Chapter II: Part 2

About 3 P.M. Sickles was called to General Meade’s headquarters to a conference of corps commanders. Upon the sound of artillery, the conference adjourned, and Meade, Sickles, and Warren, Meade’s Chief Engineer, rode to inspect Sickles’ change of line. The artillery was already engaged, and believing it too late to make any changes since the enemy was present, Meade decided to attempt to hold the new position by sending in supports. After reviewing the new line, General Warren left the other members of the party and rode up Little Round Top. He found the height unoccupied except by the personnel of a signal station.

General Lee’s Plan.

Lee as well as Meade occupied the forenoon in the arrangement of his line of battle. After a conference with Ewell, he decided to attack Meade’s left. In his report, Lee says:

“_It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy’s
left, and endeavor to gain a position from which it was thought that
our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was
directed to place the division of McLaws and Hood on the right of
Hill, partially enveloping the enemy’s left, which he was to drive
in._

“_General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy’s center to prevent
reinforcements being drawn to either wing, and coöperate with his
right division in Longstreet’s attack._

“_General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration
upon the enemy’s right, to be converted into a real attack should
opportunity offer._”

When General Lee arranged this plan of attack he believed Meade’s left terminated at the Peach Orchard; he did not know that Sickles’ advance line extended to the left from the salient at the Peach Orchard to Devil’s Den. In plain view of the Union signal station on Little Round Top, some of his forces were compelled to make a wide detour via the Black Horse Tavern on the Fairfield Road in order to avoid observation.

Little Round Top.

Meanwhile, General Warren on Little Round Top saw the importance of the hill as a tactical position on Meade’s left. The signal officers were preparing to leave; he ordered them to remain and to keep waving their flags so as to lead the Confederates to believe that the hill was occupied. He dispatched a messenger to Devil’s Den, where a Union battery was posted, with an order that a shot be fired to produce confusion in the woods in front, through which Hood’s forces were supposed to be advancing. Seeing the reflection of the sunlight from Confederate muskets, he realized that if this important position were to be held, it would be necessary to get troops there without delay.

Quickly he sent a member of his staff to Sickles for troops. Sickles said none could be spared. Warren sent another staff officer to Meade, who immediately ordered Sykes to move his Corps to Little Round Top. Barnes’ Division of this Corps had already been called for by Sickles to defend his line, and three brigades, Vincent’s, Tilton’s, and Sweitzer’s, were moving toward the Wheatfield. Learning of the need of troops on Little Round Top, Vincent moved back, skirted the east side of Little Round Top, and went into position between Little and Big Round Top, arriving just before the Confederates from Hood’s right advanced over Big Round Top.

Having watched these movements, Warren rode down to the crossing of what is now Sykes Avenue and the Wheatfield Road. There he met Colonel O’Rorke, in command of the 140th New York, and ordered his regiment, together with Hazlett’s battery, to the crest of the hill. With the addition of Weed’s Brigade, the combined forces held the Round Tops. There was a desperate engagement in which both contestants displayed courage of a very high order. The Union soldiers were victorious, and Meade’s left was secured against further attack.

The Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield.

After the struggle for the possession of Little Round Top, the other Confederate brigades of Hood and McLaws advanced rapidly. A lack of coordination in their movement allowed Meade to bring up supports. Three brigades of Anderson’s Division of Hill’s Corps advanced against Humphreys’ line, in the following order: Wilcox, Perry, Wright. Wounded, General Pender was unable to direct Posey and Mahone in support of Wright, and Wright was obliged to withdraw. Humphreys was compelled to change front in order to meet the assault on his flanks. This maneuver served to stay the Confederate attack for a brief time. The Valley of Death between the Round Tops and the opposite height was now a seething mass of opposing forces, enshrouded in clouds of smoke.

Meade had already depleted his right to support his left by withdrawing all of Slocum’s 12th Corps except Greene’s Brigade. He now sent all of the 5th Corps to the left and ordered Caldwell’s Division from the left of Hancock’s 2nd Corps south of the Angle to the Wheatfield. Willard’s Brigade on Hays’ line of the 2nd Corps was ordered to advance and oppose the Confederate, Barksdale, who, after crossing the Emmitsburg Road north of the Peach Orchard and the field beyond, reached Watson’s Union battery posted on the Trostle farm. General Sickles was severely and Barksdale mortally wounded.

Wofford’s Brigade of McLaws’ Division broke through the salient at the Peach Orchard and reached the valley between Devil’s Den and Little Round Top, where they were met by a charge of the Pennsylvania Reserves of Crawford’s Division, led by McCandless, some of whose men fought in sight of their own homes. Wofford was obliged to withdraw to and beyond the Wheatfield; the Reserves advanced across the valley from their position on the north of Little Round Top and reached the stone wall on the east side of the Wheatfield. Here they remained until after Pickett’s charge on the 3rd, when they advanced against the Confederates who had succeeded in regaining control of that part of the field.

About the time when Sickles was wounded, Meade directed Hancock to assume command of Sickles’ Corps in addition to his own. Meade in person led Lockwood’s brigade, brought from the extreme right, against the Confederate advance. Newton, now in command of the 1st Corps, sent in Doubleday’s Division. With these troops Hancock checked the advance of the Confederate brigades of Barksdale, Wilcox, Perry, and Wright, while Sykes checked the advance of Hood and McLaws. Brigades of the 6th Corps reached the field toward the close of the engagement. Withdrawing from the Wheatfield Road, Bigelow’s battery made a determined stand at the Trostle buildings and succeeded in checking the Confederate advance until the gap on Sickles’ first line was protected by a line of guns. Most of the Confederate brigades got no farther than Plum Run, except Wright’s, which actually reached the line of guns on Hancock’s front before it was obliged to withdraw.

