Chapter VII (2)

What is the condition, then, to-day, of the souls and the state of the races which are spread over the surface of the earth? There are few who have not been interested in this question. The Pope, looking upon the world and lending his ear to the sound of the struggles of contemporary society, could not help seeing, what every one knows, that now is a time of profound crisis; or, as it is expressed in the papal bull, there are torments which are afflicting at this time both church and society: "_Jam vero omnibus compertum exploratumque est qua horribili tempestate mine jactetur ecclesia, et quibus quantisque malis ipsa affligatur societas_." What is this crisis of the church and the world? If we collect in our mind the course of history and the vast ocean of ages on which we are borne for a moment, only to be swallowed up in our turn, you will first answer that this crisis is only an incident of a perpetual crisis, an interrupted scene of the drama which the destiny of the human race is composing. Untried travellers are ever thinking the voyage a long one, and that the sea has dashing waves and tempests only for them. Old sailors know that the ocean is always uncertain and that the storm of to-day has been preceded by many a severe gale.

But if we are just, as well as attentive, we shall recognize that the crisis of the present time is not a chance one, and that, like others which have gone before, it will not escape the guidance of God. I say even, when I remember the profound designs of providence, that this crisis is not without its grandeur, that it has both beauty, laws, and an end, just as do those natural phenomena which appear the most confused and disordered. Through continual struggles and obstacles, the evangelical ideal is followed by the church, who knows where she is going, and by men, often without their knowledge. The church, since her mission is to raise souls to that standard, is sorrowful here below, because that ideal is never realized perfectly enough for the glory and happiness of humanity. Undoubtedly the industry, the science, and the courage which men display to-day should be admitted. Within a few hundred years, vast treasures of science, wealth, and power have been developed. In two worlds, a most wonderful harvest of gifted men have appeared; artists and orators, _savants_ and generals, legislators and publicists, whose names will be recognized by posterity with well-merited gratitude. Yet after we have been just toward the good, let us be just to the evil, and acknowledge, with the august and truthful Pius IX., that human society is at this moment profoundly troubled.

But do not think that I intend to speak of political trouble and of war. I know that Europe has, within a few years, resounded more than once with the shock of battles, and that at the present moment many feel a dull restlessness. The people are arming and preparing, it is said, for gigantic struggles. Does the Sovereign Pontiff wish to speak of the mighty interests of political affairs, of questions of nationalities, of the frontiers of kingdoms, and of the balance of power? The church is not indeed indifferent to peace or war between nations, for every day her prayers ascend to heaven for concord between Christian peoples and Christian princes. {806} But yet, as I have already stated, she does not gather her council to solve these questions; the pacific assembly at Rome will meditate neither revolutions nor conquests, neither leagues of sovereigns nor treaties of nations, neither the establishment of dynasties nor their downfall.

While all Europe--and, if we look further, while the new world as well, as the old--is trembling at the threatening signs of war and revolution, at Rome, that august centre, that reserved place, gathered about the successor of St. Peter, around the chair of truth, the pastors of nations--their feet, it is true, upon the earth and on the immovable rock, but their eyes turned toward heaven--will be occupied with souls, the needs of souls the eternal salvation of souls; in one word, with the highest and permanent interests of humanity.

And surely they will do well; for, who can disguise it? are not souls in peril and the faith of whole nations menaced?

Do you ask, what new heresy has arisen? From the bosom of the church, none; the clergy have never been more closely united in the faith from one end of the world to the other. Without the pale of the church the same attacks, a hundred times repelled and a hundred times renewed, are levelled against all the points of Christian doctrine, but under new forms and a fresh vigor. Yet there is more than this. With an impiety which outstrips even the eighteenth century, the natural truths, those first principles on which every thing here reposes as its safeguard, even the natural truths, are denied or boldly discussed. Science is also to have its heresies. There is a schism among the philosophers. Reason has to take its turn in assaults which seemed reserved for the faith. Strange thing! Faith to-day is guarding the treasures of reason, and serves as their rampart! To-day it is you, O savants, O philosophers, who have need for us! You have often accused us of having neither science nor intelligence; but you, my poor brethren, who are so wise and so intelligent, have scarcely been able to defend a single well-known truth! And you, O Protestants! who expected to reform the church of God, it is you who to-day need reforming; it is you who feel most keenly how great an injury is the loss of the blessing of authority!

Look for a moment at the state of the intelligent minds of our day. Where have discordant philosophies led them? For three centuries, in Germany, impetuous minds have risen who, rejecting the guiding rein of faith, have shown to the astonished world the audacity, and at the same time the feebleness, of reason. This too has quickly been followed by like audacity and feebleness of morals. What has come from the prodigious efforts of talent and erudition? Nothing more admirable than the resurrection of every error of pagan times--pantheism, atheism, scepticism--and among those who yet cling to some form of religion, Christianity has in reality perished because of their many contradictory and ridiculous explanations of its doctrines. Thus have ended, under our own eyes, eighteen centuries after Jesus Christ, all these wonderful intellectual labors which are the greatest that the world has ever witnessed.

