Chapter XVI: Part 16

Upon this policy successive dynasties appear to have acted continuously up to the present day in China, where the relations of the State to religions are, I think, without parallel elsewhere in the modern world. One may find some resemblance to the attitude of the Roman emperors towards rites and worships among the population, in the Chinese emperor's reverent observance and regulation of the rites and ceremonies performed by him as the religious chief and representative before Heaven of the great national interests. The deification of deceased emperors is a solemn rite ordained by proclamation. As the _Ius sacrum_, the body of rights and duties in the matter of religion, was regarded in Rome as a department of the _Ius publicum_, belonging to the fundamental constitution of the State, so in China the ritual code was incorporated into the statute books, and promulgated with imperial sanction. Now we know that in Rome the established ritual was legally prescribed, though otherwise strange deities and their worships were admitted indiscriminately. But the Chinese Government goes much further. It appears to regard all novel superstitions, and especially foreign worships, as the hotbed of sedition and disloyalty. Unlicensed deities and sects are put down by the police; magicians and sorcerers are arrested; and the peculiar Chinese practice of canonising deceased officials and paying sacrificial honours to local celebrities after death is strictly reserved by the Board of Ceremonies for imperial consideration and approval. The Censor, to whom any proposal of this kind must be entrusted, is admonished that he must satisfy himself by inquiry of its validity. An official who performs sacred rites in honour of a spirit or holy personage not recognised by the Ritual Code, was liable, under laws that may be still in force, to corporal punishment; and the adoration by private families of spirits whose worship is reserved for public ceremonial was a heinous offence. No such rigorous control over the multiplication of rites and deities has been instituted elsewhere. On the other hand, while in other countries the State has recognised no more than one established religion, the Chinese Government formally recognises three denominations. Buddhism has been sanctioned by various edicts and endowments, yet the State divinities belong to the Taoist pantheon, and their worship is regulated by public ordinances; while Confucianism represents official orthodoxy, and its precepts embody the latitudinarian spirit of the intellectual classes. We know that the Chinese people make use, so to speak, of all three religions indiscriminately, according to their individual whims, needs, or experience of results. So also a politic administration countenances these divisions and probably finds some interest in maintaining them. The morality of the people requires some religious sanction; and it is this element with which the State professes its chief concern. We are told on good authority that one of the functions of high officials is to deliver public lectures freely criticising and discouraging indolent monasticism and idolatry from the standpoint of rational ethics, as follies that are reluctantly tolerated. Yet the Government has never been able to keep down the fanatics, mystics, and heretical sects that are incessantly springing up in China, as elsewhere in Asia; though they are treated as pestilent rebels and law-breakers, to be exterminated by massacre and cruel punishments; and bloody repression of this kind has been the cause of serious insurrections. It is to be observed that all religious persecution is by the direct action of the State, _not_ instigated or insisted upon by a powerful orthodox priesthood. But a despotic administration which undertakes to control and circumscribe all forms and manifestations of superstition in a vast polytheistic multitude of its subjects, is inevitably driven to repressive measures of the utmost severity. Neither Christianity nor Islam attempted to regulate polytheism, their mission was to exterminate it, and they succeeded mainly because in those countries the State was acting with the support and under the uncompromising pressure of a dominant church or faith.

Some writers have noticed a certain degree of resemblance between the policy of the Roman empire and that of the Chinese empire toward religion. We may read in Gibbon that the Roman magistrates regarded the various modes of worship as equally useful, that sages and heroes were exalted to immortality and entitled to reverence and adoration, and that philosophic officials, viewing with indulgence the superstitions of the multitude, diligently practised the ceremonies of their fathers. So far, indeed, his description of the attitude of the State toward polytheism may be applicable to China; but although the Roman and Chinese emperors both assumed the rank of divinity, and were supreme in the department of worships, the Roman administration never attempted to regulate and restrain polytheism at large on the Chinese system.

The religion of the Gentiles, said Hobbes, is a part of their policy; and it may be said that this is still the policy of Oriental monarchies, who admit no separation between the secular and the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. They would agree with Hobbes that temporal and spiritual government are but two words brought into the world to make men see double and mistake their lawful sovereign. But while in Mohammedan Asia the State upholds orthodox uniformity, in China and Japan the mainspring of all such administrative action is political expediency. It may be suggested that in the mind of these far-Eastern people religion has never been conceived as something quite apart from human experience and the affairs of the visible world; for Buddhism, with its metaphysical doctrines, is a foreign importation, corrupted and materialised in China and Japan. And we may observe that from among the Mongolian races, which have produced mighty conquerors and founded famous dynasties from Constantinople to Pekin, no mighty prophet, no profound spiritual teacher, has arisen. Yet in China, as throughout all the countries of the Asiatic mainland, an enthusiast may still gather together ardent proselytes, and fresh revelations may create among the people unrest that may ferment and become heated up to the degree of fanaticism, and explode against attempts made to suppress it. The Taeping insurrection, which devastated cities and provinces in China, and nearly overthrew the Manchu dynasty, is a striking example of the volcanic fires that underlie the surface of Asiatic societies. It was quenched in torrents of blood after lasting some ten years. And very recently there has been a determined revolt of the Lamas in Eastern Tibet, where the provincial administration is, as we know, sacerdotal. The imperial troops are said to be crushing it with unrelenting severity. These are the perilous experiences of a philosophic Government that assumes charge and control over the religions of some three hundred millions of Asiatics.

