Chapter VI: Book III: True Happiness and False

SUMMARY

CH. I. Boethius beseeches Philosophy to continue. She promises to
lead him to true happiness.--CH. II. Happiness is the one end which
all created beings seek. They aim variously at (_a_) wealth, or
(_b_) rank, or (_c_) sovereignty, or (_d_) glory, or (_e_)
pleasure, because they think thereby to attain either (_a_)
contentment, (_b_) reverence, (_c_) power, (_d_) renown, or (_e_)
gladness of heart, in one or other of which they severally imagine
happiness to consist.--CH. III. Philosophy proceeds to consider
whether happiness can really be secured in any of these ways, (_a_)
So far from bringing contentment, riches only add to men's
wants.--CH. IV. (_b_) High position cannot of itself win respect.
Titles command no reverence in distant and barbarous lands. They
even fall into contempt through lapse of time.--CH. V. (_c_)
Sovereignty cannot even bestow safety. History tells of the
downfall of kings and their ministers. Tyrants go in fear of their
lives. --CH. VI. (_d_) Fame conferred on the unworthy is but
disgrace. The splendour of noble birth is not a man's own, but his
ancestors'.--CH. VII. (_e_) Pleasure begins in the restlessness of
desire, and ends in repentance. Even the pure pleasures of home may
turn to gall and bitterness.--CH. VIII. All fail, then, to give
what they promise. There is, moreover, some accompanying evil
involved in each of these aims. Beauty and bodily strength are
likewise of little worth. In strength man is surpassed by the
brutes; beauty is but outward show.--CH. IX. The source of men's
error in following these phantoms of good is that _they break up
and separate that which is in its nature one and indivisible_.
Contentment, power, reverence, renown, and joy are essentially
bound up one with the other, and, if they are to be attained at
all, must be attained _together_. True happiness, if it can be
found, will include them all. But it cannot be found among the
perishable things hitherto considered.--CH. X. Such a happiness
necessarily exists. Its seat is in God. Nay, God is very happiness,
and in a manner, therefore, the happy man partakes also of the
Divine nature. All other ends are relative to this good, since they
are all pursued only for the sake of good; it is _good_ which is
the sole ultimate end. And since the sole end is also happiness, it
is plain that this good and happiness are in essence the same.--CH.
XI. Unity is another aspect of goodness. Now, all things subsist so
long only as they preserve the unity of their being; when they lose
this unity, they perish. But the bent of nature forces all things
(plants and inanimate things, as well as animals) to strive to
continue in life. Therefore, all things desire unity, for unity is
essential to life. But unity and goodness were shown to be the
same. Therefore, good is proved to be the end towards which the
whole universe tends.[E]--CH. XII. Boethius acknowledges that he is
but recollecting truths he once knew. Philosophy goes on to show
that it is goodness also by which the whole world is governed.[F]
Boethius professes compunction for his former folly. But the
paradox of evil is introduced, and he is once more perplexed.

FOOTNOTES:

[E] This solves the second of the points left in doubt at the end of bk. i., ch. vi.

[F] This solves the third. No distinct account is given of the first, but an answer may be gathered from the general argument of bks. ii., iii., and iv.