During the repulse of the Confederate advance, the 1st Minnesota regiment of Harrow’s Brigade of Gibbon’s Division of Hancock’s Corps was ordered by Hancock to oppose Wilcox’s and Perry’s Brigades, rapidly advancing against Hancock’s left. The Minnesota regiment moved up at once and succeeded in repelling the attack, but only after losing 82 per cent of its men.

Though seriously threatened, Meade’s line held, and after the repulse of Wright, the attack ended. During the night the line was prolonged to the top of Big Round Top. The Confederates remained west of Plum Run, except at Big Round Top, where they intrenched along the western slope.

Ewell’s Attack on Meade’s Right.

Ordered by Lee to begin his attack on Meade’s right at the same time as Longstreet’s attack on Meade’s left, Ewell’s artillery on Benner’s Hill opened fire on Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill where the Union forces were posted and well protected with earthworks. On account of the destructive fire from the Union batteries on East Cemetery Hill, Ewell lost most of his guns, and no infantry advance was made until Longstreet’s assault had ended. At sundown General Johnson’s infantry advanced against Culp’s Hill, General Early against East Cemetery Hill. Rodes, who was directed to move against West Cemetery Hill, was unable to obey instructions. General Walker, who had been sent east to Brinkerhoff Ridge in the forenoon, to guard Ewell’s flank, and who was expected to assist in this attack, was prevented by meeting part of the Union cavalry of Gregg’s Division that had arrived via Hanover on the forenoon of the 2nd. After an engagement with Gregg, Walker moved up to assist Johnson, but too late to be of service, as the attack on Culp’s Hill had ended.

The attack was conducted with the greatest dash and daring, in part up rough slopes of woodland over heaped boulders. On East Cemetery Hill the fight among the Union guns was hand to hand, and clubbed muskets, stones, and rammers were used to drive back the assailants. After sunset a bright moon illuminated the field. The Union troops stood firm, and at 10 o’clock the Confederates desisted, having captured only a few Union entrenchments.

Situation at End of the Second Day.

Lee’s assaults on Meade’s left had failed to accomplish anything decisive. While Sickles’ advance-line was driven back and most of the field, including the Peach Orchard, the Wheatfield, Devil’s Den, and the base of Big Round Top, was occupied by the Confederates, Meade’s line was practically intact from the crest of Big Round Top on the left to near Spangler’s Spring on the right. On the slopes of Round Top, on Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill, the advantage of the defensive positions multiplied the forces of the defenders in comparison with the attackers at least three to one. Prodigious deeds of valor were performed by both armies, and courage of the highest order was displayed in attack and in the defense. Casualties were very heavy on both sides. Meade estimated that his losses were 65 per cent of the total for the three days. At the end of the day he made the following report:

“_July 2, 1863, 8_ P.M. _The enemy attacked me about 4_ P.M. _this
day, and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed
at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded.
Among the former are Brigadier Generals Paul and Zook, and among the
wounded are Generals Sickles, Barlow, Graham, and Warren slightly. We
have taken a large number of prisoners. I shall remain in my present
position tomorrow, but am not prepared to say, until better advised of
the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an
offensive or defensive character._”

Later in the night, at a council of war held by Meade with his corps commanders—Gibbon, Williams, Sykes, Newton, Howard, Hancock, Sedgwick and Slocum—sentiment favored remaining and fighting a defensive battle. As Lee attacked both wings of Meade’s line on the 2nd it was expected that if another attack were made it would be on the center. This expectation was correct—Wright’s attack on the 2nd, when he succeeded in reaching Meade’s line south of the Angle, led Lee to believe that this was the most vulnerable point.

General Lee had more definite plans:

“_The result of this day’s operations induced the belief that, with
proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the
positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the
assaulting column, we should ultimately succeed, and it was
accordingly determined to continue the attack._”

The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett’s three brigades, which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2nd, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy’s right at the same time. The latter, during the night, re-enforced General Johnson with three brigades from Rodes’ and Early’s Divisions.

INCIDENTS OF THE SECOND DAY

The Roger House

The Roger House is located on the west side of the Emmitsburg Road, about a mile south of Gettysburg, midway between Meade’s line of battle on Cemetery Ridge and Lee’s line on Seminary Ridge. On the afternoon of July 2nd, after Sickles advanced his corps from its first position to the Emmitsburg Road, it was surrounded by the right of the new line. The 1st Massachusetts Regiment, whose monument stands adjacent to the house, held this part of the line, and was hotly engaged when the brigades of Wilcox and Wright advanced during the assault of Longstreet on the Union left on the afternoon of the 2nd. During Pickett’s Charge, on the afternoon of the 3rd, the house was again surrounded by fighting men.

While the battle raged on all sides, a granddaughter of the owner, Miss Josephine Miller, remained, and, notwithstanding the great danger, baked bread and biscuits for the hungry soldiers. In 1896, Miss Miller, then Mrs. Slyder, paid a visit to her old home, and related the following story of her experience to Mr. Wilfred Pearse, of Boston, Mass., a visitor to Gettysburg at the same time. After his return he published the following article.

“The veterans of the 1st Massachusetts Infantry Regiment will be glad to learn that the only woman member of the 3rd Army Corps ‘Veterans’ Association,’ Mrs. Slyder, née Miss Josephine Miller, granddaughter of farmer Roger, owner of the farm near which the 1st Massachusetts monument stands, is visiting her old home on the battleground where she stood from sunrise to sunset for two days of the battle making hot biscuits for the Boys in Blue. She refused to take money for the bread, and refused to stop her work even when Confederate shells were bursting around the house. She told me the other day that when her stock of flour was almost exhausted six members of the 1st Massachusetts kindly volunteered to go out and steal three sacks of flour from General Sickles’ commissary stores. In an hour’s time they returned with flour, raisins, currants, and a whole sheep, with which a rattling good meal was made.

