Chapter I: Part 1

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* * * * *
* * * *
* * * * *

THE
DISCOVERY
OF A
WORLD
IN THE
MOONE.

or,

A DISCOVRSE
Tending
TO PROVE

that 'tis probable there
may be another habitable
World in that Planet.

_Quid tibi inquis ista proderunt? Si nihil aliud,
hoc certe, sciam omnia angusta esse._
SENECA. Praef. ad 1. Lib. _N. Q._

[Decoration]

_LONDON_,

Printed by _E. G._ for _Michael Sparl_
and _Edward Forrest_, 1638.

[Decoration]

_Perlegi haec +paradoxa+ & novitatis gracia typis
mandari permitto._

Mart. 29. 1638.
THO. WEEKES _R.P._
_Episc. Lond. Cap._
_Domest._

[Decoration]

To the Reader.

_If amongst thy leisure houres thou canst spare any for the perusall of this discourse, and dost looke to finde somewhat in it which may serve for thy information and benefit: let me then advise thee to come unto it with an equall minde, not swayed by prejudice, but indifferently resolved to assent unto that truth which upon deliberation shall seeme most probable unto thy reason, and then I doubt not, but either thou wilt agree with mee in this assertion, or at least not thinke it to be as farre from truth, as it is from common opinion._

_Two cautions there are which I would willingly admonish thee of in the beginning._

1. _That thou shouldst not here looke to find any exact, accurate
Treatise, since this discourse was but the fruit of some lighter
studies, and those too hudled up in a short time, being first
thought of and finished in the space of some few weekes, and
therefore you cannot in reason expect, that it should be so
polished, as perhaps, the subject would require, or the leisure
of the Author might have done it._

2. _To remember that I promise onely probable arguments for the
proofe of this opinion, and therefore you must not looke that every
consequence should be of an undeniable dependance, or that the truth
of each argument should be measured by its necessity. I grant that
some Astronomicall appearances may possibly be solved otherwise then
here they are. But the thing I aime at is this, that probably they
may so be solved, as I have here set them downe: Which, if it be
granted (as I thinke it must) then I doubt not, but the indifferent
reader will find some satisfaction in the maine thing that is to be
proved._

_Many ancient Philosophers of the better note, have formerly defended this assertion, which I have here laid downe, and it were to be wished, that some of us would more apply our endeavours unto the examination of these old opinions, which though they have for a long time lien neglected by others, yet in them may you finde many truths well worthy your paines and observation. Tis a false conceit, for us to thinke, that amongst the ancient variety and search of opinions, the best hath still prevailed. Time (saith the learned _Verulam_) seemes to be of the nature of a river or streame, which carrieth downe to us that which is light, or blowne up, but sinketh that which is weighty and solid._

_It is my desire that by the occasion of this discourse, I may raise up some more active spirit to a search after other hidden and unknowne truthes. Since it must needes be a great impediment unto the growth of sciences, for men still so to plod on upon beaten principles, as to be afraid of entertaining any thing that may seeme to contradict them. An unwillingnesse to take such things into examination, is one of those errours of learning in these times observed by the judicious _Verulam_. Questionlesse there are many secret truths, which the ancients have passed over, that are yet left to make some of our age famous for their discovery._

_If by this occasion I may provoke any reader to an attempt of this nature, I shall then thinke my selfe happy, and this work successefull._

Farewell.

[Decoration]

The First Proposition, by way of Preface.

_That the strangenesse of this opinion is no sufficient reason why it
should be rejected, because other certaine truths have beene formerly
esteemed ridiculous, and great absurdities entertayned by common
consent._

There is an earnestnesse and hungering after novelty, which doth still adhere unto all our natures, and it is part of that primative image, that wide extent and infinite capacity at first created in the heart of man, for this since its depravation in _Adam_ perceiving it selfe altogether emptied of any good doth now catch after every new thing, conceiving that possibly it may finde satisfaction among some of its fellow creatures. But our enemy the divell (who strives still to pervert our gifts, and beate us with our owne weapons) hath so contriv'd it, that any truth doth now seeme distastefull for that very reason, for which errour is entertain'd--Novelty, for let but some upstart heresie be set abroach, and presently there are some out of a curious humour; others, as if they watched an occasion of singularity, will take it up for canonicall, and make it part of their creede and profession; whereas solitary truth cannot any where finde so ready entertainement; but the same Novelty which is esteemed the commendation of errour and makes that acceptable, is counted the fault of truth, and causes that to bee rejected. How did the incredulous World gaze at _Columbus_ when hee promised to discover another part of the earth, and he could not for a long time by his confidence, or arguments, induce any of the Christian Princes, either to assent unto his opinion, or goe to the charges of an experiment. Now if he who had such good grounds for his assertion, could finde no better entertainement among the wiser sort, and upper end of the World; 'tis not likely then that this opinion which I now deliver, shall receive any thing from the men of these daies, especially our vulgar wits, but misbeliefe or derision. It hath alwaies beene the unhappinesse of new truths in Philosophy, to be derided by those that are ignorant of the causes of things, and reiected by others whose perversenesse ties them to the contrary opinion, men whose envious pride will not allow any new thing for truth which they themselves were not the first inventors of. So that I may iustly expect to be accused of a pragmaticall ignorance, and bold ostentation, especially since for this opinion _Xenophanes_, a man whose authority was able to adde some credit to his assertion could not escape the like censure from others. For _Natales Comes_ speaking of that Philosopher,[1] and this his opinion, saith thus,

_Nonnulli ne nihil scisse videantur, aliqua nova monstra in
Philosophia introducunt, ut alicujus rei inventores fuisse appareant._

"Some there are who least they might seeme to know nothing, will
bring up monstrous absurdities in Philosophy, that so afterward they
may bee famed for the invention of somewhat."

