Chapter III: Chaldicotes (2)

Wearied with so many evasions, difficulties and delays, the ministers of the treaty powers, in 1854, determined to approach the capital, in order to represent to the court the unsatisfactory state of foreign relations with the imperial commissioner at Canton, and the necessity of redressing the many grievances of which they had to complain, and thus putting an end to a policy essentially unfriendly, which could not but lead to a fatal crisis, and which imperilled alike the interests of China and of all the nations who came into contact with her. It was hoped that the strong and united representations of the three ministers might alarm the emperor, or at all events obtain his serious attention to the dangers with which he was menaced. The attempt failed.[8] It could not but fail, through the incredible misrepresentations made to the Chinese court by the commissioners who were sent down by the emperor to meet the foreign envoys. As regards the outward forms of courtesy, the latter had perhaps no special ground of complaint. Tents were erected for their reception in the neighbourhood of the Takoo forts; and they were invited to a repast, in which, it may be worth notice, there was a display of ancient European steel knives and forks, with handsome porcelain handles, apparently of the age of Louis XIV. They were met on terms of equality, and the posts of honour were graciously conceded to them. But the urbane manners of the mandarins did not mislead the foreign ministers, who left them with the declaration that they were insuring for their country days of future sorrow. On the subject of their reports to the court of Peking, Mr. Reed says: “They illustrate the habitual faithlessness of Chinese officials.... They were certainly the most painful revelations of the mendacity and treacherous habits of the high officials of this empire ever given to the world. They cannot be read without contemptuous resentment.”[9]

There was only one possible termination to a state of things so obviously unsatisfactory, menacing, and untenable. Everything that could be said or done, in the shape of friendly counsel, had been exhausted. The American commissioner, Mr. M‘Lane, reports to his government,[10] that on leaving China, he addressed to Keih,[11] the governor of Kiangsoo, the following memorable warning:--

“Now, as my parting words, I say to you, if something is not done,
our relations will become bad, our amity be disturbed. I believe
that but for the officers of both governments there now might have
been a state of things that might have led to a war; but we have
exerted ourselves to prevent it.” [Governor Keih--“Yes.”] “I have
done well, and on the eve of my departure am most _disinterested_ in
what I say. I do not think it is in the power of either officers of
either government long to preserve the peace. If the emperor does not
listen, and appoint a commissioner to adjust the foreign relations,
so sure as there is a God in the heavens, amity cannot be preserved.
I say it in sincerity, as my parting words.”

The personal character of Yeh tended greatly to complicate every international question. He represented the pride, presumption, and ignorance of a high mandarin, without the restraints which fear of imperial displeasure generally places upon Chinese functionaries. He was the instrument, and for some time the successful instrument, for carrying out the imperial policy as regarded foreign nations. He had a great reputation for learning, had won the most eminent literary grades, was a distinguished member of the highest college (the Hanlin), and the guardian of the heir apparent--indeed, on one occasion he called himself the fourth personage of the empire. Moreover, his despatches were much admired for their perspicuity and purity of language. He was strangely unacquainted with the geography, institutions, and policy of remote nations, and even made his ignorance a ground for self-congratulation. When questions of commercial interest were brought before him, he treated them as altogether below his notice, and on one occasion abruptly terminated a conversation by saying, “You speak to me as if I were a merchant, and not a mandarin.” He devoted himself to the study of necromancy, and relied on his “fortunate star;” believing that the city of Canton was impregnable, he made no serious arrangements for its defence.

What Ke-ying preached, Yeh-ming practised; but Ke was a man of a gentle, Yeh of a ferocious nature; and the cautious cunning which often marked the course of the one was wholly wanting to the other. Yeh, armed as he was with powers of life and death, exercised them with a recklessness of which there is no equal example in history. He turned the execution-ground at Canton into a huge lake of blood; hundreds of rebels were beheaded daily. When he was asked whether he had really caused seventy thousand men to be decapitated, he boastingly replied that the number exceeded a hundred thousand; and to an inquiry whether he had inflicted upon women the horrible punishment called the cutting into ten thousand pieces, he answered, “Ay! they were worse than the men.”[12]