And what is the state, to-day, of France? Religious belief is vigorously attacked and even philosophical faith seems ready to disappear. The truths of reason are overthrown, and a pretended science, intoxicated with itself, denies human reason, and wishes, in the name of atheism and materialism, to snatch from man his belief in the immortality of the soul and his faith in God. {807} The most dangerous doctrines concerning morals, society, the soul, the family, a future life, and God, are warmly defended by means of journals, pamphlets, and even novels. Our contemporaries are either wrecked on this sea of errors, or float, without a helm or a compass, at the mercy of every wind of doubt. Dark storms are rising in human souls, and they penetrate the very depths of the masses of the people.

At the same time, there are many misunderstandings in regard to the church, and consequently there is an animated attack upon her doctrines. When the revolution, which is now making a tour through Europe and the rest of the world, appeared in France, the church was attached by bonds, which time had forged, to the old political order. She was carried with that political system into the struggle. Hence it comes that men have not been able to distinguish that which belongs to a legitimate state of society, without being at all necessary to the church, and that which constitutes the essential principles and immutable spirit of Christianity.

With certain men there is only one feeling toward the church--that of blind and implacable hatred. Forgetting eighteen centuries of benefits, they continue to wage an ungrateful war. The waves of revolution sweep in their course both truth and falsehood, virtue and crime, benefits and injuries, and the church, because she can make no compromise with error and vice, must persist in pointing out the illusion of deceitful words and the danger of false doctrines. Many stubbornly charge the church with thoughts and doctrines which are not hers. An infidel press and unscrupulous blasphemy against the church strive to separate the people from her fold. We hear, both in disorderly conventions and in the writings of those journalists who convene them, the most stupid and reckless assertions against the church mingling with threats of social war. And even in our legislative assemblies this unreasonable enmity appears, demanding a violent separation of the church and society.

And lately, when the voice of the Sovereign Pontiff was raised to describe the overflow of those impious and immoral theories which now inundate us, how many complaints, how many unmerited accusations were everywhere made! Without caring to understand his meaning, the Holy Father was calumniated. And with grief we saw statesmen, under the influence of violent passion and without asking or writing for any explanation, hasten to proclaim an antagonism which, thank God, does not exist.

These hostilities against the church, while separating from her the people who are deluded, render the peril in which these contemporary errors would drag us far more formidable. Doctrines are not inoffensive; M. De Bonald promulgated a law of history which is confirmed by constant experience, when he wrote these forcible words: "There are always great disorders where there are great errors, and great errors where there are great disorders." It is thought that brings forth facts; storms come from above.

And I say to men of good faith, you expected to establish the government of people and the conduct of life on reason alone. This experiment has been tried for three quarters of a century in France; what is the result? Are the morals of our people better? Is the civil authority respected? {808} Is liberty well established? Has war disappeared? Or misery? Or ignorance? And what can be said of those questions which reason asks with a rare fertility of invention, but which she cannot answer, and which concern the very organization of society--questions about labor, wages, and workmen? I do not exaggerate when I assert that since reason has pretended to reign alone, she reigns, like the night star, over shadows which she cannot dissipate. Even in the most civilized countries, the earth has become an abode of anxiety, distress, strife, and terror. The nineteenth century will soon close, agitated, weary, barren, and incontestably diseased. Rash indeed would be the one who would venture to predict that it would close in glory and not in perdition.

IV.

Review Of The Past

However, I beseech my friends and brethren in the faith not to exaggerate anything. It is permitted to be sad, I repeat, when we consider the present times; and I should feel bound to consider the soul which is not saddened by these things as possessing very little true nobility. The sons of the nineteenth century, the men of my day, have had many enchanting dreams; we have nourished many generous hopes; but now we are going to die, and to die deluded. But what! is our short life the whole of history? We did not live in the sixteenth century; we shall not see the twentieth; but the church lived yesterday, and she will live to-morrow. If I should say what she hopes, all my prophecies would not be forebodings; and if I should question her memory, the present times would appear all the brighter by being compared with the past. If we glance at ages which are no more, shall we find many centuries which did not have their troubles and their dangers? Ah! the discouragement of certain Catholics calls to mind the sentence of one of the sapiential books: "Say not: what thinkest thou is the cause that former times were better than they are now? for this manner of question is foolish." [Footnote 287] I was reading a few days since some of the bulls of convocation of the ancient councils of the middle ages. The lamentation of those popes of the misfortunes of their time far exceeds anything which is heard to-day. And, not to go further back than the Council of Trent, let the church tell us of those times, for she was present to them. What did she see then?

[Footnote 287: Eccles. vii. 11.]

