Chapter IX: Front Matter (9)

With a view to the removal of these sources of embarrassment and of difference between the two countries, Mr. Clayton, Secretary of State, pressed Great Britain to withdraw her pretensions to dominion over the Mosquito Coast. Her reply was a refusal, but an intimation was given that the British Government would be willing to enter into a treaty for a joint protectorate over the proposed canal. This was the germ of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, negotiated at Washington between Secretary of State Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer, the British minister, and signed April 19, 1850. Article I of the treaty, here subjoined, is a declaratory and self-denying ordinance:

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain hereby
declare that neither the one nor the other will ever obtain or
maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship
canal; agreeing that neither will ever erect or maintain any
fortifications commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, or
occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any domain
over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of
Central America; nor will either make use of any protection which
either affords or may afford, or any alliance which either has
or may have to or with any State or people, for the purpose of
erecting or maintaining any such fortifications, or of occupying,
fortifying, or colonizing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito
Coast, or any part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising
dominion over the same; nor will the United States or Great Britain
take advantage of any intimacy, or use any alliance, connection,
or influence that either may possess with any State or Government
through whose territory the said canal may pass, for the purpose of
acquiring or holding, directly or indirectly, for the citizens or
subjects of the one, any rights or advantages in regard to commerce
or navigation through the said canal which shall not be offered on
the same terms to the citizens or subjects of the other.

These stipulations applied only to a canal route across Nicaragua in Central America, not to Panama. But we carried our spirit of complacent self-denial to a further and extraordinary length in article VIII. The first clause of that article is here quoted:

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain having not
only desired, in entering into this convention, to accomplish a
particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they
hereby agree to extend their protection, by treaty stipulations, to
any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway,
across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and
especially to the interoceanic communications, should the same
prove to be practicable, whether by canal or railway, which are now
proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama.

James Buchanan, then our Minister to England, in a memorandum for Lord Clarendon, written on January 6, 1854, referring to the relation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to the Monroe Doctrine, said that while that doctrine would be maintained whenever the peace and safety of the United States made it necessary, “yet to have acted upon it in Central America might have brought us into collision with Great Britain, an event always to be deplored, and if possible avoided”; therefore these “dangerous questions” were settled by a resort to friendly negotiations. In view of the flimsy nature of Great Britain’s asserted rights in Central America, and of the manifest unfriendliness of the motives that had prompted her to plant her flag, her colonies, and her forts in the pathway of communication between our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, it must be said that Mr. Buchanan’s memorandum could not easily have been outdone in politeness. The sounder opinion, the opinion which the country has held and acted upon, is expressed by Francis Wharton in that edition of the “Digest of International Law of the United States” which he edited:

For Great Britain to assume in whole or in part a protectorate
of the Isthmus or of an interoceanic canal, viewing the term
protectorate in the sense in which she viewed it in respect to
the Belise and the Mosquito country, would be to antagonize the
Monroe Doctrine; and for the United States to unite with her in
such a protectorship would be to connive at such antagonism. The
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, if it were to be construed so as to put
the Isthmus under the joint protectorate of Great Britain and the
United States, would not only conflict with the Monroe Doctrine,
by introducing a European Power in the management of the affairs
of this continent, but it would be a gross departure from those
traditions, consecrated by the highest authorities to which we
can appeal, by which we are forbidden to enter into “entangling
alliances” with European Powers. No “alliance” could be more
“entangling” than one with Great Britain to control not only
the Isthmus, but the interoceanic trade of this continent. No
introduction of a foreign Power could be more fatal to the policy
of Mr. Monroe, by which America was to be prevented from being the
theatre of new European domination, than that which would give to
Great Britain a joint control of the continent in one of its most
vital interests.

The appearance of Ferdinand de Lesseps upon the isthmus and the public discussion of his canal project brought the possibilities of foreign control plainly into view, and public opinion in this country ripened into form and expression. “The policy of this country,” said President Hayes in his message to Congress on March 8, 1880, “is a canal under American control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender of this control to any European Power or to any combination of European Powers. If existing treaties between the United States and other nations, or if the rights of sovereignty or property of other nations stand in the way of this policy--a contingency which is not apprehended--suitable steps should be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and establish the American policy.” And Secretary Blaine in 1881 instructed Minister Lowell to let it be known that in the opinion of the President our treaty of 1846 guaranteeing to New Granada, afterward the United States of Colombia, the protection of the projected canal across the Isthmus of Panama, did not require reinforcement or assent from any other Power; and that any attempt to supersede it by an agreement between European Powers would “partake of the nature of an alliance against the United States, and would be regarded by this Government as an indication of an unfriendly feeling.”

