Chapter XXXVIII: Part III: He Sang (4)

The thinkers of Lo‐Tea, having taken the measure of these and other events subsequent to the great dialogue of the Dragon’s Bower, could not avoid the boast that their humble philosophy was better than a proud one; whereupon the infuriated statesman Kung sent a number of them into exile.

When the old philosopher of Chow heard of these sayings and doings, he murmured: “Half‐truths are contradicted, whole truths are verified. There is no courage without right fear; no good silence without true speech; no aspiration without reverence; no dignity without humility; no good without affection; and philosophy has no room for a cold heart and a vain mind. But life is not contradicted, though lives are slain. Tau reigns.”

O sages! how by thinking shall ye add a foot to your stature? And how shall it avail ye when a brick, as it were, dropped down by a tornado centre‐wise, so to speak, on a shaven head, shall fracture your systems of philosophy? What withstands the accidents of fate save the divine Truth, which is no accident?

New Publications.

LIFE AND DOCTRINE OF S. CATHERINE OF GENOA. Translated from the
Italian. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1874. 1 vol.
12mo, pp. 418.

The Catherines are a wonderful group among the female saints. The one of Genoa was a married lady, and this circumstance will undoubtedly make her _Life_ doubly interesting to those who are in the same condition, and sometimes are tempted to envy those who live in the cloister. The remarkable _Life_ of this saint, accompanied by her _Spiritual Dialogues_, now first published in English, will have an additional interest, in the eyes of all its readers, on account of the introduction by F. Hecker, which is dated Annecy, Oct. 7, 1873. The translation was made several years ago, and left, in the state of a rough draught, by a lady well known for her high culture and virtues—the late Mrs. Ripley. It has been lately revised with care, and made as accurate as possible.

The work itself has long been very famous, and ranks next to the writings of S. Teresa among the spiritual treatises of female authors. Its spirituality is of a very high order, suited for those who, either from necessity or by their own free choice, are trying to climb the rugged heights of Mount Carmel.

THE CHRISTIAN CEMETERY IN THE XIXTH CENTURY; or, The Last War‐cry
of the Communists. By Mgr. Gaume. Translated by the Rev. R.
Brennan, A.M., with a preface by the Very Rev. T. S. Preston, V.G.
New York: Benziger Bros. 1874.

Mgr. Gaume attacks, with his usual trenchant vigor and sarcasm, in this volume, the horrible travesty of funeral obsequies which atheists are wont to perpetrate at the burial of what they regard as mere clods of earth, the carcases of dead animals. These enemies of the human race are not content with the enjoyment of the civil right to live and die like beasts themselves, but they must needs attempt to desecrate the cemeteries of Christians, and to interfere with their right to live and die, and be buried like rational and immortal beings who expect a resurrection from the dead. It is highly important that the eyes of all men who have any glimmering of reason and religious belief left should be opened to the loathsome wickedness and brutality of the sect of atheists and communists who are everywhere conspiring for the destruction of society and the human race. This book will serve as an eye‐opener to all who read it attentively. We trust it will also act as an antidote to the heathenish and revolting notions respecting the burning of the bodies of the dead which have of late been so offensively presented in many newspapers.

The book has been well translated and neatly printed. We cannot, however, admire the grave‐yard view on the cover, which reminds us of the car‐doors on the Camden and Amboy Railway, with a grave‐stone and a weeping‐willow.

LIFE OF S. THOMAS OF VILLANOVA; with an Introduction by F.
Middleton, O.S.A. Philadelphia: P. F. Cunningham & Son. 1874.

This is a reprint of one of the Oratorian Series, and gives a sufficiently good biography of the great Archbishop of Valentia, which is better translated than most of its companion volumes. The introduction is quite a learned and eloquently‐written paper, chiefly valuable on account of its information respecting learned and able members of the Augustinian Order who were champions of the faith against the modern heresies.

ON SOME POPULAR ERRORS CONCERNING POLITICS AND RELIGION. By the
Right Hon. Lord Robert Montagu, M.P. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.
(For sale by The Catholic Publication Society.)

The popular errors attacked and refuted in this collection of essays are such as relate to political ethics, the mutual bearings of religion and law, church and state, civil marriage, education—in a word, they are the errors of the party of revolution, the so‐called principles of 1789. Lord Robert Montagu has made a work by F. Franco, S.J., the basis of his own, which is neither, strictly speaking, original, nor yet a translation or compendium of F. Franco’s work. The Protestant and secular papers are just now peculiarly inquisitive about the doctrines of sound and instructed Catholics on these mixed questions. It is not very easy to satisfy them by mere newspaper and magazine articles written in haste and under the pressure of editorial labors. Here is a book where they may find the information they are in quest of, and where Catholics also may gain much instruction. We have no reason to wish to withhold the full, clear, and unreserved statement of our Catholic doctrines on any subject from our non‐Catholic fellow‐citizens. The great difficulty lies in the universal confusion of ideas on these subjects, and the general want of willingness to inquire and discuss thoroughly and fairly. The European Catholic press is fairly teeming with books and articles of the most consummate ability on these burning questions of the day, and we welcome every effort made by those who write in English to place these products of sound learning and thought before our own reading public. This book is an effort of that kind, and we hope it will be read by a great number of both Catholics and non‐Catholics who wish to inform themselves about the true issues between the church on one side, Cæsarism and revolution on the other.

