Chapter I: Introduction

It gives me great pleasure to write a few words of introduction to Lieut.-Col. Preston's _History of the Desert Mounted Corps_, which I had the honour to command. In writing this History Lieut.-Col. Preston has done a service to his country which I am sure will be fully appreciated, particularly, perhaps, by those who served in the Corps, and who feel that the part they played in the Great War is but little known to the general public. As a work on Cavalry Tactics, I trust it will be of some value to the student of Military History, and, if it does nothing else, it must demonstrate to the world that the horse-soldier is just as valuable in modern warfare as he ever has been in the past. Indeed, the whole of the operations in Palestine and Syria, under General Allenby, were text-book illustrations of the perfect combination of all arms, both in attack and defence, and the last operations in this theatre, which led to the total destruction of the Turkish Arms and the elimination of Germany's Allies from the War, could not have been undertaken without large masses of Cavalry.

Lieut.-Col. Preston is well qualified to undertake the work. First of all in command of one of my finest Horse Batteries, and subsequently as C.R.A. of the Australian Mounted Division, he was often in touch with my Staff, being constantly employed on reconnaissance duties, in which he was peculiarly expert. He served throughout the whole of the operations of which he writes, and had considerable previous experience in the Sinai Campaign, in which the Horse Artillery of the Desert Column played so conspicuous a part.

This History commences with the reorganisation of the British Troops in the Egyptian theatre of the War, on Sir Edmund Allenby taking over command in June 1917. The troops operating East of the Suez Canal had hitherto been known as the 'Eastern Force,' which had been successively commanded by Sir Herbert Lawrence, Sir Charles Dobell and Sir Philip Chetwode, who were again directly under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in Cairo.

The advanced troops of 'Eastern Force,' viz., all the available Cavalry, Horse Artillery and Camel Corps, with from one to two Divisions of Infantry, had been organised into what was called 'The Desert Column.' Sir Edmund Allenby decided to take command of the troops in the Eastern Field himself. The available Infantry was formed into two Army Corps, and the Cavalry of the Desert Column was formed into a Cavalry Corps of three Divisions (subsequently increased to four on the arrival of the Indian Cavalry from France early in 1918). The name of the original Desert Column was preserved as far as possible in the title of the new Cavalry Corps, as most of the troops composing it had fought throughout the Sinai Campaign, and by them much had already been accomplished. The Turk had been driven from the vicinity of the Suez Canal, across the Sinai Desert to the Palestine Border and beyond, and several hard-won battles had been fought. Also, covered by these operations, a railway and pipe line had been constructed, without which, under modern conditions, the further invasion of Palestine could not have been attempted.

The Desert Mounted Corps was composed of Australians, New Zealanders, British Yeomanry, and Territorial Horse Artillery and Indian Cavalry, with French Cavalry added for the last operations; and it says much for the loyalty of all, and the mutual confidence in each other, that the whole worked so harmoniously and efficiently to one end. It will be readily understood, too, that operations of the nature Colonel Preston describes could not have been carried out successfully without a highly efficient staff. I was peculiarly fortunate in the _personnel_ of my staff and also in my Divisional Commanders, two of whom were Indian Cavalry Officers, one a British Cavalry Officer, and the fourth an Officer of the New Zealand Staff Corps.

To a leader or a student of military history the campaign was intensely interesting, but at the same time there were many hardships--intense heat in the summer, with dust and insect pests inconceivable to those who did not go through the campaign, and cold and heavy rains in the winter. The fortitude and endurance of the troops was beyond all praise, but the summer of 1918 spent by the Corps in the Jordan Valley, at about 1200 feet below sea-level, with a temperature varying from 110 to 125 degrees, will not be forgotten by them.

The occupation of this area was essential to the success of General Allenby's final operations; and everything possible was done to alleviate the conditions--with considerable success, as, though our wastage from malaria and other diseases was heavy, the greater bulk of the cases of malaria were contracted after leaving the areas which had been treated under the supervision of our Medical Staff. Our most serious losses occurred after reaching Damascus, and, on the farther advance to Aleppo, one division was brought to a complete standstill by the ravages of this disease.

