Chapter XXII: The Cost of the Soudan to Egypt

The Nile Valley presents some peculiar examples of political organization. At one end of it is Uganda, a British Protectorate under the administration of the Foreign Office. At the other is Egypt, nominally an independent despotism, tempered by international Boards of Control in several departments, notably finance, and paying tribute to a suzerain Power—Turkey—but in the military occupation of England. Between comes the Soudan, where, except at Suakin, the British and Egyptian flags fly side by side. It is ruled by a Governor-General, joint representative of the King and the Khedive, whose acts have to be approved by the British Consul-General at Cairo, and it is jointly occupied by the troops of both Powers. If it is difficult to decide upon the exact position of Egypt, what shall be said of the Soudan? International jurists have in it a fair field of problems on which to exercise their wits, not to mention the peculiar status of the Lado enclave. But whatever imaginary difficulties may be conceived, one thing is certain: the hoisting of the British flag leaves no doubt of the fact that the Soudan is not in any way a part of the Turkish Empire. The difficulties and complications which have been caused in Egypt by the Capitulations and the consequences derived from them definitely cease with the boundaries of Egypt. It is easy to see that those who framed the Convention of 1899 were thoroughly determined on this. Article VIII. lays down that the mixed tribunals shall not extend to the Soudan, except Suakin, and, to further preclude any chance of international trouble, it is expressly stated that no Consuls or other foreign representatives shall be permitted in the Soudan without His Britannic Majesty’s consent, and that no special privileges shall be accorded to the subjects of any one or more Powers to trade, reside, or hold property, within the limits of the Soudan.

Otherwise, there was no reason why the Soudan should not have been placed in exactly the same position as Egypt, whatever that may be. In every other respect it is, in fact, in the same position as though the Egyptian flag flew alone, especially in the matter of cost. When the British taxpayer is looking at a map of the world in order to get some satisfaction for his Imperial expenditure, and casts his eyes over Africa, he doubtless comforts himself with the reflection that in the Soudan England governs, but Egypt pays, and wishes that other portions of the Empire were managed on similar principles. England governs, and Egypt pays, but the division of labour is not unfair. If the Egyptian finds it hard to realize the meaning of a veiled Protectorate, the more unsophisticated Soudanese would find it totally impossible. The flag is a visible symbol which appeals to him directly, and contributes largely to the maintenance of peace. Many a tribe submits contentedly to British dominion, which would indignantly scout the idea of submission to Egypt alone. As a matter of fact, the British Government does contribute something in money, for it bears the cost of the British battalion at Khartoum and its barracks. Still, it is to the Egyptian Treasury, and not the British, that the Soudan has to look, and it is worth while to estimate rather closely the sums which Egypt has to find, and the advantages which it gains in return.

The cost of the Soudan Campaign from the opening of the Dongola Campaign in 1896 to February, 1899, was £2,345,345, made up as follows:

£

Railways 1,181,372

Telegraphs 21,825

Gunboats 154,934

Military expenditure 996,223
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Total £2,345,345

Since then, up to the end of 1903, the ordinary expenditure of Egypt in the Soudan has been, as was shown, about £2,000,000, and the capital expenditure about another £1,000,000. In other words, the Soudan has cost Egypt nominally about £600,000 a year for the last five years.

But as a matter of fact the real cost during the five years has been a good deal less than this. Various deductions ought to be made. In the first place, Egypt takes all the Custom duties on goods going through to the Soudan. These came to about £60,000 in 1902, and were estimated at about £70,000 for 1903, an estimate very likely to be below the mark. It is safe to reckon that during the five years they amounted to nearly £200,000. Then, the expenses of the Egyptian army of occupation in the Soudan are charged to the Soudan Government. During the first two years these amounted to about £300,000 per annum. Taking an average of £200,000, we get a sum of £1,000,000 under this head. If the Soudan had not been reconquered, Egypt would have had to maintain nearly as large an army as at present, and although the cost of maintenance is naturally larger in the Soudan, it would not be unfair to deduct another £800,000 as money that must have been expended in any case. Of the capital expenditure, £600,000 was in loans for railway and telegraph development. Although the prospect of repayment of these loans is somewhat remote, they ought not to be written off as pure out-of-pocket expenses, seeing that the Soudan Government pays 2½ per cent. per annum upon them. Two and a half per cent. on £600,000 is equal to 5 per cent. on £300,000. An investment with this return would be more advantageous to Egypt than extinguishing an equal portion of her debt, and it is therefore reasonable to deduct that sum from the total expenditure. All these allowances added together make up a sum of £1,300,000, bringing the average annual cost to Egypt during the five years down to £340,000; while in addition to all this the Egyptian revenues have also directly benefited through the Railways and Post-office by the extra passengers, goods, letters, telegrams, and money orders, passing to and fro.