The same author doth also in another place accuse _Anaxagoras_[2] of folly for the same opinion,

_Est enim non ignobilis gradus stultitiae, vel si nescias quid dicas,
tamen velle de rebus propositis hanc vel illam partem stabilire._

"'Tis none of the worst kindes of folly, boldly to affirme one side or other, when a man knows not what to say."

[Sidenote 1: _Mytholog. lib. 3. c. 17._]

[Sidenote 2: _Lib. 7. c. 1._]

If these men were thus censur'd, I may iustly then expect to be derided by most, and to be believed by few or none; especially since this opinion seemes to carry in it so much strangenesse, so much contradiction to the generall consent of others. But how ever, I am resolved that this shall not be any discouragement, since I know that it is not the common opinion of others that can either adde or detract from the truth. For,

1. Other truths have beene formerly esteemed altogether as ridiculous
as this can be.

2. Grosse absurdities have beene entertained by generall opinion.

I shall give an instance of each, that so I may the better prepare the Reader to consider things without a prejudice, when hee shall see that the common opposition against this which I affirme cannot any way derogate from its truth.

1. Other truths have beene formerly accounted as ridiculous as this, I shall specifie that of the Antipodes, which have beene denied and laught at by many wise men and great Schollers, such as were _Herodotus_, St. _Austin_, _Lactantius_, the _Venerable Bede_, _Lucretius_ the Poet, _Procopius_, and the voluminous _Abulensis_ with others. _Herodotus_ counted it so horrible an absurdity, that hee could not forbeare laughing to thinke of it. +Gelo de horon ges periodous grapsantas, pollous ede kai oudena noon echontas exegesamenon hoi Okeanon te rheonta graphousi, perix ten te gen eousan kukloterea hos apo tornou.+

"I cannot choose but laugh, (saith he) to see so many men venture to
describe the earths compasse, relating those things that are without
all sense, as that the Sea flowes about the World, and that the earth
it selfe is round as an Orbe."

But this great ignorance is not so much to be admired in him, as in those learneder men of later times, when all sciences began to flourish in the World. Such was Saint _Austin_ who censures that relation of the Antipodes to be an incredible fable,[1] and with him agrees the eloquent _Lactantius_,[2]

_quid illi qui esse contrarios vestigiis nostris Antipodes putant?
num aliquid loquuntur? aut est quispiam tam ineptus, qui credat esse
homines, quorum vestigia sunt superiora quam capita? aut ibi quae apud
nos jacent inversa pendere? fruges & arbores deorsum versus crescere,
pluvias & nives, & grandinem sursum versus cadere in terram? &
miratur aliquis hortor pensiles inter septem mira narrari, quum
Philosophi, & agros & maria, & urbes & montes pensiles faciunt? &c._

"What (saith he) are they that thinke there are Antipodes, such as
walke with their feet against ours? doe they speake any likelyhood?
or is there any one so foolish as to believe that there are men whose
heeles are higher than their heads? that things which with us doe lie
on the ground doe hang there? that the Plants and Trees grow
downewards, that the haile, and raine, and snow fall upwards to the
earth? and doe wee admire the hanging Orchards amongst the seven
wonders, whereas here the Philosophers have made the Field and Seas,
the Cities and Mountaines hanging."

What shall wee thinke (saith hee in _Plutarch_) that men doe clyng to that place like wormes, or hang by their clawes as Cats, or if wee suppose a man a little beyond the Center, to bee digging with a spade? is it likely (as it must bee according to this opinion) that the earth which hee loosened, should of it selfe ascend upwards? or else suppose two men with their middles about the center, the feete of the one being placed where the head of the other is, and so two other men crosse them, yet all these men thus situated according to this opinion should stand upright, and many other such grosse consequences would follow (saith hee) which a false imagination is not able to fancy as possible. Upon which considerations, _Bede_[3] also denies the being of any Antipodes,

_Neque enim Antipodarum ullatenus est Fabulis accommodandus assensus_,

"Nor should wee any longer assent to the Fable of Antipodes." So also _Lucretius_ the Poet speaking of the same subject, sayes:

_Sed vanus stolidis haec omnia finxerit error._[4]

[Sidenote 1: _De civit. Dei. lib. 16. cap. 9._]

[Sidenote 2: _Institut. l. 3. c. 24._]

[Sidenote 3: _De ratione temporum, Cap. 32._]

[Sidenote 4: _De nat. rerum, lib. 1._]

That some idle fancy faigned these for fooles to believe. Of this opinion was _Procopius Gazaeus_,[1] but he was perswaded to it by another kinde of reason; for he thought that all the earth under us was sunke in the water, according to the saying of the Psalmist,[2] Hee hath founded the Earth upon the Seas, and therefore hee accounted it not inhabited by any. Nay _Tostatus_ a man of later yeeres and generall learning doth also confidently deny that there are any such Antipodes, though the reason which hee urges for it bee not so absurde as the former, for the Apostles, saith hee,[3] travelled through the whole habitable world, but they never passed the Equinoctiall; and if you answer that they are said to goe through all the earth, because they went through all the knowne world, hee replies, that this is not sufficient, since Christ would have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of his truth,[4] and therefore 'tis requisite that they should have travelled thither also, if there had been any inhabitants, especially since he did expressely command them to goe and teach all nations, and preach the Gospell through the whole world,[5] and therefore he thinkes that as there are no men, so neither are there seas, or rivers, or any other conveniency for habitation: 'tis commonly related of one _Virgilius_, that he was excommunicated and condemned for a Heretique by _Zachary_ Bishop of _Rome_, because hee was not of the same opinion. But _Baronius_ saies,[6] it was because hee thought there was another habitable world within ours. How ever, you may well enough discerne in these examples how confident many of these great Schollars were in so grosse an errour, how unlikely, what an incredible thing it seemed to them, that there should be any Antipodes, and yet now this truth is as certaine and plaine, as sense or demonstration can make it. This then which I now deliver is not to be rejected; though it may seeme to contradict the common opinion.

