Chapter III: Part 3
But for this manly conference with the Red men in the heart of their own country, and the admiration with which his presence, courage, and bearing inspired the assembled Chiefs, Oglethorpe could not have compassed the pacification and secured that treaty of amity so essential to the welfare of the Colony now on the eve of most serious difficulties with the Spaniards in Florida.
On the 5th of October, 1739, at his little town four miles from Savannah, the venerable Tomo-chi-chi,—Oglethorpe’s earliest and best friend among the Indians,—yielding to the effects of a lingering illness, died at the advanced age of ninety-seven years. The General acted as one of the pall-bearers, and the body of the old Chief, in accordance with his wish, was interred, with becoming honors, in one of the public squares in Savannah. In his last moments he expressed no little concern that he was about to be taken away at a time when his services might prove of special value to his friends, the English, against the Spaniards, and counseled his people never to forget the favors he had received, when in England, from the King, and to persevere in their amicable relations with the colonists.[77] These injunctions were not unheeded. Toonahowi—the favorite nephew of the aged Mico—accompanied General Oglethorpe in his expedition against St. Augustine; and again, leading a party of Creek Indians, brought off from the very walls of that city Don Romualdo Ruiz del Moral, lieutenant of Spanish horse and nephew to the late governor of Florida, and delivered him a prisoner to Oglethorpe. During the memorable and successful resistance maintained when St. Simon’s island was attacked by the Spaniards in 1742, this brave Indian, illustrating the valor, personal courage, and friendship which characterized his distinguished uncle, remained firm in his attachment to the colonists and rendered valuable military service. On the 7th of July, although wounded in the right arm by Captain Mageleto, he drew his pistol with the left, and shot the Captain dead on the spot. This brave warrior and faithful ally was finally killed in 1743, at Lake di Papa, while valiantly fighting for the English against the Yemasee Indians.[78]
The disputes existing between England and Spain culminated in a declaration of war in October, 1739. On the 15th of November intelligence was brought to Frederica that a party of Spaniards had recently landed on Amelia island in the night, and, concealing themselves in the woods, had, on the ensuing morning, shot two unarmed Highlanders who were in quest of fuel, and then, in the most inhuman manner, hacked their bodies with their swords. Francis Brooks,—commanding the scout-boat,—heard the firing and gave the alarm to the fort, which was garrisoned by a detachment from Oglethorpe’s regiment. Although pursued, the enemy escaped, leaving behind them the proofs of their inhuman butchery.[79] Informed of the outrage, Oglethorpe manned a gunboat and followed in the hope of overtaking the party. The effort proved futile, and the General, by way of retaliation, passing up the St. Johns drove in the guards of Spanish horse posted on that river, and detached Captain Dunbar to ascertain the location and force of the enemy’s fort at Picolata. This incursion was followed by another in January, which resulted in the capture of Forts Picolata and St. Francis, the garrisons being made prisoners of war. In the assault upon the latter work General Oglethorpe narrowly escaped death from a cannon shot.[80]
Chafing under these repeated annoyances experienced at the hands of the Spaniards, advised that the garrison at St. Augustine was suffering for lack of provisions, and ascertaining that the galleys having been sent to Havana for reinforcements and supplies, the St. Johns river and the Florida coast were in a comparatively defenseless condition, the General deemed it a fitting opportunity to attempt the reduction of St. Augustine and the expulsion of the Spaniards from Florida. Admiral Vernon was instructed to assume the offensive against the Spanish possessions in the West Indies, while General Oglethorpe should conduct all available forces against the seat of their dominion in Florida. The assistance of Carolina was urgently invoked, but the authorities at first would not acquiesce in the feasibility of the enterprise.[81] A rapid movement being regarded essential to success, General Oglethorpe repaired to Charleston to urge early and potent co-operation. As a result of the conference which there ensued, the Legislature, by an act passed April 5th, 1740, agreed to contribute a regiment of five hundred men to be commanded by Colonel Vanderdussen, a troop of Rangers, presents for the Indians, and three months’ provisions. A large schooner,—conveying ten carriages and sixteen swivel guns, and fifty men under the command of Captain Tyrrell,—was also furnished for the expedition. Commodore Vincent Price, with a small fleet, pledged his assistance.
On the first of April General Oglethorpe published a manifesto, in which, recognizing Alexander Vanderdussen, Esq., as Colonel of the Carolina regiment, he empowered him for the space of four months to hold regimental court martials for the trial of all offenders. At the expiration of that period all connected with that regiment were to be suffered to return to their homes. To the naval forces uniting in the expedition a full share of all plunder was guaranteed. To the maimed and wounded, and to the widows and orphans of such as might perish in the service, was promised whatever share of the spoils should fall to the lot of the General in Chief. Indian enemies, if taken captive, were to be treated as prisoners of war, and not as slaves.[82]
The mouth of the St. Johns was designated as the point of rendezvous.
Runners were sent from the Uchee town to the Indian allies to inform them of the contemplated demonstration against St. Augustine, and to request a junction of their forces at Frederica at the earliest moment. This done, the General returned at once to St. Simons island where he devoted himself to equipping his forces and collecting the requisite munitions of war.
Anticipating the concentration of his forces, and wishing to reduce the posts through which the enemy derived supplies from the country, General Oglethorpe, with four hundred men of his own regiment and a considerable force of Indians led by Molochi,—son of Prim, the late Chief of the Creeks,—Raven, war chief of the Cherokees, and Toonahowi, nephew of Tomo-chi-chi, on the 9th of May passed over into Florida, and within a week succeeded in capturing Fort Francis de Papa[83] seventeen miles north of St. Augustine, and Fort Diego[84] situated on the plains twenty-five miles from St. Augustine. The latter work was defended by eleven guns and fifty regulars, besides Indians and negroes. Leaving Lieutenant Dunbar and sixty men to hold this post, the General returned with the rest of his command to the place of rendezvous where, on the 19th of May, he was joined by Captain McIntosh with a company of Highlanders, and by the Carolina troops under Colonel Vanderdussen. The anticipated horsemen, pioneers, and negroes, however, did not arrive.
