Chapter XIV: Exeunt Omnes (4)

Michael Angelo alone has understood Catholicism, and in St. Peter's has given it its most sublime and complete expression--an apotheosis in stones, the monumental transfiguration of the religion of Christ. The architects of gothic cathedrals were sublime barbarians--Michael Angelo a philosopher in conception. Saint Peter's is itself philosophical Christianity from which the divine architect chases darkness and superstition, and bids enter the imperishable stream of beauty, symmetry, and light. In its incomparable beauty--a temple that might serve any worship, a temple deistical, if I may use the word applied to stones--God himself reclothed in his splendor. Christianity itself might perish, but St. Peter's would still remain the eternal, universal, and rational temple of whatever religion succeeded Christ's, provided that religion was worthy of God and humanity. The most abstract Temple that ever human genius, inspired by divine ideas, has constructed here below. {282} When one enters, one knows not if it is ancient or modern. No detail offends the eye, no symbol distracts the thought. Men of all religions enter with the same respect; sufficient to know the idea of God alone pervades it, and none other could occupy the place.

Change the priest, take away the altar, detach the pictures, carry off the statues--nothing is changed, it is always the house of God, or rather, St. Peter's is to him alone the great symbol of that eternal Christianity, which in influence and sanctity is but the germ of successive developments of the religious thought of all men and every age; and in proportion as God has illuminated it, so it opens to reason, communicates with him in this light, enlarges and elevates itself in proportion to the human mind, growing endlessly, gathering all people in a unity of adoration more and more rational, and making of each form of divinity an only God, of each age a single religion, and of all people a single humanity. Michael Angelo is the Moses of monumental Catholicism, and as such will one day be understood. He has constructed the imperishable arch for the future--the pantheon of divine reason.

LAMARTINE.

_Oriental Translation Committee_.--An attempt is being made to resuscitate the operations of the Oriental Translation Committee. The Oriental Translation Fund was established in 1828 by several Oriental scholars and others interested in Eastern literature, "for the translation and publication of such works on Eastern history, science, and _belles lettres_ as our inaccessible to the European public in MS. form and indigenous language." This scheme received at first very considerable support, and the reigning sovereign has from its commencement always been the patron of the undertaking. During a period of thirty-two years the committee have published, or aided in the publication of more than seventy translations. Of these many are highly valuable, all are curious and interesting, and several of them are of such a nature, that without the aid afforded by the Society they could scarcely have been undertaken. The Sanskrit translations include those of the Sankhya Karika, Rig Veda, and Vishnu Purana. Among those from the Arabic, are found the travels of Ibn-Batuta, and of the Patriarch Macarius, Al-Makkari's history of the Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain, and the extensive Lexicon of Hajji Khalfa. There are also on the list translations from the Persian, Syriac, Ethiopic, Armenian, Chinese, and Japanese languages. For the last two or three years no work has been issued from the press of the society, nor is any one preparing for publication; but as there are signs in the literary world of a renewed interest in Oriental learning, the committee invite[s] the special co-operation of all those who are anxious to bring the East and West into a still closer communion with each other--_London Reader_.

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NEW PUBLICATIONS.

ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Henry Wheaton, LL.D., Minister of the United States at the Court of Prussia, corresponding member of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in the Institute of France, honorary member of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Berlin, etc. Eighth Edition, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Jr., LL.D. 1 vol. 8vo., pp. 749. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 1866.

Whoever will examine Fulbecke's Pandects of the Law of Nations, published at London in 1602, which the author styles the first, to his knowledge, that hath been written on this subject, and compare it with the first addition of Wheaton's International Law, published in 1836, must be astonished at the great progress which has been made in this most interesting science in a period of two centuries and a third. But a glance at Dana's Wheaton will satisfy the most superficial Inquirer that the last thirty years have still more fully develop the principles of that code of law which professes to find the nations of the civilized world.

Mr. Dana has well and faithfully performed a duty, requiring for its proper {283} and efficient discharge talents of the highest order. He has produced a book which will be read with interest, not only by the professional man, but by the general reader; for he treats on subjects that the people of the United States are, at the present time, and have been for the last five years, more nearly concerned with than ever before in the history of their government. And as the work is edited with signal ability, it is the more to be regretted that, in a Treatise on International Law, Mr. Dana has deemed it proper to incorporate his own political opinions on a question not of International, but of American Constitutional Law.

On pages 82 and 85, in a note on the United States as a supreme government, the editors says:

The United States "is a new state or government, acting directly upon each individual, by its own officers and departments, in the execution of its own laws. Within its sphere it acts as if there were no separate states in existence. _It is also the final judge in a dispute between itself and a state as to the limits of its sphere of action."_

"The civil war saw the final and complete establishment of that construction of the Constitution which makes the United States a _State_ in the scientific sense of the term, having direct authority over each citizen, to be exercised by its own officers independently of the states; and a right to the direct allegiance of each citizen, from which no state action can absolve him; _with the right to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction_; with no appeal from its decision except through constitutional methods of altering the laws, or the administration, by the ballot, or through public revolution."