It was the affair of the _Arrow_ which brought about the inevitable crisis. The question of Sir John Bowring’s action on that occasion was entangled with the party politics of the day, and little more need now be said than that the verdict of the country reversed the condemnatory decision of the House of Commons. Certain it is that the very build of a _lorcha_, so altogether unlike any Chinese junk in its external appearance, ought to have led the local authorities in Canton to be very cautious in their interference with her crew; and that the fact of her papers being in the hands of the British consul, and not of the Chinese custom-house, was _primâ facie_ evidence of her nationality. Since the brutal character of ex-Commissioner Yeh has been better understood, even those most forward to censure Sir John Bowring, for refusing to deliver over to that savage and sanguinary personage men who at all events believed themselves to be entitled to the protection of British authority,[13] cannot but have felt that they ought to have been more indulgent to his hesitation. That he carried with him the sympathy of the representatives of the treaty powers,--that Yeh’s policy was condemned by his colleagues and by the people in general,[14]--and that Yeh himself was finally degraded and disgraced by his own sovereign for his proceedings, are matters of historical record. Yeh, there is little doubt, would have been publicly executed, had he returned to China, notwithstanding the efforts of his father, who betook himself to Peking with a very large sum of money, hoping to be able--but failing--to propitiate the court.[15]

The war was carried on by the Chinese according to their usual mode of dealing with foreign nations.[16] They had no chance of success in open combat, so they had recourse to the ordinary stratagems adopted by uncivilized races. An “anti-barbarian committee” was formed among them, under the auspices of the mandarins. They offered premiums from 100 up to 100,000 ounces of silver for assassinations of “the barbarians,” according to the gradation of rank, and similar graduated rewards for the capture of vessels, for acts of incendiarism, for denouncing those who sent provisions to Hong Kong. Intercourse was prohibited under pain of death; and provision was promised to be made for the families of those who might perish in any desperate enterprise against the “foreign devils.” But so well was the government of Hong Kong served, that only one of many attempts to injure the colony had any success. In this, however, 360 persons of all nations were poisoned; but, happily, from the excess of arsenic employed, which led to an immediate perception of the danger, very few lost their lives. No less than 25,000 of the inhabitants fled to the mainland in consequence of the menaces of the mandarins; yet, though there were not 400 effective men in the garrison, such was the efficiency of the naval department, so active the police, and so well-disposed the mass of the Chinese population, that scarcely any damage was inflicted on the colony.

Canton was taken on the 29th of December. The resistance was ridiculous.[17] The walls were scaled by a handful of men, and Yeh, who had concealed himself, was captured. Why British authority, which would have been welcomed by the respectable part of the population, was not established under military law, and the whole administration of the public revenues taken into our hands, it is very difficult to explain. But at the meeting in which the English and French ambassadors informed the high Chinese authorities that the city had been captured and was held by the allied forces, both the governor of Kwang-tung and the Tartar general were allowed to be seated on the same elevation with the foreign ambassadors, and above the positions occupied by the naval and military commanders-in-chief who were left in charge of the city. Subordinate to these, an hermaphrodite government was created, called “the Allied Commissioners,” who were to be consulted on all occasions by the mandarins charged to carry on the administration of public affairs.