This is the first volume of “S. Joseph’s Theological Library” Series, edited by the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, and is to be followed by several others.

THE SACRED ANTHOLOGY. A Book of Ethnical Scriptures Collected and
Edited by Moncure Daniel Conway. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1874.

As a specimen of the typographical art, this book is superb. The literary taste and skill exhibited in its preparation are also of a high order. Its contents are, moreover, specimens of the productions of genius and wisdom gathered from all time and all cultivated nations, including many passages from the inspired writings. So far, the book is one which may be valuable to one who knows how to use it, and is competent to discriminate between the truth and the error which it contains. Nevertheless, the intention of the author and the real scope of the volume are radically anti‐Christian and anti‐theistic. The very idea of presenting a conglomeration of the Divine Scriptures and of the sacred writings, legends, and philosophical works of heathens, is to place all religions on a common level. In the index the author, with the pert assumption of a neological sciolist, takes care to assert as a fact the want of genuineness and authenticity of a great part of the books of the Bible. As a mere opinion, this is in defiance of sound criticism, and has been often exploded. To put forward such an opinion, in defiance of the learning of the whole Christian world, as something certain and unquestionable, is simple impudence, and is as unscientific as it is irreligious. In the extracts on theism the author has adroitly given the whole a pantheistic issue.

The ignorant, the unwary, and those who wish to escape from the sense of responsibility to God may be deceived by this kind of art. But really, and in the view of a true and comprehensive science, all that can be gathered from false religions and imperfect philosophies, both in those things which resemble, and those which are partly or wholly dissimilar to, the divine philosophy of revelation and Christian theology, confirms and proves the divine truth of the Old and New Testaments and the concurrent religious tradition of the church of God from the creation of man. Proudhon was right when he said that a man who is logical must be an atheist or an ultramontane. Whoever stands by what is positive, and is ready to follow it to its consequences, belongs logically to the Catholic side. Whoever takes the negative belongs with atheists and materialists. One sad and startling proof that the great mass of those who reject the Catholic Church, and yet are not ready to renounce the name of Christian, are sliding downward, is the multiplication of books like this one, and much worse than this, published by our principal firms, and everywhere advertised along with works professedly Christian and pious. We suppose that most of these gentlemen profess to be Christians. Where is their conscience, then, when, for the sake of money, they disseminate the works of Renan, Strauss, Büchner, and other infidels and atheists, which are sapping the foundations of religion and morality, and poisoning the public mind? Where is the public conscience which tolerates this? And why do not the Protestant periodicals, newspapers, synods and conventions, pulpits and lecturing rostrums, resound with a cry of alarm, warning and denunciation? Have they lost all interest and all courage in the matter, or are they going over to the enemy?

DIALOGUES OF ST. GREGORY. London: Burns & Oates. 1874. (For sale
by The Catholic Publication Society.)

Gregory the Great is illustrious among the popes, and even among the doctors of the church, for his genius. There is an exquisite flavor in his writings which is peculiar to them. Edited and published with the utmost care and the most perfect literary taste, like all the books of this series, this volume adds one more gem to the treasury of English Catholic literature which is now so rapidly filling up. The publication of entire works of the fathers presents the evidences of the Catholic religion in the most convincing form, and is therefore a way of propagating the faith in some respects superior to the ordinary method of controversy. It is also most valuable for Catholics as a means of increasing and deepening their knowledge of our holy faith. It is to be hoped that a taste for books of this description will become more general among reading Catholics, and that all who have the means of doing so will in every way promote their general circulation.

TIGRANES: A TALE OF THE DAYS OF JULIAN THE APOSTATE. Translated
from the Italian of F. John Joseph Franco, S.J. Philadelphia: P.
F. Cunningham & Son. 1874.

This historical romance, which is not literally translated, but condensed and abridged—judiciously, we think, for it is plenty long enough as it is—is much superior to the most of similar works of fiction founded on early Christian history. It is full of information which only a learned man could give with accuracy, and the events it describes are of thrilling interest. The _Messenger of the Sacred Heart_, from whose pages the translation is reprinted, we have already had occasion to say, is as distinguished for its literary excellence as it is for its edifying piety. We hope to see much more frequent and more important contributions to sacred literature in future from the learned and accomplished group of professors at the Woodstock College.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ITS RELATIONS TO HUMAN PROGRESS. A Lecture
by the Rev. J. J. Moriarty, A.M., Chatham Village, N. Y. Albany:
Van Benthuysen.

This pamphlet, which has as neat an appearance as if it had been printed in London or Boston, is a good specimen of a well‐written popular lecture, of just the sort to please and instruct an ordinary audience. Our familiar friend, the New Zealander, who is an indefatigable traveller, and whom we last saw in a French costume in the columns of a Paris newspaper, turns up again in the lecture. Lord Macaulay would have been astonished, when he drew the picture of this venerable personage sitting on a broken arch of London bridge, if he could have foreseen how many would make use of it to adorn their discourse. We can say nothing, however, to F. Moriarty, which does not recoil upon ourselves; for have we not done the same thing?

