Chapter III

On his return from Horseshoe Bend, Jackson was acclaimed throughout Middle Tennessee for his victory, and was given spectacular public receptions in Gallatin and Nashville. But his stay in Tennessee was brief and he moved south again, this time to Mobile, where he established headquarters in late August, 1814.[4] Jackson’s use of Mobile as his base of operations was fortunate, for two weeks later British vessels appeared at the entrance to Mobile Bay and made a concerted attack on Fort Bowyer (now Fort Morgan). However, the tiny garrison of 130 men stood fast and when one of the British frigates ran aground, exploded, and burned, the fleet withdrew to an unknown area. Jackson speculated over Britain’s future intentions.

The thrust against Mobile convinced Jackson that an invasion of major proportions somewhere along the coast was imminent. A likely site, he thought, would be Pensacola, which was still under Spanish control. Spain, it will be recalled, was England’s ally against France but was neutral toward America. Spain’s neutrality, Jackson believed, was only a veneer for her selfish interests which she would direct against the United States the moment a suitable opportunity arose. Then, too, there were the Creeks. Jackson had broken their power at Horseshoe Bend, but they remained in the vicinity, possibly ready to resume hostilities if supported by a strong belligerent. Before leaving Nashville, Jackson had conferred with Governor Willie Blount about sending a brigade of mounted Tennessee militiamen under Brigadier General John Coffee to join him in Mobile. Now he sent urgent word for the militiamen to come without delay!

The fraternal feeling existing between John Coffee and Andrew Jackson ran deep. Each man, completely devoted to the other, was willing to undergo the most rigid personal sacrifice should the other command it. Coffee, “tall, broad-shouldered, gentle in manner, but brave and intelligent,” had executed the key move that bottled up the Creeks at Horseshoe Bend.[5] With his usual alacrity, he once again answered his country’s call to duty and ordered his troops to rendezvous in Fayetteville on October 3. Patriotic feeling swept across Tennessee as Coffee’s veterans, with the fire of battle still flashing in their eyes, emerged from the hills, valleys, and hamlets to make the long trek southward for the second time within a year. Most of them were simple countrymen, armed only with their long rifles and knives and attired in the clothing of the frontier. Their pantaloon pockets were filled with bullets. In this manner they responded to the appeal to “come forward ... as there (could not) be a moment’s delay.”[6]

Jackson’s recall of the Tennessee militia, already schooled in the kind of wilderness warfare which appeared forthcoming, was a wise decision. Against the Creeks these men had subsisted for months in the Alabama back country with only scanty supplies. Their mobility, loyalty, and capacity to move upon their objective with a minimum loss of time made Jackson confident that here was a fighting force well prepared to meet any test.

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At Fayetteville, Coffee mustered 2,000 men into service, and organized two divisions under Colonels Robert H. Dyer and Thomas Williamson. At dawn on October 5, the high-spirited troops began their long march southward over the familiar trails which they had traveled the previous year. During the march, their ranks were swelled by the addition of 800 more men, including four East Tennessee companies. Coffee’s men reached Camp Gaines, 70 miles north of Mobile, on October 22, after having traveled 470 miles in 18 days.[7] That autumn trip had been accomplished with a minimum of sickness and no deaths, and the men were inspired with the feeling that Nature’s blessing was upon them, however arduous the campaign might be.

With the arrival of General Coffee, Jackson was ready to move against the Spaniards at Pensacola. He did so with an awesome display of force on November 7, and within a few hours declared the town in the possession of the United States. With this blow, although it accomplished little in the way of military success, Jackson confirmed his “reputation as a man who could act boldly, assume vast responsibilities, and move rapidly.”[8] Having quieted the aggressive intentions of the Spaniards and Creeks, Jackson quickly returned to Mobile where he expected a British attack at any moment. Coffee, in the meantime, was instructed to proceed at once to the mouth of Sandy Creek, about 20 miles north of Baton Rouge.

At this point of the campaign, Jackson had no idea that New Orleans would be the focal point of a British invasion. He was convinced that the landing would come somewhere to the east, and considered that logically the invaders would align themselves with the hostile Creeks and push through the back country to the Mississippi River near Baton Rouge. There Coffee would be in a position to repulse whatever force was thrown against him. Unknown to Old Hickory, however, the British had no immediate designs upon Baton Rouge. At that moment, a great invasion fleet of some fifty armed vessels and over ten thousand veterans of the Napoleonic wars were being organized at Negril Bay in Jamaica: its objective being New Orleans.[9]

However uncertain Jackson’s initial operations along the coast may have seemed to the uneasy citizens of New Orleans, it was soon evident that he did not intend to allow the city to go completely undefended. To further bolster his army and make his coastal defenses adequate, Jackson now called upon the trusted William Carroll. Carroll was only 26 years of age at this time but his courage and intelligence had already elevated him to the rank of Major General of the Second Tennessee Division.[10] A veteran of the Creek campaign, Carroll made no effort to conceal his destination in his strongly worded appeal for volunteers:

Should any foreign power obtain a permanent possession of
the City of New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi we
may bid farwell (sic) to all our prosperity and anticipated
greatness. Let our enemy ... place one foot in Louisiana and
we are at once bestrode by a colossus who has too long
rested the other in Canada; in fine let him command the
Mississippi River, and we become the most dependent,
degraded, and miserable people on earth.... You may add the
immortal glory of conquering the boasted troops of a Lord
Wellington.[11]

The 3,000 militiamen who met with Carroll in Nashville on November 13 were similar in appearance to those of Coffee. One eyewitness remarked that they were “as fine looking men as any we ever saw, and a considerable part of them (were) well armed, with muskets and rifles.”[12] Another observer noted that they “have come forward with that promptitude which has heretofore characterized the state.... They are generally provided with arms, etc. at their own expense.”[13]

Six days after they gathered in Nashville, the troops embarked on boats for New Orleans. The main diversion offered the Tennesseans during the slow, tedious trip down the Cumberland, Ohio and Mississippi rivers was the daily drilling which Carroll and his two subordinates, Brigadier Generals Thomas Coulter and Bird Smith, gave the recruits. There had been no time for training prior to their hasty departure.

Enroute the militiamen were cheered when they overtook a New Orleans-bound keelboat laden with muskets. Thomas L. Servoss, a prominent Natchez businessman, was responsible for this fortunate occurrence. While visiting New York during the summer of 1814, he was informed by a government official that New Orleans was considered the likely site for a British invasion. Concerned for his family’s welfare, Servoss had left for home immediately. At Pittsburg he boarded one of two keelboats headed for New Orleans with large quantities of arms and ammunition. Experienced in navigation himself and familiar with the route, Servoss prevailed upon the captain to depart earlier than was scheduled. By doing so, Servoss unintentionally insured that Carroll’s troops were fully armed before their trip was completed.[14]

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