Chapter XXXI: German Appreciation of British Tanks

The tardy development of both tanks and anti-tank defences has been referred to; from this it is evident that the Germans did not take kindly to the tank idea. In the tank they apparently only saw a cumbersome machine, a land Merrimac; they were unable to read the writing in iron or to understand the message that this machine brought with it on to every battlefield, namely, “the doom to all muscular warfare.” Why they took so little interest in tanks may have been due to the feeling that time lacked for their development; it may have been due to the extremely low opinion held by the German Higher Command of our generalship, which prejudiced them against a purely British idea. These, however, are trivial reasons, and there must have been a deeper and broader foundation to their prejudice. The two following extracts from documents issued by the German General Staff appear to supply the real reason:

(i) From an account of the German offensive of 1918:

“The use of 300 British tanks at Cambrai (1917) was a battle of
matériel.... The German Higher Command decided, from the very
outset, not to fight a battle of matériel.”

(ii) From an order issued by the German G.H.Q., similar to many others issued during the war:

“The Higher Command is continually hearing that men who are
classified as ‘fit for garrison duty’ are of the opinion that there
is no need for them to fight and that officers hesitate to demand
that they should do so. This totally erroneous assumption must be
definitely and rigorously stamped out. Men in the field who are
classified as fit for garrison or labour duties, but who can carry
a rifle, must fight.”

Such was the German tactical policy: masses of men rather than efficiency of weapons, quantity of flesh rather than quality of steel.

The policy of drafting into first-line formations men who could only just carry a rifle began in 1915. Since this date it was the constant complaint of the German regimental officer that he was obliged “to carry” in his unit an ever-increasing number of useless men--men who, for physical or moral reasons, were unfit to fight, who never intended to fight, and who never did fight.

The best men went to the machine-gun units and to the assault troops. In many cases the remainder of the infantry were of little fighting value, though many of these men might otherwise have been usefully employed in a war, which if not one of matériel, was at least one in which economic factors such as man-power played an important part.

By abiding by this policy of “cannon-fodder” the German Higher Command was able to look at an order of battle totalling some 250 divisions--on paper a terrific muscular force. Being pledged to a policy of employing masses of men for fighting, the Germans were not in a position to find labour for the construction of additional weapons such as tanks. It now seems clear that this policy, at least as far as tanks were concerned, was regretted before the end of the war, as the following extracts and quotations will show:

In July 1918 General Ludendorff wrote: “In all the open-warfare questions in the course of their great defensive between the Marne and the Vesle, the French were only able to obtain one initial tactical success due to surprise, namely, that of July 18, 1918. It is to the tanks that the enemy owes his success.” A similar remark was made in an order of the LIst Corps on July 23, 1918: “As soon as the tanks are destroyed the whole attack fails.”

The tank victory at the battle of Amiens brought forth a rich crop of appreciative comments from the Germans. Ludendorff on August 11 wrote:

“Staff officers sent from G.H.Q. report that the reasons for the
defeat of the Second Army are as follows: ‘The fact that the troops
were surprised by the massed attack of tanks, and lost their
heads when the tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken
through under cover of natural and artificial fog ... the fact that
the artillery allotted to reserve infantry units ... was wholly
insufficient to establish fresh resistance ... against the enemy
who had broken through and against his tanks.’”

A 21st Infantry Divisional Order dated August 15 contained the following:

“Recent fighting has shown that our infantry is capable of
repelling an unsupported hostile infantry attack and is not
dependent on our protective barrage.

“On the other hand, a massed tank attack, as put in by the enemy
during the recent fighting, requires stronger artillery defensive
measures.

“The duty of the infantry is to keep the enemy advancing under
cover of the tanks (whether infantry, cavalry, or aeroplanes) away
from our artillery in order to give the latter freedom of action in
its main rôle, viz.: the engagement of tanks.”

This clear statement that the main duty of the artillery has become the engagement of tanks is noteworthy, especially when compared with previous orders which stated that the allotment of artillery to tank defences must not interfere with defensive barrages and counter-battery work.

This document continues:

“Counter-attacks against hostile infantry supported by tanks do not
offer any chances of success and demand unnecessary sacrifices;
they must, therefore, only be launched if the tanks have been put
out of action.”