Though drawn from such widely different quarters of the Empire, the _personnel_ of the Corps was well fitted for the class of warfare it was called upon to undertake. The horsemen of Australia and New Zealand were accustomed to wide spaces and long days in the saddle, and were full of initiative, self-reliance and determination to overcome every obstacle in their way. The Yeomanry, though not so accustomed to hardships, had behind them the glorious traditions of the British Cavalry, in the annals of which their charges at Huj and El Mughar will live for all time. The Horse Artillery too, drawn from the Counties of England and Scotland and the City of London, lived through the whole of the campaigns in Sinai and Palestine with their comrades from overseas, and showed themselves no whit behind-hand in the matter of endurance. The value of their work is best shown by the esteem in which they were held by the other troops. The long apprenticeship of the Indian Cavalry to the trench warfare of the Western Front had robbed them of none of their dash and brilliancy in the open warfare to which they were so eminently fitted. The _personnel_ of the Signal Service, Engineers, Army Service Corps, Army Ordnance Corps, Army Medical Corps, and Army Veterinary Corps came from the same sources as the other troops--units often being composed of mixed _personnel_--and to the efficiency of these the successes attained by the Corps were very largely due.

HARRY CHAUVEL,

_Lieut.-General,
late Commanding the Desert Mounted Corps_.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL,
_3rd September 1920_.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

As regards both the numbers engaged and the results achieved, the campaign in Palestine and Syria ranks as the most important ever undertaken by cavalry. In the first series of operations our troops made a direct advance of seventy miles into enemy territory, and captured some 17,000 prisoners and about 120 guns. The final operations resulted in an advance of 450 miles, the complete destruction of three Turkish Armies, with a loss of about 90,000 prisoners and 400 guns, and the overwhelming defeat of what had hitherto been considered one of the first-class Military Powers.

These remarks must not be taken, in any way, as underrating the value of the work of our infantry, who, as always, bore the brunt of the fighting, while denied much of the interest and excitement of the long pursuits that fell to the lot of the cavalry. In both the main series of operations, the infantry prepared the way for the cavalry, and enabled them to complete the victory won, in the first instance, by the bayonets.

General Allenby's campaign divides itself naturally into three phases. First, the Beersheba-Gaza battle and the subsequent pursuit over the Philistine Plain, culminating in the capture of Jerusalem; secondly, the operations in the Jordan Valley, and east of the river Jordan; and thirdly, the final series, resulting in the destruction of the Turkish Armies, and the capture of Damascus, Aleppo, etc., followed by the capitulation of the Turkish Empire.

Though the Turks at their best are not to be compared in fighting value with the troops of the first-class fighting nations of Europe, such as the British, French, and Germans, they generally fought well against our infantry, attacking with vigour, and defending their entrenched positions most stubbornly. They were well supplied with all the appurtenances of modern warfare, and, in the first part of the campaign, were generally well led.

At the commencement of the operations, the Turkish soldiers were of good _morale_ on the whole, their physique was excellent, and their health satisfactory. There was a large proportion of seasoned soldiers among them, many with the Gallipoli medal. In the latter part of the campaign, however, their _morale_ had deteriorated considerably, their physique was greatly undermined by disease, and there were few old soldiers left, nearly all having been killed or captured, or died of disease. Many units were full of untrained troops, ill-disciplined and demoralised. After the first day's fighting, there was little resistance by the enemy, except when stiffened by a large proportion of German troops, as at Semakh and Jisr Benat Yakub.

There were doubtless many causes for this deterioration of _morale_ among the Turkish troops, but, unquestionably, one of the chief was the constant friction that existed between Turkish and German officers, which spread downwards to the ranks of both nations. The hectoring stupidity of the Prussian was nowhere better exemplified than in his treatment of his Turkish Allies. German officers openly and constantly expressed their contempt for the Turks, whom they compared to niggers, and numerous instances came to our knowledge of German N.C.O.'s and privates beating and kicking Turkish officers.