[Sidenote 1: _Comment. in 1. Cap. Gen._]

[Sidenote 2: _Psal. 24. 2._]

[Sidenote 3: _Comment. in_ 1. Genes.]

[Sidenote 4: 1 Tim. 2. 4.]

[Sidenote 5: Mat. 28. 19]

[Sidenote 6: _Annal. Eccles. A.D. 748._]

2. Grosse absurdities have beene entertained by generall consent. I might instance in many remarkeable examples, but I will onely speake of the supposed labour of the Moone in her eclipses, because this is neerest to the chiefe matter in hand, and was received as a common opinion amongst many of the ancients, and therefore _Plutarch_ speaking of a Lunary eclipse, relates, that at such times 'twas a custome amongst the _Romanes_ (the most civill and learned people in the world) to sound brasse Instruments, and hold great torches toward the heaven. +Ton de Romaion (hosper esto enomismenon) chalkou te patagois anakaloumenon to phos autos kai pura polla dalois kai dassin anechonton pros ton ouranon+,[1] for by this meanes they supposed the Moone was much eased in her labours, and therfore _Ovid_ calls such loud Instruments the auxiliaries or helpes of the Moone.[2]

_Cum frustra resonant aera auxiliaria Lunae._

and therefore the Satyrist too describing a loud scold, saies, she was able to make noise enough to deliver the labouring Moone.[3]

_Vna laboranti poterit succurrere Lunae._

[Sidenote 1: _In vita Paul. AEmil._]

[Sidenote 2: _Metam. l. 4._]

[Sidenote 3: _Iuven. Sat. 6_]

Now the reason of all this their ceremonie, was, because they feared the world would fall asleepe, when one of its eyes began to winke, and therefore they would doe what they could by loud sounds to rouse it from its drowsinesse, and keepe it awake by bright torches, to bestow that light upon it which it began to lose. Some of them thought hereby to keepe the Moone in her orbe, whereas otherwise she would have fallen downe upon the earth, and the world would have lost one of its lights, for the credulous people believed, that Inchanters, and Witches could bring the Moone downe, which made _Virgil_ say,

_Cantus & e coelo possunt deducere Lunam._

And those Wizards knowing the times of her eclipses, would then threaten to shew their skill, by pulling her out of her orbe. So that when the silly multitude saw that she began to looke red, they presently feared they should lose the benefit of her light, and therefore made a great noise that she might not heare the sound of those Charmes, which would otherwise bring her downe, and this is rendered for a reason of this custome by _Pliny_ and _Propertius_:

_Cantus & e curru lunam deducere tentant,
Et facerent, si non aera repulsa sonent._[1]

[Sidenote 1: _Nat. hist. lib. 2. c. 12._]

_Plutarch_ gives another reason of it, and he sayes, 'tis because they would hasten the Moone out of the darke shade wherein shee was involv'd, that so she might bring away the soules of those Saints that inhabit within her, which cry out by reason they are then deprived of their wonted happinesse, and cannot heare the musicke of the Spheares, but are forced to behold the torments, and wailing of those damned soules which are represented to them as they are tortured in the region of the aire, but whether this or what ever else was the meaning of this superstition, yet certainly 'twas a very ridiculous custome, and bewrayed a great ignorance of those ancient times, especially since it was not onely received by the vulgar, such as were men of lesse note and learning, but believed also, by the more famous and wiser sort, such as were those great Poets, _Stesichorus_ and _Pindar_. And not onely amongst the more sottish heathens, who might account that Planet to be one of their Gods, but the primitive Christians also were in this kinde guilty; which made S. _Ambrose_ so tartly to rebuke those of his time, when he said,

_Tum turbatur carminibus Globus Lunae, quando calicibus turbantur &
oculi_.

"When your heads are troubled with cups, then you thinke the Moone to be troubled with charmes."

And for this reason also did _Maximus_ a Bishop,[1] write a Homily against it, wherein hee shewed the absurditie of that foolish superstition. I remember, that _Ludovicus Uives_ relates a more ridiculous story of a people that imprisoned an Asse for drinking up the Moone, whose image appearing in the water was covered with a cloud, as the Asse was drinking, for which the poore beast was afterward brought to the barre to receive a sentence according to his deserts, where the grave Senate being set to examine the matter, one of the Counsell (perhaps wiser than the rest) rises up, and out of his deepe judgement, thinkes it not fit that their Towne should lose its Moone, but that rather the Asse should be cut up, and that taken out of him, which sentence being approved by the rest of those Politicians, as the subtillest way for the conclusion of the matter was accordingly performed. But whether this tale were true or no I will not question, however there is absurdity enough in that former custome of the ancients, that may confirme the truth to be proved, and plainly declare the insufficiency of common opinion to adde true worth or estimation unto any thing. So that from that which I have said may be gathered thus much.

[Sidenote 1: _Turinens. Episc._]

1. That a new truth may seeme absurd and impossible not onely to the
vulgar, but to those also who are otherwise wise men, and excellent
schollers; and hence it will follow, that every new thing which
seemes to oppose common Principles is not presently to be rejected,
but rather to be pry'd into with a diligent enquiry, since there
are many things which are yet hid from us, and reserv'd for future
discovery.

