Chapter I: Preface

The paucity of war experience since the introduction of the steam-driven armoured ship invests the battle of Tsu-shima with supreme importance. Between Trafalgar and the 27th May 1905, there had been only two fleet actions on a large scale--those of Lissa and of the Yalu--and the first was fought before the wooden vessel had disappeared and the rifled gun had become universal. The various minor engagements which occurred during this long period were either destitute of teaching, or failed to provide an adequate basis for conclusions capable of serving as guides to a rational system of tactics or to a scientific shipbuilding policy.

It has, therefore, followed, in this country especially, that the evolution of the warship has been frequently capricious, indicating the absence of any clear principles, and entailing an immense total expenditure upon vessels unsuited to our national requirements, but happily not forced to demonstrate their inutility.

In all wars, whether by sea or land, some few general lessons stand out unmistakably; but the difficulty of arriving at a just estimate of the relative significance of the causes which have led to victory or to defeat is always extreme. Genius, which may be defined as an unerring sense of proportion, is necessarily rare, and the person with an _idée fixe_ in favour of some particular method or weapon will generally discover, in every conflict, evidence in support of his faith. This tendency will be most marked when national experience of war is lacking, and we are, therefore, compelled to draw our inspirations from fighting carried on by other peoples.

In the long series of wars which culminated in the Nelson era, broad principles had been evolved and had been grasped by the leaders of naval thought. More than ninety years have elapsed since the British Navy was called upon to fight a great fleet action, and meanwhile technical progress of all kinds, advancing by giant strides, has opened out new possibilities tending to bewilder the imagination and to invite mistakes and impolicy.

Even when, as now, valuable war experience is available, there is always a risk of false deductions. Conditions differ so greatly that generalisations based upon special episodes may be misleading and even dangerous. Thus the American Navy and our own have unquestionably suffered from shallow reasoning derived from the peculiar operations of the Civil War. Similarly, the action off Lissa led to a cult of the ram which has left a deep impress upon shipbuilding, while a few isolated successes obtained by torpedoes, in exceptional circumstances, have given rise to exaggerated claims on behalf of this weapon which can only end in disappointment.

Instances could be multiplied, and the obvious moral is the vital necessity for the most careful study by the clearest available brains before translating any so-called lesson of war into national policy. In a single year a navy of the magnitude of our own may be committed to many millions of expenditure, the result of which will affect its fighting efficiency for nearly a quarter of a century. The vital need for caution and for profound study of all such experience as is forthcoming is, therefore, evident.

The battle of Tsu-shima is by far the greatest and the most important naval event since Trafalgar, and the navy which is able to draw the most accurate conclusions, technical as well as tactical, from its experiences and to apply them in terms of policy and of training will secure marked advantage in the future.

At the battle of the Yalu the Japanese and Chinese fleets were numerically equal--twelve ships--but the former had only three vessels (all under 3000 tons) carrying side armour, and eight were protected cruisers.[1] The Chinese, on the other hand, had five vessels with side armour, including two battleships, and six protected cruisers.[1] In heavy armament the Chinese had a great superiority, the Japanese having the advantage in quick-firing guns, as shown below:

------------------------------+------+-------
GUNS. |JAPAN.| CHINA.
------------------------------+------+-------
12-inch and over | 3 | 8
Over 8-inch and under 12-inch | 8 | 17
Intermediate | 27 | 15
Q.F. 6-inch and 4.7 inch | 67 | 2
------------------------------+------+-------

At Tsu-shima the classification of armoured ships engaged was as follows:

--------------------------+--------+--------
CLASS. | JAPAN. | RUSSIA.
--------------------------+--------+--------
Battleships | 4 | 8
Coast-defence Armour-clad | ... | 3
Armoured Cruisers | 8 | 3
+--------+--------
TOTAL, | 12 | 14
--------------------------+--------+--------

The respective armaments were:

-------+-------+-------+------+------+---------------
| | | | | Q.F.
| | | | +------+--------
GUNS. | 12-IN.| 10-IN.| 9-IN.| 8-IN.| 6-IN.| 4.7 IN.
-------+-------+-------+------+------+------+--------
Japan | 16 | 1 | ... | 30 | 160 | ...
Russia | 26 | 15 | 4 | 8 | 102 | 30
-------+-------+-------+------+------+------+--------

In heavy guns (9-inch and over) the Russians had the large preponderance of 28, the proportion being 45 to 17. In the smaller types, 4.7-inch to 8-inch, on the other hand, the Japanese superiority was 50, and in the 6-inch Q.F. type alone it was 58. A fair inference seems to be that the Japanese secondary armaments played the most important part in the first and practically decisive period of the battle.