The three things which the Turks feared most were a threat to their communications, a charge of cavalry, and a heavy aerial attack. As regards the first, there was, I believe, no instance in the campaign when they fought on to the end after being surrounded, though, on several occasions, Turkish units continued to attack till annihilated.

The losses of the Turks were much heavier than ours in every action of the campaign, even when they were successful, or partially so, as in the two trans-Jordan raids.[1] This fact was largely due to their bad rifle shooting. While our troops were good enough shots to pick off Turkish soldiers showing their heads above rocks and trenches, the Turks, as a rule, could only hit our men when standing up during an advance. When the enemy made his great effort to retake Jerusalem, on the 26th of December 1917, the number of dead Turks found on the position after the battle was greater than our total casualties.

As a set-off to their bad rifle shooting, the enemy troops were supplied with a far larger proportion of machine guns than we were. Their machine-gun companies, which were largely staffed by Germans, were generally effective, and caused us the major part of our casualties during the war.

Their field artillery work in general was slow and inaccurate, but the heavy artillery, manned by Germans or Austrians, was almost invariably good.

The above remarks as to _morale_ should be borne in mind in estimating the tactics of General Allenby.

It will be noticed that he took greater risks in the latter part of the campaign than he had done at the beginning. These risks were fully justified by the very complete knowledge of the reduced state of the enemy's _morale_ which had been acquired by our Intelligence Staff.

In spite of the indifferent _morale_ of the enemy troops, the campaign is of great value to the student of cavalry tactics, being, as it is, the only instance in modern war of cavalry operating on a large scale. It demonstrated once more the soundness of the principles laid down in our training manuals, which appear to be immutable, in spite of aircraft and other devilish inventions of present day warfare.

The value of aeroplanes and armoured cars acting in conjunction with cavalry was very clearly brought out, notably in the final series of operations.

My thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Osborne, D.S.O., M.C., 20th Hussars, cavalry instructor at the Staff College Camberley, for very kindly reading the manuscript, and for many valuable suggestions and corrections. Also to Major A.F. Becke, R.A., in charge of the Historical Section, W.D., for much help in studying war diaries and maps.

My thanks are also due to the many officers, too numerous to mention individually, who have very kindly lent me their private diaries, or given me information about obscure points. I have taken every care to make the narrative as accurate as possible, but, if any who read it notice inaccuracies, I shall be very grateful if they will point them out to me. I have also to thank those who have allowed me to use photographs taken by them as illustrations. A number of the photographs taken on the enemy side were obtained from Mr. C. Raad, photographer, of Jerusalem, who had secured the original negatives, and by whose permission they are reproduced in the book.

Lastly, I desire to thank Lieutenant-General Sir H.G. Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Commander of the Desert Mounted Corps throughout the campaign, for his help and encouragement, and for having very kindly written the preface to the book.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: Except in the two first battles of Gaza, April and May 1917, when our losses, in comparison with the numbers engaged, were as severe as in some of the hardest fought battles on the Western Front.]

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

Preliminary. Situation in the East in June 1917. Objectives of
the Palestine Campaign. The country. The opposing armies 1

CHAPTER II

Plan of the operations. Laying the foundations. Cavalry
reconnaissances. Work of the engineers. Maps and water supply 10

CHAPTER III

1917
Oct. 27th to Nov. 1st

The first round. The attack on Beersheba. Charge
of the 4th A.L.H. Brigade. Capture of the town with
2000 prisoners. Destruction of the wells. First attack
on the Gaza defences. German buildings in Beersheba.
Arab sheikhs and the Camel Transport Corps 18

CHAPTER IV

Nov. 2nd to Nov. 7th

The decisive battle. Enemy counterstroke on the
east. Hard fighting of the cavalry and the 53rd
Division. Lack of water. Capture of Tel Khuweilfeh.
And of Hareira and Sharia. Enemy's front broken.
Cavalry through the gap. Fall of Gaza 38