That century was much like ours, because of its great discoveries, its appreciation of learning, and its revival of the arts; it was like the present century, also, in the bad use it made of these gifts. The sixteenth century peopled America, which had been only recently discovered; abandoned itself to cruel excesses of crime and avarice there, and introduced the disgrace of human slavery. It received treasures from that country, and it used them for the corruption of the morals of Europe. Whether we look upon the thrones, or among the masses of the people, or even in the church herself, we find many a sad spectacle. This century was the witness of the crimes of Henry VIII.; Elizabeth; Ivan the Terrible; Christian II.; the Medici; Charles IX.; and Henry III. This century saw the pillaging of Rome and the siege of Paris. {809} This century saw the pretended reformation rend the church, disturb the peace of all Europe, and divide Christians into two parts. If one desires to find out the evils which existed in the church and in society in those days, let him read the lives of great and holy people of that time; let him read of Bartholomew, of the Martyrs St. Charles Borromeo and St. Francis of Sales. I have already mentioned the papal bulls of the middle ages; but read those of the pontiffs who convoked the Council of Trent, and it will be soon seen that Adrian VI., Paul III., Pius IV., were then more alarmed at the dangers of the Christian republic than Pius IX. now is. There was tepidity, disorder, and scandal; the clergy poorly organized; the religious orders much relaxed; and then, too, princes were divided, the people oppressed, and war a daily occurrence in every country. And the council which had assembled amid such sad circumstances was compelled to meet in a little village hidden in the mountains of Tyrol, and or six years it was at the mercy of temporal princes to suspend or to allow it to proceed; and thus it was compelled to endure a perpetual conflict.

But vain are obstacles to God's church! Her virtue will triumph over everything. What great works and great men came forth from this council and from the regenerating breath that it breathed over Christian society! St. Charles Borromeo, St. Philip Neri, St. Peter of Alcantara, St. Theresa, St. John of the Cross, St. Francis of Sales, St. Jane of Chautal, St. Vincent de Paul, St. Francis Borgia, and St. Francis Regis, heirs of the spirit of St. Ignatius and St. Francis Xavier. Then closely following these canonized saints were such apostolic men as the B. Peter Fourrier, Cardinal Berulle, M. Olier, M. Eucles, M. Bourdoise, the Abbé of Raucé, and many others. Then too came many congregations, which were fruitful in showing again the true standard of clerical and religious life, and in reanimating everywhere the love of study, regularity, and charity. Such was the universal improvement which the church displayed. This was followed by Fénélon and Bossuet and the majestic unity of the seventeenth century. And notwithstanding all the misfortunes that this immortal Mother of men has had to overcome, the church has now places of worship in Jerusalem, liberty in Pekin and Constantinople, the episcopal hierarchy in England and Holland, her councils in Baltimore, and her missionaries in Africa, Oceanica, and Japan. The church rejoices from the very depths of her soul to see that, although religion has got much to wish for and much to deplore, still in every part of the world the laws are now more equitable, the powerful are less oppressive, the weak are better protected, the poor more generously assisted, and slaves are declared free. But when the church turns to that pretended reform which so audaciously rose up against the spouse of Christ in the sixteenth century, she finds that its doctrines have almost vanished; it has run its course and exhausted its arms. How different is the present condition of the Holy Church! That church, whose abuses were so fearful that they could no longer be endured, to-day presents a Pope whose eminent virtue compels respect; her bishops are more numerous and zealous; her priests faithful, united, devoted; her religious orders, tempered by the fire of persecution and poverty, are learned and exemplary. {810} And when this church desires to assemble a council, it is to Rome she bids her children come, by the reliable roads, the rapid carriages and the facilities of every kind which she owes to the genius, the justice, and the resources of modern times.

It is well enough known that I am not among those who close their eyes and preserve silence in regard to the evils of the day and the many perils which lie in the way of souls. But neither do I wish to be ungrateful for the benefits of God, or to refuse to see the power which lends its strength to the church, and the help which he gives to the good cause, even in the worst times. Nor should it be forgotten that man's duty is to struggle for truth, and that each century has its task and its difficulty. I pity, I do not execrate, the present time. I do not despair of the people, and I do not anathematize their rulers. They are not omnipotent, and they have to contend with many difficulties. I pray for them, as the Catholic Church has always done; I caution them, both princes and people, as much as lies within my power, and I ask a loyal and sincere concurrence to the great work of the church, which is the sanctification and civilization of the world.

There are three things which should cause us all the keenest anxiety; these are, the destruction of faith, which has been hastened by the impious direction which scientific and philosophical studies have taken; the prevailing laxity of morals, which may fairly be attributed to the thousand new and seductive forms of vice; and lastly, the unjust statements which the enemies of religion delight in perpetuating between the church and the masses of the people. These are three diseases which, by God's grace, will be cured.

There are certain persons in whose eyes these three scourges are only the partial results of that which is now, and has always been, the greatest of all scourges, namely, revolution. I do not like to use this vague and indefinite word which, like a spectre, appears and grows formidable at one's will; but yet it is very true that these evils do foster in the bosom of society a division of mind, a scorn of God and of all authority, a pride and a hatred, which are continually threatening these societies with a return to revolutions.

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{811}

Catholicity And Pantheism.

Number Five.