From the best information he could obtain,—gathered from prisoners and otherwise,—General Oglethorpe ascertained that the Castle of St. Augustine at that time consisted of a fort, built of soft stone. Its curtain was sixty yards in length, its parapet nine feet thick, and its rampart twenty feet high, “casemated underneath for lodgings, and arched over and newly made bomb-proof.” Its armament consisted of fifty cannon,—sixteen of brass,—and among them some twenty-four pounders. The garrison had been for some time working upon a covered-way, but this was still in an unfinished condition. The town of St. Augustine was protected by a line of intrenchments with ten salient angles, in each of which some field pieces were mounted. In January, 1740, the Spanish forces in Florida, by establishment, consisted of the following organizations:[85]
1 Troop of Horse, numbering 100 officers and men.
1 Company of Artillery, ” 100 ” ” ”
3 Independent Companies of old Troops, each ” 100 ” ” ”
2 Companies of the Regiment of Austurias, ” ” 53 ” ” ”
1 Company ” ” ” Valencia, ” 53 ” ” ”
1 ” ” ” ” Catalonia, ” 53 ” ” ”
2 Companies ” ” ” Cantabria, ” ” 53 ” ” ”
2 ” ” ” ” Mercia, ” ” 53 ” ” ”
Armed Negroes, 200 ” ” ”
White Transports for labor, 200
1 Company of Militia, (strength unknown.)
Indians, (number not ascertained.)
It was General Oglethorpe’s original purpose, as foreshadowed in his dispatch of the 27th of March, 1740,[86] with four hundred regular troops of his regiment, one hundred Georgians, and such additional forces as South Carolina could contribute, to advance directly upon St. Augustine, and attack, by sea and land, the town and the island in its front. Both of these, he believed, could be taken “sword in hand.” He would then summon the castle to surrender, or surprise it. Conceiving that the castle would be too small to afford convenient shelter for the two thousand one hundred men, women, and children of the town, he regarded the capitulation of the fortress as not improbable. Should it refuse to surrender, however, he proposed to shower upon it “Granado-shells from the Cohorns and Mortars, and send for the Artillery and Pioneers and the rest of the Aid promised by the Assembly;[87] also for Mortars and Bombs from _Providence;_” and, if the castle should not have yielded prior to the arrival of “these Aids,” he was resolved to open trenches and conduct a siege which he reckoned would be all the easier, the garrison having been weakened by the summer’s blockade.
About the time of the concentration of the Georgia and Carolina forces for combined operations against St. Augustine, that town was materially reinforced by the arrival of six Spanish half-galleys,—manned by two hundred regular troops and armed with long brass nine-pounder guns,—and two sloops loaded with provisions.
Warned by the preliminary demonstration which eventuated, as we have seen, in the capture of forts Francis de Papa and Diego, the enemy massed all detachments within the lines of St. Augustine, collected cattle from the adjacent region, and prepared for a vigorous defense.
Apprehending that he might not be able to carry the town by assault from the land side,—where its entrenchments were strong and well armed,—unless supported by a demonstration in force from the men of war approaching the town where it looks toward the sea and where it was not covered by earth-works, and being without the requisite pioneer corps and artillery train for the conduct of a regular siege, before putting his army in motion General Oglethorpe instructed the naval commanders to rendezvous off the bar of the north channel, and blockade that and the Matanzas pass to St. Augustine. Captain Warren, with two hundred sailors, was to land on Anastasia island and erect batteries for bombarding the town in front. When his land forces should come into position and be prepared for the assault, he was to notify Sir Yelverton Peyton, commanding the naval forces, and St. Augustine would thus be attacked on all sides. Shortly after the middle of May, 1740, General Oglethorpe, with a land army numbering over two thousand regulars, militia, and Indians, moved upon St. Augustine. Fort Moosa,[88] situated within two miles of that place, lay in his route. Upon his approach the garrison evacuated it and retired within the lines of the town. Having burnt the gates of this fort and caused three breaches in its walls, General Oglethorpe, on the 5th of June, made his reconnoissances of the land defenses of St. Augustine and prepared for the contemplated assault. Everything being in readiness, the signal previously agreed upon to insure the coöperation of the naval forces was given; but, to the General’s surprise and mortification, no response was returned. His forces being disposed and eager for the attack, the signal was repeated, but failed to evoke the anticipated answer. Satisfied that the town could not be carried without the assistance of the naval forces, and being ignorant of the cause of their non-action, the General reluctantly withdrew his army and placed it in camp at a convenient distance, there to remain until he could ascertain the reason of the failure on the part of the navy to coöperate in the plan which had been preconcerted. This failure was explained in this wise. Inside the bar, and at such a remove that they could not be affected by the fire of the British vessels of war,—the Flamborough, the Phœnix, the Squirrel, the Tartar, the Spence, and the Wolf,—Spanish gallies and half gallies were moored so as to effectually prevent the ascent of the barges intended for the attack, and preclude a landing of troops upon Anastasia island. The shallowness of the water was such that the men of war could not advance near enough to dislodge them. Under the circumstances therefore, Sir Yelverton Peyton found himself unable to respond to the important part assigned him in the attack.