A grand opportunity was thus lost of exhibiting to the Cantonese the benefits of a just and honest, however severe, administration: they could not but have been struck with the difference between the humane and equitable laws of foreigners, as contrasted with the corrupt and cruel dealings of the mandarins. The _Elgin Papers_ throw little light upon the atrocities which were perpetrated by the Chinese, long after our possession of the city. The prisons continued to be scenes of horrible tortures. It was thought necessary to destroy whole streets, in order to convey terror into districts where assassinations of the subjects of allied powers had taken place: all the eastern suburb of the city was razed to the ground, and not a respectable inhabitant was left amidst the desolation. There can be no doubt that Governor Pehkwei considered himself invested with supreme authority over Chinese subjects. He complains bitterly, in a despatch to Lord Elgin, of 31st January, 1858, of Consul Parkes’ interference--of his “overbearing” and unreasonably oppressive “conduct in disposing of Chinamen confined in the gaols of Canton. I ask, whether Chinese officers would be tolerated in their interference with British subjects confined in British gaols?” Lord Elgin does not, in his reply, assert British jurisdiction over the prisons in Canton; but says, Pehkwei will be required to release all prisoners entitled to the benefits of the amnesty; and in another despatch (p. 178), distinctly throws upon Pehkwei the responsibility of preserving the public peace. This anomalous state of matters awakened the attention of our Government at home: a despatch of Lord Malmesbury (14th June, 1858), says: “It will be a disgrace to the allied powers if they do not prevent such enormities as are practised in the prisons of Canton.” ... The “British name must be relieved from the disgrace and guilt of having connived at a state of things so monstrous and revolting.” As to the mixed authority of native mandarins and allied commissioners, Lord Malmesbury says: “It is wholly inefficient for all objects of administration and policy, and should be replaced by a military government acting under the rules of martial law.” He recommended that the allies should take possession of the custom-house revenues, and hold the balance after the payment of the local expenses. It is much to be regretted that these measures were not adopted. Undoubtedly, Lord Elgin exercised a sound discretion in not proceeding to Peking until “a lesson” had been given to Yeh’s obstinacy. Had he gone to the North it would have been deemed a confession that he had been foiled in the South, and compelled to appeal to the emperor, in order to relieve himself from the difficulties in which Yeh had placed him; for Yeh--who had chosen to represent the English “barbarians” as making common cause with the rebels, and in fact, being themselves in a state of rebellion against imperial authority--gave the court the assurance that, as he had been so successful in breaking up the native insurrection, so he would not fail “to drive the foreign ‘barbarians’ into the sea.” In short, there could be little doubt, that had his calculations proved correct, a hostile policy would have pursued us in all the other parts of China, and our immense interests there have been placed in jeopardy.

For some time the court ventured to dream that by Yeh’s indomitable bravery China might be wholly rid of the presence of the intrusive strangers.[18] It is known that the emperor was much displeased with a mandarin, who, having lived in Canton, and being acquainted with the power of the English, ventured to express doubts as to the trustworthiness of Yeh’s representations that he could bridle and extirpate the English barbarians;[19] and nothing less than the taking the Takoo forts by the allied forces, and an advance upon the capital (even after Yeh’s capture and humiliation) was likely to bring the court of Peking to a sense of its own weakness, and the necessity of listening to our representations and remonstrances.

Every effort had been made to obstruct the progress of the allied ambassadors towards Peking; but they wisely determined not to delay their voyage to the Gulf of Pecheli, and, on the 24th April, they announced to the Chinese prime minister their arrival, at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river. The usual evasions were brought into play; and it was soon discovered that the commissioners sent down had no sufficient powers. On the 18th May, therefore, after consultation with the admirals, it was determined to “take the forts,” and to “proceed pacifically up the river;” on the 19th, notice was given to the Chinese, and on the 20th, the forts were in the hands of the Allies. On the 29th, the ambassadors reached Tien-tsin. On the same day they were advised that “the chief secretary of state,” and the president of one of the imperial boards, were ordered to proceed without delay “to investigate and despatch business.” After many discussions the Treaty was signed on the 26th June.

The progress and the result of these negotiations only demonstrate that where our policy has failed, and where it will always fail in China, is in placing confidence in the Chinese. Our distrust must be the groundwork: it is the only sound foundation of our security. When the four ambassadors were at Tien-tsin, and had extorted from the fears of the Chinese treaties more or less humiliating to Chinese pride, according to the amount of pressure employed, it should have been foreseen that on the removal of that pressure the Chinese mind would resume its natural obstinacy. A treaty with China will always be waste paper, unless some security is obtained for giving it due effect. It is, therefore, greatly to be regretted that the ambassadors should have left the most difficult of questions, one most wounding to Chinese pride--the reception of foreign ministers at Peking, and the initiation of their constant residence at court--to be settled by their successors, who had neither the same high diplomatic position, nor the same large naval and military forces at their disposal. It may, indeed, be a question whether it was desirable to force upon the Chinese the recognition of our right to have an ambassador permanently fixed at the capital; but if we thought fit to insist on such recognition, there should certainly have been no vacillation--no disposition shown to surrender in any shape or on any terms the right which had been conceded. We could not plead want of experience, for we had abundant evidence of the determination of the Chinese to repudiate and deny every concession, the enjoyment of which was either rediscussed or deferred. We should have avoided, above all things, the transfer of the Canton question to Peking. Our right to enter Canton was incontestable. Shufflings and subterfuges on the part of the Chinese, hesitation and an erroneous estimate of the importance of the question on the part of the British Government and the British functionaries in China, led to one delay after another, and ended by an absolute denial of our treaty right, and an arming of the Chinese population to enforce that denial, accompanied at the same time by a Chinese proclamation mendaciously averring that we had withdrawn our claims. A similar course has been pursued at Peking. The Chinese, who have no notion--what Oriental has?--of privileges possessed and not exercised, saw in the willingness to give way to their representations, not, as we might have supposed, a consideration for their repugnancy, and a magnanimity in refraining from the enjoyment of a privilege distasteful to them, but an infirmity of purpose--a confession that we had asked for something we did not want, and which they felt to be a degradation needlessly and gratuitously imposed upon them. There is, in fact, neither safety nor dignity in any course but the stern, steady persistence in the assertion and enforcement of whatever conditions are the subject of imperial engagements.