PEACE AND PLENTY

~Lord Salisbury~ (chuckling): “I like arbitration--in the _proper place_!”]

In a further instruction to Mr. Lowell, on November 19, 1881, Secretary Blaine stated at length the reasons for holding that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty had become obsolete, or at least inapplicable to the conditions existing thirty years after its ratification, and he expressed the hope of the President that Great Britain would consent to such modifications as would remove every obstacle to our fortification and holding political control of the canal “in conjunction with the country in which it is located.”

President Cleveland, in his first administration, did not approve the policy of exclusive American ownership, control, and guaranty, favoring rather a neutralized canal “open to all nations and subject to the ambitions and warlike necessities of none.” But Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State in Mr. Cleveland’s second term, expressed the “deep conviction” of our Government that the canal should be constructed “under distinctively American auspices.” Secretary Olney, who succeeded Mr. Gresham, in a memorable communication rejected the argument frequently heard, that the treaty had been abrogated by Great Britain’s persistent violation of the provision relating to her Mosquito Coast colony, and recorded the conclusion that if the treaty has now become inapplicable or injurious, the true remedy was “a direct and straightforward application to Great Britain for a reconsideration of the whole matter.”

Thus, in the slow process of time public opinion was prepared and the way cleared for the ending of a joint protectorate agreement with Great Britain by the substitution of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty for the convention negotiated fifty years before between Mr. Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer. The time for action had now come. The French company was bankrupt, the commercial demand for a canal had become more pressing, and the voyage of the _Oregon_ from the Pacific coast around Cape Horn to take her place with the blockading squadron that encircled the harbor entrance at Santiago de Cuba brought vividly to the minds of the American people the vital need of a canal as a measure of national defense. Commissions were studying routes and making estimates of cost. There could no longer be any doubt that the two oceans were to be connected, and with all possible speed, by a navigable way. There was an obstacle--the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. If we built a Nicaragua canal, we must forego “any exclusive control,” and we must submit to the engagements of article V, that the United States and Great Britain jointly will “protect it from interruption, seizure, or unjust confiscation, and that they will guarantee the neutrality thereof.” We must observe the further stipulation of article VI, requiring us to join Great Britain in inviting other nations to enter into the arrangement for the construction, control, and guaranty of this American canal. If we chose to build at Panama, we were bound by article VIII to make a new treaty with Great Britain for a joint protectorate over that route.

Never for a day after President Cleveland’s Venezuela message would the American people have been in a mood to sanction any canal undertaking under these vexatious and impossible conditions. We were quite done with the idea of a joint protectorate over an isthmian canal. The resolve had been taken to build a canal, and the conclusion reached that it must be a canal of our own construction and under our exclusive control.

Most fortunately, we found the Government of Great Britain in an assenting mood. Indeed, the contrast between the rasping quality of Lord Salisbury’s notes declining arbitration of the Venezuela boundary dispute and the candid, placable tone of Lord Lansdowne’s correspondence in the negotiations that led to the superseding of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty silenced, if it did not shame, those half-hearted Americans who had denounced Mr. Cleveland’s memorable message of December 17 as “the crime of the century” and a menace to the friendly relations between ourselves and our kinsmen of England. Following President McKinley’s message of December, 1898, in which he pointed out that the prospective expansion of American commerce and influence in the Pacific called more imperatively than ever for the control of the projected canal by the United States, Lord Pauncefote was instructed to acquaint himself with our attitude. He was informed that we desired at once to enter upon the necessary pourparlers, with a view to such modifications of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as would remove all obstacles to our construction of the canal, which it was evident would not be undertaken by private capital. To this her Majesty’s Government assented, and a draft of the proposed convention was handed to Lord Pauncefote by Secretary Hay on January 11, 1899. This convention her Majesty’s Government, after due consideration, “accepted unconditionally as a signal proof,” said Lord Lansdowne, “of their friendly disposition and of their desire not to impede the execution of a project declared to be of National importance to the people of the United States.”