The editor entirely ignores the theory that the federal government is one of delegated powers, as well as the 10th article of the amendments to the Constitution, by which it is declared that "the powers not _delegated_ to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are _reserved_ to the states respectively, or to the people." If the federal government has this exclusive right to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction, then has this provision of the bill of rights become nullity. Besides, the argument is an illogical one; if it be once admitted the powers of the federal government are _delegated_ powers, it is difficult to maintain the theory that either an individual, or a government acting by virtue of delegated powers, is competent to decide, without appeal, on the extent of the powers delegated. There is always this great question to be solved, Have the people delegated such a power? If not, how can the determination of the federal government, that the people have done so, be construed to confer it?

If Congress should, by statute, enact that the presidential term of office should continue during the life of the incumbent, and the executive should ratify the act, and the judiciary decide that it was a constitutional exercise of the powers delegated, inasmuch as the federal government has the exclusive right to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction, would any sane man believe that this could give efficacy to such a gross usurpation?

But it is useless to follow out the argument; the mere statement of the principal is its own reputation.

Nor has the Civil War just ended established any such principle. Slavery has been abolished as a result of the war, but this has been done under the forms of the Constitution. The heresy of secession has also been overthrown forever; this, however, has been accomplished, not by virtue of any power in the federal government to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction, but because the majority of the people of the North have decided in favor of such a construction of the Constitution, upon a point left undetermined at its formation, upon which two great parties have ever since held opposite views, and which could only be settled by the _ultima ratio regum_; there being no other tribunal to which they could submit their differences.

The civil war was not waged for the purpose of enlarging the powers of the federal government, nor for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the states; as was emphatically declared by both branches of Congress in 1861; and its effect has been simply to maintain the authority of the constitution, with all the powers which it confers, and all the restrictions which it imposes, unabridged {284} and unaltered. No such authority having been previously vested in the government, it cannot be assumed as one of the results of the civil war.

Putting aside, however, this only blemish upon a great work, we desired to call particular attention to the masterly manner in which Mr. Dana has treated the great topics of the day.

His note on the Monroe doctrine will well repay perusal, as it is a subject on which much apprehension exists in the public mind. This enunciated of American policy, he shows to have consisted of two points: 1. That inasmuch as the whole of the American continent is now within the territorial limits of some one or other civilized power, it is no longer open to colonization by European nations. 2. That the United States will view, as an unfriendly act, any attempt on the part of European powers to interfere for the purpose of controlling the political affairs of any of the American States, or to extend to them the operation of the European political system. The question is well worth the study of the statesman, and it is ably treated in this work.

Another question of more than common interest, especially to our naturalized citizens, is the extent to which the government of the United States will afford them protection in foreign lands. The doctrine extracted by Mr. Dana from the cases of Martin Koszta, Simon Tousig, and others, is, that the government will afford protection to a domiciled resident of the United States whilst travelling in a foreign country, under her passport, against any arrest or seizure by the government of his native sovereign, in any event except that of a voluntary return to his place of birth; but in such case he will not be protected against military service owing by him to his native sovereign at the time of his emigration.

The case of the Trent, in which Messrs. Mason and Slidell, the rebel commissioners to Great Britain and France, were removed from that vessel, at sea, by the commander of an armed vessel of the United States, and brought in as prisoners of war, is the subject of a learned note by Mr. Dana. He considers this case to have settled but one principle: "that a public ship, though of a nation at war, cannot take persons out of a neutral vessel, at sea, whatever may be the claim of her government on those persons." A doctrine always held by the government of the United States, and one which they were glad to see authoritatively established on a claim made by that of England.

We have not space to point out in detail the many interesting questions discussed in Mr. Dana's learned notes, such as those of Intervention, Mediation Extradition, etc. But we cannot, injustice to him, omit a reference to the question now agitating the public mind, arising out of our reclamation on Great Britain for compensation for the ravages of the Alabama and other Confederate privateers, fitted out in the ports of that country. The question at issue is a somewhat different one from what is generally supposed. Our own supreme court has decided that it is no breach of neutrality, in the absence of any treaty stipulation, or local statute, to build, arm, and equip a vessel of war, and send her, under American colors, to the port of a belligerent, with the _bonâ fide_ purpose of there offering her for sale as a commercial enterprise; though she may be subject to capture by the other belligerent, as contraband of war. Mr. Dana, after a thorough examination of the authorities and of the diplomatic correspondence between the two governments, thus sums up the points at issue:

The United States claims reparation from Great Britain for injuries
done to her commerce by cruisers under the rebel flag, for the
following reasons:

1. Because Great Britain made a precipitate and unwarranted
recognition of belligerency of the rebel power, and thereby
established in law, and to some extent brought about in fact, a
state of things which made possible and probable the illegal acts of
individuals complained of.

