Chapter XXXI

Further Details of the Maiwand Disaster—A Force ordered to march from
Cabul to Candahar—Aid given by the Amir—Farewell Dinner to Sir F.
Roberts—Details of the Force destined for Peshawar—Closing Scenes of
the Occupation of Cabul—Interview between the Amir and Sir Donald
Stewart—A Friendly Leave-Taking—The Evacuation of Sherpur on August
11th—Peaceful March to India—The Arrangements made with the
Amir—Grant of £190,500 and Thirty Guns—The Forts left intact about
Cabul—Weakness of such a Policy.

_6th August, 1880._

On the 4th of August orders were received from the Government of India for a force 10,000 strong under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts to march from Cabul to the relief of Candahar; but it was not until last evening that the full meaning of the sinister news from Candahar was generally recognized in camp. So much secrecy had been kept regarding the earlier despatches, no doubt in the hope that later news would show the disaster to have been exaggerated, that until Colonel St. John’s long telegram giving details of the losses was issued in the Club, we could not accept the defeat at Khusk-i-Nakhud as a reality. In a large camp like this wild rumours obtain ready circulation; they are believed for a day, or a week, until some new theory is broached and a new turn given to the current of men’s thoughts. First we believed that General Burrows’ Brigade had indeed been annihilated; then the affair sank into a reconnaissance in which two companies of the 66th had been cut up to a man, and two guns lost; and at last, when it became known that General Roberts was to form a division to march southward, the belief became general that our army in Candahar had been roughly handled, and that Ayub Khan’s success was growing with alarming strides. When Colonel St. John’s telegram was read outside the Club-house to an audience of twenty or thirty officers, we could scarcely realize that 1,200 of our men had been killed in open fight, and that the remainder of the ill-fated brigade had made the best of their way back to Candahar over an almost waterless country. But there was no mistaking the hard facts set forth; the list of officers killed and wounded; and the ominous closing paragraph that the British garrison was preparing for a siege. Our past experience in December had taught us one salutary lesson; the Afghans respond to the call of a successful leader with a readiness which defies all ordinary calculations; and we saw that there might indeed be good cause for marching even such war-worn regiments as those about Cabul right down to distant Candahar. Our hearts were light a fortnight ago at the prospect of an early return to India, for the campaign has been a trying one, and officers and men have grown very weary of the endless see-saw in the political world wherein Mr. Griffin and Abdur Rahman are the chief figures. All hopes were dashed when the order went forth for a new and arduous march, with the prospect of guerilla fighting half the way; and it must be confessed that at first there were hearty curses bestowed upon the heads of those responsible for the change in the programme. But when the details of the disaster were made known, the duty of relieving Candahar was accepted quietly and with a certain pride, all sense of personal discomfort and danger being sunk in the feeling that the credit of our army must be vindicated without useless delay. To form one of a picked force such as General Roberts has now under his orders is no common fortune, for certainly not in the whole of India could be a better lot of fighting men be got together than that now waiting the final order to march. We are self-conscious of our own strength, and are just a little impatient that it cannot be put forth at once, while our enemies are still in the flush of success. To meet 10,000 British, Sikh, and Ghoorka soldiers—for Sir Frederick Roberts’s force is made up almost entirely of these races—would try the mettle of a better armed and disciplined army than the Afghans can ever hope to put in the field; and if this force cannot do the work marked out for it, then our military supremacy in the East must indeed be coming to an end. I do not care to play the part of a trumpeter to the Cabul army, but the merits of the regiments now brigaded are too great to be lightly passed by. The trust which is placed in the infantry and their breech-loaders appears at once from the fact that no field artillery is to be taken. General Roberts will have only three mule batteries (7-pounders), although one of these is of course the screw-gun battery, which has a reputation for accuracy and range that cannot be equalled by our 9-pounders. With these three batteries (in all eighteen guns), we have to meet Ayub Khan’s thirty or forty guns, and we are going out upon our errand without any fear of results: our screw-guns can silence one or two of the batteries which were turned upon our little force at Khusk-i-Nakhud, and our infantry can deal with the rest. We shall meet Ayub Khan, presumably, either within sight of Candahar, or on the Ghazni Road, and then his army of regulars and ghazis will have a fair opportunity of measuring itself against a British force worthy of the name. We shall not make the fatal mistake of scattering our brigades over the country side, each liable at any moment to be taken in detail and broken up by overwhelming numbers. Our march has not yet begun, and there are soothsayers in our midst who foretell a journey to Ghazni only, and then a backward movement towards the Shutargardan—Candahar having been relieved in the meantime by General Phayre; but if it should be our lot to cut ourselves off for three weeks from the outer world, there need be no anxiety as to our fate; we are well able to take care of ourselves.