“The old range still stands in the kitchen, and in it, at the last reunion of the 3rd Corps, Mrs. Slyder cooked a dinner for General Sickles.”

Spangler’s Spring

This spring, which takes its name from Abraham Spangler, its owner at the time of the battle, is located at the southeast corner of Culp’s Hill. Inasmuch as it was used by soldiers of both armies during the battle, and since then by thousands of tourists, it is an interesting feature of the field. Only during the drought of 1930 has it failed to give forth a copious flow of cool, pure water. At the time of the battle it was surrounded by a wall of flat stones with a flagstone cover over the top. These were removed and a canopy top erected.

The 12th Corps of the Army of the Potomac occupied this part of Meade’s line on the night of the first day and until the afternoon of the 2nd, when the troops were ordered to the left to help repel Longstreet’s assault. Until this time the spring was used only by the Union troops. During their absence, the Confederates under Johnson moved up and took possession of part of the vacated line. In the early morning of the third day, the Union forces, who had returned from the left during the night of the 2nd, attacked Johnson, drove him out and succeeded in regaining possession of the line that had been vacated by them on the afternoon of the 2nd, including the spring.

The story that a truce was entered into between the opposing forces on the night of the 2nd and that they met in large numbers at the spring to get water is a mistake. The captured and wounded of the Union forces were allowed access to it along with the Confederates who were there at the time, but there was no truce. When armies were encamped, pickets from the opposing lines would sometimes get together, usually to trade coffee and tobacco, but this was never done when a battle was in progress.

The following extract from the address of Captain Joseph Matchett at the dedication of the monument erected by the 46th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment, shows that there was no truce:

“Some time in the night (2nd), we were ordered to return to our works on Culp’s Hill. It seems Captain Selfridge of Company H had taken some of his men’s canteens and gone ahead to Spangler’s Spring to fill them, when he discovered ‘Johnnies’ also filling their canteens. He backed out with the best grace he could command, and reported it to the colonel. Colonel McDougall, the brigade commander, did not believe it and got very angry, but the colonel of the regiment insisted on deploying his men, and sent a skirmish line, who found the enemy as stated and saved many lives.”

Colonel Avery’s Lost Grave

Among those who faced death in the desperate charge on the Union right on East Cemetery Hill, July 2nd, Colonel I. E. Avery, of North Carolina, in command of Hoke’s brigade, bore a gallant part. At the head of the column he led his men up the slope of Cemetery Hill and, a conspicuous mark, fell mortally wounded.

Unable to speak, he drew a card from his pocket and wrote the following: “Tell father that I died with my face toward the enemy.” In the retreat from Gettysburg, his body was taken along to be delivered to his family, but when the army reached Williamsport the Potomac was too high to cross. There, in the cemetery overlooking the river, the remains were interred in an oak coffin under a pine tree. He was buried in his uniform by the men who saw him fall.

Thirty years after, Judge A. C. Avery, of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, a resident of Morgantown, and Captain J. A. McPherson of Fayette, N. C., both veterans of the Confederacy, came to Williamsport with the object of locating Colonel Avery’s grave. Their search was fruitless.

The Leister House

On his arrival, General Meade established his headquarters at the Leister House, one of the oldest houses in the community, located at the intersection of Meade Avenue and the Taneytown Road. At the time of the battle it was the property of a widow, Mrs. Leister. It now belongs to the Government, and a bronze plate marks it as Meade’s Headquarters. It is built of logs, chinked and weatherboarded with rough pine boards, pierced by bullet-holes and scarred by shells.

Inside there are two rooms, a small kitchen at the west, and a larger room at the east. In the latter, Meade held a council of war after the battle of the 2nd had ended, summoning his Corps commanders between 9 and 10 o’clock to consult them as to what action, if any, should be taken on the 3rd. Generals Sedgwick, Slocum, Hancock, Howard, Sykes, Newton, Birney, Williams, and Gibbon were present. The following questions were asked:

(1) Under existing circumstances is it advisable for this army to remain in its present position, or to retire to another nearer its base of supplies?

(2) It being determined to remain in present position, shall the army attack or wait the attack of the enemy?

(3) If we wait attack, how long?

_Replies_:

Gibbon: (1) Correct position of the army, but would not retreat. (2) In no condition to attack, in his opinion. (3) Until he moves.

Williams: (1) Stay. (2) Wait attack. (3) One day.

Birney and Sykes: Same as General Williams.

Newton: (1) Correct position of the army, but would not retreat. (2) By all means not attack. (3) If we wait it will give them a chance to cut our line.

Howard: (1) Remain. (2) Wait attack until 4 P.M. tomorrow. (3) If don’t attack, attack them.

Hancock: (1) Rectify position without moving so as to give up field. (2) Not attack unless our communications are cut. (3) Can’t wait long; can’t be idle.

Sedgwick: (1) Remain. (2) Wait attack. (3) At least one day.

Slocum: (1) Stay and fight it out.

The unanimous opinion of the council was to stay and await attack. Just as the council broke up, General Meade said to Gibbon, “If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be on your front. He has made attacks on both our flanks and failed, and if he concludes to try it again it will be on our center.” The attack of Lee on the 3rd was made where Meade expected.