This was the first form of the Hay-Pauncefote convention, signed at Washington in February, 1900. Consideration by the Senate followed, but it was not ratified until December 20 of that year, and then with three amendments which proved to be unacceptable to Great Britain. As to the first of these amendments, declaring the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to be “hereby superseded,” Lord Lansdowne, in his memorandum of August 3, 1901, objected that no attempt had been made to ascertain the views of his Government upon the entire abrogation of the former treaty, which dealt with several matters for which no provision had been made in the new instrument; and with rather startling frankness he pointed out that if the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty were wholly abrogated, “both Powers would, except in the vicinity of the canal, recover entire freedom of action in Central America, a change which might be of substantial importance.” That was enough to make the Senate open its eyes, for it was not exactly the purpose of our Government to confer upon Great Britain entire freedom of action in Central America.

The statesmanship and the diplomacy of John Hay found a way to reconcile these divergences and bring the negotiations to a successful end. He submitted a new draft of the treaty, providing by a separate article that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty should be superseded, a method of accomplishing that important object more acceptable to Great Britain than procedure by Senate amendment. Lord Lansdowne’s comment upon this article of the draft was that “the purpose to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer convention is not, I think, inadmissible if it can be shown that sufficient provision is made in the new treaty for such portions of the convention as ought, in the interests of this country, to remain in force.” The victory for American control and for the Monroe Doctrine was won. From that point the negotiations proceeded smoothly. Lord Lansdowne suggested the article, accepted by Secretary Hay, providing that the general principle of the treaty should not be affected by any change of sovereignty over the territory traversed by the canal. The question of our right to take measures for the defense of the canal presented no great difficulty.

To the first of the rules for the neutralization of the canal, as it appeared in Mr. Hay’s draft, Lord Lansdowne suggested an amendment which served to bring into the clear light of day both our purpose to secure exclusively American control over the canal, and Great Britain’s willingness to consent thereto. After the words “the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations,” his lordship proposed to add, “which shall agree to observe these rules,” and further on the words “so agreeing” after the clause declaring that there should be “no discrimination against any nation,” and so forth. To this, Mr. Hay informed him, there would be opposition “because of the strong objection to inviting other Powers to become contract parties to a treaty affecting the canal”; and he suggested as a substitute for Lord Lansdowne’s amendment “the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these rules,” and instead of “any nations so agreeing” the words “any such nation.” The difference was vital, for all connotation of inviting formal agreements with other nations disappeared. Lord Lansdowne at once accepted this form of the amendment, which he wrote “seemed to us equally efficacious for the purpose which we had in view, namely, to insure that Great Britain should not be placed in a less advantageous position than other Powers, while they stopped short of conferring upon other nations a contractual right to the use of the canal.”

The minds of the two governments had now met. The amendments proposed on each site, with the modifications noted, were agreed upon. The treaty was reduced to final form, engrossed for signature, and on November 19, 1901, Lord Pauncefote had the honor to inform the Marquis of Lansdowne that on the preceding day he had visited the State Department and had “signed the new treaty for the construction of an interoceanic canal.” The Senate ratified the treaty on December 16 following.

Venezuela had opened the way for Panama. The hand withdrawn from broad areas east of the Orinoco had relinquished its lawful rights under the canal partnership, and in both cases at our instance. In the one, Lord Salisbury’s noble British contempt of our demands and our doctrine forced us into an unaccustomed attitude of firmness. In the other, the Marquis of Lansdowne’s open-minded, amicable, and statesmanlike disposition favored our interest, and left us free to give to the commerce of the world a channel of communication that had been the dream of centuries. We had expressly set up the principle of the Monroe Doctrine as the warrant of our interference for the protection of Venezuela, and Great Britain gave heed by submitting to impartial examination titles she had insisted upon enforcing as though they were beyond dispute. Ill-judged concessions contrary to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, made in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, we recalled by a substitute agreement with Great Britain which left us with a free hand for the construction and control of the canal as an exclusively American work. The vitality, the continuing and constant applicability, of the Monroe Doctrine at every stage of our National existence, as Mr. Cleveland put it, could hardly be more conclusively demonstrated than by the record of the American Government’s part in bringing about the agreement to arbitrate the Venezuela boundary dispute, and in replacing the outworn Clayton-Bulwer convention by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.

[7] ~The Century Magazine~, July, 1901.