The behaviour of the Amir, since he has learnt that a strong force will march to Candahar, has been all that could be wished. He is sage enough to see that Ayub Khan is the only dangerous rival he now has in Afghanistan, and if we break up the Herat army, Cabul will be made quite safe. The Amir has also sent several men of importance to travel a day’s march ahead of our army, and arrange with the _maliks_ for the provision of supplies. If these officials of Abdur Rahman really do their work properly, our Commissariat officers will find their task of feeding 15,000 fighting men and followers greatly lightened. South of Ghazni we shall have to trust mostly to our own foraging parties, and we shall doubtless be on half-rations before Khelat-i-Ghilzai is reached. Sir Donald Stewart on the march to Cabul had at times difficulty in collecting supplies, as the villages on the road were deserted, and if the peasants have not since returned to look after their crops the country will not furnish much food. However, our own resources will carry us over half the distance at least, and a few double marches will make Khelat-i-Ghilzai seem not so far off after all. Mushk-i-Alam has accepted the new order of things in such a thorough-going spirit that he now talks of coming in with Mahomed Jan and accompanying Sir Donald Stewart’s army to India. Both our late foes are anxious to make a pilgrimage to Mecca.

Last night the Political Officers gave a farewell dinner in honour of General Roberts, at which Sir Donald Stewart and the chief officers of the force were present. In responding to the toast of his health Sir Frederick Roberts made the following characteristic speech:—

“MR. GRIFFIN, SIR DONALD STEWART, AND GENTLEMEN,

“I scarcely know how to thank you all for the kind way in which
you have drunk my health, and that of the Column under orders for
Candahar. To the very flattering terms in which Mr. Griffin has spoken
of me I should have considerable difficulty in replying, were it not
that I can honestly say that any successes which I may have attained
hitherto have been due entirely to the experienced commanders I have
had with me, the most capable Staff that ever accompanied a General
Officer in the field, and the gallantry and discipline of the troops
under me. I do not think there ever have been, and I doubt if there
ever will be, more efficient troops sent from India than those which
General Stewart and I have had the honour to command for the last two
years. With such troops success is a certainty. Without wishing to
underrate the dangers and difficulties of the task before us, I feel
quite confident that the efficient force which Sir Donald Stewart has
placed at my disposal will succeed in reaching Candahar as quickly as
possible, and in effectually disposing of any Afghan army that may be
brought against us. As Mr. Griffin has said, we must all deplore the
cause which requires Cabul troops to be now sent to Candahar. A few
days ago we were all congratulating ourselves upon the prospect of a
speedy return to India. Some of us had laid in a store of Nipal pepper
for use at home; others, I have heard, had actually named an early
date for leaving Bombay for England. Well, Sir Donald Stewart is
willing to guarantee—and were it not an indecorous thing for an
officer so high in rank—would even bet—that we shall reach India
again, _viâ_ Candahar, in November next. Gentlemen, this is a country
of great uncertainties. We have been living in a state of uncertainty
for many months; but, thanks to the political skill of our kind host,
affairs have during the last few weeks, progressed so rapidly and
favourably that we have reason to hope the country may now have
comparative rest and quiet, and that some settled form of government
will be established. However, we must not be too sanguine: and I trust
that our fellow-countrymen, who have not had the same opportunity that
we have had of knowing Afghanistan and the Afghans, will not be
disappointed if matters do not go altogether smoothly after the
British troops leave Cabul. No Amir has ever yet occupied the throne
for any time until he has proved himself capable of governing the
country, and it is not likely that Amir Abdur Rahman will be an
exception. We all know what difficulties Mr. Griffin has had to
contend with, and we all rejoice at the great success which has
attended his efforts—efforts so ably assisted by the Political
Officers now with him. It now remains for Abdur Rahman to show that he
is capable of filling the great position in which he has been placed.
From the commencement of this campaign, the Political Officers have
borne as important, if not as active, work as the soldier. First and
foremost the gallant Cavagnari, known to and mourned by us all, and
more than liked by many of us: with him many brave men fell, and it
was to avenge their base and treacherous murder that this force came
to Cabul. It is a great satisfaction to me to think that at present,
at any rate, no officers will be required to remain at Cabul, and that
all the Political Officers I see around me will return to India with
the troops. But I feel quite sure if the decision had been otherwise,
officers would have been found to accept the dangerous post, either
officers of the civil service, or amongst those military politicals
who have gained for themselves a reputation on the frontier and other
parts of India.”