2. Because the measures taken by the British Government to prevent
the sailing of vessels from British ports, fitted and equipped
therein in violation of her neutrality, were tardy and feeble, as
well as ineffectual; whether this arose from mistakes of law in the
advisers of the crown, or bad faith, or incapacity in inferior
officials, or from the insufficiency of the Acts of Parliament,
being purely an internal question, with which the United States were
not bound to deal.

3. Because Great Britain did not seize and detain or disarm these
vessels, or refuse them asylum, or otherwise deal with them in such
manner has the law of {285} nations authorized her to do, after
their fraudulent escape from the original ports.

4. Because the British Government refused even to suggest amendments
of her Acts of Parliament in any respect whatever, or to introduce
the subject to Parliament when their inefficiency had been proved,
and the government had then requested so to do, not only by the
United States, on terms of reciprocity, but by citizens interested
in preserving neutrality.

5. Because the government had neglected or refused to prosecute
citizens of the so-called Confederate States who work openly
residing in England as agents for that power, and notoriously
engaged in fitting out vessels in violation of British neutrality,
though abundant evidence had been furnished to authorize
proceedings.

6. Because, by reason of this course of the British Government, the
rebels had been able to set forth and maintain an effective force of
steamers cruising against American commerce, having asylum and
making repairs and getting coal and supplies in British ports;
built, fitted out, armed, and manned in and from England, and never
even expecting, or pretending to visit a port of the confederacy,
when otherwise they would scarcely have had a single cruiser; the
result of which had been a most effective belligerent aid to the
rebellion, and the great advantage to England and detriment to the
United States of driving from the seas the greater part of the
American mercantile marine, heretofore the equal and rival of Great
Britain, and transferring the commerce of the world to the British
flag.

The British Government replies:

1. That the recognition of belligerency was justifiable, and made
necessary at the time it was done, and dictated by a duty to the
United States as well as to Great Britain: and that the United
States gained by it the rights of blockade and search.

2. That the government acted in good faith and with reasonable
diligence in in enforcing its laws for the preservation of it's
neutrality; and that, if subordinate officials failed in capacity or
diligence in particular cases, their acts or failures being but a
part of the entire proceedings otherwise proper and effective, the
nation cannot be expected to hold itself responsible their remote
consequences, in the way of making compensation for acts done by
belligerents out of the jurisdiction.

3. That the government did seize and prosecute, in her colonial
ports, vessels which were charged with being fitted out at home in
violation of neutrality; and that she was not bound by the law of
nations to refuse asylum to, or seize or disarm or insist on the
disarmament of vessels afterward commissioned as public ships of war
of a belligerent visiting her ports, on the ground that they had been
originally, and before their commissioning as vessels of war, fitted
out in her jurisdiction in violation of her neutrality.

4. That the government was not satisfied that the Acts of Parliament
had proved inadequate to such an extent, and after so full trial, or
that any amendment would be likely to improve them so materially as
to justify the United States in charging the refusal to attempt
their amendment as a want of good faith.

5. That the government had judged in good faith, on the advise of
competent counsel, whether, in cases suggested, prosecutions against
individuals should be instituted.

6. That if vessels fitted out and dispatched from Great Britain ever
so clearly in violation of her neutral rights, had fraudently
escaped, without bad faith on the part of the government. Great
Britain was not responsible for acts of hostility done by such
vessels beyond her jurisdiction. Her duty was fulfilled if she
restored any prizes such vessels might bring within her
jurisdiction.

7. That it was inconsistent with the dignity and honor of the
government to submit to arbitration claims of another government,
the decision of which involved a question whether the advisers of
the crown had correctly interpreted the law, or the executive
officers of the crown had acted with diligence, good judgment, or
good faith.

The points we have thus briefly noticed are but a few of the most important ones which are fully discussed by Mr. Dana; for a proper appreciation of his labors we must refer the reader to the book itself, with the assurance that it will well repay the time devoted to its perusal. It is no ephemeral production, but a good, solid, and deeply interesting work, which will long preserve its place as a landmark in the literature of the nineteenth century.

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LIFE OF SAINT CECILIA, VIRGIN AND MARTYR. By the Reverend Prosper Guéranger, Abbé de Solesmes. Translated from the French. 12mo, pp. 404. Philadelphia: P. F. Cunningham. 1866.