CATHOLICS AND ROMAN CATHOLICS. By an Old Catholic (Bishop Coxe).
Buffalo: Martin Taylor.

This reply to Dr. Ryan’s pamphlet seems to have elated the spirits of our Episcopalian friends no little. It is receiving due attention at present in the columns of the Catholic paper at Buffalo, and no doubt the articles published in that paper will appear in a pamphlet form when they are completed. Etiquette will not allow us to interfere in this controversy until the principals have done with it. If anything is left for us to say after that, we may pay our respects to Dr. Coxe in this magazine.

THE BALTIMORE GUN CLUB. From the French of Jules Verne. Freely
translated by Edward Roth. Philadelphia: King & Baird, Publishers,
607 Sansom St.

It is a daring attempt to improve on Jules Verne, but Mr. Roth has, on the whole, been successful in making his celebrated story of the great Columbiad and the shot fired from Florida to the moon even more American and more interesting to Americans than before. _De la Terre à la Lune_ has been translated previously, but Mr. Roth has introduced some little points of his own, and local traits which it would have been almost impossible for a foreigner to seize.

THEOLOGIA MORALIS NOVISSIMI ECCLESIÆ DOCTORIS S. ALPHONSI, IN
COMPENDIUM REDACTA, ET USUI VENERABILIS CLERI AMERICANI
ACCOMMODATA. Auctore A. Konings, C.SS.R. Pars Prima. Bostoniæ:
Typis Patricii Donahoe. 1874.

This is the first instalment of what promises to be a valuable work, and one which has been much needed. The treatises on moral theology hitherto in use in this country are, with the exception of Archbishop Kenrick’s, which is not in a very convenient form for a text‐book, of European origin, and are unsatisfactory in America both by excess and defect. In this first part of F. Koning’s work, containing the treatises, “De Actibus Humanis, de Conscientia, de Legibus, de Peccatis, de Virtutibus,” there is not, of course, so much opportunity for the introduction of matter peculiar to this country as in those which will follow. The objection may be made to the book that the various opinions of theologians are not always given on controverted points; but this is unavoidable in a treatise merely intended as an exponent of S. Alphonsus. The system advocated is that of equiprobabilism.

CHILDREN OF MARY. Baltimore: Kelly, Piet & Co.

Seven simple and interesting biographies of young pupils of the Maison des Oiseaux, Paris. The book is nicely bound and suited for a premium.

TWELVE TALES FOR THE YOUNG. London: Burns & Oates. (For sale by
The Catholic Publication Society.)

This is the second volume of Mrs. Parsons’s “Twelve Tales for the Young,” the first volume having appeared several years ago. They are what the title indicates, and we may add are very good and instructive.

SILVIA, AND OTHER DRAMAS. By a Sister of Charity. New York: P. M.
Haverty.

The plays performed by the young ladies in our convent schools are often very pretty and entertaining spectacles to those who can appreciate the charm of innocence and simplicity. Of course there is a great demand for dramas which are suitable for such occasions, and the supply is not always easy. It is a great flavor to those concerned in preparing these plays when the managers of the convent theatres publish some good dramas. Those before us are from Mt. St. Vincent. The author has shown a great deal of judgment and good taste, and no little dramatic and poetic talent. The publisher has brought them out in a pretty dress. They will do well for private family theatricals, as well as for schools, and make also a nice little volume for a present.

THE LETTER‐BOOKS OF SIR AMIAS POULET, KEEPER OF MARY, QUEEN OF
SCOTS. Edited by John Morris, Priest of the Society of Jesus.
London: Burns and Oates. (For sale by The Catholic Publication
Society).

The heart of our late friend, Mr. Meline, would have leapt up at sight of this book, and his pen would have given our pages another racy article, had it appeared while he was still in this mortal coil. The letters in this collection are many of them newly discovered and now first published. They throw new light on the villainy of Walsingham, and thus really add something to the already numerous documents in the Marian controversy.

SCHOOL HYGIENE. By Dr. R. J. O’Sullivan. New York: D. Appleton &
Co.

Dr. O’Sullivan’s pamphlet is a paper which all persons having the oversight of schools will find worthy to be carefully read and preserved.

BRIC‐A‐BRAC SERIES—PERSONAL REMINISCENCES. By Chorley, Planché,
and Young. Edited by Richard Henry Stoddard. New York: Scribner,
Armstrong & Co. 1874.

An agreeable volume of chat, gossip, and anecdote about many well‐known persons, with other miscellaneous bric‐a‐brac, very well printed, and having an uncommonly pretty binding. In this last department of art the recent efforts of publishers are enough to fill one with astonishment; but success is rare, unless they may be regarded as attempts to illustrate the metaphysical definition of _ens rationis_. Something really pretty is therefore always doubly welcome.

THE CATHOLIC WORLD. VOL. XIX., NO. 113.—AUGUST, 1874.

Matter.