Advised of this fact, and chagrined at the non-realization of his original plan of operations, Oglethorpe determined at once to convert his purposed assault into a siege. The ships of war lying off the bar of St. Augustine were directed to narrowly observe every avenue of approach by water, and maintain a most rigid blockade. Colonel Palmer, with ninety-five Highlanders and forty-two Indians, was left at Fort Moosa with instructions to scout the woods incessantly on the land side and intercept any cattle or supplies coming from the interior. To prevent surprise and capture, he was cautioned to change his camp each night, and keep always on the alert. He was to avoid anything like a general engagement with the enemy. Colonel Vanderdussen, with his South Carolina regiment, was ordered to take possession of a neck of land known as Point Quartel, about a mile distant from the castle, and there erect a battery. General Oglethorpe, with the men of his regiment and most of the Indians, embarked in boats and effected a landing on Anastasia island, where, having driven off a party of Spaniards there stationed as an advanced guard, he, with the assistance of the sailors from the fleet, began mounting cannon with which to bombard the town and castle.[89] Having by these dispositions completed his investment, Oglethorpe summoned the Spanish Governor to a surrender. Secure in his strong-hold, the haughty Don “sent him for answer that he would be glad to shake hands with him in his castle.” Indignant at such a response, the General opened his batteries upon the castle and also shelled the town. The fire was returned both by the fort and the half gallies in the harbor. So great was the distance, however, that although the cannonade was maintained with spirit on both sides for nearly three weeks, little damage was caused or impression produced.[90] It being evident that the reduction of the castle could not be expected from the Anastasia island batteries, Captain Warren offered to lead a night attack upon the half gallies in the harbor which were effectually preventing all ingress by boats. A council of war decided that in as much as those galleys were covered by the guns of the castle, and could not be approached by the larger vessels of the fleet, any attempt to capture them in open boats would be accompanied by too much risk. The suggestion was therefore abandoned.
Observing the besiegers uncertain in their movements, and their operations growing lax, and being sore pressed for provisions, the Spanish Governor sent out a detachment of three hundred men against Colonel Palmer. Unfortunately that officer, negligent of his instructions and apprehending no danger from the enemy, remained two or three consecutive nights at Fort Moosa. This detachment, under the command of Don Antonio Salgrado, passed quietly out of the gates of St. Augustine during the night of June 14th, and after encountering a most desperate resistance, succeeded in capturing Fort Moosa at day light, the next morning. Colonel Palmer fell early in the action. The Highlanders “fought like lions,” and “made such havoc with their broadswords as the Spaniards cannot easily forget.” This hand-to-hand conflict was won at the cost to the enemy of more than one hundred lives. Colonel Palmer, a Captain, and twenty Highlanders were killed. Twenty-seven were captured. Those who escaped made their way to Colonel Vanderdussen at Point Quartel. Thus was St. Augustine relieved from the prohibition which had hitherto estopped all intercourse with the surrounding country.
Shortly after the occurrence of this unfortunate event, the vessel which had been blockading the Matanzas river was withdrawn. Taking advantage of the opportunity thus afforded, some small vessels from Havana, with provisions and reinforcements, reached St. Augustine by that narrow channel, bringing great encouragement and relief to the garrison. This reinforcement was estimated at seven hundred men, and the supply of provisions is said to have been large. “Then,” writes Hewitt,[91] whose narrative we have followed in the main, “all prospects of starving the enemy being lost, the army began to despair of forcing the place to surrender. The Carolinean troops, enfeebled by the heat, dispirited by sickness, and fatigued by fruitless efforts, marched away in large bodies. The navy being short of provisions, and the usual season of hurricanes approaching, the commander judged it imprudent to hazard his Majesty’s ships by remaining longer on that coast. Last of all, the General himself, sick of a fever, and his regiment worn out with fatigue and rendered unfit for action by a flux, with sorrow and regret followed, and reached Frederica about the 10th of July, 1740.”
The Carolineans, under Colonel Vanderdussen, proved themselves inefficient, “turbulent, and disobedient.” They lost not a single man in action, and only fourteen deaths occurred from sickness and accident. Desertions were frequent.[92]
Upon Oglethorpe’s regiment, and the Georgia companies, devolved the brunt of the siege. On the 5th of July the artillery and stores on Anastasia island were brought off, and the men crossed over to the mainland.[93] Vanderdussen and his regiment at once commenced a disorderly retreat in the direction of the St. Johns, leaving Oglethorpe and his men within half-cannon shot of the castle. In his dispatch to the Secretary of State, dated Camp on St. Johns in Florida, July 19th, 1740, the General thus describes his last movements: “The Spaniards made a sally, with about 500 men, on me who lay on the land side. I ordered Ensign Cathcart with twenty men, supported by Major Heron and Captain Desbrisay with upwards of 100 men, to attack them; I followed with the body. We drove them into the works and pursued them to the very barriers of the covered way. After the train and provisions were embarked and safe out of the harbour, I marched with drums beating and colours flying, in the day, from my camp near the town to a camp three miles distant, where I lay that night. The next day I marched nine miles, where I encamped that night. We discovered a party of Spanish horse and Indians whom we charged, took one horseman and killed two Indians; the rest ran to the garrison. I am now encamped on St. Johns river, waiting to know what the people of Carolina would desire me farther to do for the safety of these provinces, which I think are very much exposed to the half-galleys, with a wide extended frontier hardly to be defended by a few men.”