This work from the pen of the learned Benedictine will, no doubt, be warmly welcomed, both because of its authorship and its own intrinsic merit. It will take its rank, however, rather among works of profound hagiological research than as a contribution to popular biographies of the saints. The history of the life and martyrdom of St. Cecilia occupies but a very small portion of the volume. The rest is devoted to the confirmatory testimonies to her life afforded by the liturgies of the church, both Greek and Latin, the history of her relics and of the Roman basilica erected in her honor, and the homage paid to her throughout Christendom in literature and the arts. All this is of the greatest interest and value, and no little thanks are due to the eminent author for his labor and research. As a life of Saint Cecilia it does not satisfy us. The style is crude and laborious, and lacking in the elements of a finished biography. The author has collected materials which would have come from the hand of a Wiseman or a Newman a masterpiece of literary art, a living picture of the life and times of one of the most illustrious saints of the church. But he does not appear to know how to take advantage of the treasure which he has gathered together with so much painstaking labor. Hence the scenes in the life of Saint Cecilia furnished him by the quaint and charming descriptions in the "Acts" of the saint--her espousals, the vision of the angel seen by her husband, the martyrdom of the two brothers Valerian and Tiburtius, her own interrogatory before the Roman prefect, and sublime death--scenes replete with varied interest, and affording matter for the most powerful dramatic description, and presented to us in the tamest and rudest style. What, for instance, can be more commonplace than the following: Valerian, in presence of Cecilia and the angel, is assured by the heavenly visitor that in return for his consent to the vow of virginity made by his saintly spouse, any request he might make will be granted him. The young man, overcome with gratitude, threw himself at the feet of the divine messenger, and thus expressed his desires: "Nothing in life is more precious to me than the affection of my brother; and now that I am rescued from peril, it would be a bitter trial to leave this beloved brother exposed to danger. _I will, therefore, reduce my requests to one_: I beseech Christ to deliver my brother, Tiburtius, as he has delivered me, and to perfect us both in the confession of his name."

The translation we should judge to be a faithful one, and is, in the main, correct English. We hardly see how it could be much improved considering the formal unsympathetic style of the original; but we wish that in certain descriptive passages the historical present had been preserved throughout, or altogether avoided. We are surprised to see the authors styled upon the title page as the _Reverend_ Prosper per Guéranger, _abbé de Solesmes_. It is not common to attach the title of Rev. to the name of authors and prelates of such note as Dom Guéranger, and abbé de' for 'abbot of' is not in good taste.

A fancy portrait accompanies the volume, representing Saint Cecilia with a harp, which ill accords with the Antiphon quoted on the title-page: "_Cantantibus organis, Cecilia Domino decantabat_," and which is, moreover, so completely at variance with all representations of her by both ancient and modern artists, and we would willingly dispense with that; but the book is, for the reasons we have assigned, of such value, that we thank the enterprising publisher for the opportunity afforded the American public of perusing the work in English.

SPANISH PAPERS AND OTHER MISCELLANIES, hitherto unpublished or uncollected, by WASHINGTON IRVING. Arranged and edited by PIERRE M. IRVING. 2 vols., 12mo. With a portrait after Wilkie. New York: G. P. Putnam. Hurd and Houghton. 1866.

In the first of these volumes we are presented with a choice selection of papers by the illustrious author, consisting of several charming Spanish legends, illustrative of the events of the conquest of Spain by the Moors, the greater portion of which is newly published. The second volume contains some early contributions to the Morning Chronicle, when the author was but nineteen years of age. These were his first essays in print, but they are none the less remarkable for the fine humor they display, and for which he became so much admired him after years. {287} The biographical sketches, which follow, of Captain James Lawrence, Lieutenant Burrows, Commodore Perry, and Captain David Porter possess no little historical value; and the extended memoir of the child poet, Margaret Miller Davidson, the younger sister of the well-known youthful authoress, Lucretia Maria Davidson, is full of the most touching and romantic interest. A number of reviews and miscellaneous papers close these volumes, which need no further praise from us than to say that they are all marked with the genius of Washington Irving. We have been so much charmed by the perusal of the Spanish legends that we could not refrain from placing one of them entire before our readers--the Legend of Count Julian and his family. It will be found in the pages of the present number of THE CATHOLIC WORLD. The form in which the publication is given is as credible to the publishers, as it is worthy of the interesting matter.

LAURENTIA: A Tale of Japan. By Lady Georgiana Fullerton. (American Reprint) Baltimore: Kelly and Piet, 174 Baltimore street. 1866.

Lady Georgiana Fullerton consecrates her high intellectual gifts and finished culture with a noble devotion to the sacred cause of the Catholic religion. In her latest story of Laurentia, she has chosen her theme from the comparatively unknown history of the Catholic Church in Japan, and appears to have derived her materials chiefly from the work of F. Charlevoix on that subject.

F. Charlevoix's History of Christianity in Japan is one of the most intensely interesting books we have ever read, and unfolds a page in the annals of the church equalling the records of the first three centuries in glory. The persistent misrepresentation and suppression of truth, which the enemies of the Catholic religion make use of just so far as the credulousness of the public will permit, have hitherto kept the facts in regard to this topic under a veil of mist. This veil is lifting, however, and is destined soon, we trust, to disappear before the rays of truth.

Lady Fullerton's story is well adapted to awaken attention to this subject, if the general apathy and aversion to all Catholic literature does not prevent its being read. Its incidents are mainly historical, with just enough of embellishment and portraiture of imaginary characters and incidents to make it life-like. It is written with that ardor of feeling and in that glowing style, chastened by good taste, which are characteristic of Lady Georgiana's productions. As a work of art it is not equal to her master-piece, Constance Sherwood. The events described are, however, so replete with the highest and most absorbing interest, that one feels no inclination to advert to the mere artistic merit of plot, style, or description. It combines the fascination of a well-written sensation novel, with the utility of a solid book of spiritual reading. We recommend it to all who read anything at all except the daily papers, and advise all parents, whether they read or do not read themselves, to give it to their children. The latter, we are sure, will not find it hard to take.