During the forenoon of the third day, conditions at headquarters were generally quiet. In the afternoon, when the Confederate artillery on Seminary Ridge opened fire as a prelude to Pickett’s Charge, it was directed mainly against the left center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. As the location of Meade’s headquarters was in the immediate rear, just under the crest of the ridge, much damage was done by the hail of shot and shell that crossed the ridge. A shell exploded in the yard among the staff officers’ horses tied to the fence, and a number of them were killed, while still other horses were killed in the rear of the building. Several members of the headquarters’ guard were slightly wounded.

George G. Meade, a grandson of General Meade, in his interesting narrative “With Meade at Gettysburg,” tells the following story:

“During this rain of Confederate shell, and while Meade, deep in thought, was walking up and down this little back yard between the house and the Taneytown Road, he chanced to notice that some of his staff, during the enforced inactivity while waiting the pleasure of their general, were gradually and probably unconsciously edging around the side of the house.

“‘Gentlemen,’ he said, stopping and smiling pleasantly, ‘Are you trying to find a safer place? You remind me of the man who was driving the ox-cart which took ammunition for the heavy guns on the field of Palo Alto. Finding himself within range, he tilted up his cart and got behind it. Just then General Taylor came along, and seeing the attempt at shelter, shouted, “You damned fool; don’t you know you are no safer there than anywhere else?” The driver replied, “I don’t suppose I am, General, but it kind o’ feels so.”’”

As the firing still continued it was decided to move the headquarters several hundred yards south on the Taneytown Road, to a barn on the Cassatt property. There a Confederate shell exploded and wounded General Butterfield, the chief of staff, who was obliged to leave the field and was unable to return that day. After remaining a short time, General Meade and staff removed to General Slocum’s headquarters at Powers’ Hill, along the Baltimore Pike, moving there by way of Granite Lane.

The Louisiana Tigers

Major Chatham R. Wheat’s battalion of Louisiana Infantry was organized in New Orleans in May, 1861. Their first engagement was in the first battle of Bull Run, where Major Wheat was shot through both lungs. After his recovery, he re-entered the service and took an active part in command of the battalion in the defense of Richmond in 1863 against the advance of the Union forces under McClellan. During this campaign the battalion became known as “The Louisiana Tigers” on account of their desperate fighting qualities. At the battle of Gaines Mill, Major Wheat and several other leading officers of the battalion were killed, and the loss of the organization was very heavy. It was then broken up and the survivors distributed among the other Louisiana regiments, of Hays’ brigade of Early’s Division, and Nicholls’ brigade of Johnson’s Division of Ewell’s Corps. A number of them were in the battle of Gettysburg with these brigades, but not as the separate organization originally known as “The Louisiana Tigers.” This designation was given to all the Louisiana troops after the original battalion was discontinued. The story sometimes told, that 1,700 Louisiana Tigers attacked East Cemetery Hill on July 2nd, that all but 300 were killed or captured, and that the organization was unknown afterward, is not correct.

General Meade’s “Baldy”

In the first great battle of the Civil War, at Bull Run, there was a bright bay horse with white face and feet. He, as well as his rider, was seriously wounded and the horse was turned back to the quartermaster to recover. In September General Meade bought him and named him “Baldy.” Meade became deeply attached to the horse but his staff officers soon began to complain of his peculiar racking gait which was hard to follow. Faster than a walk and slow for a trot, it compelled the staff alternately to trot and walk.

“Baldy” was wounded twice at the first battle of Bull Run; he was at the battle of Drainsville; he took part in two of the seven days’ fighting around Richmond in the summer of 1862; he carried his master at Groveton, August 29th; at the second battle of Bull Run; at South Mountain and at Antietam. In the last battle he was left on the field for dead, but in the next Federal advance he was discovered quietly grazing on the battleground with a deep wound in his neck. He was tenderly cared for and soon was fit for duty. He bore the general at the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. For two days he was present at Gettysburg, where he received his most grievous wound from a bullet entering his body between the ribs and lodging there. Meade would not part with him and kept him with the army until the following spring.

In the preparations of the Army of the Potomac for the last campaign, “Baldy” was sent to pasture at Downingtown, Pa. After the surrender of Lee at Appomattox, Meade hurried to Philadelphia where he again met his faithful charger, fully recovered. For many years the horse and the general were inseparable companions, and when Meade died in 1872, “Baldy” followed the hearse. Ten years later he died, and his head and two fore-hoofs were mounted and are now cherished relics of the George G. Meade Post, Grand Army of the Republic, in Philadelphia.

General Lee’s “Traveller”

The most famous of the steeds in the stables of General Lee, was “Traveller,” an iron-gray horse. He was raised in Greenbriar County, Virginia, near Blue Sulphur Springs, and as a colt won first prize at a fair in Lewisburg. When hostilities commenced, Traveller, then called “Jeff Davis,” was owned by Major Thomas L. Broun, who had paid $175 in gold for him. In the spring of 1862, Lee bought him for $200 and changed his name to “Traveller.”

“Traveller” was the especial companion of the general. His fine proportions attracted immediate attention. He was gray in color, with black points, a long mane, and flowing tail. He stood sixteen hands high, and was five years old in the spring of 1862. His figure was muscular, with deep chest and short back, strong haunches, flat legs, small head, quick eyes, broad forehead, and small feet. His rapid, springy step and bold carriage made him conspicuous. On a long and tedious march he easily carried Lee’s weight at five or six miles an hour without faltering and at the end of the day’s march seemed to be as fresh as at the beginning. The other horses broke down under the strain and each in turn proved unequal to the rigors of war, but “Traveller” sturdily withstood the hardships of the campaigns in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. When, in April, 1865, the last battle of the Army of Northern Virginia had been fought and Lee rode to the McLean House at Appomattox Court House, he was astride “Traveller” who carried him back to his waiting army, and then to Richmond. When Lee became a private citizen and retired to Washington and Lee University as its president, the veteran war-horse was still with him, and as the years passed and both master and servant neared life’s ending, they became more closely attached. As the funeral cortege accompanied Lee to his last resting-place, “Traveller” marched behind the hearse. After “Traveller’s” death, his skeleton was mounted and is on exhibition in the museum in the chapel on the campus of Washington and Lee University.

