Chapter XVI: Montbrehain and After

The successive withdrawals of the First, Fourth, Third and Fifth Australian Divisions from the battle zone during the period from September 22nd to October 2nd had been arranged with the Fourth Army Commander about the middle of September. The Corps had been continuously employed on front-line duty since April, and had already accomplished a considerable advance, for every inch of which it had been obliged to fight.

This consideration alone had earned for the Corps a period of rest. But other important questions arose which affected the situation.

I have mentioned that early in 1918 all Brigades of the Imperial Service had, owing to failing man-power, been reduced from four to three Battalions each. In this reduction the Australian Brigades participated only to a small extent during the fighting period. Every one of the Australian battalions had created great traditions; regimental _esprit_ and pride of unit were very strong. The private soldier valued his Battalion colour patch almost more than any other decoration.

My predecessor in the Corps Command had, during May, 1918, directed the disbandment of one Battalion each of the 9th, 12th and 13th Brigades. This was due to the wastage resulting from the heavy fighting by these Brigades on the Villers-Bretonneux front. The residues of the disbanded battalions were used as drafts to replenish the remaining three Battalions of each Brigade. It was doubtless a measure directed by necessity, as the flow of reinforcements was steadily diminishing.

Much lamentation was, however, caused among the officers and men who thus lost their battalion identity, both among those remaining in the field and those convalescing from wounds and sickness, who were thereby deprived of the hope of rejoining their former units.

Through all these events I became fully alive to the difficulties which would present themselves when the evil day should arrive on which the fate of still other battalions would have to be decided. It was a day whose advent I was anxious to stave off until the last possible moment.

Throughout the summer and autumn it became incumbent upon me to keep a close watch upon the fighting strengths of all the 57 Australian Infantry Battalions in the field. I had to consider the numbers actually present with the unit, the numbers likely to join from time to time from convalescent camps and hospitals, and the flow of new recruits from the Australian Depots in England. Almost daily forecasts had to be made as to the probable strengths available on a given date in all the Battalions likely to be employed in a given operation.

The full official strength of a Battalion of Infantry was 1,000 at the outbreak of the war, but a reduction to 900 had been authorized in July, 1918. No battalion in the Army was ever for long able to maintain itself at a strength of 900. Indeed, experience went to show that so long as the strength did not fall below 600, a unit could quite well carry out, in battle, a normal battalion task, provided that frequent periods of short rest could be assured.

Towards the middle of September, 1918, the successful course of the fighting, and the moderate rate of net wastage--by which I mean the excess of battle losses over replenishments from the rear--had convinced me that there was every reason to hope that the strengths of the 57 battalions could be maintained at a useful standard until the end of the campaigning season of that year. If the war were to go on into 1919, and provided that the Australian Corps could be kept out of the line over the three winter months, thereby avoiding the daily wastage of trench duty, I felt able to guarantee that by the spring of 1919 the whole of these battalions would again have become replenished to a sufficient extent for a spring campaign.

It may have been an optimistic view; it may have savoured of a desire to postpone the evil day. But I felt assured that the disbandment of a number of additional battalions would seriously impair the fighting spirit of the whole Australian Corps. I was prepared to take the chance of being able to carry on until the end of 1918 with the whole 57 battalions retained intact.

But I was not permitted to do so. At various times during the period June to August, 1918, an unimaginative department at G.H.Q. kept harassing me with inquiries as to when it was proposed to conform to the new Imperial organization in which all Brigades were to be reduced to three Battalions each. These inquiries were at first ignored, but early in September the Adjutant-General became insistent for a reply.

I set out the whole position as I saw it, and strongly urged a postponement of the question until the Corps should have completed the vitally important series of fighting operations on which it was then engaged. Looking back upon the course of events of that time, it is hardly credible now that, having regard to the reasons given, these representations should have been ignored. I procrastinated. Suddenly I received instructions from the War Office that some 6,000 men of the Corps, who had served continuously since 1914, were to be given six months' furlough to Australia, and that they were to be held in readiness to entrain en route for Australia at forty-eight hours' notice.