CHAPTER V

Nov. 8th and 9th

The pursuit. All three cavalry divisions employed.
Strong enemy resistance. Charge of the Yeomanry at
Huj. Water at last. Sufferings of the horses. Delay
caused by lack of water. Arak el Menshiye and Beit
Duras 50

CHAPTER VI

Nov. 10th to Nov. 12th

The Cavalry Corps in line from the railway to the sea.
Difficulties of supply. Withdrawal of all but two
infantry divisions. Great heat and lack of water causes
a slackening of the pursuit. Anzac Division seizes the
Esdud bridge. Stiffening of the enemy resistance.
The action of Balin 61

CHAPTER VII

Nov. 13th to Nov. 15th

Attack on the enemy line. Charge of the 6th Mounted
Brigade at El Mughar. Armoured cars enter Junction
Station. Capture of the station. Enemy forces cut
in two. Right group driven northwards across the
River Auja, and left group into the Judæan Hills.
Occupation of Ramleh, Ludd, and Jaffa. The Sidun-Abu
Shusheh position. Second charge of the 6th
Mounted Brigade 77

CHAPTER VIII

Nov. 16th and 17th

Necessity for reinforcements, and exhaustion of horses
causes a lull in the operations. A waterless record.
The Australian cavalry horse. Junction Station. Reappearance
of the Corps Ammunition Column. The Predatory Gunner. The
A.P.M.'s Odyssey. A Turkish _communiqué_ 93

CHAPTER IX

Nov. 18th to Nov. 25th

The advance resumed. Amwas. The Australian
Mounted Division withdrawn to rest. The Yeomanry
Division enter the mountains. Rain. Unsuccessful
attacks on the Beitunia Ridge. Difficulties of the
country. Our infantry seize Nebi Samwil. The
Anzac Mounted Division forces the crossing of the
Nahr el Auja in the plain. And is driven back 101

CHAPTER X

Dec. 1st to Dec. 31st

Hard fighting and bad weather in the hills. Our communications
cut. The last of the Yeomanry Division.
Winter conditions in the Philistine Plain. Rain and
mud. Floods cause breakdowns in the supply services.
A 'Merry Christmas.' Enemy spies in the mountains.
Surrender of Jerusalem. Final crossing of the Auja.
Results achieved by the Desert Mounted Corps during
the operations 112

CHAPTER XI

1918
Jan. 1st to Feb. 28th

'Rest and Refit.' The ruins of Gaza. Decision to
extend the battle line to the Jordan. The country between
Jerusalem and the Dead Sea basin. The
first descent into the Jordan Valley. Occupation of Jericho.
A naval battle 1300 feet below the level of the ocean.
Second descent into the Valley. Our right flank
established on the river Jordan. Operations of the
Arab forces 123

CHAPTER XII

Mar. 1st to Apr. 2nd

The first trans-Jordan raid. Description of the trans-Jordan
country. Bridging the Jordan. Difficulties
of the cavalry. Rain and cold. Hedjaz Railway cut
north and south of Amman. Unsuccessful attacks
on the town. Large enemy reinforcements arrive on
the scene. Floods sweep away the bridges over the
Jordan. Hard fighting at El Salt. Attack on Amman
abandoned. Withdrawal of the raiding force 132

CHAPTER XIII

Apr. 3rd to May 4th

Results of the raid. Successes of the Arab Army.
Reorganisation of the Cavalry Corps. The second
trans-Jordan raid. Capture of El Salt. Failure of
first attack on Shunet Nimrin. Enemy reinforcements
cross the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh. 4th A.L.H.
Brigade hard pressed. Loss of the guns. Enemy
clears the way to El Salt. The Beni Sakhr play us
false. Precarious position of our cavalry in the hills.
Failure of second attack on Shunet Nimrin. Hard
fighting at El Salt. Ammunition running out. The
raiding force withdraws across the Jordan. Results
of the raid 153

