Chapter I: Introduction

"To attack always, to attack everywhere, and to overlap in the attack" is the essential principle of German military training. This is the principle which is acted upon when hostilities definitely open and the diplomatist retires into the background. There is only one means by which it can be carried into effect, and that is to have overwhelming numbers of men ready to pour into the field and bear down opposing forces by sheer weight. At Liège, at Namur, at Charleroi, or in the Vosges, the mowing down of the invading hosts by rifle or cannon must have seemed to the defensive troops as wearying and useless a task as cutting off the heads of a hydra; for two German soldiers appeared to rise out of the ground for every single one that fell.

This was one great advantage with which the German army entered upon the war. For years past strategic railways have been under construction on the Belgian border--railways designed, not for the conveyance of goods or passenger traffic (for there was none), but for the conveyance of German troops from Cologne and other places to north-east France through Belgium and Luxemburg. The plans of the German General Staff were admirably conceived. One observer compared the advance of the invading army to a human tidal wave spreading through the valley of the Meuse. True, there were one or two small hitches. It was clear from the stories told by the prisoners taken by the Belgians at Liège that the German commissariat was unexpectedly defective. Again, insufficient preparations had been made for besieging Liège itself, and it was not for some days that it was found possible to bring up the great siege guns which should have been there from the very beginning. These faults, however, were not the result of negligence so much as of conceit and of too great a belief in the invulnerability of the German arms. According to a message quoted in the present volume, the Kaiser waved his hand through the air and said: "I will go through Belgium like that." He did not; and the delay consequent upon the stubborn defence of Liège interfered with the German plans at the outset and gave the French time to complete their mobilisation. The effects of this delay are, indeed, incalculable, especially in view of the unexpected rapidity of the Russian mobilisation, and General Rennenkaempf's advance through East Prussia. Still, once the Germans realised that they had to meet resistance in Belgium it must be acknowledged that they took immediate steps to break it down. Large siege guns were hurried to the front, with the result, so far as can be ascertained from the meagre news which is allowed to pass the Censors on both sides of the Channel, that four of the strongest forts at Namur fell after a three days' siege. Nothing, at first, seemed to be able to stop, or even to check, the advance of 2,000,000 Teutons.

Although only a few details have been allowed to leak out, the admitted facts all go to show that the German onslaught on France through Belgium has been successful, but delayed. It is said that the invaders expected to be in Paris within two weeks of crossing the frontier, after which they expected to be able to turn the bulk of their mighty army towards Russia before the Tsar's forces could be properly mobilised--before, at any rate, they could take the field and begin their advance into East Prussia. To this extent the plan has miscarried, thanks to the gallant resistance of Liège. Unless the Germans were in full possession of the railways at Liège and Namur an entry into France would have been dangerous, since the free passage of reinforcements could not be guaranteed. As it was, the Russians were in possession of Eydkuhnen before the Germans were in possession of Liège; and the German advance on Namur coincided in point of time with the Russian advance on Insterburg.

While the German plans have miscarried to this extent, it would be foolish not to realise that they have succeeded in other respects. A glance at the map will show this; for if the official communiqués tell us little else they tell us, at least, what the approximate position of the armies was at given dates. On August 15th and 16th, for instance, and even, we may assume, on the 17th, the German army stretched in an irregular line from Maastricht to Alt Breisach, through Huy, Arlon, Longwy, and Metz. The southern portion of it, composed chiefly of Bavarians, lay from Château Salins to Strassburg, and thence to the end of the long line in the neighbourhood of Alt Breisach. The French army lay opposite in a nearly parallel line. French regiments had reached and reinforced the Belgian lines at Malines and Louvain, and the main body of the French army was spread out along a front of nearly three hundred miles from Tirlemont to Mülhausen, via Namur, Mézières, Verdun, Sarreburg, Cirey, and Colmar.

As the Germans had opened their southern campaign by invading French territory at Cirey and Longwy, the position of the French army at this time makes it clear that General Joffre had taken the offensive. The Germans had been driven back over their original lines; Alsace had been invaded by the French; Altkirch and Mülhausen had been captured, and even Strassburg was menaced. This right wing of the French forces--the wing which had been thrust forward into Alsace--was based, of course, on the impregnable fortresses of Belfort and Epinal. As the subsequent developments showed, this invasion of Alsace was a strategic error, and this was acknowledged almost in so many words before a week had passed.

Why, at this early stage, a forward move was made in this direction was never explained. There were critics who not unreasonably called it "fancy work." Certainly, it was to be expected that the Germans would advance from their southern base of Strassburg, and their central base of Metz; but the really serious work of the campaign, as everybody expected, was to be in the north-east. The advance into Alsace gave General Joffre an opportunity of issuing a proclamation to the Alsatians which, in view of their treatment by the Germans for more than a generation, naturally rejoiced them. But it was an advance which had to be paid for in another direction, when the main body of the German army began to make its way across the Upper Meuse.