In one of the Indian chiefs Oglethorpe found a man after his own heart. When asked by some of the retreating troops to march with them, his reply was, “No! I will not stir a foot till I see every man belonging to me marched off before me; for I have always been the first in advancing towards an enemy, and the last in retreating.”[94]
This failure to reduce St. Augustine may be fairly attributed
I; to the delay in inaugurating the movement, caused mainly,
if not entirely, by the tardiness on the part of the South
Carolina authorities in contributing the troops and provisions
for which requisition had been made;
II; to the reinforcement of men and supplies from Havanna
introduced into St. Augustine just before the English
expedition set out; thereby materially repairing the inequality
previously existing between the opposing forces;
III; to the injudicious movement against forts Francis de Papa
and Diego, which put the Spaniards on the alert, encouraged
concentration on their part, and foreshadowed an immediate
demonstration in force against their stronghold; and
IV; to the inability on the part of the fleet to participate
in the assault previously planned, and which was to have been
vigorously undertaken so soon as General Oglethorpe with
his land forces came into position before the walls of St.
Augustine.
V. The subsequent destruction of Colonel Palmer’s
command,—thereby enabling the enemy to communicate with and
draw supplies from the interior,—the lack of heavy ordnance
with which to reduce the castle from the batteries on Anastasia
island,—the impossibility of bringing up the larger war
vessels that they might participate in the bombardment,—the
inefficiency of Colonel Vanderdussen’s command,—the impatience
and disappointment of the Indian allies who anticipated
early capture and liberal spoils,—hot suns, heavy dews, a
debilitating climate, sickness among the troops, and the
arrival of men, munitions of war, and provisions through the
Matanzas river, in the end rendered quite futile every hope
which at the outset had been entertained for a successful
prosecution of the siege.
Great was the disappointment upon the failure of the expedition, and unjust and harsh the criticisms levelled by not a few against its brave and distinguished leader.[95] We agree with the Duke of Argyle who, in the British House of Peers, declared “One man there is, my Lords, whose natural generosity, contempt of danger, and regard for the public prompted him to obviate the designs of the Spaniards, and to attack them in their own territories; a man whom by long acquaintance I can confidently affirm to have been equal to his undertaking, and to have learned the art of war by a regular education, who yet miscarried in the design only for want of supplies necessary to a possibility of success.”
Although this attempt,—so formidable in its character when we consider the limited resources at command, and so full of daring when we contemplate the circumstances under which it was undertaken,—eventuated in disappointment, its effects were not without decided advantages to the Colonies. For two years the Spaniards remained on the defensive, and General Oglethorpe enjoyed an opportunity for strengthening his fortifications on St. Simons island, so that when the counter blow was delivered by his adversary he was in condition not only to parry it, but also to severely punish the uplifted arm.[96]
For two months after the termination of this expedition, Oglethorpe lay ill of a continued fever contracted during the exposures and fatigues incident upon his exertions and anxieties during the siege. When, on the second of September, Mr. Stephens called to see him at Frederica, he found him still troubled with a lurking fever and confined to his bed. His protracted sickness had so “worn away his strength” that he “seldom came down stairs, but retained still the same vivacity of spirit in appearance to all whom he talked with, though he chose to converse with very few.”[97]
Four companies of the regiment were now encamped at the south-east end of St. Simons island, and the other two at Frederica. So soon as the men recovered from the malady contracted at St. Augustine, they were busily occupied in erecting new fortifications and strengthening the old. From these two camps detachments garrisoned the advanced works, St. Andrew, Fort William, St. George, and the outposts on Amelia island;—the details being relieved at regular intervals.[98]
During the preceding seven years, which constituted the entire life of the Colony, General Oglethorpe had enjoyed no respite from his labors. Personally directing all movements,—supervising the location, and providing for the comfort, safety, and good order of the settlers,—accommodating their differences,—encouraging and directing their labors,—propitiating the Aborigines,—influencing necessary supplies, and inaugurating suitable defences, he had been constantly passing from point to point finding no rest for the soles of his feet. Now in tent at Savannah,—now in open boat reconnoitering the coast,—now upon the southern islands,—his only shelter the wide-spreading live-oak,—designating sites for forts and look-outs, and with his own hands planning military works and laying out villages,—again in journeys oft along the Savannah, the Great Ogeechee, the Alatamaha, the St. Johns, and far off into the heart of the Indian country,—frequently inspecting his advanced posts,—undertaking voyages to Charlestown and to England in behalf of the Trust, and engaged in severe contests with the Spaniards, his life had been one of incessant activity and solicitude. But for his energy, intelligence, watchfulness, and self-sacrifice, the enterprise must have languished. As we look back upon this period of trial, uncertainty, and poverty, our admiration for his achievements increases the more narrowly we scan his limited resources and opportunities, the more intelligently we appreciate the difficulties he was called upon to surmount. Always present wherever duty called or danger threatened, he never expected others to press on where he himself did not lead. The only home he ever owned or claimed in Georgia was on St. Simons island. The only hours of leisure he ever enjoyed were spent in sight and sound of his military works along the southern frontier, upon whose safe tenure depended the salvation of the Colony. Just where the military road connecting Fort St. Simon with Frederica, after having traversed the beautiful prairie,—constituting the common pasture land of the village,—entered the woods, General Oglethorpe established his cottage. Adjacent to it were a garden, and an orchard of oranges, figs and grapes. Magnificent oaks threw their protecting shadows above and around this quiet, pleasant abode, fanned by delicious sea-breezes, fragrant with the perfume of flowers, and vocal with the melody of song-birds. To the westward, and in full view, were the fortifications and the white houses of Frederica. Behind rose a dense forest of oaks. “This cottage and fifty acres of land attached to it,” says the honorable Thomas Spalding in his “Sketch of the life of General James Oglethorpe,”[99] “was all the landed domain General Oglethorpe reserved to himself, and after the General went to England it became the property of my father.... After the Revolutionary war, the buildings being destroyed, my father sold this little property. But the oaks were only cut down within four or five years past, and the elder people of St. Simons yet feel as if it were sacrilege, and mourn their fall.” Here the defences of St. Simons island were under his immediate supervision. His troops were around him, and he was prepared, upon the first note of warning, to concentrate the forces of the Colony for active operations. In the neighborhood several of his officers established their homes. Among them, “Harrington Hall,”—the country seat of the wealthy Huguenot, Captain Raymond Demeré, enclosed with hedges of cassina,—was conspicuous for its beauty and comfort.