CHAPTER XIV

May 5th to Aug. 31st

Decision to hold the Jordan Valley during the summer.
The Valley line. Description of the country and
climate. Enemy attacks on Abu Tellul and El Henu
repulsed. An example of 'Kultur.' Out of the Valley
of Desolation 177

CHAPTER XV

Sept. 1st to Sept. 18th

Preparations for the great drive. Description of the
Turkish line and the country behind it. The opposing
forces. Precautions to ensure secrecy. Plan of the
operations. Lawrence's Arabs cut the enemy railway
at Deraa junction. At the starting post 190

CHAPTER XVI

Sept. 19th to Sept. 21st

Opening the door. Cavalry through the gap and over
the Carmel Range. On the Plain of Armageddon. 13th
Cavalry Brigade captures the enemy G.H.Q. at Nazareth.
Cavalry seize Afule, Jenin, and Beisan. Big
haul of prisoners at Jenin 202

CHAPTER XVII

Sept. 19th to Sept. 22nd

Rolling up the enemy flank. Work of the 5th A.L.H.
Brigade. Our infantry attack all along the line and
drive in the Turkish front. Our cavalry reoccupy
Nazareth. Sad fate of the 'Haifa Annexation Expedition.'
Chaytor's force closes the Jisr el Damieh
road, and advances on Shunet Nimrin. Turkish
armies trapped 217

CHAPTER XVIII

Sept. 23rd

Drawing the net. Action of Makhadet Abu Naj.
Capture of Haifa. Action at Makhadet el Masudi.
Turkish VIIth and VIIIth Armies completely destroyed.
Adventures of Chaytor's Force. Surrender of the
Hedjaz Corps. British and Turks as 'Allies' 229

CHAPTER XIX

Sept. 24th to Sept. 27th

Decision to advance on Damascus. The orders for
the advance. 4th A.L.H. Brigade captures Semakh.
Treachery of the Germans. Capture of Tiberias. The
race for Damascus. 4th Cavalry Division strikes at
the flank of the retreating IVth Army. And joins
hands with the Arab forces 247

CHAPTER XX

Sept. 27th and Sept. 28th

The action at the Bridge of Jacob's Daughters. A
memory of Napoleon's campaign in Syria. Last crossing
of the Jordan. Occupation of El Kuneitra. Some
undisciplined 'Allies.' 4th Cavalry Division reaches
El Mezerib. Turks massacre women and children.
The Arabs' vengeance 258

CHAPTER XXI

Sept. 29th to Oct. 5th

The last lap of the race to Damascus. Orders of the
Cavalry Corps. A fight in the darkness. The action
of Kaukab. 5th A.L.H. Brigade closes the Beirût
road. Our two columns meet at Damascus. End of
the Turkish IVth Army. Capture of the city with
12,000 prisoners. Terrible condition of the enemy
troops. A record charge by Australian cavalry. Disorders
in Damascus 266

CHAPTER XXII

Oct. 5th to Oct. 31st

Decision to advance to Rayak and Beirût. Sickness
in the Corps. Occupation of Homs and Tripoli. 5th
Cavalry Division ordered to advance to Aleppo. A
hunt by the armoured cars. A piece of bluff.
Fall of Aleppo. The last of the Turkish army. The Armistice.
Captures of the Desert Mounted Corps 282

CHAPTER XXIII

Police work. The Desert Mounted Corps administers a country
larger than Scotland. Condition of the country after the
Armistice. Pax Britannica. Co-operation of the Arabs. Work
of the Armenian Reparations Committee. Character of the
Armenians. A gamble in exchange. Sport and games. End
of the Desert Mounted Corps. Northern Syria handed over to
the French 295

CHAPTER XXIV

Horse Artillery 303

CHAPTER XXV

Horses 311

CHAPTER XXVI

Transport and Ammunition Supply 322

APPENDIX I: (_a_) The Desert Mounted Corps 331

(_b_) Infantry 335

APPENDIX II: Note on the Arab Movement 337