Lord Elgin returned to England, and Mr. Bruce was appointed his successor. It was at first announced that he had been furnished with ambassadorial powers, but as such powers would have entitled him to demand a personal reception by the emperor, it was, on reconsideration, very judiciously thought better to avoid a question which might lead to great embarrassments, and he was accredited as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Peking court. To our judgment it appears the instructions of Lord Malmesbury were too peremptory as to the course Mr. Bruce was to pursue; and if that course was to be insisted on, most inadequate means were provided.[20] It is but another example of those in the distance imagining they see more clearly than those who are near, and assuming an acquaintance with local circumstances--subject every hour to change--which, without the attributes of omnipresence and omniscience, it is impossible they should possess. Whatever may have been the views of the Cabinet at home, it is obvious that the forces which accompanied Mr. Bruce were as superfluous for peace as they were insufficient for war, and that he was placed in the embarrassing dilemma either of disobeying his orders, or of incurring great risk in the attempt to execute them. That the Admiral singularly overrated his own force, and under-estimated that of the Chinese, admits now of no controversy. But an indulgent judgment should be awarded to one so personally brave and self-sacrificing, and who was entitled to confide in the indomitable bravery of those he commanded; whose experience, too, of the general character of Chinese warfare was not likely to teach them prudence or caution.

The first and the most natural inquiry is, what is likely to be the result of these disastrous events? If negotiations are wisely conducted, the probability is that the emperor will throw the blame on the local authorities, attribute to the misrepresentations which have been made any approval he may have given to those who attacked the Allies, and repudiate any intended complicity in the mismanagement of foreign relations. For it has hitherto been the invariable policy of the Chinese government to localize every quarrel, and to avoid any general war. There is no scruple about sacrificing any mandarin whose proceedings, though lauded and recompensed at first, have in the sequel proved injudicious or injurious.

We cannot look forward, however, without apprehension--apprehension not from the possible defeat of our arms--they will be too strong, too efficient for defeat by any Chinese forces--but from their successful advance and overthrow of all resistance. Nothing can arrest their course to Peking, nor prevent the capture of that vast capital; but its possession may prove our great embarrassment. If the emperor, accompanied by his court, should retreat into Manchuria--if Peking be deserted, as Canton was, by all that is respectable and opulent--the Allies may find themselves amidst vacant streets, abandoned houses, a wandering, a starving population, too poor to migrate with their betters. Winter will come--the cruel, bitter winter of northern China; the rivers will be frozen, communications cut off; and with no war-ship in the Gulf of Pecheli, supplies must be inaccessible. Peking may even prove another Moscow to its conquerors.

The condition of the French and Spanish expedition in Cochin China is full of present instruction. They are acting against a miserable and despised enemy. They have been for more than a year in possession of Turon, the principal harbour of the country; but they have not ventured to attack the adjacent capital. Disease has thinned their ranks; victories have brought no results, but ever new disappointment: every calculation of success having been thwarted by a patient but stubborn “no surrender.” It is a resistance that cannot be reached by strength of arms, nor dealt with by the cunning of diplomacy. May it serve as a warning in that wider field upon which we are entering in China!