In both actions the Japanese had the highest average speed--about 2 knots at the battle of the Yalu and much more at Tsu-shima, where the three Russian coast-defence ships, the older battleships, and the three armoured cruisers were poor steamers. Excluding, on the Russian side, the _Sissoy-Veliki_, _Navarin_, and _Nicolay I._, the difference of average battleship speed was only 0.6 knots; but the condition of the Russian vessels was such that they could not approach their theoretical maximum.

These were the antecedent technical conditions of a great battle which, in the startling decisiveness of its results, and in the fact that the victors lost no ship, challenges comparison with that of the Nile. The tangled chain of causation now requires to be unravelled by the coolest heads at our disposal, excluding all previous bias, and seeking only to apportion the true relative values of the various factors involved with the single object of securing the sound direction of future naval policy.

What part did superior speed play in carrying destruction to the Russian fleet? What guns established the initial superiority of fire and wrought the havoc, moral and material, which ensured victory? What purpose did armour serve, and how did its distribution conform to the needs of the battle? It is upon the answers to such questions as these that our naval policy must depend.

Underlying the experience of the battle of Tsu-shima there are undoubtedly principles of general application. It is for us to ascertain those principles, and to apply them as a test to all ship designs and tactical theories.

The merit of this little work is that it records the impressions of a naval officer who apparently had no official duties to absorb his attention. Captain Semenoff had also the advantage of being present on board the _Cesarevitch_ at the action of the 10th August 1904, when it was vital to the Japanese to take no great risks. He significantly notes the difference of conditions. At Tsu-shima, Admiral Togo was determined to force a decisive action. Moreover, the Japanese had, meanwhile, improved their fuses. Thus, in the later action, “shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly.... It seemed as if these were mines, not shells.... They burst as soon as they touched anything.... No! It was different to the 10th August.”

Incidentally the author notes the “portmanteaus” (Japanese 12-inch shell) “curving awkwardly head over heels through the air and falling anyhow on the water.” This shows that some of the Japanese 12-inch guns--numbering only sixteen--were so much worn as to be unable to give adequate rotation to their projectiles, which consequently could only have hit the Russian ships by accident.

The _Suvoroff_, where Captain Semenoff’s experiences were gained, was a ship of 13,500 tons, with a continuous armour belt 12 feet broad, tapering in length at the water-line from 8 inches to 6 inches, and vertically from 6 inches to 4 inches above. Her heavy armament consisted of four 12-inch guns in 10-inch turrets, standing upon 10-inch barbettes built up from the armoured deck. The secondary armament of twelve 6-inch guns was mounted in 6-inch turrets standing upon 6-inch barbettes, all built up from the upper deck. Below the 6-inch barbettes were armoured ammunition hoists carried down to the belt level. A main armoured deck (3 to 2 inches) at the water-line level extended all over the ship.

Such was the _Suvoroff_, which was driven out of the line in less than forty minutes, and after being reduced to the hopeless state described by Captain Semenoff, was gratuitously torpedoed by the Japanese. Being the flag-ship of the Commander-in-Chief she was doubtless singled out as a target; but, of her three sister-ships, the _Alexander III._ was sunk by gun fire about five hours after the beginning of the action; the _Borodino_ also sank in five hours, apparently as the result of the explosion of a magazine; and the _Orel_ surrendered on the 28th with main turrets not seriously injured and thick armour not penetrated.

The general impression conveyed by Captain Semenoff, and confirmed from other sources, is that the Russian ships were overwhelmed by the volume of the Japanese fire, and that frequency of hitting rather than weight of shells should be the main object. If this conclusion is correct, the principle which guided the British Navy in the days of Nelson--to close to effective range and then deliver the most rapid fire possible--has been strikingly reaffirmed. Effective ranges have increased; but this principle remains unchanged and is probably unchangeable.