If the position of the German troops has been traced as indicated, the line will be almost straight, except towards the south, where the Germans have had to give way before the French in Alsace. A day or two later, however, the line will be anything but straight. By the 20th, although there is still fighting at Liège, and Brussels has not yet been occupied, there is a distinct German advance towards the north-west. The invaders have pushed on to Malines and Louvain, and, in the centre, they menace Namur. They have also brought up large forces to Givet, Dinant, and Sedan. They are cut down by the thousand; their dead fill the trenches; the defenders wonder how the officers can possibly induce their men to advance in such close formation, since they are certain to be annihilated. There is a reason, nevertheless, and a good one; for the time being there is no limit to the number of men who can be brought forward to take the places of those that fall. The result is a slow German advance, and everywhere the Allies, though stubbornly contesting every inch of the ground, slowly retire.

By the 22nd there is a further decided change. Brussels has been occupied, and the German forces are converging on Charleroi in, so far as we know, six or seven parallel columns. From Enghien, from Hal, from Nivelles, from La Hulpe, from Wavre, and from Jodoigne, the Kaiser's troops make their way into the country lying between Namur and Mons. We do not know, at this time, precisely where the British troops are, nor are we at liberty to guess the strength of the French in this district. We are soon to know, however. A battle rages for three or four days at Charleroi; the French retire in good order; and two thousand British casualties are reported. Our troops and the French troops have behaved with the utmost gallantry; but, so far as we can ascertain, they have been outnumbered by two to one--perhaps in an even greater proportion. Set the minute hand of a clock at eleven, and the hour hand at five. That will, roughly, indicate the position of the German army (with the Belgian, British, and French troops in an almost parallel line) about August 17th to 19th. Then bend the minute hand of the clock to nine. That will convey a correct impression of the broad sweep made by the northern wing of the German army within four or five days; and it must be acknowledged, unfortunately, that it swept the Allies in front of it.

The result of the first stages of the Charleroi fighting made one or two things evident. In the first place, it was then known that the strength of the opposing German armies had been considerably under-estimated; they had succeeded in bringing up very strong reinforcements, with field guns and adequate munitions, through Liège. Secondly, it was seen that the French had not advanced northwards in sufficiently strong force. General Joffre had concentrated on Alsace and the Ardennes, rather than on the Namur front. The official statement published in Paris shows the French position at the commencement of the battle:

An army starting from Northern Woevre and proceeding towards Neufchateau is attacking the German forces which have marched through the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg on the right bank of the Semois, and are going in a westerly direction.

Another army, which had started from the region of Sedan, is crossing the Ardennes, and is attacking the German forces which are marching between the Lesse and the Meuse.

A third army, from the region of Chimay, has begun an attack on the German right between the Sambre and the Meuse. This army is supported by the English army, proceeding from the Mons region.

In this statement, as Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett remarked at the time, several very important facts stood forth clearly:

(1) The French armies had never held the line of the Meuse and of the Sambre in any strength.

(2) The German armies, before the commencement of the fighting at Charleroi, were in possession of the country contained within the triangle, of which Namur is the apex, between the Sambre and the Meuse.

(3) Before some of its forts fell, Namur must have been entirely isolated, and attacked not only from the north but also from the south; and the French armies were not in a position to reinforce the garrison unless they sent forward some detachments before the Germans crossed the Sambre.

(4) In the fighting between August 18th and 22nd or 23rd it was the French armies who attacked and not the German--except in the neighbourhood of Mons.

Reference has been made to the triangle of which Namur is the apex. This, it was generally believed by the military critics, was the angle which the French were ready to occupy, if they had not, indeed, already occupied it, before the fighting at Charleroi began. The discovery that this triangle was really in possession of the Germans came as a shock. Exaggerated hopes gave way to exaggerated fears; and it was even held that the Germans had a reasonable chance of breaking through the French lines in the north and advancing on Paris before the Russians could advance much further into Germany.

It is to be presumed that these fears are exaggerated, and that General Joffre can shift his men from Alsace to the north. One gathered that eighteen German army corps had advanced through Belgium, and that only three or four had been left to watch over Alsace-Lorraine. It would be unwise to hazard any conjecture as to the strength of the French; but if it were said that the proportions were just the reverse the statement might not be far out. At any rate, the fact remains that at the time of writing the French advance has been entirely checked; and the Allies are now on the defensive. If General Joffre had chosen to remain on the defensive from the first instead of advancing into Alsace; or, on the other hand, if he had considerably strengthened his force in the north and advanced in that direction with the object of establishing himself at Namur, the position would have been totally different. The numbers of the opposing forces would, at least, have been better proportioned, and the "human tidal wave" could have been held back.