Including the soldiers and their families, Frederica in 1740 is said to have claimed a population of one thousand.[100] This estimate is perhaps somewhat exaggerated, although much nearer the mark than that of the discontents Tailfer, Anderson, and Douglas, who, in their splenetic and jacobinical tract entitled “A True and Historical Narrative of the Colony of Georgia in America,” assert that of the one hundred and forty-four lots into which the town was divided, only “about fifty were built upon,” and that “the number of the Inhabitants, notwithstanding of the Circulation of the Regiment’s money, are not over _one hundred and twenty_ Men, Women, and Children, and these are daily stealing away by all possible Ways.”[101]
As we have already seen, the town was regularly laid out in streets called after the principal officers of Oglethorpe’s regiment; and, including the military camp on the north, the parade on the east, and “a small wood on the south which served as a blind to the enemy in case of attack from ships coming up the river,” was about a mile and a half in circumference. The fort was strongly built of tabby and well armed. Several eighteen pounders, mounted on a ravelin in front, commanded the river, and the town was defended on the land side by substantial intrenchments. The ditch at the foot of these intrenchments was intended to admit the influx of the tide, thus rendering the isolation of Frederica complete, and materially enhancing the strength of its line of circumvallation. We reproduce from “An Impartial Enquiry into the State and Utility of the Province of Georgia”[102] the following contemporaneous notice: “There are many good Buildings in the Town, several of which are Brick. There is likewise a Fort and Store-house belonging to the Trust. The People have a Minister who has a Salary from the Society for propagating the Gospel. In the Neighbourhood of the Town, there is a fine Meadow of 320 Acres ditch’d in, on which a number of Cattle are fed, and good Hay is likewise made from it. At some Distance from the Town is the Camp for General _Oglethorpe’s_ Regiment. The Country about it is well cultivated, several Parcels of Land not far distant from the Camp having been granted in small Lots to the Soldiers, many of whom are married, and fifty-five Children were born there in the last year. These Soldiers are the most industrious, and willing to plant; the rest are generally desirous of Wives, but there are not Women enough in the Country to supply them. There are some handsome Houses built by the Officers of the Regiment, and besides the Town of _Frederica_ there are other little Villages upon this Island. A sufficient Quantity of Pot-herbs, Pulse, and Fruit is produced, there to supply both the Town and Garrison; and the People of _Frederica_ have begun to malt and to brew; and the Soldiers Wives Spin Cotton of the Country, which they Knit into Stockings. At the Town of _Frederica_ is a Town-Court for administering Justice in the Southern Part of the Province, with the same Number of Magistrates as at _Savannah_.”
At the village of St. Simon, on the south point of the island, was erected a watch-tower from which the movements of vessels at sea might be conveniently observed. Upon their appearance, their number was at once announced by signal guns, and a horseman dispatched to head quarters with the particulars. A look-out was kept by a party of Rangers at Bachelor’s Redoubt on the main, and a Corporal’s guard was stationed at Pike’s Bluff. To facilitate communication with Darien a canal was cut through General’s island. Defensive works were erected on Jekyll island, where Captain Horton had a well improved plantation, and there a brewery was established for supplying the troops with beer. On Cumberland island were three batteries,—Fort St. Andrew,—built in 1736, on high commanding ground, at the north-east point of the island,—a battery on the west to control the inland navigation,—and Fort William,—a work of considerable strength and regularity,—commanding the entrance to St. Mary’s river. Two companies of Oglethorpe’s regiment were stationed near Fort St. Andrew. As many of the soldiers were married, lots were assigned to them which they cultivated and improved. Near this work was the little village of Barrimacké of twenty-four families.
Upon Amelia island, where the orange trees were growing wild in the woods, were stationed the Highlanders with their scout boats. They had a good plantation,—upon which they raised corn enough for their subsistence,—a little fort, and “a stud of horses and mares.”[103]
“Nowhere,” remarks Mr. Spalding,[104] “had mind, with the limited means under its control, more strongly evinced its power. And it will be seen hereafter, that it was to the great ability shown in the disposition of these works, that not Georgia only, but Carolina owed their preservation; for St. Simon’s was destined soon to become the Thermopylæ of the southern Anglo American provinces.” Besides compassing the improvement of, and garrisoning his defensive works along the southern frontier with the men of his regiment, Oglethorpe kept in active service considerable bodies of Indians whose mission was to harrass the Spaniards in Florida, annoy their posts, and closely invest St. Augustine. So energetically did these faithful allies discharge the duty assigned them, and so narrowly did they watch and thoroughly plague the garrison and inhabitants of St. Augustine, that they dared not venture any distance without the walls. Adjacent plantations remained uncultivated; and, within the town, food, fuel, and the necessaries of life became so scarce that the Spanish government was compelled to support the population by stores sent from Havana. To the efficient aid of his Indian allies was Oglethorpe on more than one occasion indebted for the consummation of important plans. It would not be an exaggeration to affirm that to their friendship, fidelity, and valor, was the Colony largely beholden not only for its security, but even for its preservation. “If we had no other evidence,” writes Mr. Spalding, “of the great abilities of Oglethorpe but what is offered by the devotion of the Indian Tribes to him, and to his memory afterwards for fifty years, it is all-sufficient; for it is only master minds that acquire this deep and lasting influence over other men.”