Laws According To Which The Mystery Of
The Trinity Should Be Understood.

We proceed, in this article, to lay down some general laws which govern, so to speak, the organism of the life of the infinite. The ignorance or the overlooking of these laws has ever caused those who plunged into the abyss of infinite life to search its genesis, to fall into one form or other of pantheism, as will be seen in the course of this article.

The first and principal law may be enunciated as follows: _No other distinction can be predicated of the infinite, but that arising from the relative opposition of origin between the terms._ [Footnote 288]

[Footnote 288: Realis distinctio inter relationes divinas non
est nisi ratione oppositionis relativae.
S. Th., S. T.; qu. 30, art. ad.]

We have already demonstrated that the life of the infinite is terminated by three distinct personalities, which establish a multiplicity in its bosom. A distinction, therefore, _must_ be predicated of the infinite. But of what sort?

This distinction, in the first place, could not fall upon the essence, without breaking its absolute simplicity. It must, consequently, be found among the terminations of the essence, or personalities. But, again, these three persons being possessed of the same identical essence, and thus participating in all its perfections, how can they be distinguished, one from the other? By a real opposition of origin. One person originates; the other is originated; as principle and term they are necessarily opposed to each other, and consequently distinct.

This law maintains both the unity and the multiplicity in the infinite. It maintains the unity; for the law does not require any real distinction between the persons and the essence, but only a distinction made by our reason to facilitate our apprehension; hence the three divine persons are truly and essentially the infinite. It maintains multiplicity, because the three divine persons are opposed on the ground of opposition of origin, and are consequently distinct. Here lies the whole difficulty, the reader will say; three things opposed one to another, and thus distinct from each other, how are they _one_ in essence?

We might reply, in the first place, that the possibility of this is grounded on a psychological fact, which every one accustomed to reflection may easily ascertain. Take the operation of the human spirit. Man knows himself; in this fact the _me_ enters twice; because the _me_ is the subject which knows, and at the same time the object known. The _me_ knowing is the being in the subjective form; the _me_ known is the being in the objective form. Again, man loves himself through the idea of himself: the _me_ here enters three times--the _me_ under the subjective form of knowing and of loving; the _me_ under the objective form of known; the _me_ under the objective form of being loved. {812} Nevertheless, all three are one and the same being: the _me_ under the subjective form knows and loves the _me_ under the objective form; a multiplicity and a unity which cannot be disputed; not only because of the testimony of consciousness, which avers to the fact, but because on this multiplicity and unity are founded two distinct sciences, psychology and ideology; psychology, which treats of the _me_ as subject, of its nature and properties; ideology, which treats of the product of the _me_, or ideas.

This operation of man is an image of the genesis of God's life. The infinite knows and loves himself. Into this fact of his eternal life he enters three times; the infinite, so to speak, as subject knowing and loving himself; the infinite as object known; the infinite as object loved. The infinite knowing himself is necessarily opposed to the infinite known, because it originates him by an intellectual operation; the infinite known is necessarily opposed to the infinite knowing, because originated by him. Again, the infinite loving himself and the infinite known (because the infinite cannot love himself except through the infinite known) are necessarily opposed to the infinite loved, because they originate him; the infinite loved is necessarily opposed to the infinite loving and known, because emanating from both. This relative opposition of origin causes a real distinction among the terms without breaking the unity of the essence.

But, the better to illustrate this law, and to show how well it maintains unity and multiplicity in the infinite, we shall here investigate the metaphysical law of the fact; that is, why and how things which are opposed to each other can harmonize and be brought into unity, in a third thing.

We have given an example of the fact in the operation of man; but let us give a few more instances to generalize it more and more. This fact is observed in both the ideological and ontological orders. First, as to the order of ideas. Two ideas, which in their own order are opposed to each other, harmonize and are brought together in a third idea. Take, for instance, the idea of substance and modification; substance conveys the idea of something subsisting by itself, that which requires no being to lean on in order to subsist. It means something standing permanent. The idea of modification is that of something which is not permanent in itself, but requires another being to lean on, to cling to, in order to subsist. The two ideas, as it appears, are directly opposed to each other, since their notions are contradictory; yet both ideas, contradictory one to the other in their own order, agree and are brought into companionship in the common idea of existence, one existing permanently, the other existing by leaning on another.

Moreover, take the transcendental idea of unity, truth, and goodness. Unity implies a negation of multiplicity, something undivided in itself and distinct from others. Truth implies a multiplicity, because it is essentially a relation of an object to an intelligence; _aequatio rei et intellectus_, as St. Thomas defines it. Goodness also implies a multiplicity, because it is essentially a relation of a being to a tendency or faculty.

These three ideas, contradictory or diverse, are brought into harmony in the common idea of being; for every metaphysician knows that unity, truth, goodness, are the transcendental qualities of being, and are identified with it.

