Chapter XVI: Groveton and the Second Manassas (3)

Four divisions, Schurz’, Steinwehr’s, Hooker’s, and Reno’s, had been hurled in succession against Jackson’s front. Their losses had been enormous. Grover’s brigade had lost 461 out of 2,000, of which one regiment, 288 strong, accounted for 6 officers and 106 men; three regiments of Reno’s lost 530; and it is probable that more than 4,000 men had fallen in the wood which lay in front of Hill’s brigades.

The fighting, however, had not been without effect on the Confederates. The charges to which they had been exposed, impetuous as they were, were doubtless less trying than a sustained attack, pressed on by continuous waves of fresh troops, and allowing the defence no breathing space. Such steady pressure, always increasing in strength, saps the morale more rapidly than a series of fierce assaults, delivered at wide intervals of time. But such pressure implies on the part of the assailant an accumulation of superior force, and this accumulation the enemy’s generals had not attempted to provide. In none of the four attacks which had shivered against Hill’s front had the strength of the assailants been greater than that of his own division; and to the tremendous weight of such a stroke as had won the battles of Gaines’ Mill or Cedar Run, to the closely combined advance of overwhelming numbers, Jackson’s men had not yet been subjected.

The battle, nevertheless, had been fiercely contested, and the strain of constant vigilance and close-range fighting had told on the Light Division. The Federal skirmishers, boldly advancing as Pender’s men fell back, had once more filled the wood, and their venomous fire allowed the defenders no leisure for repose.[25] Ammunition had already given out; many of the men had but two or three cartridges remaining, and the volunteers who ran the gauntlet to procure fresh supplies were many of them shot down. Moreover, nine hours’ fighting, much of it at close range, had piled the corpses thick upon the railroad, and the ranks of Hill’s brigades were terribly attenuated. The second line had already been brought up to fill the gaps, and every brigade had been heavily engaged.

4 p.m. It was about four o’clock, and for a short space the pressure on the Confederate lines relaxed. The continuous roar of the artillery dwindled to a fitful cannonade; and along the edge of the wood, drooping under the heat, where the foliage was white with the dust of battle, the skirmishers let their rifles cool. But the Valley soldiers knew that their respite would be short. The Federal masses were still marching and counter-marching on the opposite hills; from the forest beyond long columns streamed steadily to the front, and near the Warrenton turnpike fresh batteries were coming into action.

Pope had ordered Kearney and Reno to make a fresh attack. The former, one of the most dashing officers in the Federal army, disposed his division in two lines. Reno, in the same formation, deployed upon Kearney’s right, and with their flank resting on Bull Run the five brigades went forward to the charge. The Confederate batteries, posted on the ridge in rear, swept the open ground along the stream; but, regardless of their fire, the Federals came rapidly to close quarters, and seized the railroad.

4.30 p.m. When Hill saw this formidable storm bursting on his lines he felt that the supreme moment had arrived. Would Gregg, on whose front the division of Reno was bearing down, be able to hold his own? That gallant soldier, although more than one half of his command lay dead or wounded, replied, in answer to his chief’s enquiry, that his ammunition was almost expended, but that he had still the bayonet. Nevertheless, the pressure was too heavy for his wearied troops. Foot by foot they were forced back, and, at the same moment, Thomas, Field, and Branch, still fighting desperately, were compelled to yield their ground. Hill, anxiously looking for succour, had already called on Early. The enemy, swarming across the railroad, had penetrated to a point three hundred yards within the Confederate position. But the grey line was not yet shattered. The men of the Light Division, though borne backwards by the rush, still faced towards the foe; and Early’s brigade, supported by two regiments of Lawton’s division, advanced with levelled bayonets, drove through the tumult, and opposed a solid line to the crowd of Federals.