How is the social edifice to be constructed out of crumbling ruins? To overthrow the existing dynasty of China may be easy enough; indeed, the difficulty, as with that of Turkey, is its maintenance and preservation: its very feebleness cries to us for pity and mercy. It may yet totter on for generations, if not harshly shaken; but if it--fall--fall amidst its wrecked institutions--China, inviting as it is to foreign ambition and the lust of conquest, may become the battle-field of contending interests. Russia, moving steadily and stealthily forward in its march of territorial aggression; France, charged with what she fancies herself specially called upon to represent--the missionary propagand, with the Catholic world behind her; England, with those vast concerns which involve about one-ninth of the imperial and Indian revenues, and an invested capital exceeding forty millions sterling; and the United States, whose commerce may be deemed about one-third of that of Great Britain, to say nothing of Holland and Spain, who are not a little concerned, through their eastern colonies, in the well-being of China;--will then be engaged in a struggle for power, if not territory, the result of which cannot be anticipated; indeed we scarcely venture to contemplate such portentous complications.

No thoughtful man will deny the necessity of teaching the Chinese that treaties must be respected, and perfidy punished. Duty and interest alike require this at our hands; but this is but one of many duties--one of many interests; and we would most emphatically say, _Respice finem_--look beyond--look to the end. The destruction of hundreds of thousands of Chinese, the ravaging of their great cities, may fail to accomplish the object we have in view. They have been but too much accustomed to such calamities, and their influences soon pass away from a nation so reckless of life. But it may be possible to exact penalties in a shape which will be more sensible to them, and more beneficial to us: for example, the administration of their custom-house revenues in Shanghae and Canton, and the payment out of these of all the expenses of the war.

But is there nothing to hope from the Taiping movement? Nothing. It has become little better than dacoity: its progress has been everywhere marked by wreck and ruin; it destroys cities, but builds none; consumes wealth, and produces none; supersedes one despotism by another more crushing and grievous; subverts a rude religion by the introduction of another full of the vilest frauds and the boldest blasphemies. It has cast off none of the proud, insolent, and ignorant formulas of imperial rule; but, claiming to be a divine revelation, exacts the same homage and demands the same tribute from Western nations, to which the government of Peking pretended in the days of its highest and most widely recognized authority.

We cannot afford to overthrow the government of China. Bad as it is, anarchy will track its downfall, and the few elements of order which yet remain will be whelmed in a convulsive desolation.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Peiho, in Chinese, means a north or northern river, but no river in particular. No Chinaman applies the word to the locality which now bears the name on our charts. In Bristol, the Mersey would be deemed entitled to the name of the Peiho; in London, the Humber, the Tyne, or the Tweed.

[2] The matchlock is still used in China, where even the flint has not been introduced. The late emperor, Taou-Kwang, had heard of “improvements in musketry,” and specimens of “percussion locks” were sent to Peking, but they were rejected; and the military examinations to this hour consist of feats of individual strength, the exercise of the bow and arrow, the spear and the shield. In the use of artillery there have been some improvements. The Chinese have purchased cannon for their fortifications and war-junks, both in Hong Kong and Macao, and of late from the Russians, for their forts of Takoo.

[3] The emperor’s words are: “This was the only proper arrangement to be made (for the settlement of the treaties). We understand the whole question.” In 1854, when the foreign Ministers visited Tien-tsin, the imperial orders were conveyed to the mandarins in the following words:--“At your interview, you must snap short their deceit and arrogance, and foil their malicious sophistry.” Another imperial decree says:--“The barbarians study nothing but gain. Their hurrying backwards and forwards only means [more] trade and [lower] tariffs. When a trifle is granted on this score they naturally acquiesce and hold their tongues.”

[4] Nothing is less intelligible to a high-bred mandarin than the desire of foreign females to be introduced to him. At Hong Kong, when English ladies were brought to see the ex-commissioner Yeh, he turned away, and refused to look at them, and on their departure, expressed his annoyance and disgust. He was invited at Calcutta to a ball given by the Governor of Bengal. Inquiring what was meant, he was told by his Chinese secretary, that a ball was a sport in which “men turned themselves round, holding the waists and turning round the wives of other men;” on which, he asked whether the invitation was meant for an insult? There was an amusing scene at Canton, when Chinese ladies were for the first time introduced to some of our British fair. The Chinese kept for some minutes tremblingly in the distance, afraid to approach, when one was heard to say to another, “They do not look so _very_ barbarous, after all;” and they moved a little forward to meet their guests; another whisper was heard, “Surely they have learnt how to behave themselves. Is it not wonderful?” and a third voice replied, “Yes! but you know they have been for some time in Canton!”