The foregoing was the last of my letters from Sherpur, as on the 8th of August I joined the force destined for Candahar. Accordingly, I will here briefly summarize the events which occurred at Cabul after the march upon Candahar had been begun. The force left in Sherpur and in the fortifications about Cabul were the 2nd Division under the Command of Major-General Hills. They were brigaded as follows:—

1st Brigade.—General C. Gough—9th Foot, 28th Punjab Native Infantry, 45th Sikhs.

2nd Brigade.—General Hughes—59th Foot, 3rd Ghoorkas, 19th Punjab Native Infantry.

3rd Brigade.—General Daunt—67th Foot, 5th Punjab Infantry, 27th Punjab Native Infantry.

Cavalry Brigade.—General Palliser—1st Punjab Cavalry, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.

Artillery.—11-11 R.A., and G-4 R.A.

With camp-followers and servants there were about 20,000 men in the Division. Sir Donald Stewart waited until Sir Frederick Roberts had entered the Upper Logar Valley and heliographic communication had ceased before giving the order to evacuate Sherpur. The troops were all under canvas ready to file out at a moment’s notice. The following extract from a letter written by a trustworthy correspondent will give an exact idea of the actual evacuation:—

“BUTKHAK, _11th August_.

“Late in the evening of the 10th instant arrangements were finally
concluded for an interview between His Highness the Amir Abdur Rahman
Khan and the British representatives in Cabul. Whether a meeting could
be arranged was doubtful, I understand, up to nearly nine o’clock; and
if it had not taken place, Sir Donald Stewart would have had to forego
the pleasure of seeing the Amir whom his efforts have done so much
towards placing on the throne of Cabul. But good fortune favoured Sir
Donald. The camp of the Amir had been moved during the morning of the
10th to Deh Gopak, a small secluded village about three miles from,
and within easy sight of, the Sherpur cantonments. Prior to this, the
camp had been at Kila Murad Beg, six miles from Cabul, and on the
other side of the first low range of hills beyond the lake. His
Highness did not, however, arrive at Deh Gopak till eight o’clock in
the evening; and here he was agreeably surprised to find Sirdar
Mahomed Afzul Khan waiting for him. This distinguished gentleman, who,
it will be remembered, was the leading member of the Mission to
Turkistan at the beginning of negotiations with Abdur Rahman, had been
fitly selected as the bearer of the Government presents to the Amir.
They consisted of a handsome grey English horse, a rifle, a pair of
pistols and a gold watch. The Sirdar arrived at Deh Gopak about six
o’clock, and had to wait two hours before the Amir arrived. He was
greatly pleased with the presents; insisted on the Sirdar’s dining
with him; presented him with a Kashmir shawl and a few other articles
of dress; and on dismissing him sent a message to the effect that he
would be glad to meet the British officers at seven o’clock the
following morning. It will thus be seen that the Amir has got the
better of the absurd suspicions which not only made him backward in
dealing with us, but actually led him to throw away the food near
which a stranger had merely passed, from fear of being poisoned.