Once more the fresh reserve, thrown in at the propitious moment, swept back numbers far superior to itself. Once more order prevailed over disorder, and the cold steel asserted its supremacy. The strength of the assailants was already spent. The wave receded more swiftly than it had risen, and through the copses and across the railroad the Confederates drove their exhausted foe. General Hill had instructed Early that he was not to pass beyond the original front; but it was impossible to restrain the troops, and not till they had advanced several hundred yards was the brigade halted and brought back.

5.15 p.m. The counterstroke was as completely successful as those that had preceded it. Early’s losses were comparatively slight, those inflicted on the enemy very heavy, and Hill’s brigades were finally relieved. Pope abandoned all further efforts to crush Jackson. Five assaults had failed. 30,000 infantry had charged in vain through the fatal wood; and of the 8,000 Federal casualties reported on this day, by far the larger proportion was due to the deadly fire and dashing counterstrokes of Jackson’s infantry.

While Pope was hurling division after division against the Confederate left, Lee, with Longstreet at his side, observed the conflict from Stuart’s Hill, the wooded eminence which stands south-west of Groveton. On this wing, though a mile distant from Jackson’s battle, both Federals and Confederates were in force. At least one half of Pope’s army had gradually assembled on this flank. Here were Reynolds and McDowell, and on the Manassas road stood two divisions under Porter.

Within the woods on Stuart’s Hill, with the cavalry on his flank, Longstreet had deployed his whole force, with the exception of Anderson, who had not yet passed Thoroughfare Gap. But although both Pope and Lee were anxious to engage, neither could bring their subordinates to the point. Pope had sent vague instructions to Porter and McDowell, and when at Length he had substituted a definite order it was not only late in arriving, but the generals found that it was based on an absolutely incorrect view of the situation. The Federal commander had no knowledge that Longstreet, with 25,000 men, was already in position beyond his left. So close lay the Confederates that under the impression that Stuart’s Hill was still untenanted, he desired Porter to move across it and envelop Jackson’s right. Porter, suspecting that the main body of the Southern army was before him, declined to risk his 10,000 men until he had reported the true state of affairs. A peremptory reply to attack at once was received at 6.30, but it was then too late to intervene.

Nor had Lee been more successful in developing a counterstroke. Longstreet, with a complacency it is difficult to understand, has related how he opposed the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. Three times Lee urged him forward. The first time he rode to the front to reconnoitre, and found that the position, in his own words, was not inviting. Again Lee insisted that the enemy’s left might be turned. While the question was under discussion, a heavy force (Porter and McDowell) was reported advancing from Manassas Junction. No attack followed, however, and Lee repeated his instructions. Longstreet was still unwilling. A large portion of the Federal force on the Manassas road now marched northward to join Pope, and Lee, for the last time, bade Longstreet attack towards Groveton. “I suggested,” says the latter, “that the day being far spent, it might be as well to advance before night on a forced reconnaissance, get our troops into the most favourable positions, and have all things ready for battle the next morning. To this General Lee reluctantly gave consent, and orders were given for an advance to be pursued under cover of night, until the main position could be carefully examined. It so happened that an order to advance was issued on the other side at the same time, so that the encounter was something of a surprise on both sides.[26] Hood, with his two Texan brigades, led the Confederates, and King’s division, now commanded by Hatch, met him on the slopes of Stuart’s Hill. Although the Federals, since 1 a.m. the same morning, had marched to Manassas and back again, the fight was spirited. Hood, however, was strongly supported, and the Texans pushed forward a mile and a half in front of the position they had held since noon. Longstreet had now full leisure to make his reconnaissance. The ground to which the enemy had retreated was very strong. He believed it strongly manned, and an hour after midnight Hood’s brigades were ordered to withdraw.