{813}

The fact is therefore indisputable in the ideological order, that is, of ideas contradictory one to another or diverse, agreeing in a common idea. It is no less true in the order of reality, because ideology is founded on ontology. Take, for instance, a body; it has length, breadth, height, and depth. These qualities of bodies are contrary to each other in their own order, yet they harmonize in the body. Take the forces of attraction and repulsion; both are contradictory laws, yet both agree in the same body. Man harmonizes and brings together in himself the laws of movement, of vegetation, of animality and of intelligence, which are different and contradictory to each other. And in his spirit, as we have said before, he opposes himself as an object to himself, as subject without breaking the unity of the soul. Now wherein lies the reason of this fact? In the ideological order it lies in the universality of ideas; in the order of reality, in the intensity of being, or in the amount of perfection. A universal idea comprehends and harmonizes in itself inferior and more particular ideas, opposed to or different from each other; a more perfect being, or a greater reality harmonizes and brings together inferior realities opposed to and diverse from each other, for the reason of its very intensity of perfection. A doctrine of St. Thomas beautifully illustrates this truth. He inquires into the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent entities, and, after having remarked that intelligent beings are distinguished from those not intelligent by this--that the second are only capable of containing their own forms or actuality, whereas the first, besides their own actuality, are capable of receiving the forms or actuality of other things, because in intelligent beings is found the ideal similitude of the object known, he alleges, as a reason for this distinction, contraction or limitation. "From this it appears," he concludes, "that the nature of unintelligent beings is more contracted and limited, while the nature of intelligent beings is endowed with the greater extension; hence the philosopher said that the soul is as it were every thing." [Footnote 289]

[Footnote 289: S. Th., S. T.; part, 1, qu. 14, art. 1.]

This reason, however, which accounts for a more general idea or for a greater reality harmonizing in itself particular ideas or lesser realities opposed to each other in their own order, does not account for an opposition lying in the very bosom of a being. In other words, when the particular ideas and the lesser realities are taken as opposed to each other, they are considered distinct and apart from the general idea or greater reality. When they are harmonized in the general idea or greater reality, their limits and opposition are supposed to be eliminated; and this is the reason why the harmony becomes possible. But when the opposition is to be found in the same being, that is to say, when terms opposed to each other are not distinct from the general idea or greater reality, but lie in its very bosom, then what is it that maintains both the opposition of the terms and the unity and simplicity of the being?

In this case, a relation of origin causes the opposition without breaking the unity of the being.

The same being supposed subsistent, being capable of intelligencing itself, can beget an ideal conception of itself; in other words, the same being can exist as object understood in itself, as subject understanding, as object loved in itself, and as subject loving. In this origination, the relation between the terms originated is true and real; because the being as subject, as such, is really opposed to itself as object, and truly relative to itself. {814} The being could not be subject, without opposing itself as object to itself as subject. Yet this takes place without addition to or subtraction from the unity and the simplicity of the being; ontologically, the being is absolutely the same. What prevents us from perceiving this fully and clearly, is the action of the imagination and the essential condition of our intelligence, which cannot be exercised except by the help of a sensible phenomenon. Thus, when we strive to perceive a relation, it is pictured to our imagination as being something real, a kind of link or chain between the terms related. Now, when it is considered that this is only imaginary, and that ontologically a relation is nothing more than the attitude, to speak the language of schoolmen, of one object toward another, it is evident that a being, capable of intelligence and of love, can oppose itself, as object, to itself as subject, without addition to or diminution from or breaking up of the simplicity of the being.

We conclude--particular ideas or lesser realities, opposed to each other, can be harmonized in general idea, or greater realities.

The metaphysical reason of this is, that opposition proceeds often-times from limitation, and that general idea or greater reality, by elimination of the limits, can harmonize things opposed in their own order. This reason is satisfactory when the particular ideas or lesser realities are considered distinct and apart from the general idea or greater reality; that is, they are opposed when distinct--the opposition vanishes when identified. But the reason is not satisfactory to explain how there may be terms distinct and opposed to each other in the same being, without breaking the unity of the being. The law of opposition of origin, and the relation resulting therefrom, fully explains and maintains both the multiplicity and the unity in the same being.

Applying these ideas to the infinite, it is evident that, the distinction of the divine personalities taking place according to the law of opposition of origin, both the multiplicity of persons and the absolute simplicity of the divine essence are maintained. Because the distinction of the divine persons is caused by a relation of origin. Now, as we have seen, a relation of origin neither adds to nor subtracts from the essence; on the other hand, the relation between the terms is true and real. Consequently, the law of opposition of origin explains, as far as human intellect can fathom, how the distinction of the divine personalities can be maintained without at all detracting from the unity of the essence.

It will not do to say that theologians have imagined this law, to suit their systems. This law is given by the fact of human thought and by the ontological requirements of being. As we have already observed, being is essentially one, true, and good. Now these qualities at the same time are identified with being, because, when the mind tries to fathom them, it finds nothing added to being, and yet are they essentially a relation. Here we have identity and distinction, and nothing can explain it, as far as the mystery of being can be explained, except the law of opposition of origin. Our readers, from the above remarks, may see what becomes of that great objection, so often urged against the dogma of the trinity, and so many times disposed of by the doctors of the church, yet repeated again and again which the same assurance.