VIGNETTES, Biographical Sketches of Madame Swetchine, La Soeur Rosalie, Madame Pape Carpentier, Madame Lamertine, etc. By Bessie Rayner Parkes. London and New-York: Alexander Strahan. 1866.

These sketches are all full of interest, some of them most touching and beautiful. The life of La Soeur Rosalie cannot fail to win admiration from every heart. The most wretched faubourg of Paris was the scene of her labors; here with heart and hands, with every power of soul and body, she labored year after year, never weary, but simply and quietly performing a work which man has been proud to honor, a work which God alone fully knows. We quote a short passage describing the funeral of La Soeur Rosalie:

"She was followed to the grave by a multitude such as could be
neither counted nor described: every rank, age, and profession was
there; great and small, rich and poor, learned men and laborers, the
most famous and the most obscure. Instead of going straight toward
the church, the body was borne through the streets where she had
been accustomed to visit, and women and children who could not walk
in the great profusion fell on their knees and prayed. A band of
soldiers surrounded the bier and rendered military honors to the one
who lay upon it, for she had been decorated with the Cross of the
Legion of Honor."

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This lowly Sister of Charity felt not that her sphere was narrow, but her love, her energy, and activity found everywhere opportunities; they never failed her, she never failed them. This life of Sister Rosalie alone would give interest to any volume of biographies; but several others have almost an equal interest, particularly that of Madame Swetchine, a noble Russian lady. She embraced the Catholic faith, spent many years of her life in Paris, associating with the noblest spirits of the day--Lacordaire, Chateaubriand, Montalembert--by all of whom she was admired with a sort of tender reverence. Though influencing for many years the highest circles of Parisian society, her life was most simply, humbly, and devoutly Christian. The sketch of one of our own countrywomen, Harriet K. Hunt of Boston, who has done much toward enlightening the women of the working classes by her lectures on physiology, is also pleasantly given. We think our authoress has shown in this volume that women have power to do a great work, and that this work can easily be found, and easily done, if but the heart and soul are in it. The volume is beautifully gotten up.

THE SHAM SQUIRE, AND THE INFORMERS OF 1798, with a View of their Contemporaries. To which are added jottings about Ireland seventy years ago. By William John Fitzpatrick, J.P., Biographer of Bishop Doyle, etc., etc. 1 vol. 12mo, pp. 379. Boston: Patrick Donahoe.

In THE CATHOLIC WORLD for April last, page 122, will be found an article entitled: "Ireland, and the Informers of 1798." That article gave a synopsis of portions of "The Sham Squire," of which the copy under notice is a reprint from the last Dublin edition. It is a curious book, and contains many highly interesting incidents of the rebellion of 1798; of the death of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Emmet, and other Irish patriots of that day. The facts disclosed show that through bribery and the spy system, England succeeded in crushing out all efforts for Ireland's independence, even better than her ministers hoped. This system of bribery, however, is not peculiar to Ireland, as many writers have asserted; but is the same in all countries, and in all times. It has been used in this country by both sides in the late or, with as much success as it ever was in Ireland. The only difference being that the Irish patriots never had money to use for such a purpose, while England had plenty, hence her success. The book is well worth reading, and throws white on many disputed points of Irish history, especially that portion of it relating to 1798.

FIRST PRINCIPLES: A letter to a Protestant friend asking information about the Catholic Church, by the Rev. G. H. Doane. New York: P. O'Shea, Publisher, No. 27 Barclay Street. 1866.

The title of this pamphlet speaks for itself. It is a plain statement of the difference between Catholics and Protestants on the way pointed out by Christ to find true Christianity.

LAWRENCE KEHOE, New York, will soon publish a new volume of Sermons by the Paulist Fathers. It will contain several Sermons by the late Father Baker.

MESSRS. JOHN MURPHY & CO. announce a new edition of "Good Thoughts for Priest and People." By Rev. Father Noethen.

RECEIVED:

From J. J. O'Connor and Co., Newark, N. J. Curious Questions. by Rev. Henry A. Brann, D.D. 1 vol. 12mo. pp. 292.

D. and J. Sadlier and Co., New York. Disappointed Ambition; or, Married and Single. By Miss Agnes M. Stewart 1 vol. 12mo, pp. 248.

Wanted to purchase, at this Office, several copies of Branchereau's "Praelectiones Philosophicale." Second Edition.

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THE CATHOLIC WORLD.

VOL. IV., NO. 21.--DECEMBER, 1866.

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ORIGINAL.

PROBLEMS OF THE AGE.

THE STATE OF PROBATION--IT'S REASON AND NATURE--THE TRIAL OF THE ANGELS.

In our preceding number we have endeavored to show what is that order of regeneration or supernatural grace, in which rational nature, and through it all nature, attains the end of creation metaphysically final. The position we have taken is, that the creation returns to God as final cause through the hypostatic union of created nature with the divine nature in the person of the incarnate Word, and the participation in this union by angels and men who are elevated through grace to the rank of sons of God.