[5] _Elgin Papers_, p. 175.

[6] In the French treaty the discrepancies between the French and Chinese text are yet more striking. The Chinese text places Chinese subjects claimed by the authorities under conditions far less favourable than those provided by the French version.

[7] _Debate_, July.

[8] In the _Elgin Papers_ many pages are occupied with the details of the correspondence between the commissioners who came to the mouth of the Tien-tsin river and the court of Peking, and which were found in Yeh’s archives at Canton.

[9] Speech at Philadelphia, quoted in _North American Review_, No. CLXXXV. p. 503.

[10] _American Papers_, p. 417: _Despatch_ dated 27th November, 1857.

[11] Keih was one of the most intelligent and honest of the high mandarins of China. He was killed in an action with the rebels soon after his last interview with the foreign ministers. He openly blamed the perversity of Yeh, whom he hoped to succeed in the office of high commissioner. Had his life been spared, and his counsels prevailed, he would have initiated a policy of conciliation and amity.

[12] We give one of Yeh’s characteristic proclamations, issued during the siege of Canton:--

“Yeh, governor-general of the two Kwang provinces, member of the cabinet, and baron of the empire, hereby proclaims for the general information:--

“These are the contumacious English barbarians, who are akin to dogs and hogs, and like wolves and jackals in disposition, who make no distinction in the human relations, and are destitute of propriety or manners * * * * * who act as they list, have the tempers of wild beasts, and go here and there in wild recklessness, regardless of human rights or order.

“These are they who have presumed, like flocks of ravens issuing from out their coverts, to cast contemptuous looks on celestial awe-inspiring dignity, and seeing that our troops were unprepared, suddenly have taken possession of our forts, and following the bent of their lawless wickedness have burned the shops and dwellings of our people. Gods and men are indignant, heaven and earth can no longer endure them, and well will it be for your people if you unite in particular, and with vigorous arm exterminate them altogether. Let soldiers and gentry exhibit their loyalty, and with the braves, known to be in every place, swear, as they exhibit a force and union like the driving tempest, that they will revenge the honour of their country. Let full obedience be given to his majesty’s rescript, and with firm purpose and stout arm sweep them off without remainder, burning their lairs, and exterminating their whole kith and kin.

“Then the memorial of your merit will be seen in the palace, while the state stands secure in the greatness of its people, as in the golden days of Shun, and the elements genially combine to produce plenty, through the good rule universal in the land, as was seen in the halcyon days of Tsin.

“The other nations of the West must all reverently obey our heavenly dynasty, according to their laws and their administrators, for they will be amerced in the same crimes (as the English) if they venture to copy their conduct.

“Those native traitors who are serving these several tribes, by aiding their purposes, must be strictly watched after and judged, the worst of them by the extermination of their kindred, the lesser by the destruction of their own families.

“Those who are employed as servants to any of the foreigners are allowed twenty days to return to their own patrimonies, there to pursue their several occupations. If they linger along in the hope of gain, they will be treated and punished as traitors.

“Each one must tremblingly obey these orders without opposition.”

[13] The words of the treaty are: “If it shall be ascertained or suspected that lawless natives of China, having committed crimes or offences against their own government, have fled, a communication shall be made to the proper English officer, in order that the said criminals and offenders may be rigidly searched for, seized, and, on proof or admission of their guilt, delivered up” to the Chinese authorities.

[14] A thoroughly well-informed American gentleman, then on the spot, declares that the Cantonese prayed that some English ball might “make hit the Viceroy; he all same devil,” they said. “Yeh had no supporters among his own countrymen, except his immediate followers, natives of other provinces, and having no local interest. He ruled simply by terror, and all would have been glad to have seen him destroyed.”--_A Foreigner’s Evidence on the China Question_, p. 14.

[15] Yeh died in Calcutta. So great was the quantity of gas emitted by his body after death, that the leaden coffin burst twice. On its arrival at Canton the Chinese would not allow the body to be brought into the city.