{815}

It is said, _quae sunt idem tertio, sunt eadem inter se_; that is, things which are identical with a third thing are identical with each other. Now, the three divine persons, according to catholic doctrine, are identical with infinite essence; therefore they are identical with each other; that is, not distinct, and consequently cannot exist. Oftentimes, in thinking over this objection so triumphantly brought forward, we have thought of the well-known lines of Pope:

"A little learning is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring;
Those shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
But drinking largely sobers us again."

For the principle, when examined carefully, does not apply to those cases in which a distinction is predicated of a being caused by a relation to itself.

For instance, upon that principle we might reason thus: things which are identical with a third thing are identical with each other. But height, length, breadth, and depth are one and the same thing with bodies; therefore, are identical among themselves; and all distinction between height and depth, length and breadth, is a pure figment; and architects, calculating the proportions of a building, would do well to remember the principle, for it would save them considerable time and trouble.

Again: unity, truth, and goodness are identical with reality. But those things which are identical with a third are identical with each other; therefore, unity, truth, goodness are identical among themselves, and it is the same thing to be one, true, and good, as to be. And all the different sciences formed on these relations of being are useless wastes of thought and meditation.

Moreover, the thinking and loving subject in man, the thought and the love, are identical with the soul; therefore, according to the said principle, there is no distinction between the thinking subject and the thought, and all ideology and grammar is nothing but useless pastime, and we could correctly say, the soul is a thinking subject--the soul is a thought.

The truth is, that the principle applies only to particular cases, and is by no means general; because, as we have demonstrated, being, in general, requires three distinct relations to be conceived, and which, remaining distinct among themselves, are yet identical with being.

The infinite being could neither be conceived, nor be actual, without three distinct relations, which must be identical with the essence, without ceasing to be distinct one from another. If its truth were general and it applied to all cases, it would abolish all distinction in the infinite being, and consequently, abolish its actuality and intelligibility, and leave it only as an abstraction--the Hegelian being--nothing.

Moreover, that the principle does not apply to the infinite is evident from the very enunciation and meaning of the principle. Things which are identical with a third are identical with each other. In the enunciation and in the meaning, the principle supposes a plurality, and, consequently, a distinction; for the gist of the principle is to compare a multiplicity to a unity. Now, who does not see that, if there were not a supreme identity and a supreme multiplicity beyond the sphere and subordination of this principle, the principle itself would be destroyed?

{816}

For if it be asked, what is the origin, the cause, and the supreme expression of plurality and distinction, which this principle supposes, we must rise to a supreme and typical distinction and identity, not subject to the principle; else we could never account for the existence of the principle.

The infinite is the supreme identity and the supreme multiplicity, the cause of all distinction and identity, and consequently, to it the principle cannot apply.

We conclude, therefore, that the first law governing the genesis of God's life is the law of opposition of origin, and that this law accounts both for the unity of essence and the trinity of persons in God.

We pass to the second law, which is as follows: _In the infinite, there must be a person who does not proceed from anything, and who is neither begotten nor made, but who subsists by himself_. The metaphysical reason of this law is, that there must be a first principle in everything, both in the ontological and in the ideological orders.

In the ontological order, because if every principle of reality, if every cause called for the existence of another to explain its existence, it is evident that there would be a process _ad infinitum_ without explaining anything. For an infinite number of causes, each requiring another cause to explain their existence, would multiply, _ad infinitum_, the necessity of first cause, existing by itself and containing in itself the reason of its existence.

In the ideological order, because every science must have a principle which is not derived from any other, and which must be taken for granted, otherwise science would become impossible. Ask a proof and a demonstration for every principle, say of mathematics, and you will never be able to learn it.

Thus, in the genesis of infinite life, there must be a first person who subsists by himself, otherwise the life of the infinite becomes impossible.

But, besides this general reason which requires a first person underived from anything, there is a particular reason, more closely allied to the subject, which demonstrates it. Because, if there were not a first person in the infinite, not proceeding from any other thing, it would originate either from the essence or from another person. Now, it could not originate from the essence; because between the principle and its product there is a real opposition of origin; therefore, in the supposition, there would be a real opposition between the essence of the infinite and the first person. Now, the essence in question is infinite, and only the finite can be opposed to it. The first person, therefore, proceeding from the essence, would be finite and not infinite; that is, he would be a creature. Moreover, it would be impossible that the first person should proceed from the essence, because the essence without subsistence is an abstraction, and an abstraction could not originate a reality.

It could not proceed from another person, because, as we have remarked, this other person, unless subsisting of himself, would require another as his principle, and so on _ad infinitum_.

As a corollary of this law, it follows that whatever other persons may be supposed to exist in the infinite, they must originate from the first; because--no other distinction being possible in the infinite, but that arising from opposition of origin--it follows that, if there were other persons in the infinite, and if they did not originate from the first, they could not be opposed to it, and therefore they could not be distinguished from it; in other words, they could not exist.