Much as has been written on matter by ancient and modern philosophers, the last word about its constitution has not yet been said. The old school of metaphysicians, in spite of its high intellectual attainments, could not unravel this perplexing subject, because it had not a sufficient knowledge of natural facts. The modern scientist, on the other hand, in spite of his vast knowledge of facts, can never reach the ultimate consequences implied in them, because he is too little acquainted with the old principles of philosophical speculation. For, as all the questions connected with the constitution of matter are of a metaphysical character, purely experimental science cannot answer them; it can only supply materials to the philosopher for their solution. In the study of natural philosophy observation picks up the spontaneous revelations of nature, experiment verifies and controls the results of observation by compelling nature to act under definite conditions, and speculation discovers the relations intervening between effects and effects, as also between effects and causes, thus paving the way to the determination of the nature of causes from the nature of their effects.

We are of opinion that the scientific materials gathered from observation and experiment since the discovery of universal attraction are quite sufficient for the purpose of determining the constitution of matter; and we presume that, under the guidance of positive science, we may safely engage in a full philosophical investigation of this interesting subject. We are not ignorant that the treatment of this great question has always presented, and still presents, many difficulties and dangers, against which proper precautions are to be taken. Sometimes the phenomena on which our reasonings must be based are so complex that it might be doubted whether they reveal more than they mask the truths which we aspire to discover. Again, we are very easily misled by the outward appearance of things, and blinded in a measure by deep‐rooted prejudices of our infancy, which, besides being shared by all classes of persons, have in their favor the almost irrefragable sanction of the popular language. Moreover, many conflicting hypotheses have been advanced by philosophers of different schools in their attempt at solving the questions concerning the nature of material things; and thus the subject of our discussion comes before us with an accompaniment of many elaborate theories, old and new, which it becomes our duty to subject to a careful criticism, lest they overcloud the intellect and obstruct our vision of truth. Fortunately, however, as we shall see in the sequel, only three of those theories can be considered to have a real claim to the attention of the modern philosopher, and each of them, by proper management, can be made to yield a fair portion of truth.

We propose to commence with the consideration of those natural facts from which the true nature and the essential constitution of material substance can be most easily ascertained. We shall then determine accurately the essence of matter, examine its constituents in particular, and point out their necessary relations, according to the scholastic method. And, lastly, we shall inquire what, in the light of modern science, must be the philosophical theory of the generation and corruption of material compounds.

I.

Existence of matter.

The first foundation of what we shall say hereafter is that matter, or material substance, really exists. By “matter” we mean a being which is the proper subject of local motion, or _Ens mobile_, as the ancient philosophers define it. Hence, if there is local motion, there is matter. And since local motion is undeniable, the existence of matter is equally undeniable.

It is all very well for the idealist to say that we perceive nothing but phenomena. Local movement, of course, is only a phenomenon; but evidently such a phenomenon would be impossible, if nothing existed which could receive local motion. But that which can receive local motion we call matter. And therefore what we call matter is something real in the world.

Origin of matter.

Democritus, Epicurus, and other pagan philosophers taught that matter is eternal and uncreated. This old error has been utterly dispelled by the light of Christian philosophy; yet it has been lately revived, and is studiously propagated in our own days by a set of infidel scribblers, who pretend, in the name of science, to do away with what they call the obsolete notion of a Creator. It may therefore be useful to say here a few words about the contingency and the creation of matter. We have already shown, in an article on the extrinsic principles of being,(128) that the changeableness of a thing is a sufficient proof of its coming out of nothing, inasmuch as nothingness is the true extrinsic principle of passivity and potentiality. As matter is evidently passive and potential, it directly follows that matter has come out of nothing.

But since unbelievers are not philosophers, though they call themselves so, and may not be able to realize the value of an argument based on metaphysical grounds, and since we hear them repeat without end that science—their degraded science—has done away with the old dream of creation, we deem it expedient to appeal to science itself, and bring forward from it a clear proof of the fact of creation. This proof is to be found in the very constitution of the primitive molecules of bodies, as Prof. Clerk‐Maxwell has recently shown in a very remarkable lecture on molecules.(129) His scientific argument is contained in the following passage:

“The molecule, though indestructible, is not a hard, rigid body, but is capable of internal movements, and, when these are excited, it emits rays, the wave‐length of which is a measure for the time of vibration of a molecule. By means of the spectroscope the wave‐length of different kinds of light may be compared to within one ten‐thousandth part. In this way it has been ascertained not only that molecules taken from every specimen of hydrogen in our laboratories have the same set of periods of vibration, but that light having the same set of periods of vibration is emitted from the sun and from the fixed stars. We are thus assured that molecules of the same nature as those of our hydrogen exist in those distant regions, or at least did exist when the light by which we see them was emitted.... Light, which is to us the sole evidence of the existence of these distant worlds, tells us also that each of them is built of molecules of the same kind as those which we find on earth. A molecule of hydrogen, for example, whether in Sirius or Arcturus, executes its vibrations in precisely the same time. Each molecule, therefore, throughout the universe, bears impressed on it the stamp of a metric system as distinctly as does the metre of the Archives of Paris or the double royal cubit of the temple of Karnac. No theory of evolution can be formed to account for the similarity of molecules; for evolution necessarily implies continuous change, and the molecule is incapable of growth or decay, of generation or destruction. None of the processes of nature, since the time when nature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules or the identity of their properties to the operation of any of the causes which we call natural. On the other hand, the exact equality of each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John Herschel has well said, the essential character of a manufactured article, and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self‐existent. Thus we have been led, along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at which science must stop. Not that science is debarred from studying the internal mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any more than from investigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in tracing back the history of matter science is arrested when she assures herself, on the one hand, that the molecule has been made, and, on the other, that it has not been made by any of the processes we call natural. Science is incompetent to reason upon the creation of matter itself out of nothing.(130) We have reached the utmost limit of our thinking faculties when we have admitted that, because matter cannot be eternal and self‐ existent, it must have been created. That matter, as such, should have certain fundamental properties, that it should exist in space and be capable of motion, that its motion should be persistent, and so on, are truths which may, for anything we know, be of the kind which metaphysicians call necessary. We may use our knowledge of such truths for purposes of deduction, but we have no data for speculating as to their origin. But that there should be exactly so much matter and no more in every molecule of hydrogen is a fact of a very different order.... Natural causes, as we know, are at work, which tend to modify, if they do not at length destroy, all the arrangements and dimensions of the earth, and of the whole solar system. But though, in the course of ages, catastrophes have occurred, and may yet occur, in the heavens; though ancient systems may be dissolved, and new systems evolved out of their ruins, the molecules out of which those systems are built, the foundation‐stones of the material universe, remain unbroken and unworn. They continue to this day as they were created, perfect in number and measure and weight, and from the ineffaceable characters impressed on them we may learn that those aspirations after accuracy in measurement, truth in statement, and justice in action, which we reckon among our noblest attributes as men, are ours because they are essential constituents of the image of Him who, in the beginning, created not only the heaven and the earth, but the materials of which heaven and earth consist.”

Such is the verdict of true science as interpreted by the eminent English mathematician and natural philosopher. The whole is so instructive and interesting that we think we have no need of apologizing for the length of the quotation.

Essential properties of matter.

The constituents of things are revealed to us by their properties. For, as every being acts according as it is in act, and suffers according as it is in potency, from the activity and the passivity with which a being is endowed we can easily find out the special nature of the act and of the potency which constitute its metaphysical essence. Hence, if we wish to ascertain the essential constitution of material substance, we must first ascertain and thoroughly understand the properties which are common to all material substances, and without which no material substance can be conceived. In doing this we must guard against confounding, as many scientists do, the essential properties of matter with the general properties of bodies. Extension, impenetrability, divisibility, porosity, etc., are general properties of bodies; but it does not follow that they are essential properties of material substance as such, as they may arise from accidental composition. Those properties alone are essential which are altogether primitive, unchangeable, and involved in the principles of the substance; and such properties, as we shall see, are, so far as material substance is concerned, the three following: _active power_ to produce local motion, _passivity_ for receiving local motion, and _inertia_. These three properties correspond to the three constituents of material substance.

There are philosophers who deny that material things have any active power. They know that matter is inert, and they cannot see how activity can be reconciled with inertia. There are others, on the contrary, who, for a similar reason, being unable to deny the activity of bodies, deny their inertia. From what we are going to say it will be manifest that these philosophers have never known exactly what is meant in natural science by the inertia of matter.

Other writers, especially those of the old school, while admitting the three essential properties of matter which we have just mentioned, contend that material substance has a fourth important and connatural, if not essential, property—viz., _continuous extension_—without which, they say, nothing material can be conceived. They further teach, and would fain have us believe, that all material substance is endowed with extension and resistance; and many of them think that extension and resistance constitute the essence of matter. This last opinion is very common among philosophical writers, and deserves the most careful examination, as it bears very heavily on an essential point of the controversy in which we have to engage.

Let us see, then, first, what we have to think regarding the activity, the passivity, and the inertia of matter; and, when we have done with these, we shall take up the question of material continuity, of which we hope to give a full analysis and a satisfactory solution.

Activity, passivity, and inertia.

The special character by which the phenomena of the material world are recognized consists in their being brought about by local motion. For it is a well‐known fact that in things purely material no change takes place but through local movements; so that we cannot even conceive a change in the material world without a displacement of matter. Hence all the actions of matter upon matter tend to produce local movement, or to modify it; and all passion of the matter acted on is a reception of movement.

That all material substances possess activity, passivity, and inertia is quite certain on experimental grounds. No conclusion is better established in science than that all the particles of matter act on one another according to a fixed law, and receive from one another their determination to move from place to place, while they are incapable of setting themselves in movement or modifying the movement received from without. Now, it is clear that they cannot act without being _active_, nor receive the action without being _passive_, nor be incapable of modifying their own state without being _inert_.

This shows that activity and inertia do not exclude one another. A particle of matter is said to be active inasmuch as it has the power of causing the movement of any other particle; and is said to be inert inasmuch as it has no power of giving movement to itself. It is plain that these two things are very far from being contradictory. Those philosophers, therefore, who have apprehended an irreconcilable opposition between the two, must have attached to the term “inertia” a meaning quite different from that recognized by physical science.