In his letter to the Duke of Newcastle, dated Frederica, May 12th, 1741, Oglethorpe advises the Home Government of a reinforcement of eight hundred men newly arrived at St. Augustine, and of a declared intention on the part of the Spanish authorities to invade the provinces of Georgia and Carolina so soon as the result of Admiral Vernon’s expedition in the West Indies should have been ascertained. He makes urgent demand for men-of-war to guard the water approaches, for a train of artillery, arms, and ammunition, and for authority to recruit the two troops of Rangers to sixty men each, and the Highland company to one hundred, to enlist one hundred boatmen, and to purchase or build, and man two half-galleys. Alluding to the expected advance of the Spaniards, the writer continues: “If our men of war will not keep them from coming in by sea, and we have no succour, but decrease daily by different accidents, all we can do will be to die bravely in his Majesty’s service.... I have often desired assistance of the men-of-war, and continue to do so. I go on in fortifying this town, making magazines, and doing everything I can to defend the Province vigorously, and I hope my endeavors will be approved of by his Majesty, since the whole end of my life is to do the duty of a faithful subject and grateful servant. I have thirty Spanish prisoners in this place, and we continue so masters of Florida that the Spaniards have not been able to rebuild any one of the seven forts which we destroyed in the last expedition.”
It does not appear that the men-of-war and ordnance requested were ever furnished.
With a little squadron composed of the Guard sloop, the sloop “Falcon,” and Captain Davis’ schooner “Norfolk” carrying a detachment of his regiment under command of Major Heron, General Oglethorpe on the 16th of August, 1741, bore down upon a large Spanish ship lying at anchor, with hostile intent, off the bar of Jekyll sound. A heavy storm intervening, the Spanish vessel put to sea and was lost to sight. Unwilling to dismiss his miniature fleet until he had performed more substantial service, the General boldly continued down the coast, attacked and put to flight a Spanish man-of-war, and the notorious privateer “Black-Sloop” commanded by Destrade, a French officer, challenged the vessels lying in the inner harbor of St. Augustine to come out and engage his small squadron, remained at anchor all night within sight of the castle, cruised for some days off the Matanzas, and, after having alarmed the whole coast, returned in safety to Frederica.
In the midst of these labors and anxieties incident upon his preparations to resist the threatened Spanish invasion, and at a time when harmony and content were most essential to the well-being of the Colony, Oglethorpe was annoyed by sundry complaints from evil-minded persons. Most of them were frivolous, and a few quite insulting in their character. The publication of two tracts, one entitled “An Impartial Enquiry into the State and Utility of the Province of Georgia,”[105] and the other “A State of the Province of Georgia attested upon Oath in the Court of Savannah, November 10, 1740,”[106]—both presenting favorable views of the Colony and disseminated in the interest of the Trust,—irritated these malcontents and gave rise to several rejoinders, among which, as particularly reflecting upon the conduct of the commander-in-chief and his administration of affairs, may be mentioned “A Brief Account of the Causes that have Retarded the Progress of the Colony of Georgia in America, attested upon Oath, being a Proper Contrast to ‘A State of the Province of Georgia attested upon Oath,’ and some other misrepresentations on the same subject.”[107] The charge was openly made that some of the magistrates at Savannah and Frederica (the principal towns in Georgia) had wilfully injured the people by declaring “from the Bench that the Laws of England were no laws in Georgia,” by causing “false imprisonments,” by “discharging Grand Juries while matters of Felony lay before them,” by “intimidating Petit Juries,” and, in short, “by sticking at nothing to oppress the people.” It was further alleged that there was no way of applying for redress to his Majesty. General Oglethorpe was accused of partiality and tyranny in his administration. In support of these charges various affidavits were obtained from parties claiming to be residents of Frederica, Darien, Savannah, Ebenezer, and Augusta,—most of them, however, being sworn to and verified outside the limits of Georgia. Those who are curious with regard to the contents of these affidavits, so far as they reflect upon the conduct of the Frederica magistrates, are referred to the depositions of Samuel Perkins, John Roberson, and Samuel Davison.[108]
A desire to sell forbidden articles, and to ply trades for which special permission had been granted to others, opposition to the regulation which prohibited the owners of hogs and cattle from allowing them to run at large on the common and in the streets of Frederica, alleged misfeasance in the conduct of bailiffs and under-magistrates in the discharge of their duties, the unprofitableness of labor, overbearing acts committed by those in authority, and similar matters formed the burthen of these sworn complaints. While they tended to distract the public mind and to annoy those upon whose shoulders rested the administration of affairs, they fortunately failed in producing any serious impression either within the Colony or in the mother country. We allude to the subject in its proper connection simply as a matter of history, and to show how ill-judged and ill-timed were these efforts of the malcontents, among whom Pat Tailfer, M. D., Hugh Anderson, M. A., and Da: Douglas should not be forgotten.
The utter destruction of the provinces of Georgia and South Carolina was the avowed object of the Spaniards, who promised to extend no quarter to English or Indians taken with arms in their hands. The struggle was to be desperate in the extreme. To the urgent applications for assistance forwarded by General Oglethorpe, Lieutenant-Governor Bull turned a deaf ear; and the Carolinians, instead of furnishing supplies and munitions of war, and marching to the south to meet the invader where the battle for the salvation of both Colonies was to be fought, remained at home, leaving the Georgians single-handed to breast the storm.[109]
The Gentleman’s Magazine[110] contains the following estimate of the Spanish forces under the command of Don Manuel de Monteano, Governor of Augustine and Commander-in-Chief of the expedition, and Major General Antonio de Rodondo, Engineer General, participating in the attack upon St. Simons island:
“2 Colonels with Brevits of Brigadiers.