These orders were received only two days before the battle of Hargicourt. The First and Fourth Divisions, destined to fight in that battle, were those most affected by such a withdrawal of men, because these Divisions contained the battalions and batteries which had been longest in the field. I could not, obviously, take up any attitude which would postpone the well-earned furlough of these veterans; nor had I the smallest inclination to do so. My case against the main proposal for an immediate extinction of additional battalions, was, however, weakened thereby.

The responsible authorities overruled my objections, and on September 19th I received peremptory instructions to disband eight additional battalions forthwith. With many misgivings, I had no option but to comply. I called my Divisional Commanders together, and with them decided which battalions should suffer extinction.

It was a difficult choice, and created a situation of great difficulty. The whole of the personnel affected raised a very subordinate but none the less determined protest. One battalion after another very respectfully but very firmly took the stand that they did not wish to disband, and would prefer not to fight as dismembered and scattered portions of other battalions.

This attitude, perhaps, bordered upon insubordination, but it was conceived for a very worthy purpose. It was a pathetic effort, and elicited much sympathy from the senior Commanders and myself.

On the eve of the great operations for the overthrow of the Hindenburg Line I found myself, therefore, in a sea of troubles, and threatened with the possibility of internal disaffection. To outsiders who could have no understanding of the situation this might imperil the fair fame and prestige of the Australian Army Corps.

Up to this stage the Fourth Army Commander had been in no way concerned in the matter. The pressure upon me had come from the War Office and the Adjutant-General's Department. Lord Rawlinson's interests, however, now became vitally involved. I submitted the whole position to him. I pointed out how inopportune the time was for risking trouble of this nature. The order for disbandment, having been given, must of course stand, and obedience must be insisted upon; but a postponement of further action for fourteen days was desirable, if the opportunity of a decisive blow against the enemy was not to be imperilled by an impairment of the fighting spirit and goodwill of the Australian Corps.

Rawlinson accepted my views in their entirety, and used his authority and influence with the Commander-in-Chief. A postponement of action was authorized, and all the Battalions which had been threatened with extinction, with one exception, were permitted to remain intact during the remainder of the fighting period. The exception was made in the case of the 59th and 60th Battalions (of the 15th Brigade), whose men most loyally made no demur at the immediate amalgamation of the two battalions for the purposes of the forthcoming operations.

By the end of September, therefore, three separate factors were operating to make a short withdrawal of the Corps from the battle zone desirable.

These were, the long unbroken period of line service, the orders for the reorganization of the Brigades on a three-Battalion basis, and the granting of Australian furlough to the veterans.

These were the reasons which brought about the decision that the whole of the Australian Corps should be sent for a period of rest in a coastal area as soon as the battle operations on which it had embarked had been brought to a successful conclusion.

Those operations were, on October 1st, almost completed. Only the Beaurevoir line still remained to be mastered, and the Second Australian Division, which had been resting since its successes at Mont St. Quentin, was available to undertake that task. For the next three days the Australian Corps became, therefore, reduced to only one Division (the Second Australian) in the line, with the 27th and 30th American Divisions in support.

The Second Division occupied the night of October 1st and the greater part of October 2nd in the process of taking over line duty from the Fifth Division, and in preparing for an attack timed for the next morning upon the Beaurevoir defences. I handed over the northern part of what had been the Australian Corps front, on the day previous, to the 50th Division (of the Thirteenth Corps), which had by now effected the passage of the tunnel line, and had deployed upon my left, facing north and north-east.

After these adjustments were made, the Corps front, on the night of October 2nd, extended from Mont St. Martin through the eastern outskirts of Estrées and Joncourt, where I joined with the 32nd Division (now belonging to the Ninth Corps). It was a frontage of nearly 6,000 yards, an extraordinary length for the battle front of a single Division. Our line lay parallel to and about 1,000 yards to the west of the Beaurevoir line, and the attack for next day was designed to be delivered in a north-easterly direction. If the Beaurevoir line itself were captured, the attack was to be pushed on beyond, in the endeavour to sweep the enemy off the prominent hill on which was situated the village of Beaurevoir. Concurrently the Thirteenth Corps would attack Prospect Hill, lying to the north-east of Gouy village.