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A third law governs the life of the infinite; which, if possible, is yet more important than the former two. It is the law of immanence, which may be expressed in the following formula.

_The action, by which the persons in the infinite are originated, terminates inside of the infinite, and is permanent, eternal, and complete_.

Let it be observed that the action of an agent is always interior to it, because it is its own movement. But the product of the agent is not always so; sometimes it is laid inside the agent; sometimes it terminates outside the agent. In the first case, the action is called immanent or interior; in the second, transient or exterior; not because the action is not always interior to the subject, but because the effect or term of the action is exterior or foreign to the subject. The first sense, then, in which the law of immanence is to be applied to the infinite is, that the terms of the action of the first person terminate inside the infinite; because, if they were to terminate outside of God, they would be something different from him, and consequently not divine persons, but finite beings.

But the law has a higher and more important bearing: it implies that the action by which the divine persons are originated is not transitory, successive, and incomplete, but permanent, eternal, and complete; because God is infinite actuality, or actuality itself.

Forget for one single moment to apply this law to the genesis of God's life, and you fall at once into pantheism. For suppose the act, by which the divine persons are originated, to be transient, successive, temporary, incomplete, and it would follow at once that God is in continual development and explication. For He is either complete and perfect, or on the road to perfection. He is in _fieri_, or becoming.

And since, as we have often remarked, every development consists of different stages of explication, the last of which is always more perfect than those which precede it, it would follow that the genesis of God's life consists of a successive series of evolutions, the last of which is always more perfect than that which precedes it. Now, assuming the genesis of God's life at one determinate stage, and travelling backward to arrive at the first stage of explication from which He started, we should pass from a more perfect, defined, concrete stage of development, to one less perfect, less defined, less determinate, and thence to one still less so, until we should arrive at the most indeterminate, undefined, abstract stage of evolution; at the _least being_--the _being_ not _being_, the first principle of pantheism.

But, keeping in view the law of immanence, every one can see that God's action is supposed at once all perfect, complete, and adequate--in one word, eternal; and consequently every idea of development, progress, and succession is eliminated; and the consequence is, that the infinite is at once conceived as being infinite actuality; the first principle of Catholic theology--the precise contradictory of pantheism.

Hence, according to this law, the first person is always originating, and his origination is always perfect; the others are always originated, and their existence is always perfect, adequate, and complete. We say _always_ and _are originated_, not because the expressions convey the idea of eternal actuality and completeness, but because, our mind being measured by time, we can find no better words to exhibit the idea. Let this remark be made once for all.

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A corollary of this law is, that whatever persons are originated in the infinite, being within the essence of God and terminating in Him, they are--_the infinite_, because nothing can be added to the infinite.

Fourth law: _In the infinite there are no more than two processions_.

By processions we mean the origination of one person from another.

Now, that in God there are no more than two processions will appear evident, if we consider the proper operation of God. God is a spiritual nature; the proper operation of a spiritual nature is by intelligence and by will; therefore, the operation of God is by intelligence and by will, and consequently one origination is by the intelligence, the other by the will.

So far we have given those laws which govern, in general, the genesis of God's life. We must now proceed to those laws which govern the particular origination of each of the two divine persons.

Now, the law governing the origination of the second person is the law of intellectual generation. Generation implies the following elements:

1st, the production of a living being from a living principle;

2d, identity of nature between the two;

3d, this identity required by the very natural, essential, and
direct tendency of the action by which the term is produced.

It is according to these elements of generative law that the second person in the infinite is produced; and consequently he is really and truly the _Son_ of God, as the producer is _Father_.

For the first person, whom we have said to be subsisting by himself, being intelligent activity, necessarily intelligences himself. He is the God-head intelligencing himself.

Now, an object understood, inasmuch as it is understood, exists in the understanding in an intelligible state; for to understand means just to apprehend, to grasp intelligibly that which is understood.

The Godhead, therefore, is in himself as the Godhead understood is in the Godhead understanding. Now, the object understood existing in the intelligence, is what is called mental word, intellectual conception, and by the Greeks, _logos_.

Hence in the Godhead exists the Godhead as mental word or logos. St. John, with a sublime expression, which electrified all the Platonic philosophers, began his Gospel thus: "In the beginning (the Father) was the Word."

This Word of the Godhead being conceived by an immanent act, an act which has neither beginning nor end, which is not power before it is act, is conceived therefore eternally, and consequently is coeternal with the conceiver. It is God or the infinite; because the first person, or intelligent activity, begets him by an operation which terminates inside himself, by the law of immanence; consequently the Word is identical with his essence, and is, therefore, the infinite.

Yet is he a distinct person from the first as Word.