We have now another problem to deal with. The Catholic doctrine teaches that angels and men are not brought to their destined end, in view of which they were created, by an immediate, indefectible operation of divine power alone; but by a concurrence of this divine operation with the spontaneous, contingent, and defectible operation of their own free-will. Moreover, that in consequence of the contingent, defectible operation of the second cause which is concurrent with the first cause, a multitude of angels and men finally and irremediably fail to reach their destination.

This statement of the relation of the rational creature to God as final cause, involves a number of the most difficult and perplexing questions. The reason for placing creatures in a state of probation by which their eternal destiny is decided, the relation of divine foreknowledge to contingent events, the conciliation of the efficacy of grace with the liberty of the will, the nature of free-will itself, the reason for permitting the existence of evil, predestination, and similar vexed questions, start up at once to trouble and compound the feeble human intellect.

They are all summed up in the problem of probation. The creature is placed in a state where he is to decide in a certain brief span of time, by his own voluntary choice, his eternal destiny; this destiny including the alternative of the attainment or the forfeiture of supreme beatitude. What reason can be given for this? Why is the rational creature defectible or liable to fail of reaching his destination? Why does God place him in a state of probation, knowing his defectibility? Why is it that some fail and others do not fail to attain their destination?

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A de-Christianised and de-Catholicised philosophy cannot get even a plausible solution of this great problem, and the problems arising out of it. It must either deny the problem, or throw out some ingenious guesses which satisfy no one. It is wholly at fault, always has been, and always will be. With those who deny the whole problem, by denying the whole supernatural order, we have nothing to do at present; for we cannot raise anew questions already discussed. We are concerned only with those who would admit the moral order of the universe; and these admit the existence of a period of probation, although some of them may extend the limits of this probation indefinitely, and doubt or deny some of its consequences.

The very notion of probation springs from the notion of a free will, permitted and even compelled to choose between good and evil. Now, why is the created will permitted and even compelled to exercise this prerogative which is too often the occasion of the greatest injury to its possessor?

A certain class of philosophers answer this question by asserting that it could not possibly be otherwise. They exaggerate beyond all measure this liberty of choice as something essential to all voluntary operation. They have no conception of any moral goodness, virtue, or sanctity, except that which is the product of this continual striving to make a right choice between two rival objects of desire, the good and evil. They even extend their notion so far as to include God; as if he were in a kind of infinite state of moral probation, amenable to a standard or law above himself, and only preserving his holiness by a continual effort of will to choose among various possible determinations that which is most perfectly conformed to this standard. Of course, then, when he created intelligent spirits like himself, he was obliged to leave them to their liberty of choice. They could not become holy or happy in any other way. Indeed, according to this system, they must remain in this state of moral probation for ever. There is no conceivable way of determining them to good without destroying the liberty of will which is essential to a rational nature. The only immutability of will possible is that which arises from a confirmed, long-continued habit of choice. Therefore God has not absolutely determined the wills of his rational creatures to good, because he could not. He has left them with the power and exposed to the risks of wrong choices because he could not help it.

This solution of the problem must be rejected as completely unsatisfactory. God is good, and is blessed, by his nature. The human nature of Christ is holy, impeccable, and beatified, by its hypostatic union with the divine nature. The Blessed Virgin was impeccable from the instant of her immaculate conception. The holy angels and just men made perfect have finished their moral probation, and are in an unchangeable state. The perfection of the intelligent nature, therefore, so far from implying, excludes liberty of choice between good an evil. If this be so, this liberty of choice is an imperfection. Why, therefore, did God create rational existences with this imperfection? Without doubt he could have given them impeccability. He could have elevated them to a state of perfection without requiring them to pass through any probation. He could have placed all rational creatures at once in the state of beatitude, and kept all sin an evil out of the universe. Why, then, is evil allowed to enter?

Moreover, _whence_ and _what_ is evil? How is it possible that there should be any evil? Extrinsic to the being of God which is the absolute good, nothing does or can exist, except that which God has created after the similitude of his own being, and which, therefore, participates according to its measure in his goodness. Besides, God has created all things in view of an end. Being infinitely wise, he {291} knows how to attain this end through his works, and being infinitely powerful, he is able to do it. Being also infinitely good, only good can terminate is volition. Therefore, if evil were possible, he could not will to actualize it; and if, by an impossible supposition, it could come into actual existence without him, he must will to destroy it. The superficial theology and philosophy which dates from the Reformation, is tied up here in a Gordian knot, which no skill can unravel. It contains two dogmas which are absolute contradictions: creation, and the substantive essence of evil. These two can never coexist in harmony. One or the other must be modified or given up. Either the dogma of creation must be so far given up as to admit of some eternal self-existent _materia_ in which lies the essential principle of evil, or the substantive existence of evil must be denied. Those who deny or impair the first, have ceased to be Theists in the strict and proper sense of the word, and are already moving toward Pantheism. Those who deny the second, throw up with it the conception of a moral order in the universe, of a state of probation, strictly so called. There is no Theistic, Christian philosophy of any depth or comprehensiveness on these topics, except that which is included in the theology of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and other great Catholic writers.