The firing, even of the skirmishers, had long since died away on the opposite flank. The battle was over, and the Valley army had been once more victorious. But when Jackson’s staff gathered round him in the bivouac, “their triumph,” says Dabney, “bore a solemn hue.” Their great task had been accomplished, and Pope’s army, harassed, starving, and bewildered, had been brought to bay. But their energies were worn down. The incessant marching, by day and night, the suspense of the past week, the fierce strife of the day that had just closed, pressed heavily on the whole force. Many of the bravest were gone. Trimble, that stout soldier, was severely wounded, Field and Forno had fallen, and in Gregg’s brigade alone 40 officers were dead or wounded. Doctor McGuire, fresh from the ghastly spectacle of the silent battle-field, said, “General, this day has been won by nothing but stark and stern fighting.” “No,” replied Jackson, very quietly, “it has been won by nothing but the blessing and protection of Providence.” And in this attitude of acknowledgment general and soldiers were as one. When the pickets had been posted, and night had fallen on the forest, officers and men, gathered together round their chaplains, made such preparations for the morrow’s battle as did the host of King Harry on the eve of Agincourt.

NOTE

Students of war will note with interest the tactical details of the passage of the Rappahannock by the Army of Northern Virginia.

_August 21._—FEDERALS.

In position behind the river from Kelly’s Ford to Freeman’s Ford.

_Tête de pont_ covering the railway bridge, occupied by a brigade.

CONFEDERATES.

Longstreet to Kelly’s Ford.

Jackson to Beverley Ford.

Stuart to above Beverley Ford.

Constant skirmishing and artillery fire.

_August 22._—FEDERALS.

In position from Kelly’s Ford to Freeman’s Ford.

Bayard’s cavalry brigade on right flank.

Buford’s cavalry brigade at Rappahannock Station.

CONFEDERATES.

Jackson to Sulphur Springs. Early crosses the river.

Longstreet to Beverley Ford and railway.

Constant skirmishing and artillery fire.

_August 23._—FEDERALS.

Pope abandons _tête de pont_ and burns railway bridge.

Sigel moves against Early, but his advance is repulsed.

Army to a position about Warrenton, with detachments along the river, and a strong force at Kelly’s Ford.

CONFEDERATES.

Early moves north to Great Run, and is reinforced by Lawton.

Stuart to Catlett’s Station.

Longstreet demonstrates against railway bridge.

_August 24._—FEDERAL.

Buford’s and Bayard’s cavalry to Waterloo.

Army to Waterloo and Sulphur Springs.

CONFEDERATES.

Jackson in the evening retires to Jefferson, and is relieved after dark opposite Sulphur Springs and Waterloo by Longstreet.

Anderson relieves Longstreet on the railway.

Constant skirmishing and artillery fire all along the line.

_August 25._—FEDERALS.

Pope extends his left down the river to Kelly’s Ford, determining to receive attack at Warrenton should the Confederates cross.

CONFEDERATES.

Jackson moves north and crosses the river at Hinson’s Mills.

Longstreet demonstrates at Waterloo, and Anderson at the Sulphur Springs.

_August 26._—FEDERALS.

A reconnaissance in force, owing to bad staff arrangements, comes to nothing. At nightfall the whole army is ordered to concentrate at Warrenton.

CONFEDERATES.

2 a.m. Stuart follows Jackson.

Late in the afternoon, Longstreet, having been relieved by Anderson, marches to Hinson’s Mills.

Jackson captures Manassas Junction.

Skirmishing all day along the Rappahannock.

_August 27._—FEDERALS.

7 a.m. Hooker’s division from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe Station.

8.30 a.m. Army ordered to concentrate at Gainesville, Buckland Mills, and Greenwich. Porter and Banks at Warrenton Junction.

3 p.m. Action at Bristoe Station.

6.30 p.m. Pope arrives at Bristoe Station.

Army ordered to march to Manassaa Junction at dawn.

CONFEDERATES.

Jackson at Manassas Junction.

Longstreet to White Plains.

[1] The _Times,_ September 4, 1862.

[2] Letter to the author.

[3] June 9, 1863.

[4] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 67. “It may have been fortunate for the Confederates,” says Longstreet, “that he was not instructed to fight like Jackson.”

[5] General George H. Gordon. _The Army of Virginia,_ p. 9.