“Before the return of Mahomed Afzul Khan, a tent had been pitched
within a couple of hundred yards of the cantonment walls, in
anticipation of the Amir’s consent to come in; so that though the
interview was not decided upon till so late, there was no bustle or
confusion. Sir Donald Stewart and the Chief Political Officer had
moved under canvas in the centre of the cantonments, and as all tents
and baggage had to be ready to start by 5 A.M.;, there was a weary
period of waiting in the open air, under a sun sufficiently warm even
at six o’clock. At a few minutes before seven the escort of Guides’
Cavalry rode up; the General mounted, and followed by a string of some
thirty or forty officers approached the tent, which was in a field
about twenty paces from the roadside. As soon as the British party got
outside the Head-quarters’ Gate, the Amir and his followers were seen
coming from the opposite direction. Half a mile in his rear on the
side of a hill were a large number of his troops, both cavalry and
infantry; but the number of followers with His Highness was hardly
more than sixty; and only two of his sepoys were on sentry at the tent
itself. The two parties met exactly in front of the path leading to
the tent. Abdur Rahman had with him Sirdar Yusuf Khan. Sir Donald
Stewart was accompanied by Mr. Lepel Griffin, all the rest standing at
some few yards’ distance. The Chief Political Officer introduced the
Amir to the Lieutenant-General as they met; and then walked towards
the tent, followed by all the British officers present. There were not
more than five chairs. His Highness occupied the centre seat: on his
right were Sir Donald Stewart and General Hills; on his left Mr.
Griffin. The conversation was conducted in Persian by Mr. Griffin on
behalf of the Lieutenant-General, His Highness having little or no
command of Hindustani. After the usual formalities were concluded
several officers were introduced to the Amir; amongst others were the
three Brigadiers under Major-General Hills; Colonel Lockart (Chief of
the Staff), Dr. Smith (Chief Medical Officer), Colonel Fryer, Major
Morgan, Major Lance, and others. His Highness was dressed in a drab
suit of striped cloth, with his ‘continuations’ tucked into long black
boots; a black Astrakan cap, in which a diamond star glittered,
covered his head; his arms consisted of a revolver only, which he
carried in an ordinary waist-belt. Though still nervous, I thought he
was less so than on the former occasions when I saw him; and all who
observed him were greatly pleased at his appearance. In the course of
conversation he said that his whole heart was full of gratitude to the
British, and he begged that his best thanks might be conveyed to His
Excellency the Viceroy. The interview was public throughout; no
business was entered into (indeed it is said that all matters of
business were concluded at Mr. Griffin’s last meeting with the Amir);
and we took our leave in less than a quarter of an hour, His Highness
shaking hands with all who cared to wish him good-bye and good-luck.

“The Amir deputed his right-hand man, Sirdar Yusuf Khan, to accompany
the General out of Cabul, himself returning almost at once to Deh
Gopak. The British officials did not return to the cantonment, but
went by the road along the outer wall, out by Siah Sung, and thence by
the main road to Butkhak. As we rode along we could see the forts on
Bemaru already occupied by small parties of the Amir’s infantry. The
Asmai fort had been occupied the night before as soon as our own
picquets left it; the big fort on Siah Sung was occupied during the
day, as were the Sherderwaza and other forts. The Bala Hissar was
taken over by General Gholam Hyder Khan, with one regiment of infantry
and about a hundred cavalry. Sherpur itself was garrisoned by the Haz
Danari, a celebrated Turkistan cavalry regiment, and 500 khasidars, a
force scarcely strong enough to defend any single corner of the huge
cantonment. The Amir on his way back to his camp at Deh Gopak was
preceded by a band of music, and on his arrival there received a
salute of thirty-one guns. Considerable enthusiasm was evinced among
his followers; for, incredible as it may appear, there were many of
them who believed that the Amir would be made a prisoner by us, even
up to the last moment of the interview. Had anything happened to him,
they knew well what would be their fate with any new-comer who might
be chosen, and they feared any mishap to the man with whom they had
thrown in their lot.

