.--At 3 A.M. the ox convoy moved off towards
Leeuwkuil (23) with an escort of 1 squadron Cape Police; 86th
Company Imperial Yeomanry; 200 men 1st Battalion Northumberland
Fusiliers; 100 men 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire
Regiment; 1 section 4th Battery Royal Field Artillery; 1
pom-pom 'GG' Section. The whole was under command of Captain
Montagu, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.

The main column moved off at 4 A.M. as follows:--_Advance
guard_:--1 squadron Cape Police; Ashburner's Light Horse; 1
pom-pom Diamond Fields Artillery. _Main body_:--Cullinan's
Horse; British South Africa Police; Detachment 5th Regiment,
Imperial Yeomanry; 1 section 38th Battery, Royal Field
Artillery. _Rearguard_:--Diamond Fields Horse; Dennison's
Scouts.

Thinking there was a likelihood of an attack in rear, I had
called Major Paris's attention to the necessity of putting
thoroughly reliable troops in the rearguard.

The country through which we passed was flat and without brush.
At daybreak (about 5 A.M.) a heavy fire was opened on the
rearguard. The fire was so intense that the rear screen was at
once reinforced by the section of the 38th Battery, and one
pom-pom Diamond Fields Artillery. A portion of Ashburner's
Light Horse, and the detachment of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry,
were extended on either flank, round which the enemy seemed
intent on galloping.

At this time (5.30 A.M.) the ox convoy was about a mile in
front of the baggage, which was moving in four lines well
closed up. I therefore ordered the ox convoy to halt, and the
baggage to join it. Major Berangé was directed to move, with
the police that were with him, towards a fresh body of the
enemy, who now appeared on our right rear. The time was about 6
A.M.

I joined the ox convoy about this time, and found Captain
Tilney, D.A.A.G., assisting Captain Montagu, 1st Battalion
Northumberland Fusiliers, Commanding the Infantry, to extend
the men to meet the attack on our right flank.

The section 4th Battery Royal Field Artillery and the pom-pom
'GG' Section had already taken up a position to meet this
attack.

I could see no mounted men available, and could only assume
that they had all gone to reinforce the rear screen, so I
ordered the baggage to continue to advance, it being impossible
to move the ox convoy, as the native drivers were lying under
the waggons and refused to move.

I would here like to draw attention to the orderly manner and
complete control exercised by Lieutenant Hartley, Transport
Officer to Major Paris's column, over the mule waggons during
the fight.

The Boers, attacking the rearguard, had come on with great
determination right amongst the rear screen, but the support
to the screen having been reinforced by Ashburner's Light
Horse, Cullinan's Horse, and some of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry,
held them in check till about 6.30 A.M. A heavy attack then
developed on our rear and right flank, which caused, as far as
I could see, all mounted troops then in rear (some of them
which had originally been there had moved off towards the
flanks to meet threatened attacks) to break, and they galloped
in complete confusion past our left flank. The section 38th
Battery was thus left unprotected, but continued in action
until every man, with the exception of Lieutenant Nesham, was
hit. I am informed that this officer was called upon to
surrender, and on refusing to do so was killed.

The attack on our right flank was pressed home to within six
hundred yards of the gun of the 4th Battery.

I then gave orders for a kraal about one mile along the road to
Leeuwkuil to be occupied, and sent orders to rally the mounted
men on the rising ground beyond the kraal. The kraal was
occupied by Major Paris and Major Berangé with some forty men.
The mounted troops in the meantime continued their retirement.
I remained with the guns, 4th Battery, and Infantry until my
horse was killed, and my thigh fractured by a bullet.

They held out in a most splendid manner until about 9.30 A.M.,
when all the men round the guns had been shot down and
Lieutenant Venning, commanding the section, had been killed. In
the meantime the two guns and a pom-pom with Commandant
Cellier's commando had rendered the kraal untenable, when the
men at the kraal and those remaining with the baggage
surrendered.

The Boer Commandants present were--Delarey, Vermaas, Cellier,
Kemp, Van Zyl, D. Botha, and Lemmer. It is difficult to
estimate the number of Boers on the field, but I should say
about 1500. General Delarey treated myself and the prisoners
with the greatest kindness, and left General Cellier to look
after our wounded on the ground; they buried eleven of their
own men at Kareelaagte, and, from what I can learn, their
losses were heavy.

I beg to draw attention to the good work done by Major Paris in
endeavouring to keep the mounted troops in hand, and to the
promptitude with which Captain Tilney, 17th Lancers, D.A.A.G.,
assisted in placing the Infantry round the convoy.

I would also call attention to the gallant manner in which
Lieutenants Nesham and Venning, Royal Field Artillery, stuck to
their guns.