I can only make a hasty reference to Japan. In that country the relations of the State to religions appear to have followed the Chinese model. Buddhism, Confucianism, Shintoism, are impartially recognised. The emperor presides over official worship as high priest of his people; the liturgical ordinances are issued by imperial rescripts not differing in form from other public edicts. The dominant article of faith is the divinity of Japan and its emperor; and Shinto, the worship of the gods of nature, is understood to be patronised chiefly with the motive of preserving the national traditions. But in Japan the advance of modern science and enlightened scepticism may have diminished the importance of the religious department. Shinto, says a recent writer, still embodies the religion of the people; yet in 1877 a decree was issued declaring it to be no more than a convenient system of State ceremonial.[60] And in 1889 an article of the constitution granted freedom of belief and worship to all Japanese subjects, without prejudice to peace, order, and loyalty.

* * * * *

In India the religious situation is quite different. I think it is without parallel elsewhere in the world. Here we are at the fountain-head of metaphysical theology, of ideas that have flowed eastward and westward across Asia. And here, also, we find every species of primitive polytheism, unlimited and multitudinous; we can survey a confused medley of divinities, of rites and worships incessantly varied by popular whim and fancy, by accidents, and by the pressure of changing circumstances. Hinduism permits any doctrine to be taught, any sort of theory to be held regarding the divine attributes and manifestations, the forces of nature, or the mysterious functions of mind or body. Its tenets have never been circumscribed by a creed; its free play has never been checked or regulated by State authority.

Now, at first sight, this is not unlike the popular polytheism of the ancient world, before the triumph of Christianity. There are passages in St. Augustine's _Civitas Dei_, describing the worship of the unconverted pagans among whom he lived, that might have been written yesterday by a Christian bishop in India. And we might ask why all this polytheism was not swept out from among such a highly intellectual people as the Indians, with their restless pursuit of divine knowledge, by some superior faith, by some central idea. Undoubtedly the material and moral conditions, and the course of events which combine to stamp a particular form of religion upon any great people, are complex and manifold; but into this inquiry I cannot go. I can only point out that the institution of caste has riveted down Hindu society into innumerable divisions upon a general religious basis, and that the sacred books separated the Hindu theologians into different schools, preventing uniformity of worship or of creed. And it is to be observed that these books are not historical; they give no account of the rise and spread of a faith. The Hindu theologian would say, in the words of an early Christian father, that the objects of divine knowledge are not historical, that they can only be apprehended intellectually, that within experience there is no reality. And the fact that Brahmanism has no authentic inspired narrative, that it is the only great religion not concentrated round the life and teachings of a person, may be one reason why it has remained diffuse and incoherent. All ways of salvation are still open to the Hindus; the canon of their scripture has never been authoritatively closed. New doctrines, new sects, fresh theological controversies, are incessantly modifying and superseding the old scholastic interpretations of the mysteries, for Hindus, like Asiatics everywhere, are still in that condition of mind when a fresh spiritual message is eagerly received. Vishnu and Siva are the realistic abstractions of the understanding from objects of sense, from observation of the destructive and reproductive operations of nature; they represent among educated men separate systems of worship which, again, are parted into different schools or theories regarding the proper ways and methods of attaining to spiritual emancipation. Yet the higher philosophy and the lower polytheism are not mutually antagonistic; on the contrary, they support each other; for Brahmanism accepts and allies itself with the popular forms of idolatry, treating them as outward visible signs of an inner truth, as indications of all-pervading pantheism. The peasant and the philosopher reverence the same deity, perform the same rite; they do not mean the same thing, but they do not quarrel on this account. Nevertheless, it is certainly remarkable that this inorganic medley of ideas and worships should have resisted for so many ages the invasion and influence of the coherent faiths that have won ascendancy, complete or dominant, on either side of India, the west and the east; it has thrown off Buddhism, it has withstood the triumphant advance of Islam, it has as yet been little affected by Christianity. Probably the political history of India may account in some degree for its religious disorganisation. I may propound the theory that no religion has obtained supremacy, or at any rate definite establishment, in any great country except with the active co-operation, by force or favour, of the rulers, whether by conquest, as in Western Asia, or by patronage and protection, as in China. The direct influence and recognition of the State has been an indispensable instrument of religious consolidation. But until the nineteenth century the whole of India, from the mountains to the sea, had never been united under one stable government; the country was for ages parcelled out into separate principalities, incessantly contending for territory. And even the Moghul empire, which was always at war upon its frontiers, never acquired universal dominion. The Moghul emperors, except Aurungzeb, were by no means bigoted Mohammedans; and their obvious interest was to abstain from meddling with Hinduism. Yet the irruption of Islam into India seems rather to have stimulated religious activity among the Hindus, for during the Mohammedan period various spiritual teachers arose, new sects were formed, and theological controversies divided the intellectual classes. To these movements the Mohammedan governments must have been for a long time indifferent; and among the new sects the principle of mutual toleration was universal. Towards the close of the Moghul empire, however, Hinduism, provoked by the bigotry of the Emperor Aurungzeb, became a serious element of political disturbance. Attempts to suppress forcibly the followers of Nanak Guru, and the execution of one spiritual leader of the Sikhs, turned the Sikhs from inoffensive quietists into fanatical warriors; and by the eighteenth century they were in open revolt against the empire. They were, I think, the most formidable embodiment of militant Hinduism known to Indian history. By that time, also, the Marathas in South-West India were declaring themselves the champions of the Hindu religion against the Mohammedan oppression; and to the Sikhs and Marathas the dislocation of the Moghul empire may be very largely attributed. We have here a notable example of the dynamic power upon politics of revolts that are generated by religious fermentation, and a proof of the strength that can be exerted by a pacific inorganic polytheism in self-defence, when ambitious rebels proclaim themselves defenders of a faith. The Marathas and the Sikhs founded the only rulerships whose armies could give the English serious trouble in the field during the nineteenth century.