Thus two of the mainstays of the former German defence, _i.e._ “the protective barrage” and “the immediate counter-attack,” were abandoned in the event of tank attacks.

Yet one more order is interesting, that issued on August 12 to the Crown Prince’s Group of Armies:

“G.H.Q. reports that during the recent fighting on the fronts of
the Second and Eighteenth Armies, large numbers of tanks broke
through on narrow fronts, and pushing straight forward, rapidly
attacked battery positions and the Headquarters of Divisions.

“In many cases no defence could be made in time against the tanks,
which attacked them from all sides.

“Anti-tank defence must now be developed to deal with such
situations.”

“Messages concerning tanks will have priority over all other messages or calls whatsoever” is the last extract we will here quote, this order being sent out on September 8, 1918. These few words alone are sufficient to show that the enemy at last had awakened to the danger of the tank and was now making frenzied efforts to organise, at all costs, an efficient anti-tank defence.

It was now no longer the pluck of our Royal Air Force, the courage of our infantry, or the masses of our shells, it was the tank which threatened the German with destruction and against which he now concentrated all his energy. These efforts were, however, so belated that even the schemes and orders issued were contradictory and lacking in co-ordination; the actual practice was, needless to say, still more diverse.

From August 1918 onwards the success of almost every Allied attack was attributed to tanks in the German official communiqués. The Allies were stated to have captured such-and-such a place “by means of masses of tanks” even on occasions when very few tanks had actually been used. This explanation of any German lack of success by reference to tanks soon produced very marked results both in the German soldier and the German public.

Since the German Higher Command could explain away failure in the event of tank attack the German regimental officer very naturally came to consider that the presence of tanks was a sufficient reason for the loss of any position entrusted to his care. His men came to consider that in the presence of tanks they could not be expected to hold out. Most German officers when captured were anxious to explain that their capture was inevitable and that they had done all that could be expected of them. From this time onwards their explanations generally became very simple: “The tanks had arrived, there was nothing to be done.” The failure of the Higher Command to produce tanks to combat those used by the Allies began to undermine the faith of the troops in their generals.

As a result of the “massed tank attacks,” so frequently referred to in the communiques, the leading German military correspondents dealt with the tank question at considerable length. They pointed out the vital importance of tanks and inquired what the German Higher Command proposed to do about it, or reassured their readers that the situation was well in hand and that a German tank would shortly make its appearance in adequate numbers. So nervous did the press grow that the War Ministry found it necessary to offer an explanation.

General von Wrisberg, speaking for the Minister of War in the Reichstag, made the following statement:

“The attack on August 8 between the Avre and the Ancre was not
unexpected by our leaders. When, nevertheless, the English
succeeded in achieving a great success the reasons are to be sought
in the massed employment of tanks and surprise under the protection
of fog....

“The American Armies also should not terrify us. We shall also
settle with them. More momentous for us was the question of tanks.
We are adequately armed against them. Anti-tank defence is nowadays
more a question of nerve than matériel.”

On October 23 the German Wireless published the following statement by General Scheuch, Minister of War:

“Germany will never need to make peace owing to a shortage of war
matériel. The superiority of the enemy at present is principally
due to their use of tanks. We have been actively engaged for a long
period in working at producing this weapon (which is recognised as
important) in adequate numbers. We shall thus have an additional
means for the successful continuance of the war, if we are
compelled to continue it.”

This statement was obviously made in reply to public criticism, but the statement that efforts were being made to produce a large number of tanks appears to be true.

It is doubtful, however, if it were true to say that they had been actively working on tanks for a long time. It is credibly reported that when Hindenburg visited the German Tank Centre near Charleroi in February 1918, he remarked, “I do not think that tanks are any use, but as these have been made they may as well be tried.” This remark of the German Commander-in-Chief was typical of the general feeling of the German Great General Staff towards tanks up to August 8, 1918. In our own Army it also expressed precisely the feeling of a section of our Higher Command. It is hoped that, as this chapter shows the Germans were eventually, though too late, cured of their want of foresight, we have also been. As to this the future alone will enlighten us.