Balmes remarks, in his _Fundamental Philosophy_,(131) that there is nothing perfectly still either on earth or in the heavens; and for this reason he expresses the opinion that all bodies have a constant tendency to move. And as he cannot see how such a tendency can be reconciled with the inertia of matter, he comes to the conclusion that bodies are not inert. But it is scarcely necessary to remark that the constant tendency to move which we observe in bodies is the result of universal attraction, and not of a self‐acting power inhering in the matter of which the bodies consist; and therefore such a tendency does not in the least interfere with the inertia of matter. A simple reference to the laws of motion suffices to convince the most superficial student that such is the case.

Malebranche goes to the other extreme. He supposes that bodies have no activity of any kind, and that accordingly all the phenomena we witness in the physical world are produced by God alone. This theory, as every one will acknowledge, is supremely extravagant and unphilosophical. It leads to idealism and to pantheism. To idealism, because, if bodies do not act, there is no reason why they should exist; as nothing can be admitted to exist throughout creation which has no aptitude to manifest in its own reality a reflex of the Creator’s perfections. And since manifestation is action, no created being can be destitute of active power. This argument drawn from the end of creation may be supplemented by another drawn from the impossibility of our knowing the existence of bodies if they do not act. For, if bodies do not act on our senses, we cannot refer to bodies for the causality of our sensations; and thus the only link by which we have the means of connecting our subjective impressions with exterior objects will be destroyed.

Hence, if bodies are not active, there is no reason why they should be admitted to exist, and we are accordingly condemned to an absurd idealism. Nor can we escape pantheism. For, if the impressions we receive from outside are caused by God alone, we cannot but conclude that whatever we see outside of us has no other objectivity than that of the divine substance itself appearing under different forms. Now, this is a pantheistic doctrine. Therefore the theory which denies the activity of bodies leads to pantheism. We will say nothing more about this preposterous doctrine and its absurd consequences. Plain common sense, without need of further argument, condemns whatever calls in question the reality and objectivity of our knowledge concerning the exterior world.

But, while we admit with all the physicists, and indeed with all mankind, that material substance is competent, through its natural activity, to cause local motion, we must guard against the opinion of the materialists, who pretend that the active power of matter is also competent, under certain conditions and through certain combinations, to produce thought. Nothing, perhaps, can be more inconsistent with reason than this assumption. Were matter not inert, the hypothesis might deserve examination; but an _inert_ thinking substance is such an enormity that it cannot, even hypothetically, be entertained. The thinking faculty evidently implies self‐acting power, whereas inertia evidently excludes it; and therefore, so long as we keep in mind that matter is inert, we cannot, without evident inconsistency, extend the range of its activity to immanent operations, but must confine it to the extrinsic production of local motion. Let us here remark that, of all the arguments usually employed in psychology against the materialistic hypothesis, this one drawn from the inertia of matter is the most valuable as it is the most simple and incontrovertible.

The inertia of matter is so universally admitted that it is hardly necessary to say a word about it. No fact, indeed, is more certain in science than that matter, when at rest, cannot but remain so until it receive from without a determination to move; and likewise that, when determined to move with any velocity and in any direction, it cannot but move with that velocity and in that direction until it receive some other determination from without. This incapability of changing its own state constitutes, as we have already stated, the inertia of matter, and is the very foundation of mechanical science.

As to the natural passivity of material substance, we need only say that it consists in its capability of receiving, when it is acted on, any accidental determination to move in any direction and with any velocity. That matter has this passivity is an obvious experimental truth; and that matter has no other passivity except this one we shall prove in another place.

Meanwhile, it is evident from the preceding considerations that all matter is active, passive, and inert. The principle of activity, in every being, is its essential act, and the principle of passivity its essential term, which is a real passive potency;(132) hence the activity and the passivity of matter are a necessary result of the essential constitution of material substance, and are therefore _essential_ properties of the same. The inertia of matter is also a necessary result of the essential constitution of material substance; for the only reason why an element of matter cannot give motion to itself is to be found in the mutual relation of its essential principles, which is of such a nature that the principle of passivity cannot be influenced by any exertion of the active principle, of which it is the intrinsic term. Now, this relation, for which we shall fully account hereafter, belongs to the essence of the substance as truly and as necessarily as the essential principles themselves. Hence the inertia of matter is an _essential_ property of matter no less than its activity and passivity.

Action at a distance.

The activity of material substance is a very interesting subject of investigation; its nature, its mode of working, the law of its exertion, and the conditions on which the production of its effects depends, give rise to many important questions, which, owing to philosophical discords, have not yet received a satisfactory solution. The first of these questions is: _Does material substance act at a distance, or does it require, as a condition sine qua non for acting, a mathematical contact of its matter with the matter acted upon?_

Philosophers and scientists have often examined this grave subject, but their opinions are still divided. Those philosophers who form their physical views from the scholastic system, commonly hold that a true material contact is an indispensable condition for the action of matter upon matter, and think it to be an evident truth. But physicists, “with few exceptions,” as Prof. Faraday remarks, admit that all action of matter upon matter is an _actio in distans_, and he himself supports the same doctrine, although suggesting that it should be expressed in somewhat different terms. We propose to show that this latter solution is the only one consistent with the principles both of science and of philosophy. And as the opposite view owes its origin, and in a great measure its plausibility, to the known theory of kinetic forces as deduced from the impact of bodies, we shall argue from the same theory in support of our conclusion.