On the whole, however, when we survey the history of India, and compare it with that of Western Asia, we may say that although the Hindus are perhaps the most intensely religious people in the world, Hinduism has never been, like Christianity, Islam, and to some extent Buddhism, a religion established by the State. Nor has it suffered much from the State's power. It seems strange, indeed, that Mohammedanism, a compact proselytising faith, closely united with the civil rulership, should have so slightly modified, during seven centuries of dominion, this infinitely divided polytheism. Of course, Mohammedanism made many converts, and annexed a considerable number of the population--yet the effect was rather to stiffen than to loosen the bonds that held the mass of the people to their traditional divinities, and to the institution of castes. Moreover the antagonism of the two religions, the popular and the dynastic, was a perpetual element of weakness in a Mohammedan empire. In India polytheism could not be crushed, as in Western Asia, by Islam; neither could it be controlled and administered, as in Eastern Asia; yet the Moghul emperors managed to keep on good terms with it, so long as they adhered to a policy of toleration.

To the Mohammedan empire has succeeded another foreign dominion, which practises not merely tolerance but complete religious neutrality. Looking back over the period of a hundred years, from 1757 to 1857, during which the British dominion was gradually extended over India, we find that the British empire, like the Roman, met with little or no opposition from religion. Hindus and Mohammedans, divided against each other, were equally willing to form alliances with, and to fight on the side of, the foreigner who kept religion entirely outside politics. And the British Government, when established, has so carefully avoided offence to caste or creed that on one great occasion only, the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, have the smouldering fires of credulous fanaticism broken out against our rule.

I believe the British-Indian position of complete religious neutrality to be unique among Asiatic governments, and almost unknown in Europe. The Anglo-Indian sovereignty does not identify itself with the interests of a single faith, as in Mohammedan kingdoms, nor does it recognise a definite ecclesiastical jurisdiction in things spiritual, as in Catholic Europe. Still less has our Government adopted the Chinese system of placing the State at the head of different rituals for the purpose of controlling them all, and proclaiming an ethical code to be binding on all denominations. The British ruler, while avowedly Christian, ignores all religions administratively, interfering only to suppress barbarous or indecent practices when the advance of civilisation has rendered them obsolete. Public instruction, so far as the State is concerned, is entirely secular; the universal law is the only authorised guardian of morals; to expound moral duties officially, as things apart from religion, has been found possible in China, but not in India. But the Chinese Government can issue edicts enjoining public morality and rationalism because the State takes part in the authorised worship of the people, and the emperor assumes pontifical office. The British Government in India, on the other hand, disowns official connection with any religion. It places all its measures on the sole ground of reasonable expediency, of efficient administration; it seeks to promote industry and commerce, and material civilisation generally; it carefully avoids giving any religious colour whatever to its public acts; and the result is that our Government, notwithstanding its sincere professions of absolute neutrality, is sometimes suspected of regarding all religion with cynical indifference, possibly even with hostility.

Moreover, religious neutrality, though it is right, just, and the only policy which the English in India could possibly adopt, has certain political disadvantages. The two most potent influences which still unite and divide the Asiatic peoples, are race and religion; a Government which represents both these forces, as, for instance, in Afghanistan, has deep roots in a country. A dynasty that can rely on the support of an organised religion, and stands forth as the champion of a dominant faith, has a powerful political power at its command. The Turkish empire, weak, ill-governed, repeatedly threatened with dismemberment, embarrassed internally by the conflict of races, has been preserved for the last hundred years by its incorporation with the faith of Islam, by the Sultan's claim to the Caliphate. To attack it is to assault a religious citadel; it is the bulwark on the west of Mohammedan Asia, as Afghanistan is the frontier fortress of Islam on the east. A leading Turkish politician has very recently said: 'It is in Islam pure and simple that lies the strength of Turkey as an independent State; and if the Sultan's position as religious chief were encroached upon by constitutional reforms, the whole Ottoman empire would be in danger.' We have to remember that for ages religious enthusiasm has been, and still is in some parts of Asia, one of the strongest incentives to military ardour and fidelity to a standard on the battlefield. Identity of creed has often proved more effective, in war, than territorial patriotism; it has surmounted racial and tribal antipathies; while religious antagonism is still in many countries a standing impediment to political consolidation.

When, therefore, we survey the history of religions, though this sketch is necessarily very imperfect and inadequate, we find Mohammedanism still identified with the fortunes of Mohammedan rulers; and we know that for many centuries the relations of Christianity to European States have been very close. In Europe the ardent perseverance and intellectual superiority of great theologians, of ecclesiastical statesmen supported by autocratic rulers, have hardened and beat out into form doctrines and liturgies that it was at one time criminal to disregard or deny, dogmatic articles of faith that were enforced by law. By these processes orthodoxy emerged compact, sharply defined, irresistible, out of the strife and confusion of heresies; the early record of the churches has pages spotted with tears and stained with blood. But at the present time European States seem inclined to dissolve their alliance with the churches, and to arrange a kind of judicial separation between the altar and the throne, though in very few cases has a divorce been made absolute. No State, in civilised countries, now assists in the propagation of doctrine; and ecclesiastical influence is of very little service to a Government. The civil law, indeed, makes continual encroachments on the ecclesiastical domain, questions its authority, and usurps its jurisdiction. Modern erudition criticises the historical authenticity of the scriptures, philosophy tries to undermine the foundations of belief; the governments find small interest in propping up edifices that are shaken by internal controversies. In Mohammedan Asia, on the other hand, the connection between the orthodox faith and the States is firmly maintained, for the solidarity is so close that disruptions would be dangerous, and a Mohammedan rulership over a majority of unbelievers would still be perilously unstable.