It is well known how completely the ancient philosophers were befogged in regard to the nature and origin of evil. Plato taught that the _materia_ out of which God formed the universe is eternal, and that, from an inherent intractability in its essence, it is incapable able of perfectly receiving the of the divine ideas. The constructor of the universe was, therefore, hindered from realizing his ideal and fully executing his design by the defectiveness of his material. He was like an architect who has only soft, crumbling stone, or a sculptor with veined marble. From this source, according to Plato, is all the evil existing in the universe.

The Persians, whose great master was Zoroaster, resorted to the theory of two subordinate creators, both the offspring of the Supreme Being, one Ormusd, being good, and the other Ahriman, being evil. All that is good in the creation comes from the first, and all the evil from the second of these great master-mechanics. Ahriman is destined, however, to be eventually converted, with all his liege subjects, his botched workmanship will be repaired, and the universe will come all right in the end. This ingenious theory left out, however, one essential point; namely, how Ahriman came to have an evil nature, since he was created by the good God as well as Ormusd, and how he and his works could become good, if they were essentially evil.

Manes and the Manichaeans carried their dualism to a point of more complete consistency, and more absolute absurdity. They taught the existence of two eternal, self-existing principles, one good, the other bad, who are engaged in perpetual warfare. Spiritual existences proceed from the good principle, corporeal existences from the evil one. Human souls, having been in some way allured into corporeal forms, are polluted by them and involved in evil. It is necessary for the soul to disengage itself from matter, and it will then be fit to return to the supremely good being from whom it proceeded.

Any system which teaches that evil has anything essential or substantive, must give up the pure dogma of creation. For it is inconsistent with that dogma to suppose that God can create anything essentially evil, or that any creature can create anything, or that any substance essentially good can become essentially evil by corruption; since corruption produces no new substance, but modifies substance already existing.

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_Whence_, then, and _what_ is evil? What can there be as an alternative of good before the intelligence and will of a rational creature to form the material for a dilemma, and oblige him to exercise a faculty of choice? Where is the substratum of a state of probation?

Metaphysical evil, or that evil which is included in the metaphysical essence of all created things, is merely the limitation of their possible good. Simple being, _ens simpliciter_, is alone the absolute good in possibility and in act. Jesus Christ has said, "There is one good, God." [Footnote 62] In actual existences, evil is merely a recession from God. It is only relative, and negative, therefore, and expresses the absence of that good which exists in some other creature, or in God. In created existences, good is relative and positive, and evil, or the absence of good, is relative and privative. It is a mere deficiency, but nothing substantive, any more than darkness, cold, or vacuity are substantive.

[Footnote 62: St. Matt. xix. 17.]

If we can suppose, therefore, a certain good proposed to a rational creature as attainable by his free volition, with a power to the contrary, we have the necessary conditions of a state of moral probation. That is, the possibility is proved of a certain good being made contingent on the voluntary choice of rational creatures; and with it, the possibility of this good being forfeited by the deficiency of this choice. This answers the question whence and what is the possibility of evil as the concomitant risk annexed to a state of probation. It is only necessary, therefore, to show that we can make this supposition, by explaining how the will can be constituted in an equilibrium between this proffered good and some other object, with complete liberty to incline itself to either.

That other object cannot be an essentially evil object, for there is no such thing in existence. It must be, then, an inferior good. In the state of probation the will is inclined to all kinds of good indifferently, and capable of choosing any which the intellect judges to be best or most desirable. It is capable of making a false choice, because the intellect is capable of making a false judgment. Intelligent spirit has self-dominion where it is not determined by intrinsic necessity. It is lord over its own acts. It can determine its own judgments and volitions. And this makes it a proper subject of precept and moral obligation, capable of being placed in a state of probation.

It may appear very difficult to understand how this can be, but our own consciousness and practical experience give us an intimate sense of it's truth. Let us take, then, a familiar example in illustration.

A child is capable of appreciating the good of delicious fruit, the good of approbation and reward, the good of play and amusement, and the good of knowledge. His parents allow him to eat peaches under certain restrictions, and forbid him to eat them without their permission. They allow him to play at certain times and under certain conditions, and forbid him all other amusement and recitation. They require him to devote a certain time to study, and to apply himself to this study with diligence. It is plain that the will of the child is in equilibrium toward all the various kinds of good in respect to which he receives precepts from his parents, and is thus placed in a state of probation, the issue of which is in great measure left to the arbitration of his own free choice. He can determine himself to obey his parents for the sake of their approbation and rewards, or to disobey them for the sake of eating forbidden fruit. He can determine himself to study for the sake of knowledge, or to neglect it for the sake of play. When he determines himself to the inferior, sensible good, he does so by a false judgment, that in the particular instance the present sensible enjoyment is best for him for most desirable. Yet he has power to the contrary, and both can and ought to make a right judgment. He is determined to neither side by any {293} necessity, but determines himself and destroys the equilibrium of his will by a free choice, by virtue of his self-dominion. The necessity of exercising this self-dominion proceeds from imperfection of nature. It is easily conceivable that his nature, if it were rendered more perfect, would determine him always to prefer the approbation of parents, and of his own conscience, of the pleasure of eating fruit, and the pleasure of knowledge to that of play.