The Beaurevoir line was a fully-developed defensive system, with front, support and communication trenches, thoroughly traversed, well wired in, and still in good condition. In 1917 it would have been considered impossible to capture such a line of defence by such a force on such a frontage.

The Second Division deployed two of its Brigades, the 5th on the right and the 7th on the left, with the 6th Brigade in reserve. The 5th Tank Brigade, now greatly reduced in numbers, and some Whippet Tanks co-operated in the attack. The assault was launched at 6.5 a.m. under a Field Artillery barrage. Considerable opposition was met with. The trenches were found strongly held, particularly with machine guns, and the uncut wire seriously impeded the Infantry.

The frontal attack of the 5th Brigade, nevertheless, achieved almost immediate success, although in some parts of the line there were centres of resistance which had to be enveloped before they yielded. The performance of the Tanks on this day was disappointing. Most of the heavier Tanks were disabled by Artillery fire, while the Whippets found the Beaurevoir trench lines too wide to straddle. Nevertheless, the spirited action of the Artillery made up for the loss of the assistance of the Tanks, and by 11 a.m. the whole of the Beaurevoir line in front of the 5th Brigade had been captured.

Further to the north, the 7th Brigade found the trenches almost end on to the direction of their advance, and the battle here speedily took on the form of pure trench fighting with bomb and bayonet, a type of fighting in which the Australian excels. Steady progress northwards was made.

The whole of the Beaurevoir line over the full extent of the Corps front was taken before midday, and although already very tired, the assaulting Brigades pushed on beyond, to the ascent of the Beaurevoir spur. On a knoll at its south-western extremity stood the stone base of the now wrecked Beaurevoir Mill, a prominent landmark visible for miles.

The spur and the vicinity of the Mill were found to be strongly held, probably by fugitives driven out that morning from the Beaurevoir trenches. The weight of our attack spent itself on the slopes of the spur. The 6th Brigade was therefore launched at Beaurevoir Mill and village. Although some portion of our attack passed the Mill and reached the village, our available Infantry strength was not sufficient to mop it up satisfactorily, and the Brigadier decided to establish for the night a secure line about 1,000 yards south-west of the village.

The total captures by the Second Division on this day exceeded a thousand prisoners and many machine guns--an astonishing performance for three weak brigades, fighting under open and exposed conditions.

The attack on Beaurevoir hill had been undertaken chiefly to keep the enemy engaged and on the move, while an additional Division of the Thirteenth Corps could be brought across the line of the tunnel and deployed into the battle line. The direction of the attack had been to the north-east. It now became necessary to readjust the general easterly line of advance by redistributing the Army front between the three Corps now in line. The greater part of October 4th was occupied in carrying out these arrangements, and the Second Division availed itself of the period to improve its line and the positions of parts of it by local attacks and the capture of tactical points along its front. On this day the Division gathered in a further 800 prisoners and five guns.

By nightfall on October 4th the Corps front, now reduced to 4,000 yards, ran generally north and south, well east of Wiancourt and just east of Ramicourt. The task of the Second Division and of the Australian Corps was completed, and in pursuance of arrangements previously made, the initial steps were taken on that day to hand over the Australian Corps front to the 27th and 30th American Divisions, which had, in the days intervening since September 29th, been reorganized and rested. They were to be given a place in the front battle line under the direct orders of their own Corps Headquarters (General Read).

To cover the interval of time necessary to enable the first of the American Divisions (30th) to move up into line, General Rawlinson desired me to retain control of the battle front for one day longer, and avail myself of the time to make an endeavour to advance our line still further to the east.

I selected as a suitable objective the village of Montbrehain, which stood on a plateau that dominated any further advance.

The Second Division was instructed to carry out this attack early on October 5th, and I allotted to them one company of Tanks, which was all that could be materialized in fighting trim at such short notice.

Rosenthal launched his attack at five minutes past six in the morning of October 5th. It was the 6th Brigade which led it. The village was full of machine guns, but the gallant Brigade dashed in with the bayonet, and methodically worked its way through the village to its eastern outskirts. A counter-attack developed about noon, and for a time about 400 yards of ground had to be yielded, but our foremost line was speedily restored with the assistance of a battalion of the 5th Brigade.