I have thus endeavoured to show that the historical relations of Buddhism and Hinduism to the State have been in the past, and are still in the present time, very different from the situation in the West. There has always existed, I submit, one essential distinction of principle. Religious propagation, forcible conversion, aided and abetted by the executive power of the State, and by laws against heresy or dissent, have been defended in the West by the doctors of Islam, and formerly by Christian theologians, by the axiom that all means are justifiable for extirpating false teachers who draw souls to perdition. The right and duty of the civil magistrate to maintain truth, in regard to which Bossuet declared all Christians to be unanimous, and which is still affirmed in the Litany of our Church, is a principle from which no Government, three centuries ago, dissented in theory, though in practice it needed cautious handling. I do not think that this principle ever found its way into Hinduism or Buddhism; I doubt, that is to say, whether the civil government was at any time called in to undertake or assist propagation of those religions as part of its duty. Nor do I know that the States of Eastern Asia, beyond the pale of Islam, claim or exercise the right of insisting on conformance to particular doctrines, because they are true. The erratic manifestations of the religious spirit throughout Asia, constantly breaking out in various forms and figures, in thaumaturgy, mystical inspiration, in orgies and secret societies, have always disquieted these Asiatic States, yet, so far as I can ascertain, the employment of force to repress them has always been justified on administrative or political grounds, as distinguishable from theological motives pure and simple. Sceptics and agnostics have been often marked out for persecution in the West, but I do not think that they have been molested in India, China, or Japan, where they abound, because they seldom meddle with politics.[61] It may perhaps be admitted, however, that a Government which undertakes to regulate impartially all rites and worship among its subjects is at a disadvantage by comparison with a Government that acts as the representative of a great church or an exclusive faith. It bears the sole undivided responsibility for measures of repression; it cannot allege divine command or even the obligation of punishing impiety for the public good.

To conclude. In Asiatic States the superintendence of religious affairs is an integral attribute of the sovereignty, which no Government, except the English in India, has yet ventured to relinquish; and even in India this is not done without some risk, for religion and politics are still intermingled throughout the world; they act and react upon each other everywhere. They are still far from being disentangled in our own country, where the theory that a Government in its collective character must profess and even propagate some religion has not been very long obsolete. It was maintained seventy years ago by a great statesman who was already rising into prominence, by Mr. Gladstone. The text of Mr. Gladstone's argument, in his book on the relations of the State with the Church, was Hooker's saying, that the religious duty of kings is the weightiest part of their sovereignty; while Macaulay, in criticising this position, insisted that the main, if not the only, duty of a Government, to which all other objects must be subordinate, was the protection of persons and property. These two eminent politicians were, in fact, the champions of the ancient and the modern ideas of sovereignty; for the theory that a State is bound to propagate the religion that it professes was for many centuries the accepted theory of all Christian rulerships, though I think it now survives only in Mohammedan kingdoms.

As the influence of religion in the sphere of politics declines, the State becomes naturally less concerned with the superintendence of religion; and the tendency of constitutional Governments seems to be towards abandoning it. The States that have completely dissolved connection with ecclesiastical institutions are the two great republics, the United States of America and France. We can discern at this moment a movement towards constitutional reforms in Mohammedan Asia, in Turkey, and Persia, and if they succeed it will be most interesting to observe the effect which liberal reforms will produce upon the relation of Mohammedan Governments with the dominant faith, and on which side the religious teachers will be arrayed. It is certain, at any rate, that for a long time to come religion will continue to be a potent factor in Asiatic politics; and I may add that the reconciliation of civil with religious liberty is one of the most arduous of the many problems to be solved by the promoters of national unity.

FOOTNOTES:

[58] Delivered as President of the Congress for the History of Religions, September 1908.--_Fortnightly Review_, November 1908.

[59] 'Cujus regio ejus religio.'

[60] _The Development of Religion in Japan_, G. W. Knox, 1907.

[61] 'Atheism did never disturb States' (Bacon).

INDEX

Acton, Lord:
On causes of Franco-German War, 346.
Quoted, 362 (footnote), 386, 396, 398.
Advice to writers of history, 384, 394.
Also 370, 374, 375, 387.

Addison's _Blenheim_ criticised in _Esmond_, 101.

Adventure, see Novels of.

Adventures of Moreau de Jonnes, 16.
Popularity of, in short stories, 31.

Afghan:
Blood feuds, border forays, etc., 163, 164.
War, 163, 318.
Songs, 168.
Frontier and frontier policy, 319, 324.
Character, 320.

Afghanistan:
Barrier to Russian advance in Asia, 316.
British policy towards, compared with Russian policy in Caucasus, 317.
Is acquiring a territorial connotation, 416.
Eastern bulwark of Islam, 417, 449.

Akhlongo, siege of, 305.

Althorp, Lord, 64.

Armenians, their position and misfortunes, 414.

Arnold, Matthew:
Lord Morley's article on his letters, 50.
His letters reviewed, 57.
Quoted, 58, 59, 60, 61,177, 257.
Praised and criticised by Swinburne, 282, 287.
Also 126, 183, 207, 266, 281.

Asia and foreign dynasties, 417.

Asoka, 436.

Austen, Jane, as novelist of manners, 21, 24.

Austria-Hungary, intermixture of races and religions in, 403.

Balfour, Arthur James, _Foundations of Belief_, 250.

Balkans, policy of the Turks in the, 407.

Balzac, 94.

Bariatinsky, 314.

Beauchamp and the Utilitarian rejection of theology, 255.

Behn, Mrs. Aphra, 2.

Benedetti, 332, etc.

Bentham, see 'Utilitarians.'

Beowulf, 168.

Bismarck, see 'L'Empire Liberal,' _passim_.

Blavatsky, Madame, 134.

Blood feuds in Afghanistan, 321.
On the Scotch borders, 323.

Bonaparte, 92, 187.

Bossuet, 451.

Braddock, General, 104.

Braddon, Miss, 26.

Bret Harte, 32.

Bright, John: 'Force no remedy,' 260.

Broad Church, 62, 257.

Bronte, Charlotte, 25.

Broughton, Miss, 26.

Brown: definition of 'Intuition,' 238.

Browning, Robert, 69, 266, 267.
Swinburne's homage to, 282.

Buckle, 253, 261.

