Chapter II: The Surrender of Fugitive Servants to Their Masters Was Prohibited

"Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee. He shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place which he shall choose, in one of thy gates where it liketh him best; thou shalt not oppress him." Deut. xxiii. 15, 16.

As though God had said, "To deliver him up would be to recognize the _right_ of the master to hold him; his _fleeing_ shows his _choice_, proclaims his wrongs and his title to protection; you shall not force him back and thus recognize the _right_ of the master to hold him in such a condition as induces him to flee to others for protection." It may be said that this command referred only to the servants of _heathen_ masters in the surrounding nations. We answer: the terms of the command are unlimited. But the objection, if valid, would merely shift the pressure of the difficulty to another point. Did God require them to protect the _free choice_ of a _single_ servant from the heathen, and yet _authorize_ the same persons, to crush the free choice of _thousands_ of servants from the heathen? Suppose a case. A _foreign_ servant escapes to the Israelites; God says, "He shall dwell with thee, in that place which _he shall choose_, in one of thy gates where it _liketh him_ best." Now, suppose this same servant, instead of coming into Israel of his own accord, had been _dragged_ in by some kidnapper, who bought him of his master, and forced him into a condition against his will; would He who forbade such treatment of the stranger, who _voluntarily_ came into the land, sanction the same treatment of the _same person_, provided in addition to this last outrage, the previous one had been committed of forcing him into the nation against his will? To commit violence on the free choice of a foreign servant is forsooth a horrible enormity, provided you _begin_ the violence _after_ he has come among you. But if you commit the first act on the _other side of the line_; if you begin the outrage by buying him from a third person against his will, and then tear him from home, drag him across the line into the land of Israel, and hold him as a slave--ah! that alters the case, and you may perpetrate the violence now with impunity! Would _greater_ favor have been shown to this new comer than to the old residents--those who had been servants in Jewish families perhaps for a generation? Were the Israelites commanded to exercise towards _him_, uncircumcised and out of the covenant, a justice and kindness denied to the multitudes who _were_ circumcised, and _within_ the covenant? But, the objector finds small gain to his argument on the supposition that the covenant respected merely the fugitives from the surrounding nations, while it left the servants of the Israelites in a condition against their wills. In that case, the surrounding nations would adopt retaliatory measures, and become so many asylums for Jewish fugitives. As these nations were not only on every side of them, but in their midst, such a proclamation would have been an effectual lure to men whose condition was a constant counteraction of will. Besides the same command which protected the servant from the power of his foreign _master_, protected him equally from the power of an _Israelite_. It was not, merely "Thou shalt not deliver him unto his _master_," but "he shall dwell with thee, in that place which _he shall choose_ in one of thy gates where it liketh _him_ best." Every Israelite was forbidden to put him in any condition _against his will_. What was this but a proclamation, that all who _chose_ to live in the land and obey the laws, were left to their own free will, to dispose of their services at such a rate, to such persons, and in such places as they pleased? Besides, grant that this command prohibited the sending back of _foreign_ servants only, there was no law requiring the return of servants who had escaped from the _Israelites_. _Property_ lost, and _cattle_ escaped, they were required to return, but not escaped _servants_. These verses contain, 1st, a command, "Thou shalt not deliver," &c., 2d. a declaration of the fugitive's right of _free choice_, and of God's will that he should exercise it at his own discretion; and 3d, a command guarding this right, namely, "Thou shalt not oppress him," as though God had said, "If you restrain him from exercising his _own choice_, as to the place and condition of his residence, it is _oppression_, and shall not be tolerated."[A]

[Footnote A: Perhaps it may be objected that this view of Deut. xxiii. 15, 16, makes nonsense of Ex. xxi. 27, which provides that if a man strikes out his servant's tooth he shall let him go free. Small favor indeed if the servant might set himself free whenever he pleased! Answer--The former passage might remove the servant from the master's _authority_, without annulling the master's legal claims upon the servant, if he had paid him in advance and had not received from him an equivalent, and this equally, whether his master were a Jew or a Gentile. The latter passage, "He shall let him go free _for his tooth's sake,"_ not only freed the servant from the master's authority, but also from any pecuniary claim which the master might have on account of having paid his wages in advance; and this _as a compensation_, for the loss of a tooth.]