[6] Between August 21 and 25 Pope received the following reinforcements for the Army of the Potomac, raising his strength to over 80,000 men:

Third Corps Heintzleman Hooker’s Division Kearney’s Division 10,000 Fifth Corps Porter Morell’s Division Sykes’ Division 10,000 Pennsylvania Reserves. Reynolds 8,000

[7] Letter to the author.

[8] Pope, 80,000; Washington and Aquia Creek, 20,000. Lee was well aware, from the correspondence which Stuart had captured, if indeed he had not already inferred it, that Pope had been strictly enjoined to cover Washington, and that he was dependent on the railway for supplies. There was not the slightest fear of his falling back towards Aquia Creek to join McClellan.

[9] _The Army of Northern Virginia,_ Colonel Allan, p. 200.

[10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 533.

[11] The report received at Alexandria from Manassas Junction ran as follows: “No. 6 train, engine Secretary, was fired into at Bristoe by a party of cavalry, some 500 strong. They had piled ties on the track, but the engine threw them off. Secretary is completely riddled by bullets.”

[12] These troops were sent forward, without cavalry, by order of General Halleck. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 680. The Federal Commander-in-Chief expected that the opposition would be slight. He had evidently no suspicion of the length to which the daring of Lee and Jackson might have carried them.

[13] _The Army of Virginia._ General George H. Gordon.

[14] “Up to the night of August 28 we received,” says Longstreet, “reports from General Jackson at regular intervals, assuring us of his successful operation, and of confidence in his ability to baffle all efforts of the enemy, till we should reach him.” _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 517.

[15] Five messages were sent in between 8.45 a.m. and 11 a.m., but evidently reached headquarters much later. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, pp. 654–5.

[16] There is a curious undated report on page 671, O.R., vol. xii, part iii, from Colonel Duffie, a French officer in the Federal service, which speaks of a column passing through Thoroughfare Gap; but, although the compilers of the Records have placed it under the date August 26, it seems evident, as this officer (_see_ page 670) was at Rappahannock Station on the 26th and 27th (O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 688), that the report refers to Longstreet’s and not Jackson’s troops, and was written on August 28.

[17] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 672. Pope to Porter, p. 675. Pope to Halleck, p. 684.

[18] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 72.

[19] A. P. Hill had marched fourteen miles, Ewell fifteen, and Taliaferro, with whom were the trains, from eight to ten.

[20] The order, dated 2 a.m., August 25, was to the following effect:—
“1. Sigel’s Corps to march from Gainesville to Manassas Junction,
the right resting on the Manassas railroad.
“2. Reynolds to follow Sigel.
“3. King to follow Reynolds.
“4. Ricketts to follow King; but to halt at Thoroughfare Gap if the
enemy threatened the pass.
King was afterwards, while on the march, directed to Centreville by
the Warrenton–Alexandria road.”

[21] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 507, 508.

[22] Longstreet had been unable to march with the same speed as Jackson. Leaving Jefferson on the afternoon of August 26, he did not reach Thoroughfare Gap until “just before night” on August 28. He had been delayed for an hour at White Plains by the Federal cavalry, and the trains of the army, such as they were, may also have retarded him. In two days he covered only thirty miles.

[23] Twenty pieces had been ordered to the front soon after the infantry moved forward. The dense woods, however, proved impenetrable to all but three horse-artillery guns, and one of these was unable to keep up.

[24] Ricketts’ report would have been transmitted through McDowell, under whose command he was, and as McDowell was not to be found, it naturally went astray.

[25] “The Federal sharpshooters at this time,” says Colonel McCrady, of the Light Division, “held possession of the wood, and kept up a deadly fire of single shots whenever any one of us was exposed. Every lieutenant who had to change position did so at the risk of his life. What was my horror, during an interval in the attack, to see General Jackson himself walking quickly down the railroad cut, examining our position, and calmly looking into the wood that concealed the enemy! Strange to say, he was not molested.”—_Southern Historical Society Papers,_ vol. xiii, p. 27.

[26] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 519.