2. That it is not the commonnesse of an opinion that can priviledge it
for a truth, the wrong way is sometime a well beaten path, whereas
the right way (especially to hidden truths) may bee lesse trodden
and more obscure.

True indeed, the strangeness of this opinion will detract much from its credit; but yet we should know that nothing is in its selfe strange, since every naturall effect has an equall dependance upon its cause, and with the like necessity doth follow from it, so that 'tis our ignorance which makes things appeare so, and hence it comes to passe that many more evident truths seeme incredible to such who know not the causes of things: you may as soone perswade some Country peasants that the Moone is made of greene Cheese (as wee say) as that 'tis bigger than his Cart-wheele, since both seeme equally to contradict his sight, and hee has not reason enough to leade him farther than his senses. Nay, suppose (saith _Plutarch_) a Philosopher should be educated in such a secret place, where hee might not see either Sea or River, and afterwards should be brought out where one might shew him the great Ocean telling him the quality of that water, that it is blackish, salt, and not potable, and yet there were many vast creatures of all formes living in it, which make use of the water as wee doe of the aire, questionlesse he would laugh at all this, as being monstrous lies & fables, without any colour of truth. Just so will this truth which I now deliver appeare unto others; because we never dreamt of any such matter as a world in the Moone, because the state of that place hath as yet been vailed from our knowledge, therefore wee can scarcely assent to any such matter. Things are very hardly received which are altogether strange to our thoughts and our senses. The soule may with lesse difficulty be brought to believe any absurdity, when as it has formerly beene acquainted with some colours and probabilities for it, but when a new, and an unheard of truth shall come before it, though it have good grounds and reasons, yet the understanding is afraid of it as a stranger, and dares not admit it into its beliefe without a great deale of reluctancy and tryall. And besides things that are not manifested to the senses, are not assented unto without some labour of mind, some travaile and discourse of the understanding, and many lazie soules had rather quietly repose themselves in an easie errour, then take paines to search out the truth. The strangenesse then of this opinion which I now deliver will be a great hinderance to its beliefe, but this is not to be respected by reason it cannot bee helped. I have stood the longer in the Preface, because that prejudice which the meere title of the booke may beget cannot easily be removed without a great deale of preparation, and I could not tell otherwise how to rectifie the thoughts of the Reader for an impartiall survey of the following discourse.

I must needs confesse, though I had often thought with my selfe that it was possible there might be a world in the Moone, yet it seemed such an uncouth opinion that I never durst discover it, for feare of being counted singular and ridiculous, but afterward having read _Plutarch_, _Galilaeus_, _Keplar_, with some others, and finding many of mine owne thoughts confirmed by such strong authority, I then concluded that it was not onely possible there might bee, but probable that there was another habitable world in that Planet. In the prosecuting of this assertion, I shall first endeavour to cleare the way from such doubts as may hinder the speed or ease of farther progresse; and because the suppositions imply'd in this opinion may seeme to contradict the principles of reason or faith, it will be requisite that I first remove this scruple, shewing the conformity of them to both these, and proving those truths that may make way for the rest, which I shall labour to performe in the second, third, fourth, and fifth Chapters, and then proceede to confirme such Propositions, which doe more directly belong to the maine point in hand.

Proposition 2.

_That a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of
reason or faith._

Tis reported of _Aristotle_ that when hee saw the bookes of _Moses_ he commended them for such a majesticke stile as might become a God, but withall hee censured that manner of writing to be very unfitting for a Philosopher because there was nothing proved in them, but matters were delivered as if they would rather command than perswade beliefe. And 'tis observed that hee sets downe nothing himselfe, but he confirmes it by the strongest reasons that may be found, there being scarce an argument of force for any subject in Philosophy which may not bee picked out of his writings, and therefore 'tis likely if there were in reason a necessity of one onely world, that hee would have found out some such necessary proofe as might confirme it: Especially since hee labours for it so much in two whole Chapters. But now all the arguments which he himselfe urges in this subject,[1] are very weake and farre enough from having in them any convincing power. Therefore 'tis likely that a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason. However, I will set downe the two chiefe of his arguments from his owne workes, and from them you may guesse the force of the other. The 1. is this,[2] since every heavy body doth naturally tend downwards, and every light body upwards, what a hudling and confusion must there bee if there were two places for gravity and two places for lightnesse: for it is probable that the Earth of that other World would fall downe to this Center, and so mutually the aire and fire here ascend to those Regions in the other, which must needes much derogate from the providence of nature, and cause a great disorder in his workes. To this I answere, that if you will consider the nature of gravity, you will plainely see there is no ground to feare any such confusion, for heavinesse is nothing else but such a quality as causes a propension in 'its subject to tend downewards towards its owne Centre, so that for some of that earth to come hither would not bee said a fall but an ascension, since it moved from its owne place, and this would bee impossible (saith _Ruvio_) because against nature,[3] and therefore no more to bee feared than the falling of the Heavens.

[Sidenote 1: _De Coelo_ l. 1. c. 8. 9.]

[Sidenote 2: _Ibid._]

[Sidenote 3: _De Coelo_ l. 1. c. 9. q. 1.]

Another Argument hee had from his master _Plato_,[1] that there is but one World, because there is but one first mover, God.[2]

[Sidenote 1: _Metaphys._ l. 12. c. 8.]

[Sidenote 2: _Diog. Laert. lib._ 3.]

But here I may deny the consequence, since a plurality of worlds doth not take away the unity of the first mover.