The trouble which arose from the outbreak of fire on board the _Suvoroff_ and from the wreckage of the bridges and spar-deck, the men killed in the conning tower, the penetration of the armoured deck near the bow, the down-draught of smoke, the estimate of range (“a little more than 20 cables”) at a critical moment--all these points, which present themselves in the narrative, claim attention and careful comparison with other accounts.

Captain Semenoff’s impressions of the manœuvring of the fleets may well be somewhat vague; but it is worth collating with other observations. Lastly, the graphic touches of the author show with painful distinctness the terrible strain imposed upon human endurance. Few who read his account of the heroic signalmen “standing silently and outwardly calm,” unwilling to go below the armoured deck, wishing only for orders, and feeling “themselves indispensable to the fight,” will be inclined to accept the recent theory that partly-trained and half-disciplined men are fit to find a place on board ship in modern naval war.

Upon a correct understanding of the lessons of Tsu-shima the expenditure of millions of public money and the efficiency of the Navy in the near future must mainly depend. If this simple narrative can, in however small a degree, help us to attain such an understanding, its publication will be abundantly justified.

G. S. CLARKE.

LONDON, _10th November 1906_.

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

The following account of the battle of Tsu-shima, fought on 27th May 1905, is a translation of the narrative of Captain Vladimir Semenoff, a Russian naval officer who was on board the flag-ship (_Knyaz Suvoroff_) during the engagement. It is of more than usual interest, as the writer had previously served in the _Cesarevitch_ at Port Arthur, and had taken part in the disastrous sally from that port on 10th August 1904.

At the great battle of which he now relates his experiences, he was present in an unofficial capacity, which gave him unlimited opportunity for observation. Moreover, the fact of his being able to make a series of notes at the time (till too seriously wounded) puts an additional stamp of reality on to his already most graphic account.

It should be remembered that the Russian Baltic fleet--Russia’s final and supreme appeal to the God of Battles--left Cronstadt for the Far East on 11th September 1904, and during all the long months till the following May was slowly making its way, _viâ_ the Cape of Good Hope, to Japanese waters. The difficulties encountered during that prolonged voyage were enormous. The nerves of officers and men, who constantly apprehended attempts to destroy the fleet, were in a continual state of tension: news of the outside world and especially of events in the Far East was practically unobtainable: and yet officers and men, despite the additional disadvantage of having to take their ships into action after these many months at sea, fearlessly entered into an engagement which they knew meant death, and fought their ships with a self-devotion and courage which has earned for them the admiration of the world.

Admiral Togo--flying his flag on the _Mikasa_--awaited the enemy in Japanese waters. His fleet, which, since the fall of Port Arthur on 2nd January 1905, had been relieved of its blockading duties, had spent the intervening months in repairing damage and bringing itself up to the highest state of preparation in expectation of the coming of the Baltic fleet.

To a nation like ourselves, whose first line of defence is the Navy, I venture to think that these pages will give food for thought, as, besides enabling the reader to see the paralysing and awful effect of high explosives thrown on board a modern battleship in action, they supply us with a picture of what a losing engagement means to those who lose.

When first I took up the original volume I read it merely with a view to extracting information _re_ fire effect, gun power, weather conditions, formations, and other factors complementary to the result of the battle. But the narrative appeared so realistic that the thought occurred to me to place the following translation before the public.

The speed maintained by the opposing fleets during the battle is shown in the diagram attached. Dates have been expressed according to the English calendar (which is thirteen days in advance of the Russian)--otherwise the writer’s own words and colloquial style have, as far as possible, been faithfully adhered to, to the detriment of literary style in translating.

It may be mentioned that this narrative comes as a supplement to the very interesting account by Politovsky of the voyage of the Baltic fleet to the Far East--recently translated by Major Godfrey and published by John Murray under the title “From Libau to Tsu-shima.”

Politovsky went down in the _Suvoroff_, and his story ends with the arrival of the fleet at Shanghai on 23rd May, the date on which he posted his last letter to Russia. The following narrative commences on 25th May, as the fleet swung out of Shanghai to meet its destiny.