Here is our argument. When a body impinges upon another body, if any communication of movement is made by a true and immediate contact of matter with matter, its duration must be limited to that indivisible instant of time in which the distance between the struggling particles of matter becomes = 0. But in an indivisible instant of time no finite velocity can be communicated. And therefore no real movement can be caused in the impact of bodies by a true and immediate contact of matter with matter.

We think that this argument admits of no reply. Its major proposition is the statement of an obvious geometric truth. Nor can it be gainsaid by assuming that the duration of the action can be prolonged; for the action, in the opinion of those against whom we now are arguing, is supposed to require true material contact; and it is plain that two particles of matter coming into contact cannot remain in contact for any length of time, however inappreciable, unless in the very first instant of their meeting their velocities have become equal; it being evident that two particles of matter animated by different velocities cannot preserve for any length of time the same relation in space. To assume, therefore, that the contact can be prolonged, is to assume that from the very first instant of the collision the unequal velocities of the struggling particles have been equalized, or, in other terms, that the velocity imparted has been communicated in the very first instant of the impact. But if so, then the assumption of a prolonged contact, as a means of communicating the velocity, is altogether useless, and involves an evident contradiction. It is therefore necessary to concede that, if the velocity is communicated by a true and immediate contact of matter with matter, the communication must be made in an indivisible instant of time.

The minor proposition of our syllogism is equally evident. For it is one of the fundamental axioms of mechanics that actions, all other things being equal, are proportional to their respective duration; whence it is plain that an action of which the duration is infinitesimal cannot produce more than an infinitesimal effect. And therefore no finite velocity can be produced by true material contact.

Against this argument four objections may be advanced: First, that although in the contact of one point with another point no finite velocity can be communicated, yet in the case of a multitude of material points coming into collision the effect might be appreciable. Secondly, that a particle of matter may be carried straight away by another particle which impinges upon it with sufficient velocity. Thirdly, that a distinction is to be made between continuous and instantaneous actions, and that, although a continuous action produces an effect proportional to its duration, as in the case of universal attraction, yet instantaneous actions, as in the case of impact, may not necessarily follow the same law. Lastly, that even admitting the impossibility of producing finite velocity in an infinitesimal unit of time, yet finite velocity might still be _communicated_ in an infinitesimal unit of time without any new production, as modern scientists assume.

To the first objection we answer that, if each material point cannot, in the instant of the contact, acquire more than an infinitesimal velocity, the whole multitude will have only an infinitesimal velocity; and thus no movement will ensue.

To the second we answer that a particle cannot be carried straight away unless it receives a communication of finite velocity; and such a communication, as we have already shown, cannot be made in the instant of the contact.

The third objection we answer by denying that there is any rigorously instantaneous action. When physicists speak of “instantaneous” actions, they mean actions having a finite duration, which, however, is so short that it cannot be appreciated or measured by our means of observation. And therefore what is called an “instantaneous” action is nothing but a continuous action of a short duration. Now, a difference of duration is not a difference in kind; and accordingly, if actions are proportional to their duration when their duration is longer, they are no less so when their duration is shorter.

The last objection takes for granted that there can be a communication of velocity without production of velocity; which amounts to saying that the velocity of the impinging body is transmitted _identically_ to the body impinged upon. This is, however, a mere delusion. The velocity acquired by the body impinged upon has no previous existence in the impinging body; and accordingly its communication implies its real production, as we have proved in one of our past articles.(133)

The _actio in distans_ can also be proved from the very nature of material activity. It is generally admitted that the active power of matter is either attractive or repulsive; for all men of science agree that the movements of the material world are brought about by attractions and repulsions. Now, attraction and repulsion do not imply a material contact between the agent and the patient, but, on the contrary, exclude it; and therefore all the movements of the material world are due to actions at a distance. That attraction excludes material contact is quite evident, for attraction produces movement by causing the approach of one body to another; and it is evident that no approach will be possible if the bodies are already in immediate contact. It is therefore an essential condition for the possibility of attraction that the agent be not in immediate contact with the patient. And as for repulsion, it is known that it serves to keep the molecules of a body distant from one another, and consequently it is exercised at molecular distances. This is especially evident in the case of elastic fluids. For repulsion obtains among the molecules of such fluids, whether the said molecules be pressed nearer or let further apart. And therefore repulsion, too, is exercised without material contact.

Some modern physicists try to do away with repulsion, and explain the pressure exercised by a gas against the vessel in which it is confined by saying that the gaseous molecules are continually flying about in all directions, and continually impinging on the interior surface of the recipient, where their excursions are intercepted, and that this continuous series of impacts constitutes what we call the pressure of the gas on the vessel.

But this new theory cannot bear one moment’s examination. It is wholly gratuitous; it disregards mechanical principles by admitting that the movement of the molecules can go on unabated in spite of repeated impacts, and it assumes that the momentum of a moving molecule is its active power; which is utterly false, as we will show later.