_Vt enim forma substantialis, sic primum efficiens apparentem
solummodo multiplicitatem induit per signatam materiam_

(saith a Countreyman of ours.)[1] As the substantiall forme, so the efficient cause hath onely an appearing multiplicity from its particular matter. You may see this point more largely handled, and these Arguments more fully answered by _Plutarch_ in his Booke (why Oracles are silent) and _Iacob Carpentarius_ in his comment on _Alcinous_.

[Sidenote 1: _Nic. Hill. de Philosop. Epic. partic. 379._]

But our opposites the Interpreters themselves, (who too often doe _jurare in verba magistri_) will grant that there is not any strength in these consequences, and certainely their such weake arguments could not convince that wise Philosopher, who in his other opinions was wont to bee swayed by the strength and power of reason: wherefore I should rather thinke that he had some by-respect, which made him first assent to this opinion, and afterwards strive to prove it. Perhaps it was because hee feared to displease his scholler _Alexander_, of whom 'tis related[1] that he wept to heare a disputation of another world, since he had not then attained the Monarchy of this, his restlesse wide heart would have esteemed this Globe of Earth not big enough for him, if there had beene another, which made the Satyrist say of him,

_AEstuat infoelix angusto limite mundi._[2]

"That he did vexe himselfe and sweate in his desires, as being pend
up in a narrow roome, when hee was confin'd but to one world."

Before he thought to seate himselfe next the Gods, but now when hee had done his best, hee must be content with some equall, or perhaps superiour Kings.

[Sidenote 1: _Plutarch. de tranq. anim._]

[Sidenote 2: _Iuvenal._]

It may be, that _Aristotle_ was moved to this opinion, that hee might thereby take from _Alexander_ the occasion of this feare and discontent, or else, perhaps, _Aristotle_ himselfe was as loth to hold the possibility of a world which he could not discover, as _Alexander_ was to heare of one which he could not conquer. Tis likely that some such by-respect moved him to this opinion, since the arguments he urges for it are confest by his zealous followers and commentators, to be very sleight and frivolous, and they themselves grant, what I am now to prove, that there is not any evidence in the light of naturall reason, which can sufficiently manifest that there is but one world.

But however some may object, would it not be inconvenient and dangerous to admit of such opinions that doe destroy those principles of _Aristotle_, which all the world hath so long followed?

This question is much controverted by the _Romish_ Divines; _Campanella_ hath writ a Treatise[1] in defence of it, in whom you may see many things worth the reading and notice.

[Sidenote 1: _Apologia pro Galilaeo._]

To it I answer, that this position in Philosophy, doth not bring any inconvenience to the rest, since tis not _Aristotle_, but truth that should be the rule of our opinions, and if they be not both found together, wee may say to him, as hee said to his Master _Plato_,

+amphoin gar ontoin philoin, hosion protiman ten aletheian+.[1]

"Though _Plato_ were his friend, yet hee would rather adhere to
truth than him."

[Sidenote 1: _Ethic. l. 1. c. 6._]

I must needs grant, that wee are all much beholden to the industry of the ancient Philosophers, and more especially to _Aristotle_, for the greater part of our learning, but yet tis not ingratitude to speake against him, when hee opposeth truth; for then many of the Fathers would be very guilty, especially _Iustin_, who hath writ a Treatise purposely against him.

But suppose this opinion were false, yet 'tis not against the faith, and so it may serve for the better confirmation of that which is true; the sparkes of errour, being forc'd out by opposition, as the sparkes of fire, by the striking of the flint and steele. But suppose too that it were hereticall, and against the faith, yet may it be admitted with the same priviledge as _Aristotle_, from whom many more dangerous opinions have proceeded: as that the world is eternall, that God cannot have while to looke after these inferiour things, that after death there is no reward or punishment, and such like blasphemies, which strike directly at the fundamentalls of our Religion.

So that it is justly to be wondred why some should be so superstitious in these daies, as to sticke closer unto him, than unto Scripture, as if his Philosophy were the onely foundation of all divine truths.

Upon these grounds both St. _Uincentius_and _Senafinus_ _de firmo_ (as I have seene them quoted) thinke that _Aristotle_ was the viol of Gods wrath, which was powred out upon the waters of Wisedome by the third Angel;[1] But for my part, I thinke the world is much beholden to _Aristotle_ for all its sciences. But yet twere a shame for these later ages to rest our selves meerely upon the labours of our Fore-fathers, as if they had informed us of all things to be knowne, and when wee are set upon their shoulders, not to see further then they themselves did. 'Twere a superstitious, a lazie opinion to thinke _Aristotles_ workes the bounds and limits of all humane invention, beyond which there could be no possibility of reaching. Certainly there are yet many things left to discovery, and it cannot be any inconvenience for us, to maintaine a new truth, or rectifie an ancient errour.

[Sidenote 1: Rev. 16. 4.]

But the position (say some) is directly against Scripture, for

1. _Moses_ tells us but of one world, and his History of the creation had beene very imperfect if God had made another.

2. Saint _John_ speaking of Gods workes, saies he made the world, in the singular number, and therefore there is but one:[1] 'tis the argument of _Aquinas_, and he thinks that none will oppose it, but such who with _Democritus_ esteeme some blinde chance, and not any wise providence to be the framer of all things.

[Sidenote 1: Part 1. Q. 47. Art. 3.]