“THE OREGON MUDDLE”

A CURIOUS PHASE OF THE HAYES-TILDEN CONTROVERSY

BY VICTOR ROSEWATER

Editor of “The Omaha Daily Bee”

I have been intensely interested in the articles appearing in ~The Century~ for May and June upon the Presidential election of 1876. While I could have no part in, nor recollection of, that controversy, acquaintance with two of the prominent figures in it some time ago led me to look into one phase of the question, and the facts concerning it brought out by the congressional investigation, which seem to me to bear vitally upon this discussion, though they have been entirely ignored. I refer to what was known as “the Oregon muddle,” being the attempt of the Democrats to secure one of the electoral votes of Oregon for Tilden, who had plainly no moral right to it.

At the November election the lowest vote polled by a Republican Presidential elector in Oregon was 15,206, while the highest vote polled by a Democratic elector was only 14,157. After the returns were in, and it was discovered that the electoral college was to be so close that one or two votes might turn it one way or another, the Democrats ascertained that one of the Republican electors in Oregon was a deputy postmaster, and they at once set up the claim that he was ineligible, and that, as a consequence, the Democrat receiving the highest vote was entitled to serve.

At that time Oregon was under Democratic control, had a Democratic governor, Democratic state officers, and one of the United States senators was a Democrat high in the national councils. Before he realized what was at stake, E. A. Cronin, the high man on the Democratic ticket, had announced publicly that he admitted his defeat, and that he would not serve even if he were declared to be elected and offered a certificate, something to that effect having been rumored as coming from the Democratic state officials.

It was at this point that the managers of the Tilden campaign in New York came to the conclusion that something had to be done and done at once. A telegram was sent to Dr. George L. Miller at Omaha, then a member of the Democratic national committee and editor of the Omaha “Herald,” requesting him to proceed at once to Portland and get in touch with the party representatives there. Dr. Miller, it seemed, had already acted on his own account, and had despatched in his stead a close, personal friend, and active Democrat, J. N. H. Patrick, also of Omaha, who had mining interests in Utah, and who was acquainted in the far West.

According to the testimony adduced in the congressional investigation, which embodies as documentary evidence copies of all the telegraphic messages that passed to and fro in connection with the case, Patrick reached Portland in the latter part of November, and immediately called upon C. B. Bellinger, the chairman of the Democratic state committee for Oregon. According to Bellinger, Patrick informed him who he was and the object of his visit, and, as a result of the conference, promised to secure $10,000 to be placed at his disposal to pay the expenses of the contest. Cronin was sent for, and introduced to Patrick, who told him how important it was for him to serve, and intimated that if his vote should make Mr. Tilden President, he would be able to get about anything he wanted from Mr. Tilden. Three thousand dollars of the money transmitted to Oregon through Patrick’s agency was used to retain a firm of Republican lawyers to argue before the governor the question of issuing the certificate to Cronin, the selection of the particular firm, however, being guided by the fact that the senior partner was also the editor of the Portland “Oregonian,” with the hope that it would be induced “not to be too severe in criticizing” the Democratic machinations.

Mr. Patrick evidently communicated with the governor at some time, because he telegraphed to Mr. Tilden, under date of December 1, a cipher translation of the following message:

December 1, 1876.

To Hon. Sam. J. Tilden,
15 Gramercy Park, New York City.

I shall decide every point in the case of post-office elector in
favor of the highest Democratic elector, and grant certificate
accordingly on the morning of the sixth inst. Confidential.

~Governor.~

In the investigation Governor Grover denied having sent this telegram or ever having seen it, but the fact stared every one in the face that just six days later Governor Grover did exactly what the telegram said he would do. The telegram was in the handwriting of Mr. Patrick.

The other message upon which great stress was laid is reproduced in facsimile in the official report, and reads as follows:

Portland, November 28, 1876.

To W. T. Pelton,
15 Gramercy Park, New York City.

By Vizier association innocuous to negligence cunning minutely
previously readmit doltish to purchase afar act with cunning afar
sacristy unweighed afar pointer tigress cuttle superannuated
syllabus dilatoriness misapprehension contraband Kountze bisulcous
top usher spiniferous answer.

~J. N. H. Patrick.~

I fully endorse this.