Other physicists have tried to get rid of attraction, also, by assuming that those effects which we ascribe to attraction are to be attributed to ethereal pressure. This hypothesis has no better foundation than the preceding one, and is equally untenable for many reasons which we shall explain hereafter.

The _actio in distans_ can also be directly proved by the consideration of statical forces. We know that the action which tends to communicate movement in a given direction cannot be frustrated or neutralized, except by an action of the same intensity applied in an opposite direction. It is evident, on the other hand, that, if the first requires an immediate contact of matter with matter, the second also must be subject to the same condition. Now, this latter is altogether independent of such a condition. Accordingly, the former also—that is, the action which tends to communicate the movement—is independent of a true material contact.

The minor proposition of this syllogism may be proved as follows: Let a small cube of hard steel be placed on a smooth, horizontal plate of cast‐ iron lying on a table. The cube will remain at rest on the plate, notwithstanding the action of gravity upon it, because, while the cube tends to fall and presses the plate, the action of the plate frustrates that tendency, and keeps the equilibrium. Now, the cube and the plate do not immediately touch one another with their matter; for we know that they can be brought nearer than they are. We may place, for instance, a second cube on the top of the first, and thus increase the pressure on the plate, and cause the plate itself to react with an increased intensity. But it is obvious that neither of the two actions can become intenser, unless the cube is brought nearer to the plate; for the resistance of the plate cannot be modified, unless some of the previous conditions be altered; and since the two surfaces have remained the same, no other condition can be conceived to be changed except their relative distance. It is therefore a change, and in fact a diminution, of the distance between the cube and the plate that entails the change of the action. Whence we see that, even in the case of the so‐called _physical_ contact, bodies do not touch one another with their matter. This shows that physical contact does not exclude distance; and therefore, when we say that two bodies touch one another, the fact we express is that the two bodies are so near to one another that _they cannot approach nearer __ without their molecular arrangement being disturbed by their mutual actions_. Therefore the hypothesis that a true material contact of matter with matter is needed for causing or for hindering movement is irreconcilable with fact.

As a further development of this proof, we may add that one of the necessary conditions for the equilibrium of the cube on the plate is, that the action of the plate have a direction opposite to the action of the cube. Now, no direction whatever can be conceived but between two distinct, and therefore distant, points. Accordingly, there cannot be the least doubt that all the points belonging to the surface of the plate are really distant from those of the neighboring surface of the cube. Whence we conclude again that their mutual action is exercised at a distance.

Other proofs of the same truth might be drawn, if necessary, from other considerations. Faraday, from the phenomena of electric conduction, was led to the conclusion that each atom of matter, though occupying a mere point in space, has a sphere of action extending throughout the whole solar system.(134) Boscovich,(135) from the law of continuity, demonstrates that movement is not communicated through material contact. And mechanical writers generally consider all dynamical forces—that is, all accelerating or retarding actions—as functions of distances; which shows that all motive actions depend on distance, not only for their direction, but also for their intensity. We have no need of developing these proofs, as we think that the preceding arguments are abundantly sufficient to convince all intelligent readers of the truth of our conclusion, viz.:

1. That distance is a necessary condition of the action of matter upon matter;

2. That the contact between the agent and the object acted on is not material, but virtual, inasmuch as it is by its active power (_virtus_), and not by its matter, that the agent reaches the matter of the object acted upon;

3. Hence that any material substance, which is anywhere by reason of its matter, has within itself a power prepared to act where the substance itself is not present by its matter.

As the _actio in distans_ shocks vulgar prejudices, and has therefore many decided adversaries, it is plain that we must be ready to meet a great number of objections. For the present we respectfully invite those who consider the action at a distance as an obvious impossibility to examine carefully the arguments by which we have established the impossibility of the action by material contact. As to their own reasons for a contrary opinion, we hope to answer them satisfactorily as soon as we have done with the explanation of a few other preliminaries.

Power and velocity.

The question which now presents itself is the following: _Is velocity the active power of material substance?_ This question has some importance in the present state of science, on account of the confusion generally made by physical writers between powers, forces, actions, and movements. We answer that, although active power and velocity are now generally considered as synonymous, they are quite different things. Here are our reasons:

In the first place, it is philosophically evident that the result of an action and the principle of the action cannot be of the same nature. But velocity is certainly the result of an action, whilst the active power is the principle of the action. And therefore velocity and active power cannot be of the same nature. But surely, if velocity has not the nature of an active power, it is not an active power, as every one must admit.

In the second place, the active power of creatures, be they material or immaterial, is the power by the exertion of which they manifest themselves and their natural perfection, thus leading us to the knowledge of the existence and the perfections of our Creator, such a knowledge being the end of creation. Active power is therefore not an accidental and changeable affection, but an essential, primitive, and permanent appurtenance of all created substances; nor does it come from interaction of creatures, but only from creation itself; so that we might well apply to it what S. Paul says of the power of kings and rulers: “There is no power except from God.” And accordingly velocity, which is an accidental and changeable affection of matter, cannot be the active power of the material substance.