Still, when all deductions have been made, it cannot be denied, especially as the Soudan still calls loudly for more capital expenditure, that the reoccupation of that country, from a strictly financial point of view, though in one aspect philanthropic, is not as yet philanthropy at 5 per cent. But there are certain solid advantages which, though their value to Egypt is difficult to calculate in terms of money, are worth to her many times over the actual sum which the Soudan costs her.

First of all comes the fact, so often insisted upon, that the whole of the upper waters of the Nile are now in the secure possession of those who are responsible for her welfare. This supreme and vital necessity overshadows all others, and would by itself have forced her to undertake almost any sacrifice. In fact, as all the water in Egypt comes through the Soudan, her contribution may be looked upon as a water-rate calculated at an exceedingly low figure. Secondly, she is relieved from all fear of foreign invasion. The frontier is once more at rest, and no longer troubled even by raids. There is a vast difference between a peaceful and comparatively prosperous neighbour and a horde of furious barbarians hammering at her gates.

Further, the pacification of the Soudan enabled the burden of conscription to be diminished. The army was reduced by 5,500 men, and the period of service was reduced from fifteen years to ten, of which five have to be spent with the colours, and five in the reserve or police. Considering how much the Egyptian fellah dislikes military service, those who are affected by this change probably regard it as the greatest benefit of all.

A new field has also been opened for Egyptian trade and the employment of Egyptians. A constantly expanding market at her door for sugar and other goods is no small advantage. A good deal of the money spent in the Soudan, though lost to the Egyptian Treasury, is not lost to Egypt, for it takes the form of salaries for numbers of Egyptians in the Government service, and the money orders passing from the Soudan to Egypt show that at least a portion of it returns immediately. Moreover, the Soudan is gradually losing its old traditional terrors, and more and more Egyptians, though as yet in small numbers, are returning to settle there when their period of service is over.

Lastly, the good name of Egypt has been restored; one of the evil pages in her history has been finally turned. The country which she once ruined by her misgovernment and oppression and by her greedy haste to share in the profits of the slave-trade, and then abandoned to barbarism, has been rescued, and set moving once more on the paths of civilization and good government. It is right that in the days of her prosperity she should do something to assist her less fortunate neighbour.

It has been said that for the present Egypt will continue her annual grant to the Soudan of £E390,000 a year. But she will also be called upon to find some large additional sums. The Soudan requires capital, but has no credit of her own on which to borrow. The British taxpayer ought not to be called upon, even if he had not borne his share already, since it is not his interests, but those of Egypt, which are primarily concerned. But Egypt herself is not in a position, owing to international complications, to contract new loans, nor is it at all desirable to impose additional taxation for the purpose. Private enterprise, even if it was possible to employ it, would in the end be too expensive. But the problem is not insoluble, though difficult. Lord Cromer in his last report gives a most admirable summary of the position:

‘I hope and believe that, although the difficulties are considerable, they will not prove insurmountable. A hopeful feature of the future is to be found in the fact, on which I have dwelt at some length in my Egyptian Report, that the programme of fiscal reform in Egypt is now completed. It cannot be doubted that the people of Egypt are now very lightly taxed. Strongly as I should object to any increase of Egyptian taxation for Soudanese purposes, I can see no objection whatever to maintaining such taxes as at present exist, partly with a view to providing the capital necessary for the improvement of the Soudan. Indeed, far from there being any objection, I believe the adoption of such a course to be strictly in accordance with Egyptian interests; for, until capital is spent, the Egyptian Treasury cannot hope that any considerable reduction in the present Soudan deficit will be possible. I am, of course, aware that the purely Egyptian requirements, such as improved justice and police, to which allusion is made in my Egyptian Report, must, in this connection, take precedence of the necessities of the Soudan, great though these latter be. I am, however, not without hope that, if due care and deliberation be exercised, if the projects on which capital is spent be chosen after a thorough examination of their merits and practicability, and if everything in the nature of undue haste and precipitation be avoided, money in fairly adequate quantities may eventually be found both for the improvement of the Egyptian administrative services and for the development of the Soudan.

‘There can be no question as to the direction in which capital expenditure is most required. As I have said in my Egyptian Report, the construction of the Suakin-Berber Railway is absolutely essential to the well-being of the Soudan. I need only add that all the testimony which I received during my recent visit to the Soudan strongly confirmed me in the opinion which I had previously held on this subject.’

Such words coming from Lord Cromer are full of hope and encouragement for the administrators of the Soudan. The man who found means to overcome the financial difficulties of the Reservoir works at Assouan is more than likely to surmount those of the Suakin-Berber Railway.

In the long-run Egypt herself will benefit as well as the Soudan. Of course, most of the trade now passing through Egypt will return to its natural channel by Suakin and the Red Sea. The Customs now taken at Alexandria will go directly to the Soudan, but as soon as this happens a corresponding reduction can be made in the Egyptian contribution. Nor will purely Egyptian trade with the Soudan suffer. The Nile Valley route will remain, but it will be cheaper for goods from Lower Egypt to travel via Suez and Suakin. The import as well as the export trade of the Soudan will be vastly encouraged, and every step forward in prosperity will make her a better market for the goods of Egypt as well as those of other countries. Once the railway is made, but not till then, there is a possibility of the revenues of the Soudan improving sufficiently to make the country self-supporting, and able to dispense entirely with any annual grant from Egypt.

It is calculated that the construction of the new railway will cost £2,500,000. Taking this as a basis, and assuming that Egypt was able to make an arrangement under which the money should be repaid by annual instalments over a period of ten years, with interest at 5 per cent., it would involve an average annual addition to her expenditure of £318,750, or a total cost of ten times that sum. If the period was twenty years, the average annual cost would be £185,625, or, say, £200,000. It is rash for an outsider to speculate on such subjects, and the figures are merely given as a rough illustration; but it seems certain that Egypt could easily bear any such burden. Nor does it appear a sanguine forecast to estimate that within ten years of the completion of the railway the revenues of the Soudan will have so greatly benefited, both by the direct cheapening of supplies, fuel, and other material, and by the development of trade generally, that at least a saving of £200,000 a year will accrue to Egypt, even if she still finds it prudent to contribute something.

What future capital Egypt will have to find must be uncertain. The whole situation will be changed by the advent of the railway. But if all the signs of the times can be trusted, whatever her expenditure may be, she will have no reason to repent of it.

NOTE.—Since the above was in print, new light has been thrown on the subject by a passage in the Note on the Budget for 1904 by Sir Eldon Gorst, Financial Adviser to the Khedive:

‘The Council of Ministers has authorized the Ministry of Finance to advance out of the Special Reserve Fund the amount required for the construction of a railway to connect the Valley of the Upper Nile near Berber with the Red Sea at Suakin. The preliminary survey of the proposed line has been completed, and an estimate of its cost prepared. The total sum required, which amounts to about £E1,770,000, will be spread over a period of from three to four years, so that there should be no difficulty in meeting the charge out of the annual increment of the Special Reserve Fund, but it will be obviously undesirable to sanction any further large grants out of the fund during this period. The construction of the railway will be put in hand without delay, and if no unforeseen contingency occurs, it may be hoped that it will be available for traffic in about three years’ time.’

The Special Reserve Fund is made up of the free balance remaining at the disposal of the Egyptian Government when all other claims on their receipts have been settled.