THE THIRD DAY

The first engagement on the third day was a continuation and conclusion of the attack and defense of Meade’s right. His forces, returning from the left, where they had been sent on the afternoon of the 2nd, found part of their earthworks in possession of the enemy. At daybreak preparations were made to recapture the lost entrenchments. By 10.30 the effort was successful, and Meade’s line was once more intact from end to end.

Second Battle at Culp’s Hill.

This action on the morning of the 3rd was one of the most hotly contested of the battle. The Confederate losses in killed were almost the same as those of Pickett’s Division in the attack on Meade’s left center in the afternoon. Meade’s losses were comparatively light, as his line was well protected by the line of earthworks. So intense was the artillery and musketry fire that hundreds of trees were shattered. After the repulse, Johnson’s forces were withdrawn, and this ended their participation in the battle.

Meade’s Line of the Third Day.

After the engagement on the morning of the 2nd, the 12th Corps reoccupied its original line, beginning on the right at Spangler’s Hill and extending to and over Culp’s Hill. Wadsworth’s Division of the 1st Corps retained its position of the 2nd, between Culp’s Hill and Barlow’s Division under Ames of the 11th Corps, at the foot of East Cemetery Hill. Barlow’s Division was strengthened by a brigade of the 2nd Corps. Doubleday’s Division of the 1st Corps, which had taken the position of Caldwell’s Division on the left of the 2nd Corps, remained. Caldwell was posted so as to support the artillery reserve to the left of Doubleday.

The other divisions of the 1st and 2nd Corps remained in the positions they occupied on the morning of the 2nd. The 5th Corps extended the line from the left of the artillery reserve to Big Round Top. Some of the brigades of the 6th Corps were put in position as local reserves and others to protect the flanks of the line. The 3rd Corps was posted in rear of the center as a general reserve. A detachment of cavalry was in reserve in rear of the 2nd Corps at the Angle. Few changes were made in the artillery positions. Beginning at Cemetery Hill and extending to Little Round Top, about ninety guns, under General Hunt, were in position to operate.

Lee’s Line of the Third Day.

Beginning on the right, Longstreet’s Corps held the ground west of Plum Run, including the base of Big Round Top, Devil’s Den, and the Peach Orchard. Pickett’s Division, after its arrival on the field on the morning of the 3rd, took the place of Anderson in reserve. Heth’s and Pender’s Divisions extended the line to the left on Seminary Ridge, connecting with part of Rodes’ Division in the western part of the town. Early’s and Johnson’s Divisions, after the engagement on the morning of the 3rd, held their positions of the 2nd. Changes in the positions of the batteries of artillery were made on the morning of the 3rd. A total of 138 guns were in position to operate. Those on the right were in charge of Colonel E. P. Alexander; those on the left under Colonel R. L. Walker.

The Bliss Buildings.

After the end of the engagement at Culp’s Hill at 10.30 A.M. there was a short battle for the capture of the Bliss house and barn, midway between the lines in front of Ziegler’s Grove. These buildings were occupied by Confederate sharpshooters, who were causing considerable loss in Hays’ line of the 2nd Corps at the grove. Two regiments were sent forward, the 12th New Jersey and the 14th Connecticut, and the buildings were captured and burned.

The Artillery Duel.

Until 1 o’clock there was comparative quiet. It was ended on the stroke of the hour by two guns of Miller’s battery belonging to the Washington artillery of New Orleans, posted near the Peach Orchard, and fired in rapid succession as a signal to the Confederate artillery.

The Confederate Colonel Alexander says:

“_At exactly 1 o’clock by my watch the two signal guns were heard in
quick succession. In another minute every gun was at work. The enemy
was not slow in coming back at us, and the grand roar of nearly the
whole of both armies burst in on the silence._

“_The enemy’s position seemed to have broken out with guns everywhere,
and from Round Top to Cemetery Hill was blazing like a volcano._”

The artillery duel was but a preface, intended to clear the ground for the infantry action to follow. The order had already been given by Longstreet to Alexander:

“_Colonel: The intention is to advance the infantry if the artillery
has the desired effect of driving the enemy off, or having other
effect such as to warrant us in making the attack. When the moment
arrives advise General Pickett, and of course advance such artillery
as you can use in making the attack._”

General Wright, who was present when this order was received, expressed doubt as to whether the attack could be successfully made. He said:

“_It is not so hard to go there as it looks; I was nearly there with
my brigade yesterday. The trouble is to stay there. The whole Yankee
army is there in a bunch._”

For one and a half hours the air was filled with screaming, whistling shot and shell. An occasional Whitworth missile, from Oak Hill on the north, made, on account of its peculiar form, a noise that could be heard above the din of all others. The headquarters of General Meade at the Leister House formed a concentric point continually swept with a storm of shot and shell. Headquarters were therefore moved to Slocum’s headquarters at Powers’ Hill, along the Baltimore Pike.

Batteries on the Union line, especially at the Angle, were badly damaged, and General Hunt had others brought forward with additional supplies of ammunition. On the whole the losses inflicted upon the Union infantry were comparatively light. The stone wall and the undulations of the ground afforded protection, as most of the men were lying down.