For although the intelligent activity and the Word are both God, yet are they distinct from each other by the law of opposition of origin, which implies that a term proceeding from a principle is necessarily opposed to it, and consequently distinct from it. Thus the intelligent activity, as principle, is necessarily opposed to the Word as term; and, _vice versa_, the Word as term is necessarily opposed to the intelligent activity as principle. {819} In other words, the intelligent activity could not be what it is, unless it were the opposite of the Word, and this could not be the Word unless it were the very opposite of intelligent activity. Hence, to be intelligent, activity belongs so exclusively to the First, as to exclude any other from partaking in that distinctive constituent; and to be Word is claimed so exclusively by the Second, as to be attributed to no other. The result is a duality of terminations, possessed of the same infinite nature and its essential attributes, each having a constituent so exclusively its own as to be altogether incommunicable. Now, two terminations, possessed of the same infinite nature and its essential attributes, with a constituent so exclusively their own as to be attributed to no other, convey the idea of two persons. For what is a person? A spiritual being with a termination of his own, which makes him distinct from any other, gives him the ownership of himself and renders him solidary of his action.

Now, the intelligent activity is a spiritual being, since he is the Godhead; is possessed of a constituent of his own, intelligent activity; has the ownership of himself; for, as intelligent activity, he is himself and no other, and cannot communicate himself; and is solidary of his notional action, that is, the action which constitutes him what he is: he is, therefore, a person.

Likewise the Word is a spiritual nature; for he is the same Godhead as to substance; as a relation or Word, he is the owner of himself, incommunicable, and solidary of his notional action; hence, he is also a person.

In other words, the Godhead is an infinite spirit; all that constitutes him, both substance and terms of relation, is spirit. Consequently, each term of the divine relation, as such term, has an individuality of his own and, as infinite spirit, has knowledge and intelligence of himself; he beholds himself distinct from the other as term of relation, one with the other as substance. His distinction causes his relative individuality; consciousness and intelligence of this relative individuality make him a person.

Here an objection might be raised; to be a person implies, necessarily, to be intelligent, which is an essential attribute of spiritual being. Therefore the Word also must be intelligent, otherwise he would have neither knowledge nor consciousness of his individuality. But you have attributed intelligence to the first person as being his particular termination; therefore how can the Word be a person, if intelligence be the particular termination of the first? Either the Word is not intelligent, and then he cannot be a person, or intelligence is not the particular termination of the first, and in that case they cannot be persons, for they cannot be distinct.

The difficulty will vanish if it be observed that we have not attributed intelligence to the first person as his particular termination, but intelligent _activity_.

A slight attention to the manner according to which the Word is produced in the infinite, will illustrate this distinction. The intelligence of the Godhead is infinite in its activity and actuality, as well as infinite in its term; which means that the Godhead understands itself infinitely, and an infinite term is the product of this intellection. Hence, once God has understood himself and conceived the expression of his intelligence, the activity is complete and fully terminated; consequently, the Word, the term of this intelligencing, has the Godhead with all its essential attributes communicated to him; except the activity of intelligencing, because the activity is complete in the production of the Word.

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In other words, the act of the first person is eternal, complete, and perfect, by the laws of immanence. Its activity is fully and perfectly exercised in engendering the Word, hence it cannot be communicated. If it were communicated, it would argue imperfection and incompleteness in the act and in its term. In the act, for if any portion of activity remained to be communicated, the Godhead would not intelligence himself to the fullest extent of his infinity; in the term, because the Godhead not intelligencing himself to the full extent of his infinity, the intellectual utterance which would be produced would not fully and perfectly express the object.

Consequently both would be imperfect, incomplete, and potential. This happens in human conception. Our mind, being finite, that is, partial and imperfect, is forced to exert itself partially and conceive various mental words, which would not be the case if its activity were perfect and complete, as it is in the infinite.

This answers another objection which is brought forward by those who lose sight of the law of immanence in the divine operation. It is said, If the Word be intelligent, there is nothing to prevent his engendering another Word, and this second, a third, and so on _ad infinitum_.

The Word is intelligent, but not intelligent activity. When intelligence, so to speak, is communicated to him, it has been exercised in the engendering of himself; or better, the eternal immanent act of the intelligent activity communicating intelligence to the Word, is continually being exercised in the immanent engendering of the Word; therefore it cannot be communicated to him. [Footnote 290]

[Footnote 290: In Filio non habet _intellectus_ illam
veluti _virtutem_ quia iam habuit actum sibi
adequatum.--_Suarez_, De Trin., lib. 1. cap. 7. v. 11.]

Hence that magnificent expression of the Scripture, "_Semel loquitur Deus_." "God speaks but once." But because the activity of engendering another Word is not communicated to him, it does not follow that he is not endowed with the act of intelligencing the Father or himself; the Father as his principle, himself as the product of the Father. For it is one thing to be intelligent, another thing to be intelligent principle. To give some examples of this distinction. The architect of a building who has planned it, is the intelligent principle of the building; another, who understands the plan of the building, is the intelligent _beholder_ of the building.

God is the intelligent cause of the world, man is the intelligent perceiver of the world.

There being, therefore, a distinction between intelligence as principle or cause, and intelligence as perception, one may easily conceive how the Word in the infinite may be possessed of intelligence, without being the principle of intelligence.