Buddhism, 400, 423, and see 'The State in Relation to Religion.'

Bulwer-Lytton, Sir E., 99, 116.

_Burial of Sir John Moore_, 173.

Burke's letters, 37.

Burney, Miss, 21.

Butler's _Analogy_, 236.

=Byron, Works of Lord=, 177-209.
Additions to his published letters, 178.
Their bearing on his reputation, 179.
Causes affecting his popularity, 183.
Comparison with Chateaubriand, 186, 194.
His success in oriental romance, 187;
and in heroic verse, 190.
Defects, tendency to declamation, etc., 191.
Carelessness, contrast between his theory and practice, 193.
Comparison with Scott, _The Giaour_, 195.
Metre of his romantic poems, 197.
His dramas, failure in blank verse, 198.
His lyrical power, examples, 200.
_Beppo_ and _Don Juan_, 203.
Founder of modern realism in poetry, 204.
_Vision of Judgment_, 206.
Conclusions: value of his influence, 207.

Byron, Lord, as realist, 6.
Also 13 and 97, and see under 'Letter-writing.'

Campbell, Thomas:
Carlyle's description, 64.
As heroic poet, 173.

Carlyle, Thomas, see 'Letter-writing.'
Denounces Utilitarianism, 256.
Swinburne's tribute, 283.
His descriptive method, 383.
See also 9, 58, 116, 215.

Castlereagh, Lord, 180, 183.

Caucasus, see 'Frontiers,' 291, etc.

Cavagnari, in Afghan ballads, 163.

Cervantes, 108.

Chanson de Roland, 161.

Charles Edward, Prince, authentic incident in _Esmond_, 104.

Chateaubriand, 97, 115, 185-187, 194.

Chaucer, 1.

_Chevy Chase_, 170.

Chillianwalla in fiction, 128.

China, religious systems, 423.
Religious polity, 438.

Christian missions in India, 326.

Christianity and Islam, as militant religions, 400, 408, 421.
Compared with Buddhism, etc., 427.
Form alliances with the State, 434, 441.

Church and State:
Lord Acton on, 398.
Separation a modern idea, 421.
Importance to the Church of recognition, 445.
Diminishing closeness of the connection, 450.
Gladstone and Macaulay on, 452.

Clough, 266.

Coleridge, S. T., see 'Letter-writing.'
Connection of speculative ideas and political movements,
211, 229, 237, 372.
Quoted, 33, 181, 393.
Also mentioned, 37, 185, 265, 287.

Colvin, Sidney, quoted, 40, 71.

Comte and J. S. Mill, 255.

Cooper, Fenimore, 32.

Cowper, as letter-writer, 37, 66.
Quoted, 62.

Crabbe, 193.
Quoted, 69.

Crimean War, 311, 313.

_Cujus regio ejus religio_, 436.

Dante, 39.

Dargo, in the Caucasus, attack on, 307-308.

Darmesteter, Afghan ballads, 163, 168.

Davidson on rhyme in poetry, 279, 280.

Defoe, 3, 99.

De la Gorce:
On Napoleon III., 330.
On the French ministry, 339, 347.

De Musset, Alfred, 111.

De Stael, Madame, 180.

De Tocqueville, 331, 402.

De Voguee, 252.

Dickens, Charles, 23, 30, 68, 98.

Direct narration in fiction, 18.

Disraeli, Benjamin, as novelist, 18.

Drama, rival of the novel, 2.

Du Barail, General:
On Napoleon III., 330.
On Ollivier, 331.

Due de Gramont, 331, etc.

Duvernois' interpellation in French Chamber, 342, 347.

Edgeworth, Miss, 21.

Eliot, George:
_Romola_, 23.
_Adam Bede_, 25.

Empire, defined, 406.

Ems, Benedetti and King of Prussia at, 343-350, 356.

Encyclopedistes, ancestors of the Utilitarians, 252, 402.

European dominion in Asia, importance of, 403.

Farrar, Archdeacon, quoted, 12.

Ferozeshah, 130.

Ferrero on Julius Caesar, 391.

Fiction and fact in the novel and in history, 10, 385.

Fiction, doubt as to its value as evidence of manners, 111.
See also 91 and 110.

Fielding, Henry, 3, 26, 95, 111.
_Tom Jones_, 19.
Influence on Thackeray, 99.

Fitzgerald, Edward, see 'Letter-writing,' 66-70.

Franco-German War, see 'L'Empire Liberal.'

French Revolution, 212, 218.

=Frontiers, Ancient and Modern=, 291-327.
Demarcation of frontiers a modern development, 291.
Interest of the subject to England, 293.
Mr. Baddeley's work on the Caucasus, 294.
Description of the Caucasus, 295.
The Russian advance, 296.
Yermoloff and his policy, 298.
Its failure for the time, and his recall, 301.
Rise of Muridism, 302.
Shamil succeeds Kazi Mullah, 303.
Capture of Akhlongo, 306.
Repulse of Vorontzoff at Dargo; 307.
and at Ghergebil, 310.
Shamil ransoms his son, 312.
Surrenders at Gooneeb (1857), 313.
Effect on Asiatic politics, 315.
Russian policy compared with British in Afghanistan, 316.
Dr. Pennell on the Afghans, 319.
Ghazis, blood feuds, 321.
Dr. Pennell on missions, 326.

Frontiers, not strictly demarcated in the East, 413.

Froude, J. A., quoted, 74.
His methods as a historian, 382.

Gambetta votes for war with Prussia, 359.

Garibaldi, 273.

Gaskell, Mrs., 26.

_Gesta Romanorum_, 2.

_Gil Blas_, 19, 204.

Gladstone, W. E., 229.

Godwin, William:
As recipient of good letters, 46.
His tragedy, _Antonio_, 46.
Carlyle's description, 64.
A peaceful anarchist, 234.

Goethe, 78, 182.