After the artillery had operated for about an hour and a half, Meade and Hunt deemed it prudent to stop the fire, in order to cool the guns, save ammunition, and allow the atmosphere between the lines to clear of the dense cloud of smoke before the expected attack was made. This pause in the fire led the Confederates to believe that the Union line was demoralized, and that the opportune time had arrived for the onset of the infantry. Accordingly, they moved forward and Pickett’s Charge was on.

At the signal station on Little Round Top, General Warren and others saw gray infantry moving out across the plain in front of the Spangler Woods. Warren at once wig-wagged to General Hunt:

“_They are moving out to attack._”

This message was passed from man to man along the entire Union line.

Pickett’s Charge.

Pickett’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps was moved from the rear to the ravine in front of the Spangler Woods and placed in line as follows: Kemper on the right; Garnett on the left in the front line; Armistead in the rear, overlapping Kemper’s left and Garnett’s right, in the second line. On the left of Garnett was ranged Archer’s Brigade of Hill’s Corps under Frye, then Pettigrew’s Brigade under Marshall. Next to Marshall came Davis’ Brigade of Hill’s Corps, and on the extreme left Brockenbrough’s Brigade, also of Hill’s Corps. In the rear of the right of Pickett were the brigades of Wilcox and Perry of Hill’s Corps and in the rear of Pettigrew were the brigades of Scales and Lane of Hill’s Corps, in command of Trimble.

The column of assault consisted of 42 regiments—19 Virginia, 15 North Carolina, 2 Alabama, 3 Tennessee, and 3 Mississippi—a total of about 15,000 men.

In addition to the artillery fire, they encountered 27 regiments—9 of New York, 5 of Pennsylvania, 3 of Massachusetts, 3 of Vermont, 1 of Michigan, 1 of Maine, 1 of Minnesota, 1 of New Jersey, 1 of Connecticut, 1 of Ohio, and 1 of Delaware—a total of 9,000 to 10,000 men.

In advance of the assaulting column a strong skirmish line was deployed. A skirmish line was also deployed in front of Meade’s line, which fell back as the assaulting column drew near.

The Advance.

General Longstreet ordered General Alexander, Chief of Artillery, to watch the havoc wrought in the Union line and signify the moment for advance.

General Alexander says:

“_Before the cannonade opened I made up my mind to give the order to
advance within fifteen or twenty minutes after it began. But when I
looked at the full development of the enemy’s batteries and knew that
his infantry was generally protected from fire by stone walls and
swells of the ground, I could not bring myself to give the word._

“_I let the 15 minutes pass, and 20, and 25, hoping vainly for
something to turn up. Then I wrote to Pickett: ‘If you are coming at
all, come at once, or I cannot give you proper support; but the
enemy’s fire has not slackened at all; at least eighteen guns are
still firing from the cemetery itself.’_

“_Five minutes after sending that message, the enemy’s fire suddenly
began to slacken, and the guns in the cemetery limbered up and vacated
the position._

“_Then I wrote to Pickett: ‘Come quick; eighteen guns are gone; unless
you advance quick, my ammunition won’t let me support you properly.’_

“_Pickett then rode forward, and on meeting Longstreet said: ‘General,
shall I advance?’ Longstreet nodded his assent and the column moved
forward._”

The column passed through the line of guns, fifteen or eighteen of which had been ordered to follow. Meanwhile the eighteen Union guns that were withdrawn were replaced by others. The Union line was once more intact, and it opened a terrific fire against the rapidly moving columns of assault. As the Confederates continued to advance, their courage unaffected in face of the tremendous fire of both artillery and infantry, their enemies were filled with admiration.

At the Emmitsburg Road, where post-and-rail fences had to be crossed, the line was broken, but only for a moment. The musketry fire from the Union line was so heavy that the attacking column was unable to maintain a regular alignment, and when the Angle was reached the identity of the different brigades was lost.

Armistead’s Brigade forged to the front at the Angle, and, reaching the wall, Armistead raised his hat on his sword and said:

“_Give them the cold steel, boys!_”

With a few men he advanced to Cushing’s guns, where he fell, mortally wounded. Cushing also was mortally wounded. Garnett, who was mounted, was killed a short distance from the wall. Kemper was badly wounded. Pickett lost all of his field officers but one. The Union Generals Hancock and Gibbon were wounded at the same time. For a short time the struggle was hand to hand.

To the right of the Angle most of the brigades on Pickett’s left reached the stone wall on Hays’ front at Ziegler’s Grove, but were obliged to retreat after meeting a withering fire both in front and on flank.

The brigades of Wilcox and Perry, in the rear of Pickett’s right, did not move until after the advance lines were part way across. Because of a misunderstanding, a gap was opened between Pickett’s right and Wilcox’s left. At once Stannard’s Vermont Brigade of the 1st Corps attacked both Pickett’s right and Wilcox’s left.

General Pickett, who had reached the Codori buildings, saw that the assaulting forces were unable to accomplish the object of the charge, and ordered a retreat. It was accomplished, but with heavy losses.

Both commanding officers witnessed the retreat: General Meade from where his statue stands east of the Angle, and General Lee from the position of his statue north of the Spangler Woods.

Engagements on the Union Left.