“Up to the present the Amir has not made his entry into Cabul. His
nine years’ residence in Russian territory has in no way removed or
lessened his Oriental superstition; and he left the choice of an
auspicious hour and day to the astrologers, of whom he has several
attached to his court. The chief of these has named eleven o’clock on
Sunday next for the public entry, and has decreed that no luck can
attend the occasion unless His Highness wears an emerald ring. One is
accordingly being prepared, and the words ‘Amir Abdur Rahman, 1297,’
are to be engraved on it. Meantime Sirdar Yusuf Khan is still carrying
on his duties as the Governor of Cabul. He has established picquets on
all the approaches to the city, and the passport system is again in
full swing. All went perfectly well the first day of our absence, and
if His Highness prove wise and conciliatory, his reign at Cabul may,
with the support already given him, possibly be longer than that of
either of the last two Amirs. This letter, however, purports to be an
account of our evacuation of Cabul, and I must keep to my subject, and
not concern myself with either the present, past, or future politics
of Afghanistan.

“The three brigades arrived at Butkhak to-day, after a dusty march,
before noon. The first march has been got over without a single
accident of any description, and too great praise cannot be bestowed
on Sir Donald Stewart, on the Chief Political Officer, and on the
officers and troops themselves for the excellent result of their
exertions. The country is perfectly quiet, though there are plenty of
marauders ready to drop on any unfortunate straggler. Accompanying us
to India are a few of the Cabul Sirdars, including Wali Mahomed Khan
and Tahir Khan. Several Hindu merchants from the city have also
grasped the opportunity of our march to proceed unmolested to India,
as well as two Khokandi pilgrims travelling to Mecca.”

---------------------

The march thus begun was carried out without the slightest opposition on the part of the tribesmen between Cabul and Peshawur; and it may be said that not a shot was fired after Cabul had been left. The heat was very trying in the Jellalabad Valley and the Khyber, but the men bore up bravely, and they had not this time to fight against cholera. It was believed that Gundamak or Jellalabad would be held until General Roberts reported that Candahar had been relieved, but the Indian Government were anxious to get the troops over the frontier, as the garrisons of Northern India were very weak. Lundi Kotal, therefore, once more became our outpost in North-Eastern Afghanistan, and the regiments composing General Hills’ division were sent to various stations in India, except such as were required to hold the Khyber posts.

Regarding the arrangements with the Amir: he received thirty guns (chiefly of small calibre), which we left behind us in Sherpur, and 19½ lakhs of rupees (£190,500). Of this sum ten lakhs (£100,000) were given as an earnest of British friendship, and 9½ were “restored” as merely belonging to the State. This was the sum seized in Yahiya Khan’s house in October 1879, upon our first arrival at Cabul. It was spent in purchasing supplies for the army, as our treasury was nearly empty at that time. The Prize Committee had regarded it as prize-money, but this view was not countenanced by the Government.

A concession was made which I strongly condemned in one of my former letters; the fortifications we had built about Cabul were not destroyed. The rather sophistical reason given for this course of action was that the Amir made many requests to us, all of which were at first refused with the exception of one respecting money. One request which he urged with singular pertinacity was that the forts, &c., we had built might not be destroyed. Again and again he was told his wish could not be granted, but he returned to the charge, pleading that his prestige would be lowered in the eyes of the people if we showed such open distrust of him at the commencement. The Government at last yielded to his insistance, and we left the chain of forts about the city intact: they will give our soldiers, perhaps, some amusement when we return in three or four years to annex the country. We refused to make any treaty with Abdur Rahman, and also to promise him gifts of arms and ammunition in the future, but with our rupees he should be able to equip an army pretty rapidly, and to consolidate his power.

------------------------------------------------------------------------