By nightfall our line ran completely around the eastern outskirts of the village of Montbrehain, the whole of which was in our possession. We took from it over 600 prisoners belonging to nine different German regiments.

What was even more interesting was that we came for the first time in the war upon French civilians, who had been under the domination of the enemy since the autumn of 1914. These unfortunate folk were found hidden away in cellars and underground shelters, and their joy at their deliverance from foreign bondage was pathetic. It was evident that the enemy had not had time to carry out the evacuation of the civilians, as had been his practice throughout the whole area over which the Australian Corps had hitherto advanced.

By the night of October 5th the Corps had, by the victory of Montbrehain, advanced its line to a point six miles to the east of the Bellicourt Tunnel, and had thereby confirmed the irretrievable collapse of the whole of the Hindenburg defences.

This achievement is, above everything else, an illustration, which should become classic, of the maxim that in war the _moral_ is to the material as three to one. The enemy had all the advantages of position, of carefully prepared field works, of highly-organized defences, of detailed acquaintance with our lines of approach from the west, and of all the other tactical benefits of the defence.

Yet we had the advantage of moral factors. For the past nine weeks the enemy had suffered defeat after defeat. He had at one time been surprised and overwhelmed. He had at another time been driven from strong positions under conditions when surprise played no part. He had been defeated in gunnery, in the air, and in close Infantry fighting. The _moral_ of his troops had steadily declined. They no longer hoped for victory, but anticipated defeat. They knew that they were a beaten army.

The victory won in the series of battles from September 29th to October 5th was a victory of _moral_, the resolute determination of our troops to overcome all obstacles prevailing against the failing spirits of the defenders. It was a signal illustration that no defences, however powerful, can resist an energetically pressed assault, unless the defenders meet the attack with equal resolution. Verdun and the cliffs of Gallipoli are examples of resolute defence. Port Arthur and the Hindenburg line are equally striking instances of the collapse of formidable field works through failure of the _moral_ of the defenders.

Montbrehain was the last Australian battle in the Great War, and the fighting career of the Australian Army Corps had, as events turned out, come to an end. On that same day my Second Division was relieved by the 30th American Division, and I handed over command of the battle front to General Read. I had borne continuous responsibility, as a Corps Commander, for a section of the battle front in France varying from four to eleven miles for 128 consecutive days without a break.

On that same day, too, Prince Max of Baden accepted the programme of the President of the United States of America, and requested him to take in hand the restoration of peace. On behalf of the German Government he also asked for an immediate Armistice on Land, Water and in the Air.

The long-drawn-out negotiations which followed need only a brief reference. It was first necessary for the Entente Powers to agree upon a common line of action; then followed negotiations between the plenipotentiaries of the belligerents, and hostilities did not actually cease until after the conditions of the Armistice had been signed in the early morning of November 11th.

During this period of five weeks, however, fighting went on. It was of an altogether different character from that in which the Australian Corps had been engaged. The enemy had no line of defence left in France. He was compelled to a retreat which became general along his whole front, and gathered momentum day by day. He gave up Lens, Armentières and the Aubers Ridge without a struggle, thus enabling the Second and Fifth Armies to advance to the occupation of Lille and the adjacent industrial centres.

A great army recoiling rapidly upon itself is beset with even greater difficulties than an army sweeping rapidly forward. If its retreat is not to be converted into a rout, time must be allowed for the methodical withdrawal, in proper sequence, of the whole complex organization in rear of the battle front. Headquarters and hospitals, workshops and aerodromes, depots and supplies must be dismantled, packed and re-established further in rear; guns, transport and reserve troops must be withdrawn stage by stage, and, last of all, the fighting line must fall back in sympathy with the rate of withdrawal of all in rear.

Every hour's delay is an hour gained. Roads become congested, bridges overtaxed, cohesion and discipline are imperilled. An enforced withdrawal on so large a scale is one of the most difficult operations of war.