Captain Montagu, commanding detachment 1st Battalion
Northumberland Fusiliers, and Lieutenant Paul, commanding
detachment 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, held
on until further resistance was impossible. Civil Surgeon
Prentice, with the rearguard, and Captain Thurston, Royal Army
Medical Corps, with the guns, continued bandaging the wounded
throughout the engagement.

Colonel Townsend, C.B., my Principal Medical Officer, remained
in the fighting line until he had received three wounds; he
has, from the commencement of the campaign, always acted most
gallantly.

Captain Fernyhough did good work with the rearguard during the
action. He has been of very great value to me ever since he has
served under me.

A large number of the Boers were dressed in khaki, many of them
wearing the chevrons of non-commissioned officers. This, in
several instances, led to misapprehension by our troops, and to
losses by death, wounds, and capture among us. Owing to having
been wounded and taken prisoner, I am unable to give any list
of casualties. This report is, for the same reason, based
solely on what came under my own observation and what I have
been able to gather from the few officers with whom I have had
the opportunity of speaking on the subject."

Lord Methuen concluded by saying that should he have omitted to bring to notice some who had distinguished themselves during the action Major Paris would supply the deficiency.

Of the General's staff of six, five were wounded. Lieutenants Venning and Nesham, Royal Field Artillery, were killed while gallantly serving their guns with case. Lieutenant Hartley, Steinacker's Horse, also lost his life. Among the wounded were Colonel Wilson, 3rd York and Lancashire Regiment, Captain Outram, 3rd Highland Light Infantry, Lieutenant Dennis, Yeomanry, Lieutenant Nash, Cape Police, and Lieutenant Logan, Yeomanry. Lord Methuen was taken to the Boer laager, but was subsequently allowed by Delarey to proceed with Colonel Townsend, who was also wounded, to the hospital at Klerksdorp.

Drawing by Allan Stewart from Sketches supplied by a New Zealand Officer]

ORANGE RIVER COLONY--MAJUBA DAY

After some days' rest, the troops which had formed the cordon to enclose De Wet's force were engaged in a new and far-reaching scheme of operations. This was divided into two phases, in the first of which two simultaneous movements were to be made to the east, one between the Heidelberg-Standerton Railway and the Wolvehoek-Frankfort-Tafel Kop blockhouse line; the other, from the line Kroonstad-Ventersburg-Doornberg up to the blockhouses between Lindley and Bethlehem. For the second phase, it was arranged that whilst the northern columns, then on a line between Standerton and Tafel Kop, made a right wheel on to Botha's Pass-Tafel Kop blockhouses, with Tafel Kop as a pivot, the southern columns should move east to the Wilge, and in conjunction with the troops at Harrismith, hold the line of the Wilge between Strydpoort and Majoor's Drift. Finally, with the line of the Wilge so held to the west, and the passes of the Drakensberg closed to the enemy from the east by the troops from the Natal command, the northern line of columns was to move south from the Tafel Kop-Botha's Pass position, right down to the blockhouses between the Van Reenan's Pass and Elands River Bridge, near Harrismith. These brilliant operations, on the principle of previous "drives," began about the middle of the month, and culminated on Majuba Day in the capture of 728 Boers, 25,000 cattle, 2000 horses, 200 waggons, and 50,000 rounds of ammunition. Various efforts were, of course, made to break through the encircling cordon, but none so violent as that which took place at the last stage of these proceedings. At dawn on the 23rd a general advance to the south was made towards the Van Reenan's Pass-Elands River Bridge blockhouses. It was timed to take four days. At night, at the close of the first day's march, another dashing attempt on the same principle as the last was made by De Wet to escape the net into which he had been driven by the advancing columns. In darkness, eighteen miles south of Vrede, at the point where Byng's right and Rimington's left joined, the noted chief, with his mob of cattle rapidly driven by natives, attempted his gallant rush. The New Zealanders of Garratt's column, commanded by Major Bauchop, with characteristic dash, gallantly resisted and repelled the attack made, and the 3rd New South Wales Mounted Rifles brought heavy fire to bear on the enemy, but De Wet and Steyn themselves succeeded in breaking through the toils. Still, the whole of the Boer cattle and vehicles were captured, and thirty-one Boers, while 160 horses were killed at the place where the gallant Colonials made their notable resistance. Our own casualties were severe, two officers and eighteen men were killed, five officers and thirty-three wounded, the majority of whom belonged to the New Zealand contingent. On the 26th Colonel Nixon repulsed a like attack made upon the line of the Cornelis River, but on the 27th the sweep down to Harrismith closed with the surrender to Colonel Sir H. Rawlinson of Commandant Truter and 650 men.