This illustrates our present point, and shows how the imperfection of an intelligent creature, which makes him capable of false judgments in regard to the eligibility of different objects of volition, renders him a fit subject of probation.

But why is he created in this imperfect state, and obliged to run the risks of a difficult and dangerous probation? It is evident that God might easily pour such a flood of light upon his intelligence that he would be incapable of making a false judgment, and communicate to him such a degree of felicity in the enjoyment of the true good, that his will would be rapt away without effort beyond all possibility of attraction from any inferior objects. He might communicate the beatific vision simultaneously with the first act of reason, as the does to those infants who are translated to heaven in their infancy. Thus he might secure the eternal beatitude of all intelligent creatures without placing any of them in probation.

It is evident that God must have a reason for establishing a state of probation, and that this reason must involve some great good to be attained by it. This reason is, also, in part intelligible to us. So far as we can understand it, it is, that God and the creature are more glorified through the elevation of created nature to supernatural beatitude, when the created nature concurs with God as First Cause, by its own activity, as Second con-creative cause, in the highest manner possible. It is the will of God that beatitude should be the prize of merit, and merit implies liberty of choice. Supernatural beatitude is a pure boon from God to the creature, not due to him as simply existing. Therefore, God may bestow it on whom he pleases, and upon any conditions he pleases to establish. As probation implies imperfection, and the creature is created for his proper perfection, when he attains it probation must cease. The period of probation must therefore be limited. It must be also a real, _bonâ fide_ probation; that is, the attainment of beatitude must really depend on the right use of the term of probation. Consequently, when the term of probation has expired, those who have failed in it must be left to the eternal consequences of their own voluntary error. That species of virtue which makes an intelligent creature capable of attaining supernatural beatitude is itself supernatural, and therefore impossible without divine grace. When this grace is lost, there is no natural power to regain it. Sin is therefore in itself irreparable. It can be repaired only by a second supernatural grace. If this grace is not conceded, there is no second probation, but the sinner must remain perpetually in that state to which his sin has reduced him. If this grace is conceded, and the limits of probation are extended, those who fail finally and pass out of the fixed period of probation must also remain perpetually in that state to which they have reduced themselves by their own free and voluntary election.

Another great difficulty here presents itself, namely: it appears that the fulfilment of the divine purpose is left to the contingencies of second causes, and at the mercy of the arbitrary wills of creatures. God appears to be like one who makes his plans in the dark, without being able to know what their success will be, or to take efficacious measures for securing their success. For how can he foresee future events that are purely contingent on the free choice of created wills? How can he predetermine an end, to be infallibly accomplished, when this accomplishment is contingent on the free arbitration of the creature? {294} The Catholic doctrine teaches that a multitude of angels and men destined to supernatural beatitude finally fail of their destination. Does not this failure partially thwart the divine plan, mar his work, and deprive his universe of its perfection? Although the divine plan has a partial success, through the concurrence of a certain number of angels and men with the divine will, is not this success even due to hap-hazard? Must we not suppose that the divine plan ran the risk of a complete failure, so far as the co-operation of free-will is concerned?

It is evident that these suppositions are all incompatible with the essential attributes of God. He must necessarily have a perfect foreknowledge of all things that will ever come to pass. He must also have supreme dominion over his entire creation, and be able to accomplish all his purposes without any liability to be thwarted by his own creatures. He must have decreed from eternity whatsoever he does in time through his creative act.

Therefore some, overwhelmed by the difficulties which encompass the doctrine of the freedom of the created will, in its relation to the divine, have adopted the part denying it altogether. The denial of free-will, however, makes the state of probation, and the entire moral order of the universe, with its retributions, completely illusory and fantastic. It is a denial of a fact of universal human consciousness. Whoever makes it ought to become a pantheist at once, and maintain that all individual existences are mere emanations of the divine substance.

The Catholic doctrine distinctly proclaims both the divine foreknowledge and decrees, and also the liberty of choice in the created intelligent nature. A Catholic theologian, therefore, cannot dispose of the difficulty in the case, by summarily denying either side of the dogmatic truth. St. Thomas Aquinas, with those who follow his school strictly, endeavors to resolve the difficulty by the hypothesis of a physical premotion of the will, or an efficacious grace, which has an infallible connection with a right choice, but yet leaves the will to make this choice freely and with power to the contrary. God has therefore predestined, by an infallible decree, all those to whom he gives this efficacious grace, to the attainment of beatitude. His foreknowledge is also explained as the knowledge of his own determination through which all events, even contingent, are made certain.