~James K. Kelly.~

The explanation of this conglomeration of words is perhaps best had by quoting directly from the congressional report:

It appears from the testimony of Alfred B. Hinman of Detroit,
Michigan, that in 1874, he, Hinman, made the acquaintance of J. N.
H. Patrick at Salt Lake City; that he there entered into business
relations with him in connection with mining interests in Utah;
that at the time Mr. Patrick gave him a small dictionary entitled
“The Household English Dictionary, London. T. Nelson & Sons, Pater
Noster Row, Edinburgh and New York, 1872,” to be used by them as
cipher in their business dispatches. That this dictionary, which
was produced by the witness, Hinman, had two columns of words on
each page; that the key to this cipher as used by Patrick and the
witness, Hinman, was as follows: In sending a dispatch the first
word of which in translation would, for instance be “every,” the
word directly opposite this in the next column would be taken as
the cipher; and so on through the whole dispatch.

It was, however, shown that the cipher-despatches in this case could not be translated from the dictionary by adopting the key of taking the corresponding word on the opposite column, but in every instance they could be translated from the dictionary by taking the corresponding word in the columns eight columns ahead. It further appeared from the testimony, and no attempt was made to impeach it, or the translation made in this way, or to contradict the claim that all these cipher-despatches were sent by this dictionary or its duplicate in accordance with the key as above stated,--and, besides, Pelton, Kelly, Bellinger, and Miller all testified that the despatches were made up from a dictionary cipher,--that the translation of the despatch just quoted is as follows:

Portland, November 28, 1876.

To W. T. Pelton,
15 Gramercy Park, New York City.

Certificate will be issued to one democrat. Must purchase a
republican elector to recognize and act with democrats and secure
the vote and prevent trouble. Deposit $10,000 to my credit with
Kountze Brothers, Wall street. Answer.

~J. N. H. Patrick.~

I fully endorse this.

~James K. Kelly.~

Mr. Patrick, after having concluded his arrangements with the local representatives of the party in Oregon, and having provided the money necessary for them to carry out the agreed plan, seems to have dropped out of the negotiations.

Governor Grover, as promised, decided the contest against the Republican elector, and in conjunction with the secretary of state had the certificate of election made out for the two uncontested Republicans and Cronin, the Democrat. These certificates were made out in triplicate, and were all delivered to Cronin, copies being refused the Republican electors. When the time came for the electoral college to meet and vote, the three Republicans got together, the contested member, Watts, having in the interval resigned his post-office position, and, after declaring the vacancy, reappointed Watts, who was then eligible to serve as elector, the three casting the vote for Rutherford B. Hayes.

Cronin and the crowd of Democrats who had assembled simultaneously moved over to the other end of the room, and under pretense that the Republicans refused to act with him, Cronin called in another Democrat, a man named Miller, and went through the form of appointing him to fill a vacancy, the two together following this up by appointing a third Democrat, Parker, to fill up the college, although neither of these two were candidates or were voted for at the election.

The three Democrats thereupon formally organized and proceeded to cast a ballot giving two votes to Rutherford B. Hayes, and one to Samuel J. Tilden. They made up the forms certifying to these facts, and appointed Cronin to carry the documents to Washington.

The disinterestedness of Cronin was further evinced by the fact that, although he was entitled to draw mileage and expenses as messenger, he refused to go until he was paid $3000 in gold by the Democratic campaign managers to reimburse him for his time and expenses, the money being part of that supplied from the national committee at New York under the arrangements made by Mr. Patrick.

“The Oregon muddle” furnished one of the disputed points passed upon by the electoral commission, and the three votes of Oregon were finally recorded for the Republican candidate who was later installed as President.

Mr. J. N. H. Patrick died here about eight years ago. Dr. George L. Miller is still alive, but his now failing mind will prevent him throwing further light on the subject. The point which, in my judgment, ought to be emphasized, is that if the Democrats in charge of Mr. Tilden’s political fortunes at that time believed that he had carried, and was entitled to, the votes of Florida and Louisiana, they would not have set so high a value upon, or have gone to so questionable lengths to obtain, this lone electoral vote in Oregon; nor have they accused the Republicans of doing anything reprehensible on behalf of Hayes which by the record was not matched by their performance in Oregon.

LOUISE

FROM THE TINTED MARBLE BUST BY EVELYN BEATRICE LONGMAN]

T. TEMBAROM

BY FRANCES HODGSON BURNETT

Author of “That Lass o’ Lowrie’s,” “The Shuttle,” etc.

WITH DECORATIVE PICTURES BY CHARLES S. CHAPMAN