3. The opinion of more worlds has in ancient time beene accounted a heresie, and _Baronius_ affirmes that for this very reason, _Virgilius_ was cast out of his Bishopricke, and excommunicated from the Church.[1]

[Sidenote 1: _Annal. Eccl. A.D. 748._]

4. A fourth argument there is urged by _Aquinas_, if there be more worlds than one, then they must either be of the same, or of a diverse nature, but they are not of the same kinde,[1] for this were needlesse, and would argue an improvidence, since one would have no more perfection than the other; not of divers kinds, for then one of them could not be called the world or universe, since it did not containe universall perfection, I have cited this argument, because it is so much stood upon by _Iulius Caesar la Galla_,[2] one that has purposely writ a Treatise against this opinion which I now deliver, but the Dilemma is so blunt, that it cannot cut on either side, and the consequences so weake, that I dare trust them without an answer; And (by the way) you may see this Author in that place, where he endeavours to prove a necessity of one world, doth leave the chiefe matter in hand, and take much needlesse paines to dispute against _Democritus_, who thought that the world was made by the casuall concourse of _atoms_ in a great _vacuum_. It should seeme, that either his cause, or his skill was weake, or else he would have ventured upon a stronger adversary. These arguments which I have set downe, are the chiefest which I have met with against this subject, and yet the best of these hath not force enough to endanger the truth that I have delivered.

[Sidenote 1: _Ibid._]

[Sidenote 2: _De Phaenom. in orbe lunae._]

Unto the two first it may be answered, that the negative authority of Scripture is not prevalent in those things which are not the fundamentalls of Religion.

But you'le reply, though it doe not necessarily conclude, yet 'tis probable if there had beene another world, wee should have had some notice of it in Scripture.

I answer, 'tis as probable that the Scripture should have informed us of the Planets they being very remarkable parts of the Creation, and yet neither _Moses_ nor _Job_, nor the _Psalmes_ (the places most frequent in Astronomicall observations) mention any of them but the Sunne and Moone, and moreover, you must know, that 'tis besides the scope of the Holy Ghost either in the new Testament or in the old, to reveale any thing unto us concerning the secrets of Philosophy; 'tis not his intent in the new Testament, since we cannot conceive how it might any way belong either to the Historicall exegeticall or propheticall parts of it: nor is it his intent in the old Testament, as is well observed by our Countrey-man Master WRIGHT.[1]

_Non Mosis aut Prophetarum institutum fuisse videtur Mathematicas
aliquas aut Physicas subtilitates promulgare, sed ad vulgi captum
& loquendi morem quemadmodum nutrices infantulis solent sese
accommodare._

"'Tis not the endeavour of _Moses_ or the Prophets to discover any
Mathematicall or Philosophicall subtilties, but rather to accomodate
themselves to vulgar capacities, and ordinary speech, as nurses are
wont to use their infants."

True indeede, _Moses_ is there to handle the history of the Creation, but 'tis observed that he does not any where meddle with such matters as were very hard to be apprehended, for being to informe the common people as well as others, he does it after a vulgar way, as it is commonly noted, declaring the originall chiefely of those things which were obvious to the sense, and being silent of other things, which then could not well be apprehended. And therefore _Aquinas_ observes,[2] that _Moses_ writes nothing of the aire, because that being invisible, the people knew not whether there were any such body or no. And for this very reason Saint _Austin_ also thinkes that there is nothing exprest concerning the creation of Angels which notwithstanding are as remarkable parts of the creatures, and as fit to be knowne as another world. And therefore the Holy Ghost too uses such vulgar expressions which set things forth rather as they appeare, then as they are,[3] as when he calls the Moone one of the greater lights #hame'orot hagdolim# whereas 'tis the least, but one that wee can see in the whole heavens. So afterwards speaking of the great raine which drowned the world,[4] he saies, the windowes of heaven were opened, because it seemed to come with that violence, as if it were, poured out from windows in the Firmament.[5] So that the phrases which the Holy Ghost uses concerning these things are not to be understood in a literall sense; but rather as vulgar expressions, and this rule is set downe by Saint _Austin_, where speaking concerning that in the Psalme, _who stretched the earth upon the waters_,[6] hee notes, that when the words of Scripture shall seeme to contradict common sense or experience, there are they to be understood in a qualified sense, and not according to the letter. And 'tis observed that for want of this rule, some of the ancients have fastened strange absurdities upon the words of the Scripture. So Saint _Ambrose_ esteemed it a heresie, to thinke, that the Sunne and starres were not very hot, as being against the words of Scripture,[7] _Psalm._ 19. 6. where the _Psalmist_ sayes that there is nothing that is hid from the heate of the Sunne. So others there are that would prove the heavens not to be round, out of that place, _Psal._ 104. 2. _Hee stretcheth out the heavens like a curtaine._[8] So _Procopius_ also was of opinion, that the earth was founded upon the waters, nay, he made it part of his faith, proving it out of _Psal._ 24. 2. _Hee hath founded the earth upon the seas, and established it upon the flouds._ These and such like absurdities have followed, when men looke for the grounds of Philosophie in the words of Scripture. So that from what hath beene said, I may conclude that the silence of Scripture concerning any other world is not sufficient argument to prove that there is none. Thus for the two first arguments.

[Sidenote 1: _In Epist. ad Gilbert._]

[Sidenote 2: Part 1. Q. 68. Art. 3.]

[Sidenote 3: Gen. 1. 16]

[Sidenote 4: Gen. 11.]

[Sidenote 5: Sr. _W. Rawly_ c. 7. Sec.. 6.]

[Sidenote 6: l. 2. in Gen. / Psal. 136. 6.]

[Sidenote 7: Wisd. 2. 4. 17. 5. / Ecclus. 43. 3. 4.]