There is, of course, another side to the story. Although the Allies had to retire, the retirement was carried out in good order. German prisoners bore flattering testimony to the accuracy of the British firing, and it was admitted that the invaders had lost very heavily--so heavily, in fact, that they could not proceed with their advance for a day or two. Furthermore, there was no particular reason why, at this stage, the Allies should have wished to assume the offensive at all. They were not driven out of their original defensive positions; they merely failed, by their forward movement, to dislodge the Germans, who were greatly superior to them in numbers. The net result of the fighting was that the Allies had simply to abandon their offensive--an offensive which does not appear to have been included in their original plans. In the official statement already quoted there was a passage saying: "On the orders of General Joffre our troops and the British troops took up positions on the covering line, which they would not have left had not the admirable Belgian effort enabled them to enter Belgium." Commenting on this, Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett said:

The only deduction one can draw from this is that these operations were never included in the pre-arranged plan of campaign, and that they were only undertaken on the supposition that Namur, isolated and surrounded by the enemy, would be able to offer the same prolonged resistance as Liège, which would give the Allies time to advance in strength and occupy the triangle formed by the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse. The unexpected fall of this fortress at the very apex has now forced General Joffre to fall back on his original line of defence along the French frontier.

As will be seen from telegrams quoted in the course of the following pages, German cavalrymen made a series of raids through northern Belgium, and took possession of Ghent and Bruges, even penetrating as far as Ostend. These raids, similar to many others in the central and southern parts of the country, were carried out--the Germans admitted it officially--with the aim of terrorising the civilian population. It appears to be a German belief--quite erroneous!--that when the civilian population is terrified by raids of this nature it brings pressure to bear on the Government to "stop the war." On August 26th, in order to check further German advances of this kind along the coast, a large force of British marines took possession of Ostend.

As moral effects count for as much in war as the effects of accurate marksmanship or the "pounding" of siege guns, it should be stated that the Belgian resistance did more than delay the German advance. It had an effect which, in this war, was of even greater importance. For forty years all Europe had been brought up to believe in the invulnerability of the German army. The mere threat of German intervention was enough to turn the scales in favour of any proposals which were being urged by German diplomats. It almost became an accepted axiom of diplomacy and war that the Germans would always win and that their opponents would always lose. Certainly the Germans, and above all the Prussians, lost no opportunity of impressing this fact upon the world at large. To a supreme belief in themselves they added a disdainful arrogance of the rest of mankind which was, for an extraordinarily long period, found effective and impressive.

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The atmosphere which this attitude brought about, the atmosphere of terror which had enveloped Europe for so many years, was swept away, once and for all, by the Belgian army at Liège. Such was the awesome feeling inspired by the mere name of Germany that we should have hardly been surprised to see the Belgians turn tail and throw down their arms without firing a shot. What did happen we all know. The forts, which the Germans expected to capture in a few hours, were still holding out after twelve days. In the field, small forces of Belgians time and again cut up forces of Germans out-numbering them by three or four to one. In some outpost engagements, on a scale which would have entitled them to be called battles a century or so ago, the invaders were beaten back time after time--cavalry, infantry, and artillery were equally ineffective against the Belgian arms. It was only by sheer weight of numbers that the Belgians were forced back into Antwerp, and even then they preserved their ranks intact and were ready, after a few days' rest, for a further onslaught.

The importance of this great moral change should be emphasised. The German army will never again represent invulnerability; it will stand rather for pure savagery. Reference has already been made to the raids undertaken by German cavalry for the purpose of terrorising the civilian population. As the telegrams in this volume will show, intimidation did not stop at mere raids, fuss, and noise. Inoffensive civilians were shot on the slightest provocation; houses were looted; villages burned; women and even young girls outraged; boys battered to death with the butts of rifles--and all this was done, not because the men got out of hand and "saw red"; but systematically, because the invaders wished to terrorise the civil population. When this statement was first made it seemed incredible--the methods of the Huns or the Tartars in the twentieth century. Some refutation, some attempt at refutation, from the German side was awaited. It did not come. Instead there came an admission of the truth of the allegations which had been accumulating for several days.

After the outbreak of war it was customary for the German "wireless" stations to send out war "news" at Nauen or Norddeich. This was picked up by the Marconi Company and given out to the English Press. The "news" was usually exaggerated and in many cases utterly mendacious. But hidden away at the end of a batch of these messages which reached London on August 27th was to be found an appalling paragraph, which, in the course of a very few lines, admitted publicly and officially the terrible charges of barbaric savagery that during the preceding days had compelled the Belgian Government to appeal to the judgment of the civilised world.

Special stress must be laid on the official character of this confession, because it is notorious that nothing can be transmitted from the German wireless stations under war conditions without the express sanction and approval of the Berlin Government.

The statement in question is as follows:

The distribution of arms and ammunition among the civil population of Belgium had been carried out on systematic lines, and the authorities enraged the public against Germany by assiduously circulating false reports. They were under the impression that, with the aid of the French, they would be able to drive the Germans out of Belgium in two days. The only means of preventing surprise attacks from the civil population has been to interfere with unrelenting severity and to create examples, which by their "frightfulness" would be a warning to the whole country. The increased war contribution levied on the Province of Liège has also had an excellent effect.

Could a confession be more frank or candid? Could any statement nerve us, as we have never been nerved before, to resist the menace of Prussian militarism to the uttermost?