Colonel Lawley and Major Du Cane made more captures in the vicinity of the Doornberg, and Colonel Barker's troops groped for Boers in the kloofs and caves of the western slopes of the Wittebergen. Before the 25th, owing to Colonel Barker's various activities, he collected 30 prisoners, 725 cattle, and 280 horses. The Boers, as may be imagined, began to accept these convincing proofs that further resistance to the British was little else than suicide.

THE CAPE COLONY

On the 2nd of February the general disposition of troops in the Cape Colony stood thus: Those under Crabbe, from Beaufort West, and those under Capper and Lund, from Sutherland, converging towards Fraserburg, where a concentration of the enemy had taken place; those under Haig and under Kavanagh and Wyndham moving from Clanwilliam upon Calvinia; the intervening space watched by Doran, forty miles north-east of Clanwilliam, and by Callwell near Sutherland. Crewe's Colonial troops occupied both the Elandsvlei and Sutherland.

On the 30th January Colonel Crabbe's column (acting as a screen to a convoy of donkey waggons which, under its own escort, was some distance in the rear) was suddenly menaced by a swarm of Boers. Their attitude and their numbers warned the Colonel to take up a defensive position at Rietfontein (twenty-five miles east of Fraserburg). That done, he there fought tenaciously, determined to hold his own till Colonel Capper and Major Lund could arrive from Sutherland to his support. Foiled in their effort to overpower Crabbe's men, the Boers promptly decided to assail the convoy. This, guarded by 60 District Mounted Rifles and 100 men of the 4th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment, under Major Crofton, was halted on the night of the 4th some forty miles south-east of Fraserburg. The Boers in great strength rushed on the British prize. All through the night fighting was fierce and sustained, and in the end the Boers were triumphant. They secured and destroyed the waggons. Though Colonel Crabbe promptly rushed to the scene he was unable to act. The waggons were wrecked, and the assailants too strong to be handled by his column unaided. He awaited the troops under Colonel Capper and Major Lund, and with them proceeded to trounce and disperse the rebels, and hunt them north-east of Fraserburg. The losses during these engagements were considerable, Major Crofton, another officer, and 11 men being killed, and 1 officer and 47 men wounded. On the 5th of February there was a tussle at Calvinia between Theron's men and Colonel Haig's, when the Boers were driven north with the loss of two killed and two wounded. Considerable loss on our side was sustained on the 6th. Colonel Doran, with 100 men, then on the hunt for Gelhenhuis, a rebel leader, was assailed by the enemy during his return march to Calvinia. In the pitch darkness his little band had to fight a prolonged rearguard action to cover their withdrawal over the mountains. This conflict led to the loss of 3 officers and 7 men killed, 17 men being wounded.

The main body of rebels--some 600 of them--heartened by their capture of the convoy on the night of the 4th, assembled on the 16th thirty miles east-north-east of Fraserburg, with a view to earning fresh laurels. But their hopes were nipped in the bud. General French had his eye on them. The congregating evil must be arrested, and the columns under General Stephenson were disposed upon a general line from Nelspoort Station, by Beaufort West, to Rhenosterfontein (fifteen miles north-west of Beaufort West), Colonel Doran on the right, Colonel Capper and Major Nickalls in the centre, and Colonel Crabbe and Major Lund on the left. An advance to north-west towards Williston was begun on the 17th--but the Boers were shy. No sooner did they come in contact with our troops than they dispersed. Some were wounded and some captured on the 18th, among them being Judge Hugo, who subsequently died of his injuries; but the rest got off. Malan's group doubled round Doran's right flank and scuttled over the rail towards the midlands, another gang fled north-west, and one J. T. Smith, with a rebel crew, broke through the blockhouse line, with some loss, to the north and then to the north-east of Victoria West.

The pursuit of Malan to the east now occupied the column under Major Wormald and two squadrons of the 9th Lancers. This force had already chased the remnants of Kruitzinger's band, under Wessels, out of the midlands well to the west. Colonel Haig, with Colonels Kavanagh and Williams, skirmished and hunted in the Calvinia and Van Rhynsdorp districts, and on the 13th Bouwer's laager was rushed by Kavanagh's braves, and eleven prisoners, with horses, rifles, and ammunition, &c., were secured.

In the midlands the enemy straggled about on the hills for the most part of the month. The rebels daily found an increasing difficulty in procuring food and necessaries from their quondam sympathisers, and their diminished popularity served somewhat to damp their activities; but early in March Fouché and Myburg made a dash across the East London Railway, whither they were chased to the south of Steynsburg by Colonels Price and Baillie.