[Sidenote 8: _Com. in c. 1. Gen._]

Unto the third, I may answer, that this very example is quoted by others, to shew the ignorance of those primative times, who did sometimes condemne what they did not understand, and have often censur'd the lawfull & undoubted parts of Mathematiques for hereticall, because they themselves could not perceive a reason of it, and therefore their practise in this particular, is no sufficient testimony against us.

But lastly I answer to all the above named objections, that the terme World, may be taken in a double sense, more generally for the whole Universe, as it implies in it the elementary and aethereall bodies, the starres and the earth. Secondly, more particularly for an inferiour World consisting of elements. Now the maine drift of all these arguments, is to confute a plurality of worlds in the first sense, and if there were any such, it might, perhaps, seeme strange, that _Moses_, or St. _John_ should either not know, or not mention its creation. And _Virgilius_ was condemned for this opinion, because he held, _quod sit alius mundus sub terra, aliusque Sol & Luna_, (as _Baronius_) that within our globe of earth, there was another world, another Sunne and Moone, and so he might seeme to exclude this from the number of the other creatures.

But now there is no such danger in this opinion, which is here delivered, since this world said to be in the Moone, whose creation is particularly exprest.

So that in the first sense I yeeld, that there is but one world, which is all that the arguments do prove, but understand it in the second sense, and so I affirme there may be more nor doe any of the above named objections prove the cotrary.

Neither can this opinion derogate from the divine Wisdome (as _Aquinas_ thinkes) but rather advance it, shewing a _compendium_ of providence, that could make the same body a world, and a Moone; a world for habitation, and a Moone for the use of others, and the ornament of the whole frame of Nature. For as the members of the body serve not onely for the preservation of themselves, but for the use and conveniency of the whole, as the hand protects the head as well as saves it selfe,[1] so is it in the parts of the Universe, where each one may serve, as well for the conservation of that which is within it, as the helpe of others without it.

[Sidenote 1: _Cusanus de doct. ignor. l. 2. c. 12._]

I have now in some measure, shewed that a plurality of worlds does not contradict any principle of reason or place of Scripture, and so cleared the first part of that supposition which is applied in the opinion.

It may next be enquired; whether 'tis possible there may be a globe of elements in that which we call the aethereall parts of the Universe; for if this (as it is according to the common opinion) be priviledged from any change or corruption, it will be in vaine then to imagine any element there, and if we will have another world, we must then seeke out some other place for its situation. The third Proposition therefore shall be this.

Proposition 3.

_That the heavens doe not consist of any such pure matter which can
priviledge them from the like change and corruption, as these
inferiour bodies are liable unto._

It hath beene often questioned amongst the ancient Fathers and Philosophers, what kind of matter that should be, of which the heavens are framed, whether or no of any fifth substance distinct from the foure elements, as _Aristotle_[1] holds, and with him some of the late Schoolemen, whose subtill braines could not be content to attribute to those vast glorious bodies, but common materialls, and therefore they themselves had rather take paines to preferre them to some extraordinary nature, whereas notwithstanding, all the arguments they could invent, were not able to convince a necessity of any such matter, as is confest by their owne[2]* side. It were much to be desired, thst these men had not in other cases, as well as this, multiplied things without necessity, and as if there had not beene enough to be knowne in the secrets of nature, have spun out new subjects from their owne braines to finde more worke for future ages, I shall not mention their arguments, since 'tis already confest, that they are none of them of any necessary consequence, and besides, you may see them set downe in any of the bookes _de Coelo._

[Sidenote 1: _De Coelo., l. 1. cap. 2._]

[Sidenote 2*: _Colleg. Cannimb. De Coelo. l. 1. c. 2. q. 6. art. 3._]

But is it the generall consent of the Fathers, and the opinion of _Lombard_, that the heavens consist of the same matter with these sublunary bodies. St. _Ambrose_ is confident of it, that hee esteemes the contrary a heresie.[1] True indeed, they differ much among themselves, some thinking them to be made of fire, others of water, but herein they generally agree, that they are all framed of some element or other. For a better confirmation of this, you may see _Ludovicus Molina_, _Euseb. Nirembergius_, with divers others.[2] The venerable _Bede_ thought the Planets to consist of all the foure elements, and 'tis likely that the other parts are of an aereous substance,[3] as will be shewed afterward; however, I cannot now stand to recite the arguments for either, I have onely urged these Authorities to countervaile _Aristotle_, and the Schoolemen, and the better to make way for a proof of their corruptibility.

[Sidenote 1: _In Hexam. lib. 4._]

[Sidenote 2: _In opere 6. dierum. disput. 5._]

[Sidenote 3: _In lib. de Mundi constit._]

The next thing then to be enquired after, is, whether they be of a corruptible nature, [1]not whether they can be destroyed by God, for this Scripture puts out of doubt.

[Sidenote 1: 2 Pet. 3. 12.]

Nor whether or no in a long time they would weare away and grow worse, for from any such feare they have beene lately priviledged.[1] But whether they are capable of such changes and vicissitudes, as this inferiour world is liable unto.

[Sidenote 1: By Doctor _Hackwell_ _Apol._]

The two chiefe opinions concerning this, have both erred in some extremity, the one side going so farre from the other, that they have both gone beyond the right, whilest _Aristotle_ hath opposed the truth, as well as the Stoicks.