Gordon, Lindsay, 32.

_Grand Cyrus_, 96.

Gray, Thomas, 37, 50.

Greek Church, 433.
Comparison with Rome, 409.

Hemans, Mrs., 265.

Herodotus, 160, 379.

=Heroic Poetry=, 155-176.
Definition, 155.
Professor Ker's _Epic and Romance_, 156.
Early bards and chroniclers, 157.
Their work based on fact, 158, 164.
The hero and the heroic poet, 159.
Icelandic Sagas, and Afghan songs, 163.
Homer, 165.
Position of women in Homeric poetry, 166.
The heroic style in the Old Testament, 167.
Romantic poetry of England, _Morte d Arthur_ and ballads, 169.
Sir Walter Scott, 171.
Limitations of heroic poetry, 172.
Its decline, unfavourable influences of both the romantic and the
realistic spirit, 174.

Hindu, meaning of, 419.

Hinduism, not a missionary religion, 400.
Never established by the State, 447.

Historical romance brought to perfection in nineteenth century, 96.

=History, Remarks on the Reading of=, 377-398.
Almost all real history written in some European language, 377.
History, formerly an art, becoming a science, 379.
Macaulay, Froude, and Carlyle as historical artists, 382.
The scientific method, possible drawbacks, 384.
Limitation and subdivision necessary, 386.
Short abstracts, their use and abuse, 388.
Motives for studying history, 390.
Our knowledge imperfect, and our predictions fallible, 392.
Lord Acton's advice and principles, 394.

Hobbes, Thomas, 243, 273.
Followed by Bentham, 221.
Quoted, 319, 413, 441.

Hogarth, William, 99.

Hookham Frere, 204.

Hugo, Victor, 187, 300.
Swinburne's admiration, 265, 282, 287.

Hume, 215, 216.
Influence on Bentham, 222;
on Mill, 244, 254.
Quoted, 224.

Humphry Ward, Mrs., example of her descriptive method, 27.

Hutcheson, 217.

Iliad, 174.

Impressionist school in fiction, 33.

Inchbald, Mrs., quoted, 46.

India, Mill's history of, 225.

Importance of frontier questions, 293.

Indian Empire:
Resemblance to Roman, 420.
Comparison with Russian, 424.
See also 'Race and Religion,' and 'The State in Relation to Religion.'

Irish characters, Thackeray's partiality for, 109.

Islam:
Its militant policy, 400, 413.
Spread of, 432.
In India, 446.
Importance to Turkey of Sultan's position in, 449.

James, G. P. R., 32.

Jeffrey, Thomas, 186, 199.

Jehu's story, 382.

_John Inglesant_, 18, 106.

Johnson, Samuel, 120.

Jones, Paul, 113.

Jowett, Benjamin, quoted, 55, 57.

Kaffir, origin of the name, 415.

Keats, John, 185, 199.
See also 'Letter-writing.'

Kemble, Fanny, FitzGerald's letters to, 68.

Ker's _Epic and Romance_, 156, 164, 168.

_Kidnapped_, direct narration in, 18.

Kingsley, Charles, 8.
Quoted, 278.

Kipling, Rudyard, 32, 149, 174.

Klugenau, Russian General, 305.

Lamartine, 187.

Lamb, Charles, 47.
Quoted, 48, 56.

Lansdowne, Lord, 228.

Laotze, 438.

Le Boeuf, Marshal, 334, 347, 351, 358.

Lecky, W. E. H., on American Loyalists, 105.
Comparison with Walpole, 376.

=L'Empire Liberal=, 328-367.
Constitutional reforms and character of Napoleon III., 330.
Ollivier's difficult position as chief minister, 331.
Crown of Spain accepted by Leopold, 332.
Effect in France, warning to Prussia, 333-336.
Benedetti's interview at Ems, 337.
Leopold's compulsory renunciation, 338.
Incautious action of Ollivier, 339;
and of Gramont, 341.
Assurances demanded from Prussia, 344.
Ollivier meditates resignation, 345.
Benedetti at Ems, 348.
'Le Soufflet de Bismarck,' 350.
Declaration of war, 352.
Thiers' opposition, Ollivier's defence, 353, 354.
French enthusiasm, 358.
Reception of declaration by Bismarck; 360;
and by the Reichstag, 361.
Bismarck's real responsibility, 362.
Ollivier's acts and motives examined, 365.

=Letter-writing (English) in the Nineteenth Century=, 34-75.
Conditions of fine letter-writing, 34.
Affinities with the diary and the essay, 36.
Poets as good letter-writers, 37.
Value of letters for biographical and other purposes, 38.
Earlier writers--Keats, Scott, Southey, Byron, Coleridge, Wordsworth,
Shelley, Lamb, 39-47.
Lord Morley's canon, 50.
Later writers and their difficulties, 52.
Dean Stanley's letters, 53.
Matthew Arnold's, 57.
Thomas Carlyle's, 63.
Edward Fitzgerald's, 66.
R. L. Stevenson's, 70.

Lever, Charles, 8, 92.

Liverpool, Lord, 66, 229, 230.

Lucretius, 271.

Macaulay, T. B., 61, 206.
On Byron, 184, 191.
His rejoinder to James Mill, 227.
Influence on Walpole, 371.
Ranke's criticism, 383.

Machiavelli:
On judging by results, 329.
On standing neutral in war, 331.

Mackintosh, as typical Whig, 228.

Maine, Sir H., on 'Sovereignty,' 412.

Malthus, T., 234, 236.

Manning, Cardinal, 53, 74.

Marbot, success of his Memoirs, 13, 16.

_Marcella_, quoted, 27.

Marlborough, Thackeray's description of, 103.

Marryat, Captain, 8.

_Master of Ballantrae_, direct narration in, 18.

Maurice, 256.

Mayor's _English Metres_, 286.

Mazzini, 273.
Quoted, 184.