[16] The following is the protest of the United States Commissioner, addressed to High Commissioner Yeh:--

“_Legation of the U.S., Macao, Jan. 16, 1857._

“The undersigned Commissioner and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America in China is again compelled to address your Excellency, demonstrating and protesting against the violation of our treaty of amity, the laws of civilized nations, and the rules of justifiable war.

“The United States Consul, who arrived from Hong Kong last evening, has appeared before the undersigned in person, and represented that a most diabolical deed has been perpetrated by Chinese subjects, who had administered poison in the bread supplied to the public in that colony and on board vessels in the harbour, to multitudes of men, women, and children, without distinction of nation; that he himself had partaken of the poison, from which he is still suffering, and that other citizens of the United States are rendered dangerously ill by the poisoned bread.

“The undersigned, as in duty bound, solemnly protests against this unjustifiable mode of warfare. ‘The use of poison as a means of war is prohibited by the unanimous concurrence of all the public jurists of the present age. The custom of civilized nations has exempted the persons of the sovereign and his family, the members of the civil government, women and children, cultivators of the earth, artisans, labourers, merchants, men of science and letters, and generally all other public or private individuals engaged in the ordinary civil pursuits of life, from the effects of military operations, unless actually taken in arms, or guilty of some misconduct in violation of the usages of war, by which they forfeit this immunity.’ Now, by the manner in which the poison has been administered in Hong Kong, not only the innocent women and children, and all artisans, labourers, merchants, and men of science, belonging to the English nation, had their lives exposed, but the citizens and subjects of other nations who are on friendly relations with China. Americans, French, Russians, Portuguese, and Spaniards have all received the deadly poison; and that some may yet die, remains to be known.

“The undersigned, therefore, on behalf of the Government of the United States, on the part of humanity, and (reverently) in the name of God, protests against this most barbarous deed; and as on former occasions when protesting against the offering of pecuniary rewards to perfidy and assassination of foreigners, must hold the imperial government of China responsible for all the consequences, both to individual and national interests.

“His Excellency Yeh.” “PETER PARKER.”

[17] One man appeared during the Canton conflict who is entitled to be mentioned with respect and honour--Wang, the Chinese admiral. He was well acquainted with the power of the British; and on one occasion had given evidence of great coolness and courage when accompanying H.M.S. _Columbine_ on an expedition against the pirates. He did his best to persuade Yeh from engaging in a quarrel which could not but be disastrous to the Chinese, but he failed, as everybody failed. “You may as well reason with a stone,” was the language of a deputation that sought the British officials. Wang received peremptory orders from Yeh to attack and destroy the British fleet in the Canton river. He answered that it was impossible: that an encounter must be fatal to the imperial war junks. The orders were renewed; and he said he would do his best--as he did in the affair at Fashan, when considerable damage was done to our boats, and many of our men lost their lives. Wang’s junk was captured; and the imperial warrant, on yellow silk, was found, recording a series of adventurous and valorous deeds; but Wang was ordered to be decapitated by Yeh, because he had not beaten the British. He fled, and was concealed for some time in a village on the banks of the river. He applied to the Governor of Hong Kong, asking to be allowed an asylum there, which was cordially offered; but severe illness prevented his removal. Yeh afterwards repented of his precipitation; recalled Wang to the public service; who stipulated that he should not be employed against Western nations.

[18] The influence of Yeh at Peking was considerably strengthened by the support he received from Iliang, who obtained the credit of persuading the United States Commissioner, Mr. Marshall, not to proceed to the capital. Iliang, in one of his despatches to the emperor, says: “Whatever the barbarian chief may insinuate against Yeh-ming-chen, it is he whom they fear.”--_Elgin Papers_, p. 280.

[19] When in the former war Commissioner Keshen humbly represented to the emperor Taou-Kwang, that it was impossible to resist the English, he was ordered to be executed for his mendacity. His life was saved by powerful friends at court.

[20] “Her Majesty’s Government are prepared to expect that all the arts at which the Chinese are such adepts will be put in practice to dissuade you from repairing to the capital, even for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the treaty, but it will be your duty firmly, but temperately, to resist any propositions to that effect, and _to admit of no excuses_.

“The Admiral in command of H.M.’s naval forces in China, has been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force.

“_You will insist_ on your being received at Peking, and will refuse to exchange ratifications at any other place.”--_Despatch of Lord Malmesbury, 1st March, 1859._

Lovel the Widower.