The enemy's tactics during this period were, therefore, purely those of delay, achieved by the methodical destruction of bridges, tearing up of railways, and the blowing of great craters at every important road intersection. These methods impeded the advance of our armies quite as much as his rearguards, who invariably yielded to the smallest demonstration of force.

Battles on the grand scale were now a thing of the past, and from the completion of the capture of the Hindenburg defences up to the signing of the Armistice there was no event in France of outstanding military importance.

The pursuit of the enemy towards the eastern frontiers of France and Belgium was, however, exhausting to the British and American troops on the front which the Australian Corps had vacated. It was only a question of time for the Corps to be again called upon, this time to take its share of pursuit. The Armistice negotiations were dragging out, and it was uncertain that they would be satisfactorily concluded. The Australian Corps had had a month for a pleasant rest along the banks of the Somme, between Amiens and Abbeville. It had had time to carry out the extensive reorganizations required by the War Office. On November 5th orders came for the Corps once again to move up to the front.

The First and Fourth Divisions led the return to the battle zone. The remaining three Divisions were to follow. My Corps Headquarters, on November 10th, commenced its move to Le Cateau, to occupy the very château which had been inhabited by General von der Marwitz, the Commander of the Second German Army, against whom the Australian Corps had for so long been operating. I was actually on the way there on November 11th when the order arrived for the cessation of hostilities.

The Australian Army Corps was therefore not again employed, either in the final stages of pursuing the enemy out of France, or as part of the Army of Occupation on German territory.

The Prime Minister of Australia forwarded to me, the day after my arrival at Le Cateau, the following message:

The Government and the people of Australia extend their heartiest
congratulations on the triumphant conclusion of your great
efforts. I am specially requested to convey to you their heartfelt
thanks and deep admiration for your brilliant and great leadership,
and for the way in which you and the brave men associated with
you have borne the sufferings and trials of the past four
years, and in common with the troops of all the Allied Nations
brought the civilized peoples of the world through adversity to
victorious peace. On behalf of the Government and the people of the
Commonwealth, I assure you, and every Australian soldier in the
field, that the Commonwealth is full of pride and admiration of
their endurance and sacrifice. The Australian soldiers are entitled
to, and shall receive, not only the thanks of a grateful people,
but that treatment which their great services deserve.

W. M. HUGHES.

Not long after the conclusion of hostilities I was called upon by my Government to undertake the organization and direction of a special department to carry out the repatriation of the whole of the Australian Imperial Force, in Europe, Egypt, Salonika and Mesopotamia. This compelled me to sever, with much regret, my close and intimate association with the personnel of the Army Corps.

Before proceeding to England to establish the new department, I issued the following Farewell Order:

Upon relinquishing the command of the Australian Army Corps,
in order to take up the important and difficult work of the
Repatriation and Demobilization of the Australian Imperial Force,
which has been entrusted to me by the Commonwealth Government, I
desire to offer to all ranks of the Corps a heartfelt expression of
my gratitude to all for the splendid and loyal support which they
have rendered to me during the past six months.

It has been the period during which the Corps has attained its
highest development, as a fighting organism, of cohesion and
efficiency. This has been brought about alike by the valour of
the troops of all arms and services, and by the splendid devotion
of Commanders, Staffs, and Regimental Officers, and has resulted
in the series of brilliant victories which have contributed in so
high a measure to the overthrow and utter collapse of our principal
enemy.

For the remainder of the period during which the Corps will
continue to act as a military body, held in readiness for any
emergency that may arise during the peace negotiations, I am
confident that every man will strive to do all in his power to
uphold the great renown which the Corps has so worthily won.

But, having completed our task in the main object which brought
us from our distant homeland, and having thereby safeguarded the
future of our Nation by the conquest of our most formidable enemy,
we are now faced with another and an equally important task,
namely, to prepare ourselves to resume our duties of citizenship
and to assist individually and collectively in the reconstruction
of the Australian Nation. Our numbers and our prestige place
this opportunity in our hands, and impose upon us this great
responsibility.

I feel sure that every man in the Corps will in this also worthily
respond to the call of duty, and will co-operate loyally and
self-sacrificingly in the realization of all plans and projects
which will be developed to so worthy an end.