“One Regiment of Dragoons, dismounted, with their Saddles and
Bridles.
“The Regiment call’d The Battalion of the _Havannah_.
“10 Companies of 50 each, draughted off from several Regiments
of _Havannah_.
“One Regiment of the _Havannah_ Militia, consisting of 10
Companies of 100 Men each.
“One Regiment of Negroes, regularly officer’d by Negroes.
“One ditto of Mulattas, and one Company of 100 Miguelets.
“One Company of the Train with proper Artillery.
“_Augustine_ Forces consisting of about 300 Men.
“Ninety Indians.
“And 15 Negroes who ran away from _South Carolina_.”
From the various accounts of this memorable struggle we select that prepared by Oglethorpe himself, written on the spot, with the scars of battle fresh around him, and the smoke of the conflict scarce lifted from the low-lying shores and dense woods of St. Simons island. The commanding eye that saw, the stern lips which answered back the proud defiance, and the strong arm which, under Providence, pointed the way to victory, are surely best able to unfold the heroic tale. We present the report as it came from his pen:[111]
“FREDERICA IN GEORGIA, 30th July, 1742.
“The Spanish Invasion which has a long time threatened the
Colony, Carolina, and all North America has at last fallen
upon us and God hath been our deliverance. General Horcasilas,
Governour of the Havannah, ordered those Troops who had been
employed against General Wentworth to embark with Artillery and
everything necessary upon a secret expedition. They sailed with
a great fleet:[112] amongst them were two half Galleys carrying
120 men each & an 18 pound Gun. They drew but five feet water
which satisfied me they were for this place. By good great
Fortune one of the half Galleys was wrecked coming out.[113]
The Fleet sailed for St. Augustine in Florida. Capt. Homer the
latter end of May called here for Intelligence. I acquainted
him that the Succours were expected and sent him a Spanish
Pilot to shew him where to meet with them. He met with ten
sail[114] which had been divided from the Fleet by storm, but
having lost 18 men in action against them, instead of coming
here for the defence of this Place he stood again for Charles
Town to repair, and I having certain advices of the arrival of
the Spanish Fleet at Augustine wrote to the Commander of His
Majesty’s Ships at Charles Town to come to our assistance.[115]
“I sent Lieut. Maxwell, who arrived there and delivered the
letters the 12th of June, and afterwards Lieut. MacKay, who
arrived and delivered letters on the 20th of June.
“Lieut. Colonel Cook who was then at Charles Town, and was
Engineer, hastened to England, and his son-in-law Ensign Eyre,
Sub-Engineer, was also in Charles Town, and did not arrive here
till the action was over; so, for want of help, I myself was
obliged to do the duty of Engineer.
“The Havannah Fleet, being joined by that of Florida, composed
51 sail, with land men on board, a List of whom is annexed:
they were separated, and I received advice from Capt. Dunbar
(who lay at Fort William with the Guard Schooner of 14 Guns
and ninety men) that a Spanish Fleet of 14 sail had attempted
to come in there,[116] but being drove out by the Cannon of
the Fort and Schooner they came in at Cumberland Sound. I sent
over Capt. Horton to land the Indians and Troops on Cumberland.
I followed myself and was attacked in the Sound, but with two
Boats fought my way through. Lieut. Tolson, who was to have
supported me with the third and strongest boat, quitted me in
the fight and run into a River where he hid himself till next
day when he returned to St. Simons with an account that I was
lost but soon after found. I was arrived there before him, for
which misbehaviour I put him in arrest and ordered him to be
tryed. The Enemy in this action suffered so much[117] that the
day after they ran out to sea and returned for St. Augustine
and did not join their great Fleet till after their Grenadiers
were beat by Land.
“I drew the Garrison from St. Andrews, reinforced Fort William,
and returned to St. Simons with the Schooner.
“Another Spanish Fleet appeared the 28th off the Barr: by God’s
blessing upon several measures taken I delayed their coming in
till the 5th of July. I raised another Troop of Rangers, which
with the other were of great service.
“I took Captain Thomson’s ship[118] into the service for
defence of the Harbour. I imbargoe’d all the Vessells, taking
their men for the service, and gave large Gifts and promises
to the Indians so that every day we increased in numbers. I
gave large rewards to men who distinguished themselves upon any
service, freed the servants,[119] brought down the Highland
Company, and Company of Boatmen, filled up as far as we had
guns. All the vessels being thus prepared[120] on the 5th of
July with a leading Gale and Spring Tide 36 sail of Spanish
vessels run into the Harbour in line of Battle.
“We cannonaded them very hotly from the Shipping and Batterys.
They twice attempted to board Capt. Thomson[121] but were
repulsed. They also attempted to board the Schooner, but were
repulsed by Capt. Dunbar with a Detachment of the Regiment on
board.
“I was with the Indians, Rangers, and Batterys, and sometimes
on board the ships, and left Major Heron with the Regiment.
It being impossible for me to do my duty as General and be
constantly with the Regiment, therefore it was absolutely
necessary for His Majesty’s service to have a Lieut. Colonel
present, which I was fully convinced of by this day’s
experience. I therefore appointed Major Heron to be Lieut.
Colonel, and hope that your Grace will move His Majesty to be
pleased to approve the same.