Some of the Ancients have thought, that the heavenly bodies have stood in need of nourishment from the elements, by which they were continually fed, and so had divers alterations by reason of their food, this is fathered on _Heraclitus_,[1] followed by that great Naturalist _Pliny_,[2] and in generall attributed to all the Stoicks. You may see _Seneca_ expressely to this purpose in these words,

_Ex illa alimenta omnibus animalibus, omnibus satis, omnibus stellis
dividuntur, hinc profertur quo sustineantur tot Sydera tam exercitata,
tam avida, per diem, noctemque, ut in opere, ita in pastu._[3]

Speaking of the earth, he saies, from thence it is, that nourishment is divided to all the living creatures, the Plants and the Starres, hence were sustained so many constellations, so laborious, so greedy both day and night, as well in their feeding as working. Thus also _Lucan_ sings,

_Necnon Oceano pasci Phoebumque polumque credimus._

[Sidenote 1: _Plutarch. de plac. philos. l. 2. c. 17._]

[Sidenote 2: _Nat. Hist. l. 2. c. 9._]

[Sidenote 3: _Nat. Quaest. lib. 2. cap. 5._]

Unto these _Ptolome_[1] also that learned Egyptian seemed to agree, when he affirmes that the body of the Moone is moister, and cooler than any of the other Planets, by reason of the earthly vapours that are exhaled unto it. You see these ancients thought the Heavens to be so farre from this imagined incorruptibility, that rather like the weakest bodies they stood in need of some continuall nourishment without which they could not subsist.

[Sidenote 1: _I{o} Apost._]

But _Aristotle_ and his followers were so farre from this,[1] that they thought those glorious bodies could not containe within them any such principles, as might make them lyable to the least change or corruption, and their chiefe reason was, because we could not in so long a space discerne any alteration amongst them; but unto this I answer.

[Sidenote 1: _De coelo. l. 1. cap. 3._]

1. Supposing we could not, yet would it not hence follow[1] that there were none, as hee himselfe in effect doth confesse in another place; for speaking concerning our knowledge of the Heavens, hee sayes 'tis very imperfect and difficult, by reason of the vaste distance of those bodies from us, and because the changes which may happen unto it, are not either bigge enough or frequent enough to fall within the apprehension and observation of our senses; no wonder then if hee himselfe bee deceived in his assertions concerning these particulars.

[Sidenote 1: _De Coelo. l. 2. cap. 3._]

2. Though we could not by our senses see such alterations, yet our reason might perhaps sufficiently convince us of them. Nor can we well conceive how the Sunne should reflect against the Moone, and yet not produce some alteration of heate. _Diogenes_ the Philosopher was hence perswaded that those scorching heates had burnt the Moone into the forme of a Pumice-stone.

3. I answer that there have been some alterations observed there; witnesse those comets which have beene seene above the Moone. So that though _Aristotles_ consequence were sufficient, when hee proved that the heavens were not corruptible, because there have not any changes being observed in it, yet this by the same reason must bee as prevalent, that the Heavens are corruptible, because there have beene so many alterations observed there; but of these together with a farther confirmation of this proposition, I shall have occasion to speake afterwards; In the meane space, I will referre the Reader to that worke of _Scheiner_ a late Jesuit which hee titles his _Rosa Vrsina_,[1] where hee may see this point concerning the corruptibility of the Heavens largely handled and sufficiently confirmed.

[Sidenote 1: _lib. 4. p. 2. cy. 24, 35._]

There are some other things, on which I might here take an occasion to enlarge my selfe, but because they are directly handled by many others, and doe not immediately belong to the chiefe matter in hand, I shall therefore referre the Reader to their authors, and omit any large proofe of them my selfe, as defining all possible brevity.

1. The first is this: That there are no solid Orbes. If there be a habitable World in the Moone (which I now affirme) it must follow, that her Orbe is not solid, as _Aristotle_ supposed; and if not her, why any of the other? I rather thinke that they are all of a fluid (perhaps aereous) substance. Saint _Ambrose_, and Saint _Basil_[1] did endeavour to prove this out of that place in _Isay_,[2] where they are compared to smoake, as they are both quoted by _Rhodiginus_, _Eusebius_, _Nierembergius_[3] doth likewise from that place confute the solidity and incorruptibility of the Heavens, and cites for the same interpretation the authority of _Eustachius_ of _Antioch_; and Saint _Austin_,[4] I am sure seemes to assent unto this opinion, though he does often in his other workes contradict it. The testimony of other Fathers to this purpose you may see in _Sixtus Senensis. l. 5. Biblioth. annot. 14._ but for your better satisfaction herein, I shall referre you to the above named _Scheiner_ in his _Rosa Ursina_,[5] in whom you may see both authorities and reason, and very largely and distinctly set downe for this opinion, for the better confirmation of which hee adjoynes also some authenticall Epistles of _Fredericus Caesius Lynceus_ a Noble Prince written to _Bellarmine_, containing divers reasons to the same purpose, you may also see the same truth set downe by _Johannes Pena_ in his preface to _Euclids Opticks_, and _Christoph. Rothmannus_, both who thought the Firmament to bee onely aire: and though the noble _Tycho_[6] doe dispute against them, yet he himselfe holds,

_Quod propius ad veritatis penetralia accedit haec opinio, quam
Aristotelica vulgariter approbata, quae coelum pluribus realibus atque
imperviis orbibus citra rem replevit._

"That this opinion comes neerer to the truth than that common one
of _Aristotle_ which hath to no purpose filled the heavens with such
reall and impervious Orbes."

[Sidenote 1: _Isa. 51. 6._]

[Sidenote 2: _Ant. lect. l. 1. c. 4._]

[Sidenote 3: _Hist. nat. l. 2. c. 11. 13._]

[Sidenote 4: _In lib. sup. Gen. ad lit._]

[Sidenote 5: _lib. 4. p. 11, 2. c. 7. 26, 30._]

[Sidenote 6: _De stella. 15. 72. l. 6. c. 9._]