Memoirs and fiction, 13.

_Memorials of Coleorton_, 42.

Meredith, George, 264.

Mill, see 'Utilitarians.'

Milton, 200, 287.
Quoted, 183.

Mongolians have not produced spiritual teachers, 442.

Moore, Thomas, 42, 179, 193.
His sham Orientalism, 6, 123, 188.
His dealings with Byron's letters, 177.

_Morte d'Arthur_, 169.

Mullahs, 320.

Muridism, see 'Frontiers,' 320.

Murray, John, 178.
Quoted, 188.

Murray, Professor, and solar myths, 161.

Myths, historical value of, 11.

Napoleon:
His story adapted to myth-making, 14.
Transformer of democracy into Imperialism, 252, 402.

_Napoleon Intime_, 15.

Napoleon III; and see 'L'Empire Liberal.'

Nationalities, formation of, in Europe, 401.

Naturalism or realism defined, 25.

Newman, Cardinal, 257, 258.
Swinburne's tribute to, 283.

=Novels of Adventure and Manners=, 1-33.
Mr. Raleigh on origins of fiction, 1.
Metrical tales, heroic romance, the eighteenth-century school of
novelists, 2, 3.
Novel of adventure derived from the fabulous romance, 4.
Scott's influence, 5.
Later tendencies, 6.
Approximation of the historian and novelist, 10.
The novelist rivalled by the writer of Memoirs, 13.
Adventures of de Jonnes reviewed, 16.
Causes limiting the sphere of the Novel of Adventure, 18.
Novel of Manners, its pedigree: Fielding, 19.
Influence of women writers: Miss Austen, etc., 21.
Growth of Realism, 25.
Description of nature, its uses, 26.
Danger of excessive Realism, 29.
Short stories: the Impressionist School, 32.

=Novelist, The Anglo-Indian=, 121-154.
Causes affecting output of good fiction in India, 121.
_Tara_, a successful historical novel, 123.
_Pandurang Hari_, valuable as picture of pre-English times, 125.
_Oakfield_, good battle pictures, absence of native characters
noted, 126.
_The Wetherbys_, 131.
_A True Reformer_, and _The Dilemma_, 132.
_Mr. Isaacs_, 134.
_Helen Treveryan_, assigned a high place as a historical novel, 136.
_On the Face of the Waters_, Indian characters freely introduced,
minute adherence to fact, 139.
_Bijli the Dancer_, a purely native story, 143.
_Chronicles of Dustypore_, a picture of Anglo-Indian life, 145.
_The Bond of Blood_, a dramatic presentation of incidents of Indian
life, 146.
_The Naulakha_, 149.
_Transgression_, 151.
Conclusions: uniformity of Anglo-Indian society, 152.
Conditions favour the novel of action, 153.
Absence of the psychological vein, 154.

O'Connell, Daniel, described by Carlyle, 64.

_Odyssey_ quoted, 167.

Old Testament and heroic narration, 167.

Oliphant, Mrs., 26.

Ollivier, see 'L'Empire Liberal.'

Olozaga, 337.

Ottoman Empire, its complexities of Race and Religion, 406.

Ouida, 25.

Paley, 222.

Parr, Dr., 199.

Patmore, Coventry, 268.

Pearson, Hugh, 55, 57.

Peel, Sir Robert, quoted, 232.

Peninsular War and heroic poetry, 173.

Peter the Great's Caspian expedition, 296.

Phingari, 196.

Polytheism, formerly universal, 428;
gives way to Christianity, 431.

Pope, 37.
Byron's praise, 193.

Porter, Jane, and historical romance, 23.

Rabelais, 321.

=Race and Religion=, 399-426.
Ancient groupings of peoples, 399.
Effect of (1) the Roman Empire, (2) Christianity and Islam, 400.
Consolidation of States in the West, 401.
Importance of 'Race' overlooked by Utilitarians, 402.
Gravity of the question in Austria, 403.
Its complexity in Turkey, 406.
Maintenance of racial and religious differences by Asiatic Empires, 407.
Close alliance of Greek Church with the State, 410.
Classification of the people by religion in Ottoman Empire, 411.
Importance of 'Race and Religion' in Asia, 412.
Religious distinctions predominant in Western Asia, 413.
Causes of the Armenian massacres, 414.
Racial distinctions predominant in Afghanistan, 417.
India, connotation of 'Hindu,' 418.
Complexities of race and creed, 420.
Policy of religious neutrality, 421.
Peculiarity of religious situation in China, 422.
Russian Empire, conclusions, 424.

Race distinctions, increasing influence of, 252.

Radcliffe, Mrs., the novelist, 5.

Raleigh, Sir Walter, on _The English Novel_, 1.

Ramsay, Sir William, on writing of history, 386.

Rawlinson on the effect of troubles in the Caucasus on Russian policy, 315.

Realism defined, 25.
Its dangers, 28, 30, 31, (cf. 12, 140).

Reform Bill, 232.

=Religions, The State in its Relation to Eastern and Western=, 427-453.
Eastern religions, Buddhism and Hinduism; Western, Christianity and
Islam, 427.
Growth of State domination under Roman Empire, 429.
Domination of the Church when Christianity established, 431.
Conflict with Islam, its effects, 432.
Close alliance of both faiths with the State, 434.
Absence of religious wars and of persecution in ancient India, 434.
The situation in China, 437;
and in Japan, 443.
India, political independence of Hinduism, 443.
Toleration by Mohammedan rulers, 446.
Hinduism never an established religion, 447.
British policy of neutrality, 447.
Some political disadvantages, 449.
Conclusions: difference in relations of Eastern and Western religions
to the State, 451.

Renan, 379.

Ricardo, 234.

Richardson, the novelist, 3.

Ritchie, Lady Richmond, 76.
Quoted, 79.

_Robert Elsmere_, its popularity, 30.