A. B. L.

_7th November 1906._

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
PAGE
Weather on leaving Shanghai--“Order of march”--Instructions
for taking order of battle--Accident to _Senyavin’s_
engines--Manœuvres on 26th May--Spoilt by 3rd
squadron--Unpreparedness of Russian fleet--A forlorn
hope--Comparison between Russian and Japanese ships--
Feeling on Board the _Suvoroff_--Togo’s whereabouts--
A discussion--Will he be misled?--Will the Russian
fleet slip past?--Which course to follow?--Three
possibilities 1–24

CHAPTER II

Not yet discovered--Intercepting Japanese wireless
messages--Night of 26th May--Doings in the _Suvoroff_--
The engine-room--The ward-room--Reflections and
ruminations--Commander V. V. Ignatzius--His
opinion--A desperate adventure--Dawn on 27th May--The
_Sinano Maru_ runs into the hospital ships--The fleet
discovered--Recall of the scouts--Four Japanese ships
reported--_Idzumi_ sighted 6.45 A.M.--And later the 3rd
Japanese squadron--Russian fleet takes order of battle--
11.20 A.M., opens fire--A mistake--Ship’s companies
have dinner--The alarm--Japanese light cruisers--
Russians manœuvre--Orders misunderstood--Result--
Japanese main force sighted--The eve of battle--
Rozhdestvensky enters the conning tower 25–50

CHAPTER III

Movements of Japanese fleet--A dangerous manœuvre--Russians
open fire--Enemy replies--“Portmanteaus”--Accurate
shooting--Author wounded--Comparison with 10th August--
Japanese fuses--Havoc and destruction--Gun power--
A new explosive--In the conning tower--The enemy
untouched--Russian ships on fire--Fighting the flames--
A shell in the dressing station--Casualties and damage
everywhere--Again in the conning tower 51–80

CHAPTER IV

The enemy’s superior speed--His attempt to cross the Russian
T--_Suvoroff’s_ Captain wounded--A funnel shot away--
Steering gear disabled--She leaves the line--Terrific
shell fire--Japanese reports--Fore-bridge in flames--
Demchinsky wounded--Spirit of the men--Fire in the
dressing station--Attempts to extinguish it--Scene on
the upper deck--Author again wounded--The hospital--
Death and destruction in the conning tower--Necessity
of abandoning it--Transfer to lower fighting position--
Admiral wounded--Carried into a turret 81–110

CHAPTER V

The _Alexander_ leads the fleet--Attempt to pass astern of
Japanese column--Enemy turns 16 points--Destruction
in the _Alexander_--The _Borodino_ on fire--Defeat
inevitable--3.25 P.M., the _Suvoroff_ heels over--
Forward turret destroyed--Attacked by torpedo-boats--
Work of one projectile--Rumoured damage to enemy--
Effect on men’s spirits--Death of Commander Ignatzius--
Torpedo-boats approach--Only two serviceable guns--A
tour of inspection--Effect of Japanese gun fire--Their
explosive--Kursel the Courlandian--Destruction of
officers’ quarters--Author again wounded 111–135

CHAPTER VI

4 P.M., fleets lose each other--5 P.M., Russian fleet
steams northwards--Passes the _Suvoroff_--The
_Borodino_ leads--The _Alexander_ heeling over--
Torpedo-boats ahead!--The _Buiny_--Admiral to be
transferred--Attempts to collect the Staff--Death
of all hands below--No boats available--Difficulty
of the undertaking--Rozhdestvensky put aboard--The
_Buiny_ steams off--Description of the flag-ship--The
Admiral’s condition--Nebogatoff in command--Sinking
of the _Alexander_--Overtaking the fleet--Sinking of
the _Oslyabya_--Also of the _Borodino_--End of the
_Suvoroff_ 136–162

COMPOSITION OF THE OPPOSING FLEETS 163

DIAGRAM OF MOVEMENTS _At end._

TO THE EVERLASTING MEMORY
OF THE HEROES WHO
PERISHED!

THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA

In memory of the _Suvoroff_!