While Pickett’s Charge was under way, the Pennsylvania Reserves, under McCandless, charged from the stone wall on the east side of the Wheatfield and regained possession of Devil’s Den and adjacent territory held by Longstreet’s forces since the engagement of the afternoon of the 2nd. Farther south, between Big Round Top and the line held by Longstreet’s right, a cavalry charge was made by Farnsworth’s Brigade of Kilpatrick’s Division. Farnsworth was killed. Merritt’s Brigade of Buford’s Division, which reached the field on the 3rd, engaged some of Longstreet’s troops along the Emmitsburg Road. The accomplished object of these movements was to prevent Longstreet from giving assistance to the charge of Pickett on Meade’s center.

The Cavalry Fight on the Right Flank.

As already noted, General Stuart in his movement in rear of the Army of the Potomac with three brigades of cavalry—Fitzhugh Lee’s, Wade Hampton’s, and Chambliss’—reached Hanover on June 30th, fought a battle in the streets, and moved on to Carlisle on the afternoon of July 1st. There he got in touch with the main Confederate Army, with which he had been out of communication for seven days.

After an encounter with a portion of Kilpatrick’s forces at Hunterstown on the afternoon of July 2nd, he moved up to a position between the Hunterstown and Harrisburg roads on Ewell’s left, expecting to reach Meade’s rear about the time of Pickett’s Charge on Meade’s front. He was joined by Jenkins’ Confederate Brigade of mounted infantry armed with Enfield rifles. Jenkins was wounded at Hunterstown, and the brigade and the command fell to Colonel Ferguson.

General Gregg, in command of the 2nd Cavalry Division of the Union Army, reached the field east of Gettysburg at the intersection of the Hanover and Low Dutch roads at 11 A.M. on July 2nd. In the afternoon he halted a movement of Walker’s brigade of Johnson’s Division, Ewell’s Corps, in their movement from Brinkerhoff Ridge to assist in the attack on Meade’s right at Culp’s Hill. He bivouacked for the night near the bridge across White Run. On the morning of the 3rd he returned to the position of the 2nd, and took an active part in the cavalry fight on the right flank at the time of Pickett’s Charge. In the afternoon, in the important engagement on East Cavalry Field he successfully opposed General Stuart in his efforts to get behind the Union line.

The Location.

East Cavalry Field is 3 miles east of Gettysburg and includes the territory lying between the York Pike on the north and the Hanover Road on the south. On the east it is bounded by the Low Dutch Road which intersects the Baltimore Pike at its southern end, and the York Pike at its northern end. Brinkerhoff Ridge, which crosses the Hanover Road at right angles about 1½ miles east of the town, forms its boundary on the west. Cress Ridge is formed by the elevation between Cress’s Run on the west and Little’s Run on the east. Both ridges right angle across the Hanover Road.

All the positions held by troops have been marked and the entire field is readily accessible over well-built roads and avenues. Because of its partial isolation from the principal fields, this important area is not visited as frequently as it should be.

General Stuart’s Plan.

General Stuart did not wish to bring on a general engagement. He expected his skirmishers to keep the Union Cavalry engaged while his other forces were moving undiscovered toward the rear of Meade’s line. He says in his report:

“_On the morning of July 3, pursuant to instructions from the
commanding general, I moved forward to a position to the left of Gen.
Ewell’s left, and in advance of it, where a commanding ridge (Cress
Ridge) completely controlled a wide plain of cultivated fields
stretching toward Hanover, on the left, and reaching to the base of
the mountain spurs, among which the enemy held position. My command
was increased by the addition of Jenkins’ Brigade, who here in the
presence of the enemy allowed themselves to be supplied with but 10
rounds of ammunition, although armed with approved Enfield muskets._

“_I moved this command and W. H. F. Lee’s secretly through the woods
to a position, and hoped to effect a surprise upon the enemy’s rear,
but Hampton’s and Fitz Lee’s Brigades, which had been ordered to
follow me, unfortunately debouched into the open ground, disclosing
the movement, and causing a corresponding movement of a large force of
the enemy’s cavalry._”

It was the advance of Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee which caused Stuart’s plans to miscarry.

General Gregg’s Report.

On the Union side, General D. McM. Gregg had under his command three brigades of cavalry—one in command of General George A. Custer, who later was responsible for “Custer’s Last Charge” in Indian warfare. General Gregg’s report gives a brief description of the many charges and countercharges:

“_A strong line of skirmishers displayed by the enemy was evidence
that the enemy’s cavalry had gained our right, and were about to
attack, with the view of gaining the rear of our line of battle. The
importance of successfully resisting an attack at this point, which,
if succeeded in by the enemy, would have been productive of the most
serious consequences, determined me to retain the brigade of the Third
Division until the enemy were driven back. General Custer, commanding
the brigade, fully satisfied of the intended attack, was well pleased
to remain with his brigade. The First New Jersey Cavalry was posted as
mounted skirmishers to the right and front in a wood. The Third
Pennsylvania Cavalry deployed as dismounted skirmishers to the left
and front in open fields, and the First Maryland on the Hanover
turnpike, in position to protect the right of my line._

“_The very superior force of dismounted skirmishers of the enemy
advanced on our left and front required the line to be re-enforced by
one of General Custer’s regiments. At this time the skirmishing became
very brisk on both sides, and the artillery fire was begun by the
enemy and ourselves. During the skirmish of the dismounted men, the
enemy brought upon the field a column for a charge. The charge of this
column was met by the Seventh Michigan Cavalry, of the First (Second)
Brigade, Third Division, but not successfully. The advantage gained in
this charge was soon wrested from the enemy by the gallant charge of
the First Michigan, of the same brigade. This regiment drove the enemy
back to his starting point, the enemy withdrew to his left, and on
passing the wood in which the First New Jersey Cavalry was posted,
that regiment gallantly and successfully charged the flank of his
column. Heavy skirmishing was still maintained by the Third
Pennsylvania Cavalry with the enemy, and was continued until
nightfall. During the engagement, a portion of this regiment made a
very handsome and successful charge upon one of the enemy’s regiments.
The enemy retired his column behind his artillery, and at dark
withdrew from his former position. The fire of the artillery during
this engagement was the most accurate that I have ever seen._”

Stuart’s forces numbered about 7,000, and Gregg and Custer’s about 5,000.