“The Spaniards after an obstinate Engagement of four hours, in
which they lost abundance of men, passed all our Batterys and
Shipping and got out of shot of them towards Frederica. Our
Guard Sloop was disabled and sunk: one of our Batterys blown
up, and also some of our Men on board Capt. Thomson, upon
which I called a Council of War at the head of the Regiment
where it was unanimously resolved to march to Frederica to get
there before the Enemy and defend that Place. To destroy all
the Provisions, Vessels, Artillery, &c., at St. Simon’s, that
they might not fall into the Enemy’s hands.
“This was accordingly executed, having first drawn all the Men
on shoar which before had defended the shipping. I myself staid
till the last, and the wind coming fortunately about I got
Capt. Thompson’s Ship, our Guard Schooner, and our Prize Sloop
to sea and sent them to Charles Town. This I did in the face
and spite of thirty-six sail of the Enemy: as for the rest of
the Vessells, I could not save them, therefore was obliged to
destroy them.
“I must recomend to His Majesty the Merchants who are sufferers
thereby, since their loss was in great measure the preserving
the Province.
“We arrived at Frederica, and the Enemy landed at St.
Simon’s.[122]
“On the 7th a party of their’s marched toward the Town: our
Rangers discovered them and brought an account of their march,
on which I advanced with a party of Indians, Rangers, and
the Highland Company, ordering the Regiment to follow, being
resolved to engage them in the Defiles of the Woods before they
could get out and form in the open Grounds. I charged them at
the head of our Indians, Highland Men and Rangers, and God was
pleased to give us such success that we entirely routed the
first party, took one Captain prisoner, and killed another,
and pursued them two miles to an open Meadow or Savannah, upon
the edge of which I posted three Platoons of the Regiment
and the Company of Highland foot so as to be covered by the
woods from the Enemy who were obliged to pass thro’ the Meadow
under our fire.[123] This disposition was very fortunate.[124]
Capt. Antonio Barba and two other Captains with 100 Grenadiers
and 200 foot, besides Indians and Negroes, advanced from the
Spanish Camp into the Savannah with Huzzah’s and fired with
great spirit, but not seeing our men by reason of the woods,
none of their shot took place, but ours did.[125]
“Some Platoons of ours in the heat of the fight, the air being
darkened with the smoak, and a shower of rain falling, retired
in disorder.
“I hearing the firing, rode towards it, and at near two miles
from the place of Action, met a great many men in disorder who
told me that ours were routed and Lieut. Sutherland killed. I
ordered them to halt and march back against the Enemy, which
orders Capt. Demere and Ensign Gibbon obeyed, but another
Officer did not, but made the best of his way to Town. As
I heard the fire continue I concluded our Men could not be
quite beaten, and that my immediate assistance might preserve
them: therefore spurred on and arrived just as the fire was
done. I found the Spaniards intirely routed by one Platoon of
the Regiment, under the Comand of Lieut. Sutherland, and the
Highland Company under the Comand of Lieut. Charles MacKay.
“An Officer whom the Prisoners said was Capt. Don Antonio
Barba[126] was taken Prisoner, but desperately wounded, and two
others were prisoners, and a great many dead upon the spot.
Lieut. Sutherland, Lieut. Charles MacKay and Sergt. Stuart
having distinguished themselves upon this occasion, I appointed
Lieut. Sutherland Brigade Major, and Sergt. Stuart second
Ensign.
“Capt. Demere and Ensign Gibbon being arrived with the men
they had rallied, Lieut. Cadogan with an advanced party of
the Regiment, and soon after the whole Regiment, Indians, and
Rangers, I marched down to a causeway over a marsh very near
the Spanish Camp over which all were obliged to pass, and
thereby stopt those who had been dispersed in the fight in the
Savannah from getting to the Spanish Camp.[127] Having passed
the night there, the Indian scouts in the morning advanced to
the Spanish Camp and discovered they were all retired into
the ruins of the Fort and were making Intrenchments under
shelter of the cannon of the ships. That they guessed them
to be above 4,000 men. I thought it imprudent to attack them
defended by Cannon with so small a number but marched back to
Frederica[128] to refresh the soldiers, and sent out Partys of
Indians and Rangers to harrass the Enemy. I also ordered into
arrest the officers who commanded the Platoons that retired.
“I appointed a General Staff: Lieut. Hugh MacKay and Lieut.
Maxwell Aids de Camp, and Lieut. Sutherland Brigade Major.[129]
On ye 11th of July the Great Galley and two little ones came up
the river towards the Town. We fired at them with the few Guns,
so warmly that they retired, and I followed them with our Boats
till they got under the cannon of their ships which lay in the
sound.
“Having intelligence from the Spanish Camp that they had lost
4 Captains and upwards of 200 men in the last Action, besides
a great many killed in the sea-fight, and several killed in
the night by the Indians even within or near the camp, and
that they had held a Council of War in which there were great
divisions, insomuch that the Forces of Cuba separated from
those of Augustine and the Italick Regiment —— of Dragoons
separated from them both at a distance from the rest near
the woods, and that there was a general Terror amongst them,
upon which I was resolved to beat up their Quarters in the
night and marching down with the largest body of men I could
make, I halted within a mile and a half of their camp to form,
intending to leave the Troops there till I had well reconitred
the Enemy’s disposition.
“A French Man who without my knowledge was come down amongst
the volunteers fired his Gun and deserted. Our Indians in vain
persued and could not take him. Upon this, concluding we were
discovered, I divided the Drums in different parts and beat the
Grenadiers march for about half an hour, then ceased, and we
marched back with silence.
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The dead towns of GeorgiaChapter III: Part 3
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