Roberts, Lord, 136, 142, 163, 319.

Rodney, Admiral, 115.

Roman Catholic Church, its polity compared with the Greek, 410.
Inheritor of Imperial tradition, 432.

Roman Empire, its frontier policy, 292; also 400, 420, 430, 441.

_Roman Naturaliste_, by Brunetiere, 25.

Rousseau, J. J., 212.

Sagas, 163, 168.

Sainte-Beuve, 194.

Say, Leon, 16.

Scotch common sense philosophy, 215.

Scotsman, the, in fiction, 109.

Scott, Michael, 8.

Scott, Sir Walter:
Head of modern romantic school of fiction, 5.
Abandoned poetry for prose, 6.
Transferred dialogue from the drama to the novel, 108.
His historical insight, 115.
His descriptions of fighting, 103, 172, 190, 385.
Quoted, 200.

Shakespeare, 39, 108, 198, 287, 380, 385.
Quoted, 171, 275.

Shamil, see 'Frontiers,' 303, etc.

Shelley, 179, 185, 287.
His letters, 44.
Quoted, 207, 290.
Comparison with Swinburne, 264.
Swinburne's admiration, 288.

Shintoism, 443.

Shorthouse, J. H., 9.

Smollett, 111.

South African War, 176.

Southey, Robert, 41, 43, 62, 73, 206.
Carlyle's description, 64.
Type of Conservatism, 229.

Sovereignty, Territorial, a modern idea, 412.

Spenserian stanza, Byron's admiration for, 197.

Stanley, Dean, see 'Letter-writing.'

Stendhal, 87, 141.

Sterne, Laurence, 89.

Stevenson, R. L., see 'Letter-writing,' also 9, 116.

Surtees and the Sporting Novel, 26.

Swift, 89, 99.
Thackeray's description, 103.

Swinburne, A. C., 69.
On Byron, 183, 191, 207.

=Swinburne, Characteristics of his Poetry=, 263-290.
Swinburne's predecessors and contemporaries, 263.
Earlier poems, _Atalanta in Calydon_, _Chastelard_, 267.
_Poems and Ballads_, published and withdrawn, 268;
reissued with reply to critics, 272.
_Songs and Ballads_, war upon theology, 273.
_Songs of the Four Seasons_, 275.
_A Midsummer Holiday_, 276.
Love of the sea and of his country, 277.
His power of musical phrasing, 279.
His attitude to eminent contemporaries, 282.
His dramas, 285.
Concluding remarks: his high aspirations and his defects, 288.

Taeping rebellion, 423.

Taoism, 423, 438, 440.

Tchetchnia, in the Caucasus, 295, etc.

Tennyson, 38, 69, 174, 184, 194, 199, 266, 268, 286, 289, 374.
Quoted, 205, 209, 287, 288.
Absence of rhyme in 'Tears, idle tears,' 281.
Swinburne's tribute, 282.

Thackeray, W. M., 23, 26, 141.

=Thackeray, William Makepeace=, 76-120.
Lady Ritchie's biographical contributions, 76.
Brief sketch of his life, 78.
Early works, _Yellowplush Papers_, etc., 79.
His rare qualities first shown in _Barry Lyndon_, 83.
His defence of taking a rogue for hero, 86.
_Vanity Fair_, his irony and pathos, 89.
His merciless war on snobbery, 90.
His pictures from military life, 91.
_Pendennis_, a novel of manners, 93.
Tendency to moralise, 95, 106, 110.
_Esmond_, 96.
Thackeray as historical novelist contrasted with Scott, 97, 103.
_The Virginians_, 104.
_The Newcomes_, a return to the novel of society, 109.
Tendency to caricature, 111.
_Denis Duval_, 112.
Classification of his works as historical novels and novels of
manners, 115.
His character, religion and influence, 117.

Thiers, opposed to war of 1870, 353, etc.

Thorburn's _Bannu_, 163.

Tolstoi, 8, 101, 154.

Tractarians, 257.
Walpole's account of, 372.

Trollope, Anthony, 24.

Turgot, 214.

=Utilitarians, The English=, 210-262.
Objects of Mr. Stephen's history, 210.
A system with a practical aim, 211.
Its influence on government, 213.
Philosophy of Reid and Stewart, 215.
Bentham's doctrines, 216.
Brief account of his life, 218.
Mr. Stephen's criticisms, 221.
Bentham's neglect of history, 223.
James Mill, 225.
Attitude to the Church, 226.
His 'Essay on Government,' Macaulay's attack, 227.
Position of Southey and Coleridge, 229.
English and Greek theories of the State, 231.
Criticism of Malthus and Ricardo, 234;
and of James Mill, 238.
John Stuart Mill, his life and training, 241.
His doctrines and policy, 243.
His _Political Economy_, 246.
His later writings criticised, 248.
_The Subjection of Women_, 251.
Mill's theology, 253.
Opposition to Utilitarianism, 256.
Mr. Stephen's position, 259.

Voltaire, 206, 274.

Vorontzoff, Russian General, 307, 310.

Walpole, Horace, 3, 37, 50.

=Walpole, Sir Spencer=, 368-376.
His literary bent as an historian, 369.
His method described by himself, 371.
His treatment of ecclesiastical controversies, 372.
Comparison with Lecky, 375.

Waterloo in Scott and Byron's verse, 172, 190.

'Waverley' Novel, 28, 97. See 'Scott.'

Wellington, Duke of, 92, 165.

Werther, Prussian minister at Paris, 348.

Whately, _Historic Doubts_, 14.

Wolfe, General, 104.

Wordsworth, William:
His letters, 37, 43.
Described by Carlyle, 64.
Criticised by Byron, 188.
Also 49, 177, 181, 199, 277.

Yermoloff, General, 298.

Zola, 15, 33.

Zoroaster, 400, 413.

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