Lee’s Retreat.

On the night of the 3rd, Lee withdrew all his forces to Seminary and Snyder ridges. Orders were issued and instructions given for the retreat to the Potomac River at Williamsport and Falling Waters. The effectives moved to Fairfield over the Hagerstown or Fairfield Road. The wagon-train, 17 miles long, with the wounded, was moved by way of the Cashtown Road (Chambersburg Pike), under the command of Brigadier-General John D. Imboden, who has described his interview with General Lee at his headquarters, which were still located in an orchard in the rear of the Seminary buildings, as follows:

“_He invited me into his tent, and as soon as we were seated he
remarked: ‘We must now return to Virginia. As many of our poor wounded
as possible must be taken home. I have sent for you because your men
and horses are fresh and in good condition, to guard and conduct our
train back to Virginia. The duty will be arduous, responsible, and
dangerous, for I am afraid you will be harassed by the enemy’s
cavalry. I can spare you as much artillery as you may require but no
other troops, as I shall need all I have to return safely by a
different and shorter route than yours. The batteries are generally
short of ammunition, but you will probably meet a supply I have
ordered from Winchester to Williamsport._”

On account of a terrific rainstorm shortly after noon on the 4th there was considerable delay in getting the Confederate train started. Well guarded in front and rear, the head of the column near Cashtown was put in motion and began the ascent of the mountain. The wounded suffered indescribable hardships. Many had been without food for thirty-six hours, and had received no medical attention since the battle. Among the wounded officers were General Pender and General Scales. The trip cost Pender his life. General Imboden said:

“_During this retreat I witnessed the most heartrending scenes of the
War._”

As a military movement the retreat was a success. Though harassed by pursuing forces, the train reached the Potomac with comparatively little loss.

The main Confederate Army crossed the mountain, principally at the Fairfield gap. On account of the heavy rain, Ewell’s Corps, which brought up the rear did not leave Gettysburg until the forenoon of the 5th. Somewhat delayed, but not seriously impeded, Lee arrived at the Potomac on July 12, finding it too high to cross. There he entrenched his army. The next day, the waters having fallen, he got safely away.

No Pursuit by Meade.

Because of Lee’s strong position, Meade made no countercharge. He had won a notable victory, and believed it unwise to risk undoing his work. His army had suffered heavily. Both armies moved south. The Confederate cause had received a severe blow. The defeat at Gettysburg and the surrender of Vicksburg on July 4th to Grant ended all hope of foreign recognition. Yet, for almost two years the desperate struggle was to continue!

The Gettysburg Carnage.

The War records estimate the Union casualties, killed, wounded, and missing, at 23,000 of the 84,000 engaged. The Confederate casualties are estimated at over 20,000 of the 75,000 engaged. Approximately 10,000 bodies were left at Gettysburg for burial, and 21,000 living men to be healed of their wounds.

No words can picture the desolation of the little town. As the soldiers marched away, their places were taken by physicians and surgeons, nurses and orderlies, civilian as well as military, and the ministrations of mercy began. In these the citizens of Gettysburg, especially the women, took an important part. Hither came also a new army of parents and wives and brothers and sisters, seeking, sometimes with success, sometimes with grievous disappointment, for their beloved.

HAPPENINGS ON THE THIRD DAY

A Medal for Disobedience

On the afternoon of July 3rd, Captain William E. Miller, of Company H, 2nd Brigade, of Gregg’s Division of Union Cavalry, made a charge against the Confederate Cavalry, in command of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, in their movement from Cress Ridge, East Cavalry Field, to reach the rear of Meade’s line at the time of Pickett’s Charge.

The incident is described by Captain William Brooke Rawle, a participant in the charge, in his “History of the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.”

“When the cavalry fighting began, Captain Miller’s squadron was stationed in Lott’s woods to the west of the Low Dutch Road, beyond the Hanover Road, and was deployed, mounted as skirmishers, along the western edge of the woods. There was considerable long-range firing before the climax of the fighting came. About 3 o’clock in the afternoon ... a large body of cavalry, which proved to be Hampton’s and Fitzhugh Lee’s brigades, was seen approaching in magnificent order, mounted, from the northern side of the field. Captain Miller and I rode out a few yards in front of our position to a slight rise in the ground to get a good view. The enemy quickened his pace, first to a trot, then to a gallop, and then the charge was sounded. The nearest available compact body of Union Cavalry at hand to meet the enemy was the 1st Michigan Cavalry of General Custer’s brigade, which was serving temporarily under General Gregg. It was ordered to meet the enemy’s charge by a counter-charge, although the Confederate brigade greatly outnumbered the Michigan regiment. Captain Miller and I saw at once that unless more men were sent against the enemy the Michigan regiment would be swept from the field. He said to me, ‘I have been ordered to hold this position at all hazards, but if you will back me up if I get into trouble for exceeding my orders, I will make a charge with the squadron.’ This was in order to make a diversion in favor of our troops, and help the Michigan men. I assured him in an emphatic manner that I would stand by him through thick and thin. He then ordered me to rally the left wing of the squadron while he did the same with the right. When this was done the squadron fired a volley into the Confederate column, which was within easy range. The men were very impatient to begin their charge, and the right wing, headed by Captain Miller, started off at a gallop.